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Abstract
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) involved the accession of ten Central
and East European Countries (CEECs). A crucial element of the enlargement was the
economic liberalization of the CEECs, for which Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) played
an important role. While it is known that FDI increased in the CEECs after accession,
relatively little is known about the nature of this investment and about its location de-
terminants. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the location of FDI projects across
the main 25 countries and 260 NUTS2 regions of the European Union. The study uses
annual panel data from the European Investment Monitor for 1997 to 2010. This gives
project-level information on over 35,000 cross-border investments, covering ‘greenfield’
projects that add to capacity, arising from new investment or expansions.
The thesis has three main contributions. First, the spatial distribution of FDI ac-
tivity is examined at the country and region level. It reveals the nature and changing
pattern of FDI location both before and after the fifth enlargement. Second, the motives
for FDI location are investigated at the country-level. Using a conditional logit model
it shows that FDI in the ‘old’ EU is predominantly ‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking for
higher skills, whereas in the ‘new’ EU it is market-seeking and ‘general-asset’ resource-
seeking for inexpensive unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Further, expansions are not
simply about efficiency-seeking, i.e. adding scale for the purpose of achieving greater
economies. Third, the role of border effects is examined to see if FDI agglomerates in
the CEECs close to the former West-East border. It recognises that the regions along-
side the West-East border tend to be ‘winners’ of EU enlargement, receiving about 82%
more FDI projects more than non-border regions. This suggests that national borders
continue to shape the spatial distribution of economic activity.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) was completed in two stages in 2004
and 2007, and it involved the accession of ten new members from Central and Eastern
Europe and two small Mediterranean countries. It was a significant step in progress
towards European economic and political integration, a culmination of a long accession
process and a symbolic reunification of Europe that has long been split into two parts
by the Iron Wall. Twelve ‘new’ accession countries joined the fifteen ‘old’ EU Member
States (EU-15), creating the world’s largest Single Market. With the completion of the
fifth enlargement in 2007, 105 million new citizens were added to the existing EU’s
internal market of 380 million people. Although the fifth enlargement added relatively
little in the GDP terms (extra 5% to the EU-15 GNP and 10% in purchasing power parity
terms; Landaburu, 2007), it strengthened the voice of the EU on the geopolitical scene
and greatly augmented the size of the Single Market.
The fifth enlargement was exceptional in terms of its scale, and its nature made
it an unprecedented event in the history of the EU. The lengthy and complex accession
process resulted in the admission of twelve ‘new’ Member States, and never previously
had the EU negotiated accession with twelve candidate countries simultaneously. Up
until the fifth enlargement, the maximum number of countries to join the EU in a single
wave of enlargement was three. The added challenge of the fifth enlargement was the
heterogeneity of the candidate countries in terms of their population and economic size,
culture, history and economic development. The ten accession countries of Central and
Eastern Europe included the 2004 entrants of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the 2007 entrants Bulgaria and
Romania. In addition Cyprus and Malta also joined as part of the fifth enlargement.
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that acceded to the EU as part of
the fifth enlargement were the former communist and transition economies that even
prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union faced significant challenges to integration
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with the market economies of Europe. The economic and political background of the
CEECs made the nature of the fifth enlargement different to all previous ones.
Following the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the commu-
nist regime in CEECs in the late 1980s, these countries soon expressed their intention
to join the EU with the signing of the Europe Agreements and submitting of formal ap-
plications for membership in the early to mid-1990s. However, the legacy of the socio-
economic systems of CEECs made the process of their rapid integration into the EU
difficult. The collapse of communism initiated the process of transition that involved
the restructuring of their economies from a centrally-planned to a market economy. It
also revealed the urgency of a complex reform of an institutional system to support
the candidate countries in achieving stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law and human rights protection, emphasising the complexity of the pre-
accession. Although for most CEECs the pre-accession process took around a decade
to complete, the process of reform has had wide-scale implications for the economic
performance of the CEECs.
The pre-accession reforms of political, institutional and economic systems of
CEECs coincided with a growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to these
countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the inflows of FDI to CEECs were negligible
but have grown fast in absolute and relative terms thereafter. The economic literature
attributes the growth of inward FDI in the CEECs to structural reforms and the prospect
of EU accession (e.g. Bevan et al., 2004; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Landaburu, 2007). Be-
van et al. (2004) recognise that institutional quality in general enhances FDI inflows,
but admit that complementarities as well as potential conflicts exist between policy re-
form and the attraction of FDI. In another paper, Bevan and Estrin (2004) find that the
prospect of the EU membership is an important determinant of inward FDI in CEECs,
recognising that the process of EU accession negotiations is “an important political and
economic signal” (p. 776). Despite this recognition of a link between EU membership
and the size of FDI inflows, in fact relatively little is known about the impact of the fifth
enlargement on inward FDI and its location within the enlarged EU.
While FDI is not a new phenomenon, the dramatic rise in foreign investment
activity has only been recorded since the beginning of the 1980s. Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI) is defined as the cross-border transfer of capital through which a firm
significantly expands its production capacities outside its national borders. Alongside
other options such as exporting, licensing and franchising, FDI is one of the strategies
that permits a firm to enter a foreign market. Through the process of FDI a multina-
tional enterprise (MNE) is created - an entity that owns production facilities in more
than one country. The OECD (2009) recognises that “FDI is a key driver of international
economic integration (. . . ) and can provide financial stability, promote economic de-
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velopment and enhance the well being of societies” (p. 3), provided the right policy
framework is in place. As illustrated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, since the beginning of 1980s
the global size of the FDI stock has increased substantially both in absolute terms and
relative to the world GDP, while the growth rates of FDI activity have tended to exceed
that of nominal GDP.
Table 1.1: Selected Indicators of FDI and GDP: Current Prices
Item Value at current prices (billions of US dollars)1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009
FDI inflows 54 56 208 343 1415 997 1819 1222
FDI outflows 51 62 242 362 1241 904 1999 1171
FDI inward stock
(share of GDP)
698 990 2081 3426 7511 11739 15680 18428
5.81 7.46 9.22 11.26 22.88 25.27 25.28 31.30
FDI outward stock
(share of GDP)
548 902 2093 3769 8008 12564 16519 19589
4.58 6.84 9.30 12.43 24.49 27.17 26.79 33.49
GDP 12043 13286 22604 30455 32858 46506 62095 58944
(source: UNCTAD, 2010, http://unctadstat.unctad.org).
Table 1.2: Selected Indicators of FDI and GDP: Annual Growth Rates
Item Annual growth rate (percent)1991 - 1995 1996 - 2000 2001 - 2005 2008 2009
FDI inflows 22.5 40.0 5.2 -15.7 -37.1
FDI outflows 16.8 36.1 9.2 -14.9 -42.9
FDI inward stock 9.3 18.7 13.3 -13.9 14.5
FDI outward stock 11.9 18.4 14.6 -16.1 17.1
GDP 5.9 1.3 10.0 10.3 -9.5
(source: UNCTAD, 2010; http://unctadstat.unctad.org).
Swiftly rising levels of FDI recorded since the beginning of the 1980s are a sign of
accelerating globalisation. Although rising since the early 1980s, the extremely strong
growth of world FDI flows occurred in the 1990s (Jones and Wren, 2006). During the last
decade of the 20th century the annual growth rate of global FDI inflows equalled 22.5%
between 1991-1995 and 40.0% between 1996-2000, considerably exceeding the growth
of nominal GDP. The growth of FDI inflows fell to 5.2% over period 2001-2005. Focusing
on inward FDI before 2010, at its peak in 2007 the stock of inward FDI reached 18,136
billion US dollars (measured at current prices), which compares to the stock of inward
FDI equal to 2,081 billion US dollars in 1990, and represents more than an eightfold
increase. Expressed in relative terms, the inward FDI stock amounted to 9.2% of GDP
in 1990 but the corresponding figure for 2007 is a substantial 32.0%.
Driven by technological change, global competition and the liberalisation of
markets, the OECD (2009) recognises that FDI plays an important role in the process
of global economic integration because it creates direct, stable and long-lasting links
between economies. By the very nature of its motivation, FDI promotes the creation of
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a long-term relationship between investing and recipient economies given that the aim
of an investor is to obtain a lasting interest in a direct investment enterprise resident in
another country (OECD, 2009). As economies become more interlinked, FDI offers the
prospect of improved growth opportunities for host countries (Ruggiero, 1996). Impor-
tantly, FDI encourages the transfer of technology and know-how between economies,
promotes international trade through access to markets overseas and can be a catalyst
for economic growth and development (OECD, 2009). An important vehicle for local
enterprise development, FDI can contribute to improving the competitive position of
both the host (receiving) and the home (investing) economy.
The size of FDI inflows is a useful indicator of the attractiveness of economies.
The growth of inward investment implies additional capital injected into the host econ-
omy and, thus, is likely to have a positive impact on its economic performance. At
the European level, in the absence of a common fiscal policy, the attraction of foreign
investment to the EU’s less-developed nations and regions is a mechanism to achieve
economic and social convergence, alongside the formal instruments of the EU regional
policy, such as the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. Important for reducing in-
come gap between EU’s poorest and wealthiest nations and regions is the role of for-
eign investment in job creation and its contribution to productivity growth.1 In its 2010
Communication ‘Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy’, the
European Commission (2010) maintains that “overall benefits of inward FDI into the
EU are well-established” (p. 3), especially in respect to its role in creating jobs, optimis-
ing resource allocation, transferring technology and skills, increasing competition and
promoting trade.
Importantly, when considered as a single host economy, the EU remains the
largest global investor and recipient of foreign investment, and the pattern of inward
FDI flows to the EU resembles the global pattern in FDI. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1
that compares the size of global inward FDI flow to that of the EU over period 1990-
2010.2 The global FDI inflows start to grow in the early 1990s but for the EU the growth
in FDI begins in the mid-1990s. The significant growth rates in inward FDI flows are
recorded in the second half of the 1990s, especially over period 1997-2000. Between
1997 and 2007, there is more than a threefold increase in inward FDI flows worldwide
1Although academic literature does not offer a definite agreement that foreign investment increases
productivity growth, Bijsterbosch and Kolasa (2010) find evidence suggesting that FDI inflows account for
productivity growth in CEECs. Javorcik (2004) identifies the role of FDI in boosting productivity among
suppliers in upstream sectors but not in the industry in which foreign affiliates operate. Another study of
Javorcik (2015) confirms that “jobs created by FDI are good jobs, both from the worker’s and the country’s
perspective” (p. 14) because of the wage premium and more training that the foreign employers offer
(worker perspective) and promoting a growth in aggregate productivity (country perspective).
2One must be mindful of the evolving composition of the geographic coverage for the EU series: EU-15
until end of 2003, EU-25 from 2004 to 2006, EU-27 as from 2007.
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and nearly a sixfold increase in the size of aggregate inward FDI activity in the EU.
Figure 1.1: European Union and Global Inward FDI Flows (millions of US dollars, 1990-
2010)
(source: author’s own elaboration of the OECD Stats,
http://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-flows.htm)
Note: EU series: EU-15 until end of 2003, EU-25 from 2004 to 2006, EU-27 from 2007.
Following this strong growth of inward FDI flows both globally and in the EU,
the peak of FDI activity occurs in 2000. The size of global FDI inflows amount to 1,500
billion US dollars; the EU FDI equals to 800 billion US dollars meaning that EU-15
inward FDI flows account for more than 50% of global inflows. Thereafter, a fall in
inward FDI flows is observed, and is most pronounced in the year 2001. After 2001, this
decline in inward FDI continues albeit at a slower rate. The positive growth in inward
FDI flows globally is restored in 2003, after a reaching a low point of FDI inflows of less
than 600 billion US dollars. In the EU, the growth does not materialise until 2004, which
is when the first wave of the fifth EU enlargement occurs and ten new Member States
join the EU. Interestingly, inward FDI flows to the EU more than double between 2004
and 2005 representing the largest percentage increase since 1990 over a similar time
frame. Although this strong growth can partially be attributed to the greater number
of countries in the EU, there is a possibility that the fifth enlargement itself makes a
positive contribution to increasing FDI activity in that period.
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The growth of FDI inflows in the EU continues until 2007 although it is weaker
between 2005 and 2006, and relatively stronger again between 2006 and 2007, when
the other two CEECs join the EU. The size of inward FDI flow to the EU increases
by a factor of four between 2004 and 2007, rising from 213 billion US dollars in 2004
to 856 billion US dollars in 2007. Globally FDI inflows increase nearly threefold in
the same period. Following the peak of inward investment activity in 2007, a global
economic crisis hits FDI. Between 2007 and 2009, inward investment to the EU shrinks
by more than 50%; similarly, but to a lesser degree in percentage terms, inward FDI
flows decrease globally. In absolute terms, the decline in global FDI inflows over period
2007-2009 is substantial and amounts to a loss of an equivalent of 800 billion US dollars
worth of foreign investment. Finally, inward investment flows start to grow again after
2009. Although the growth of inward FDI flows globally is strong, it is more modest
at the European level. In 2010, with its aggregate inward investment flow equal to 380
billion US dollars the EU accounts for 26% of global inward FDI flows.
Beside its role as a source of capital, inward investment is considered as a cata-
lyst for economic growth through the transfer of new technologies and know-how that
it entails. Foreign firms bring new technologies, new knowledge, as well as organi-
sational and managerial skills, that local domestic firms can embrace to become more
competitive. An improvement in productive efficiency due to technology diffusion and
productivity spillovers from foreign firms means that domestic firms are more able to
compete internationally and become better integrated in global markets. Although crit-
ics emphasise a risk of job destruction associated with increasing competition, the pres-
ence of FDI, especially ‘greenfield’ investment, creates new jobs in the host economy
and stimulates employment growth. Importantly, an implication of improving pro-
ductive efficiency of firms is the increasing efficiency with which the scarce resource
are used. A report prepared for the European Commission by Copenhagen Economics
(2006) confirms that many European regions benefited from attracting inward FDI and
recommends that well-designed regional FDI policies aimed to attract FDI have posi-
tive implications on the European economy in terms of enhanced economic growth, the
promotion of regional convergence and the catching-up by the least developed regions.
Seeing that inward FDI brings benefits to host economies means that there are impor-
tant reasons to gain a better understanding of FDI, most of all recognise these factors
and location characteristics that attract inward investment.
1.1 The Aim of the Thesis
Although the EU accounts for a sizeable proportion of global inward FDI, a significant
gap still exists in our knowledge and understanding of the determinants that shape the
6
economic geography of FDI activity in the EU, especially in the period following the
accession of twelve ‘new’ EU Member States in the fifth enlargement. The aim of this
thesis is to add to the scarce cross-country evidence on FDI location decisions between
the ‘old’ EU-15 Member States and the ten CEECs (‘new’ EU-10), and to analyse the spa-
tial distribution of FDI in the EU-25 before and after the fifth enlargement. Although
the fifth enlargement represents a significant step towards political and economic in-
tegration in Europe, the EU-25 is not a homogenous space. I recognise that significant
differences exist between and within countries and regions despite efforts that are made
to strengthen the economic and social cohesion within the EU. Importantly, the legacies
of the former socialist system in CEECs imply that the characteristics of the ‘new’ and
‘old’ EU Members differ sharply, so it is an ideal opportunity to study the impact of
economic integration on FDI location. A significant heterogeneity between ‘old’ and
‘new’ EU Member States that exists on a number of dimensions may suggest that the
motives for investment differ between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU. In as much as the national
borders continue to shape the distribution of economic activity, the achievement of the
full economic convergence within the EU-25 is likely to be delayed.
In consideration of the issues raised, I conduct a three-part analysis of the impact
of the European economic integration on FDI location in the EU-25, focusing on the
fifth enlargement. The thesis has three main aims and these define its contributions as
follows:
AIM I To examine the economic geography of FDI location at the country and region
level in the EU-25, both before and after the fifth enlargement.
AIM II To analyse empirically the motives for FDI location choice in the ‘old’ EU-15
and ‘new’ EU-10 countries.
AIM III To estimate the impact of the fifth enlargement on the spatial distribution of
FDI activity across the EU-25 regions, with a special focus on the role of borders
on FDI location in CEECs in the post-accession period.
Essentially, the first of these presents descriptive statistics of FDI project data in an at-
tempt to reveal the nature and the changing pattern of FDI location in the EU-25 before
and after the fifth enlargement. The second aim seeks to address the motives for invest-
ment and in particular whether these are mainly market-, resource- or efficiency-based,
focusing on how the motives differ between the incumbent EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10
countries. Finally, the third aim analyses the role of borders in shaping the country
and regional distribution of inward FDI in CEECs in the post-accession period to ver-
ify if all the countries and regions of the ‘new’ Europe have benefited equally from the
fifth enlargement. The overall purpose of the thesis is to offer a comprehensive cross-
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country evidence on the economic geography of FDI in the EU-25 covering the period
of the fifth enlargement. In doing this, I offer an insight into how ‘different’ is Eastern
Europe from Western Europe, reminiscent of Disdier and Mayer (2004), but also how
heterogenous the individual EU Member States are.
To the best of my knowledge, these three main contributions of this thesis fill
a substantial gap in the academic literature on foreign investment location. Although
there exists a considerable amount of research on the determinants of inward invest-
ment location, it is often limited to analysing the location of FDI activity in a single
country or in a small group of countries. Despite improvements in computational
power and project-level data availability, multi-country studies of FDI location choice
conducted at a more disaggregated level such as regions remain rare. The notable ex-
ception to this is Alegria (2006), who analyses the location decisions of European multi-
national firms across European countries and regions. The sample considered by Ale-
gria (2006) includes 4,803 foreign investment projects established in 246 NUTS2 regions
belonging to the ‘old’ EU-15 and a full set of ten accession countries that joined the EU
in the first wave of the fifth enlargement in 2004.3 Importantly, the fifth enlargement
created the world’s largest internal market but little is known about the determinants
for FDI location choice in the enlarged EU-25, especially in the post-accession period. In
consideration of the conceivable role of the fifth enlargement in altering the economic
geography of FDI location in the enlarged EU, the work of Alegria (2006) fails to ac-
count for this possibility seeing that it considers a relatively short time of eight years,
from 1998 to 2005. Essentially, the time frame from 1998 to 2005 is not sufficient to re-
veal the changing nature and pattern of FDI location in the EU-25 caused by the fifth
enlargement.
Although the objective of the integration process in Europe is to achieve greater
economic and social cohesion, I recognise that a significant heterogeneity exists be-
tween countries of the enlarged EU-25 and within individual countries, especially con-
sidering the economic history of CEECs. In consequence, the national borders and the
‘West-East divide’ can be factors shaping the spatial distribution of FDI in the EU-25.
Admittedly, there exist earlier academic studies that address the question of the role of
borders and ‘West-East divide’ in affecting the location of inward investment activity in
Europe but these fail to take account of the most recent post-enlargement period. To be
precise, analysing data on 1,843 investments of French multinational firms over period
1980-99 Disdier and Mayer (2004) contrast the structure and determinants of location
choices between Eastern (six CEECs) and Western (thirteen ‘old’ EU Member States).
3Rather than consider the location of inward investment in Cyprus and Malta, I study the location of
FDI in Bulgaria and Romania, two CEECs that joined the EU during the second wave of fifth enlargement
in 2007. Similarly to Alegria (2006), number of countries in my choice set of possible locations equals 25.
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In the context of increasing attractiveness of CEECs as a destination for inward invest-
ment, to fully capture the dichotomy that exists between ‘old’ incumbent EU-15 and
‘new’ accession CEECs it is necessary to examine the location choices in the enlarged
EU, both before and after the accession. The role of national borders is the focus of
Basile et al. (2009), who analyse the location choices of 5,102 affiliates of multinational
firms between 1991 and 1999 over a set of 47 NUTS1 regions in five large economies of
the ‘old’ EU-15 (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). Importantly,
among the countries considered by Basile et al. (2009) none is classed as a ‘new’ EU
Member State, despite the increasing FDI flows to these countries.
To better understand the impact of the fifth enlargement on economic geogra-
phy of FDI in the EU, I investigate the location of FDI projects for a set of twenty-five
EU Member States (EU-25) over time period 1997-2010; of these fifteen are the ‘old’
EU Members (EU-15) and ten are ‘new’ EU Members from Central and Eastern Europe
(EU-10). The three analyses are conducted at country (EU-25) and regional level (260
NUTS2 regions). A detailed analysis of descriptive data on inward FDI to study the
economic geography of FDI location in the EU-25 before and after the fifth enlarge-
ment (AIM I) is conducted at both country and region level. This includes the number
of investment projects (absolute performance), project shares, location quotients (rela-
tive performance), mean annual FDI over 1997-2003, mean annual FDI over 2004-2010,
absolute and percentage change in mean annual FDI. Descriptive statistics are sum-
marised in the form of maps and tables. Although the descriptive statistics do not al-
low me to make conclusions beyond the data that are analysed or to reach conclusions
on hypotheses, this is a value-added exercise that allows an identification of chang-
ing patterns of FDI activity before and after the fifth enlargement. Maps enhance the
visualisation of patterns that emerge from the data.
Formal econometric analysis is undertaken as part of the subsequent studies.
Discrete choice methodology is used to investigate if the motives for investment in
the EU-25 are mainly market-, resource- or efficiency-seeking (AIM II). Specifically,
this study examines how the three motives for FDI location differ between ‘old’ and
‘new’ Member States of the EU and seeks to establish whether there exists a significant
‘West-East divide’ in the location preferences of multinational firms. Random Utility
Maximisation (RUM) based conditional logit model is used to analyse the motives that
influence the location decisions of firms (AIM II). Given that the economic decision
of a firm that chooses a single location from among a set of several location alterna-
tives is by its nature discrete means that the conditional logit model remains one of the
most popular econometric techniques in studying the location choice decisions of firms
(Schmidheiny and Bruelhart, 2011).
Panel data techniques are also employed to examine FDI activity in the EU-25
9
at the level of NUTS2 regions (AIM III). To identify the regions that are the winners
and losers of the fifth enlargement, the impact of the EU membership, borders and
distance from borders on the size of regional inward investment in CEECs in the post-
enlargement period is examined. Specifically, a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV)
estimator is used to analyse panel data on regional FDI and a system Generalised Meth-
ods of Moments (GMM) estimator is used owing to the modelling concerns such as
fixed effects and the endogeneity of regressors.
This thesis uses annual panel data on inward FDI from the European Invest-
ment Monitor (EIM) for 1997 to 2010.4 The EIM is an online information provider,
which tracks and records inward investment in Europe. Data is collected for all Eu-
ropean countries for each year from 1997. This dataset gives project-level information
on a total of 35,105 cross-border investments for the EU-25 and cover all project-based
‘greenfield’ FDI that adds to capacity, arising from new investment or ‘expansions’. It
does not include information on mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures (unless
they result in new facilities or new jobs being created), licence agreements, extraction
of ores, minerals and fuels, portfolio investments. The EIM provides detailed informa-
tion on investment projects, including company name, industry, origin country, host
country, project type (new, co-location, expansion).
The EIM covers both intra- and extra-EU FDI. Investment originating from in-
side the EU (inclusive of the ‘new’ EU Member States) accounts for 46% of the projects.
The single largest investing country is the US, where approximately 32% of all projects
originated from. The industries captured by the EIM include agriculture, energy, manu-
facturing, construction, retail and hospitality, transport, services, education and health,
and recreation. Among these, manufacturing and services are the most represented in-
dustry groups, accounting for 58% and 30% of projects respectively. The EIM data has
found applications in recent work (Alegria, 2006; Defever, 2006, 2012) and is a useful
source for exploring FDI at the project level.
In this thesis, the scale of inward FDI is measured as the number of individual
projects. Admittedly, the use of count data has its limitations as it gives equal weight-
ing to minor and major investment projects.5 Furthermore, the count data also fails
to account for the possibility that an investment is carried out in response to the de-
preciation of the existing capital stock. Although the EIM dataset captures the scale of
investment using financial flows data, owing to commercial confidentiality these data
are incomplete and consequently are not used to measure FDI (for example, the value
of capital expenditure in the dataset is reported for about 30% of projects). Another
4EIM database available at: http://www.eyeim.com/
5(Crescenzi et al., 2015) recognise that the use of data based on MNE counts exacerbates measurement
bias problems.
10
indicator that also captures the scale of investment - the number of jobs created - is also
incomplete and known for about 60% of projects.
To conduct the analysis an original dataset of independent variables is con-
structed, consisting of data on location factors available at country and NUTS2 regional
level. The main choice of location data provider is Eurostat - the Statistical Office of
the European Communities. Data is sought for each year over 1996-2010, which offers
one year’s worth of lagged explanatory data in the regression analysis. The choice of
data is informed by the literature on industrial location. The taxonomy of FDI motives
identified by Behrman (1972) and formalised by Dunning (1993), but also neoclassical,
institutional and New Economic Geography (NEG) theories define the organisation of
my location data into the following main categories: market potential variables; re-
source variables; macroeconomic variables; and industry variables. Data that attempt
to gauge the effect of borders, distance from borders and spatial spillovers are used at
the regional-level only. Location data are both collected from official statistical sources
and constructed by the author specifically for the purpose of the present study. These
include indices that capture intra- and inter-industry agglomeration, industrial compe-
tition, spatial spillovers, external and internal market potential.
1.2 The Layout of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2 I set out a formal definition of FDI and introduce a distinction be-
tween ‘greenfield’ investment, expansions of capacity, and mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) as different types of FDI. Afterwards, I discuss the theory of FDI, including the
taxonomy of FDI motives of Dunning (1993) and the core-periphery model of Krugman
(1991) of the theoretical New Economic Geography (NEG) literature, which are the the-
oretical frameworks underpinning the formal econometric analysis of this thesis. Neo-
classical, institutional and behavioural perspectives on the location of FDI activity are
presented in the context of the subsequent data collection. Following the discussion of
the theoretical frameworks, I review the empirical literature on the location choice of
multinational firms. This review begins with the early studies that focus on FDI in the
US, including the contribution of Carlton (1979, 1983) who first applied the conditional
logit model to analyse firms’ location. Subsequently, I consider those studies that anal-
yse FDI location for a single European country and a set of countries. Finally, I present
the empirical literature that examines the border effects.
In Chapter 3 I describe and reflect on the process of the fifth EU enlargement,
a period that involved the formal accession negotiations between the twelve candidate
countries and the EU. To begin with I discuss the historic nature of the fifth enlargement
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and present three accession criteria (‘Copenhagen Criteria’) that define if a candidate
country is eligible to join the EU. Afterwards, I provide a detailed account of how the
accession process progressed from the submission of the formal applications for EU
membership to the first wave of the fifth enlargement in 2004 and its second wave in
2007. I identify key milestones in the accession process that include the selection of the
candidates (‘Luxembourg Group’), the opening of the accession negotiations, a decision
to open the negotiations with the remaining candidate countries (‘Helsinki Group’), the
identification of the first wave accession countries (‘Laeken10’) and the conclusion of
the negotiations with the first wave countries at the European Council in Copenhagen
in December 2002.
In Chapter 4 I discuss the methodology that is used in this thesis to analyse FDI
location at the country and regional level. Specifically, I present discrete choice models
and panel data models and I identify conditional logit model and the Least Squares
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator as the chosen econometric techniques used in the
empirical analyses that follow. Moreover, I acknowledge the limitations of these two
econometric techniques and explain how these can be addressed using a nested logit
model and a system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. Afterwards,
I discuss the regional classification system NUTS of the Eurostat. Subsequently, I de-
scribe the project-level FDI data that I source from the European Investment Monitor
(EIM) database and specify information categories on FDI projects that this data cov-
ers. Following the discussion of FDI data, I present the results of a detailed analysis
of descriptive data on inward FDI that I conduct to study the economic geography of
FDI location in the EU-25 at the country and region level (AIM I). Finally, I discuss the
process of data collection that I do to create an original dataset consisting of data on
location factors.
In Chapter 5 I analyse empirically the motives for FDI location choice in the
‘old’ EU-15 (West) and the ‘new’ EU-10 (East) (AIM II) using conditional logit model.
To begin with I interrogate the FDI data on the project-specific dimensions to deter-
mine how the distribution of FDI projects between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ EU members
is altered as project-specific characteristics change. These characteristics include project
type (new investment, expansions, co-locations) and origin category (from inside the
EU-27, from outside the EU-27, ‘mixed’ partners). Afterwards, I present the location
data that I use and discuss how this data fits in with the market-seeking and resource-
seeking motives of Dunning’s (1993) typology. Following the discussion of data, I in-
troduce the econometric models that I employ to study the motives of FDI location in
the EU-25, including the extended model with West-East heterogeneity that allows for
slope terms to differ and determine whether the motives for FDI differ between the ‘old’
EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10. The formal econometric analysis that estimates these mod-
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els also makes an allowance for the project type heterogeneity to establish if motives
other than efficiency-seeking drive the behaviour of expansionary investment. Finally,
I acknowledge the role of information asymmetries in defining the investment strate-
gies of multinational firms and estimate the regression model depending on the origin
of the investor (outside the EU-27 and inside the EU-27).
In Chapter 6 I study the impact of the fifth enlargement on the economic ge-
ography of FDI activity across the EU-25 regions (AIM III) using the LSDV estimator.
Special emphasis of this analysis is on the role of borders to determine whether the
national borders continue to shape the distribution of economic activity in the EU-25.
To be precise, I aim to examine if foreign investment agglomerates in the CEECs close
to the former West-East border. To begin with I introduce a two-country, three-region
NEG model developed by Bruelhart et al. (2004) that models the spatial consequences
of regional integration such as EU enlargement and underpins the econometric analysis
of this study. The model is an extension of the core-periphery NEG model of Krugman
(1991). Afterwards, I discuss the econometric framework of this study, including details
on the regression models used. A formal econometric analysis that follows quantifies
the effect of EU membership, borders and distance from borders on the size of regional
inward FDI in CEECs in the post-enlargement period (2004-10). The EU membership
and distance effects are analysed at the aggregate level for the CEECs, but I also allow
for the heterogeneity in the effect across countries. The role of borders on the size of
regional inward FDI is examined using a set of border dummies, which introduce an
asymmetry between border and interior regions of CEECs. Among the extensions to
the main analysis, I define the alternative distance measures to capture the distance ef-
fect and use the system GMM analysis to measure the border effect. The role of time
fixed effects, and the use of country fixed effects instead of region fixed effects are also
considered.
The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 7, presents a summary and conclusion of
the thesis. I summarise the findings of the thesis with regard to the research questions.
In consideration of the main findings of this thesis, I reflect on the possible implica-
tions in the area of EU’s investment policy. This involves looking at the possible main
orientation of an EU investment policy in the future and the recommendations for the
immediate action in this area. Finally, I consider the strengths and limitations of my
work and discuss some ideas for future work. An appendix that follows Chapter 7 con-
sists of data that supports the discussion and analysis in the main part of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
The Theory of FDI and Literature
Review
2.1 Introduction
The growing importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational enter-
prise (MNE) after the Second World War provided an impetus for scholars to formalise
the theoretical underpinnings of FDI. Although initially FDI was explained using the
theories of capital markets and international trade theory (based on macroeconomic
approaches), over time FDI has been treated as a stand-alone theory of MNE (based on
microeconomic approaches). Broadly, from a theoretical perspective, a three-tiered hi-
erarchy of ‘MNE/exporters/domestics’ has emerged in the modelling of FDI decisions
(Cieslik and Ryan, 2009), and three questions dominate the literature (Singh and Jun,
1995):
1. Why do domestic firms evolve into international organisations that serve foreign
markets?
2. Why do firms choose to locate production in a foreign country rather than opt for
serving the market abroad using options such as licensing or exporting?
3. What are the determinants of the FDI location choice?
My review of the theoretical underpinnings of FDI activity starts by looking at
the capital market and international trade theories that preceded the emergence of a for-
mal theoretical framework for MNE. Subsequently, the theories of MNE that emphasise
market imperfections as a reason for a firm to engage in FDI are discussed. These early
theories focus mainly on the decision by a domestic firm to become an international
organisation, and why FDI may be preferred to licensing or exporting as a strategy to
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serve foreign markets. Later, I introduce the economic geography perspective on the in-
ternational economic activity of MNEs. With its interest in the spatial aspects of MNE
activity, the New Economic Geography (NEG) theory complemented the research agen-
das of international business scholars, who placed more emphasis on the firm-specific
determinants of international economic activity. Subsequently, I review the location
choice determinants that the neoclassical, institutional and behavioural perspectives
consider to be important in the FDI location decision, where the first of these includes
the agglomeration economies of the NEG theory (see: Ascani et al., 2012).
Following the discussion of the theoretical frameworks, I review the empirical
literature on the location choice of multinational firms. This literature has changed
dramatically over time as data on investment and firm location has become widely
available and the computational power of technology has increased. The early litera-
ture typically focuses on the location of FDI activity in a single country and considers
only a limited range of location factors as explanatory variables. Subsequently, with
the improvements in data availability and computational power, the analysis of the
FDI location choice decisions is feasible within a multi-country set-up or at a more-
disaggregated level, such as regions.
The review of the empirical literature begins with the early studies that focus
predominantly on FDI in the US. Following this, studies are considered that analyse
location for a single European country - firstly, the ‘old’ European Union (EU) Mem-
ber States, and secondly, the ‘new’ EU accession countries from Central and Eastern
Europe. Subsequently, attention is turned to the more recent multi-country studies of
location. Finally, empirical work is considered that examines the border effects in the
spatial distribution of FDI activity. Border regions are likely to play a critical role in the
spatial dynamics initiated by regional integration, such as EU enlargement (Resmini,
2003b; Niebuhr, 2008). In particular, the impact of EU integration on the location of
economic activity is likely to be most profound alongside the border of two integrating
groups of countries, such as the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU.
Although in large part this chapter focuses on reviewing the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on FDI location, a formal definition of FDI is set out in the next section.
I use the OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI. Importantly, the definition helps to es-
tablish the distinctive features of FDI vis-a`-vis portfolio investment. Later I discuss the
OECD recommended procedure for calculating FDI flows. I also make a distinction
between FDI stocks and flows, and explain what is meant by inward and outward FDI.
Although the FDI data used for the purpose of this thesis excludes mergers and acquisi-
tions, I introduce a distinction between ‘greenfield’ investment, expansions of capacity,
and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as different types of FDI.
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2.2 The Definition of FDI
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a term that is used to refer to the cross-border trans-
fer of capital through which a firm expands the production capacities outside its na-
tional borders. It is one of the strategies that allows a firm to enter a foreign market.
Among the range of other possible strategies one can also mention exporting, licensing
and franchising. Through the process of FDI a multinational enterprise (MNE) is cre-
ated – an entity that owns production facilities in more than one country. According to
the OECD (2009), “FDI is a key driver of international economic integration (. . . ) and
can provide financial stability, promote economic development and enhance the well
being of societies” (p. 3), provided that the right policy framework is in place.
The OECD (2009) provides an overview of FDI concepts – The Benchmark Def-
inition of Foreign Direct Investment – which sets the world standard for correct mea-
surement of FDI activity. A key aspect is that through a cross-border transfer of capital,
a resident of one country (direct investor) establishes ‘a lasting interest’ in a firm (di-
rect investment enterprise) that is a resident of a different country. The motive of the
direct investor is ‘a strategic long-term relationship’ with the direct investment enter-
prise. The investor exercises a significant degree of influence over the management of
the direct investment enterprise, with the numerical threshold of at least 10% of an eq-
uity capital of the enterprise being owned by the investor from another country used as
a criterion to define ‘a lasting interest’ (OECD, 2009). Typically, the literature refers to
the direct investment enterprise as a ‘multinational firm’, a ‘multinational company’, a
‘multinational corporation’ (MNC) or a ‘multinational enterprise’ (MNE), although no
agreed definition exists for what the above actually constitute (Pazienza, 2014).
In this sense FDI, in addition to being a cross-border transfer of capital, also in-
volves a transfer of management and organisational expertise, entrepreneurship, tech-
nology, know-how, cultural norms and values, which Dunning and Lundan (2008) refer
to as “the transfer of a package of assets or intermediate products” (p. 7). Through this
process ‘a strategic long-term relationship’ is built. This is feature of FDI is what distin-
guishes FDI from indirect investment (portfolio investment), which involves only the
transfer of capital. Furthermore, only in the case of FDI, the control over the transferred
resources remains in the hands of the investor, i.e. there is no change in the ownership.
These features underline the crucial difference between FDI and indirect (portfolio) in-
vestment. In the former case, the focus of the investor is to exercise a control and influ-
ence through which ‘the long-term relationship’ with the direct investment enterprise
is established, which allows profit stream over time to be maximised. For the latter,
there is no objective of any ‘long-term relationship’ and the focus is primarily on the
return on assets, which influences the acquisition or sale of the shares.
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Jones and Wren (2006) show that the OECD recommended procedure for calcu-
lating FDI flows involves summing four components: retained earnings, equity capital,
intra-company loans and intra-company borrowing. This procedure is outlined in Ta-
ble 2.1. The retained earnings are defined as profits generated and kept by the overseas
enterprise. Although there is no cross-border transfer of capital involved, these are
classified as FDI because the direct investor has a choice between taking the retained
earnings made by the direct investment enterprise to their home country or reinvesting
them back into the direct investment enterprise (Jones and Wren, 2006). Other flows of
capital such as transfers of shares and loans that occur between the direct investor and
the direct investment enterprise are also treated as FDI. A situation when the direct in-
vestment enterprise borrows money from the host country or from their own resources
to supply to the direct investor is considered an outflow of FDI, a disinvestment. A
negative inflow of FDI can occur when the value of this borrowing exceeds the receipts
in the form of retained earnings, equity capital and intra-company loans. Although the
above definition provides a benchmark for calculating the value of FDI flows, Jones
and Wren (2006) maintain that the calculation of FDI remains difficult owing to the
differences in law and regulations that exist between countries on how to record and
measure different individual components of FDI.
Table 2.1: OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
equals Retained earnings (i.e. direct investors’ share of earnings/losses)
plus Direct investors’ purchase less sales of enterprises’ shares
plus Net increase in long and short term loans, credit and other amounts given by
the direct investor to the overseas enterprise
minus Overseas enterprise borrowing of money from host country or from their own
resources in order to give to the direct investor in home country
(source: Walker (1983), Office for National Statistics (1996) and Jones and Wren (2006))
FDI flows can be categorised according to the direction of the flow between the
enterprises. Inward FDI flows are the inward direct investments made by non-resident
direct investors in the reporting economy. Outward FDI flows are the outward direct
investments made by the residents of the reporting economy to external economies.
The FDI flows (both financial and income flows) capture a different dimension of FDI
activity to that measured by another FDI indicator, FDI stocks. Essentially, data on FDI
flows (FDI financial flows and FDI income flows) measure the size of FDI activity within
a given time period, while data on FDI stocks (also referred to as FDI positions) measure
the levels of investment at a given point in time (OECD, 2009). On the one hand, all
cross-border transactions that qualify as FDI recorded during a reference period (e.g.
year, quarter, month) make the FDI flows. On the other hand, the value of the stock of
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FDI held at the end of the reference period equates to the FDI position (stock). OECD
(2009) recognises that FDI data expressed as a ratio to GDP allows for the cross-country
comparisons of the relative importance of globalisation for the host economy.1
A distinction can be made between different types of FDI according to the choice
of the market entry mode. Specifically, the OECD (2009) distinguishes between:
• purchase/sale of existing equity in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A);
• greenfield investments;
• extension of capital (additional new investments); and
• financial restructuring.
While mergers and acquisitions imply the purchase or sale of existing equity, ‘green-
field’ FDI entails an acquisition of a new asset, a new investment altogether. An ex-
pansion of an existing capacity (extension) relates to additional new investment and
according to the OECD (2009), it is similar to ‘greenfield’ FDI in terms of its economic
impact. Finally, financial restructuring covers all investment made for debt repayment
or loss reduction.
2.3 The Theory of FDI and MNE
Ever since the emergence of trade and FDI, scholars have sought to formalise the rea-
sons for firms engaging in FDI activity by developing theoretical frameworks. Al-
though each theory offers an explanation for certain aspects of FDI and MNE activ-
ity, there is no complete theory of FDI (Harrison et al., 2000). Casson (1985) maintains
that “the theory of FDI is a ‘logical intersection’ of three distinct theories - the theory
of international capital markets, the theory of the international firm, and the theory of
international trade” (p. 114). These strands of economic theories, when combined to-
gether, should offer an explanation as to why firms will want to engage in FDI, where
the production will be located and what the optimal size, ownership and structure of
the firm will be.
In fact, prior to 1950, FDI was considered as a subset of portfolio investment,
and the theories of capital markets and portfolio investment were used to explain the
emergence of FDI (Nayak and Choudhury, 2014). Originally, FDI was seen as an inter-
national capital movement only (Kindleberger, 1969), and the interest rate differential
1FDI transaction flows expressed as a ratio to GDP measure the degree of globalisation of an economy
over the reference period. FDI income flows as a ratio to GDP measure the relative importance of the
earnings of direct investment enterprises in the reporting economy. Finally, FDI stocks to GDP measure
the degree of globalisation at a point in time, capturing the interdependence of economies.
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cited as the most important reason for capital flows, which under the assumption of no
risk and uncertainty will flow to the areas that offer the highest return. However, Nayak
and Choudhury (2014) note that the interest rate theory fails to account for control, a
fundamental difference that distinguishes FDI from portfolio investment. In principle,
a higher interest rate in a foreign country may induce an investor to lend money abroad,
but there is no reason why this investor would necessarily want direct control over the
enterprise that they lend money to (Hymer, 1976).
Another macroeconomic approach for explaining FDI activity is the theory of
international trade. Although the theory was developed to explain trade flows, it is
also applicable to FDI flows. Traditional trade theories were frequently used to explain
FDI until the 1960s when micro-founded theories based on industrial organisation were
developed. These theories consider market imperfections as the reason for MNE to en-
gage in FDI and Casson (1987) argued that these microeconomic theoretical approaches
had “the potential to become a general theory of the enterprise in space, and as such,
to embrace theories of the multi-regional and multi-plant firm” (p. 1). In the remainder
of this chapter I consider the attempts of international trade theory and micro-founded
industrial organisation theory to explain FDI activity, and assess how well each of these
performs. The decision to engage in FDI is a fundamental question to start with, while
the theoretical underpinnings of the spatial distribution of FDI are explored when the
location factors and New Economic Geography (NEG) models are considered below.
2.3.1 International Trade and FDI
The first attempts to explain the emergence of FDI flows, prevalent up until the 1960s,
are the traditional (classical and neoclassical) theories of international trade. Although
they were developed to explain trade flows, the application to FDI flows is possible.
The earliest of these is the theory of absolute advantage, developed by Adam Smith
(1776) in the second half of the eighteenth century. The theory of absolute advantage
assumes two countries, two commodities, no transport costs, an immobile factor of pro-
duction (labour) and constant returns to scale. The prediction of the model is that two
countries specialise and concentrate on the production of a good in which they have
an absolute advantage. Consequently, trade occurs as countries exchange the surplus
from production of the domestic good, bringing benefits from trade for both trading
partners.
The weakness of the theory of absolute advantage is its inability to explain inter-
national trade whenever a country possesses an absolute advantage in the production
of both commodities. This was addressed by the theory of comparative advantage de-
veloped by David Ricardo (1821) in the first half of the nineteenth century. Under the
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same assumptions, Ricardo maintains that comparative advantage in the production of
the good is a valid basis for international trade to occur, where the comparative advan-
tage arises due to differences in technology and labour productivity. Even if a country
has an absolute advantage in the production of two goods, it can still benefit from trade
by concentrating on producing only this good in which it has a comparative advantage.
Although the theories of absolute and comparative advantage offer a rationale
for the emergence of trade, the assumptions of both models are simplistic (Harrison
et al., 2000). The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of factor endowments, sometimes known as
the ‘factor proportions theory’, is an adaptation of the earlier theories, which along-
side labour introduces a second factor of production in the form of capital. Heckscher
(1919) and Ohlin (1933) maintain that the comparative advantage in the production of
a good arises from differences in relative factor endowments between countries. In
consequence, a country with a relative abundance of capital is able to produce capital-
intensive goods at the lower cost, enabling it to export the surplus and exchange it for
a labour-intensive good. The principle of comparative advantage continues to explain
international trade flows in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Although the theories of absolute and comparative advantage, and Heckscher-
Ohlin model explain international trade, they are perhaps less suited to explaining the
emergence of FDI flows between countries, failing to deal with the issue of production
outside of national borders. Vernon (1966) proposes a ‘product life-cycle’, thereby using
a microeconomic concept to explain a macroeconomic phenomenon of FDI. The theory
recognises the relevance of the neoclassical international trade theories by allowing for
the ‘natural’ location advantages of countries, but at the same time it criticises the use-
fulness of the neoclassical comparative advantage models, which provide “only a very
little way toward adequate understanding” of FDI flows as they neglect the role played
by innovation, economies of scale and uncertainty (Vernon, 1966, p. 160).
The product-life cycle model introduces a dynamic picture as it relates the loca-
tion advantages of countries to the characteristics of product life-cycle that evolve over
time, with different stages of production requiring different location factors. In that
respect, the theory of Vernon (1966) is perhaps the first attempt to explain the dynamic
interplay between international trade and the FDI activity of multinational firms, em-
phasising the role of markets and their location advantages.2 The model allows for the
technological capacity of countries to improve their location advantages.
In essence, Vernon (1966) specifies three different country types: the ‘lead in-
novation country’ (in his model, the US), ‘other advanced countries’ and ‘developing
2Dunning and Lundan (2008) argue that the product life-cycle theory performs well in explaining the
market-seeking motives of MNEs, yet it does not apply so well to resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking or
strategic-asset seeking FDI (see below), which reduces its applicability.
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countries’. Moreover, the life-cycle of the product is grouped into three stages: new
product, maturing product and standardised product. At the initial stage, the intro-
duction of a product requires highly-skilled human inputs and investment through re-
search and development (R&D). Due to the product being in its innovation stage, there
is a degree of uncertainty surrounding it, meaning that location of production close to
the innovation hub and home market is of utmost importance. After the innovation
stage and once the demand for the product rises there is a move towards a greater de-
gree of standardisation of the production process. Gradually the need for locating the
production close to the home market diminishes in importance, in favour of the ability
to minimise the costs of value-added activities in any given location. Coupled with
higher demand in other markets, this creates additional incentives to set up production
activities elsewhere, in the location where the costs of running the plant are lower.
At the final stage of the product life-cycle, the standardisation of the product has
reached its ‘zenith’ and the international market will now be well established’ (Jones
and Wren, 2006). At this stage of production, cost considerations are deemed to be
the most important and there is an added incentive to set up production facilities in
developing countries, where the costs of inputs, and in particular labour, are lower.
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical illustration of the dynamic interplay between the stages
of product life-cycle and the location of economic activity.
2.3.2 Imperfect Markets and FDI
A breakthrough in the theory arrived in the 1960s with the contribution of Hymer (1960,
1976), who made the first attempt to treat FDI activity as part of a stand-alone theory of
MNE, as opposed to a strand of international trade theory. In his thesis, Hymer (1960,
1976) expressed dissatisfaction with the prevailing theory of capital movements that
assumes that FDI, like portfolio investment, is motivated by the differences in the rates
of return between locations. Searching for a more plausible explanation for FDI, Hymer
presented two main motivations for firms to engage in FDI. First, a firm engages in FDI
to reduce or remove the international competition between firms in the same industry.
This is achieved by mergers and acquisitions of firms operating overseas. A second
motive for FDI is a firm’s desire to increase its returns by utilising its intangible assets
and firm-specific advantages abroad. These advantages offset the location advantages
enjoyed by incumbent domestic firms in a host country (e.g. knowledge of the mar-
ket) and provided that the firm-specific advantages are not easily imitated by domestic
firms, a multinational firm can profitably exploit its position when competing with local
firms in the foreign markets.
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Figure 2.1: Product Life Cycle Theory: illustration
(source: Peng, 2008)
Hymer (1968) argues that foreign direct investment activity is the most-effective
internationalisation strategy, a way of enforcing market power abroad. In this respect,
Hymer moved the traditional approach to FDI, rooted in the classical theories of inter-
national trade and finance, into industrial organisation and the study of market imper-
fections. Together with the work of Kindleberger (1969), the approach to explaining
FDI flows using monopolistic advantages and market imperfections theory came to be
known as the Hymer-Kindleberger Hypothesis, or sometimes as the ‘structural market
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failure hypothesis’.
Hymer’s contribution is rooted in market imperfections and during the 1970s it
was further developed, leading to the transaction cost and internalisation theories of
FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 1985; Rugman, 1981, 1985, 1986). According to these,
Hymer fails to distinguish between two types of market imperfections: the structural
type (a` la Bain, 1954, 1956) and the transaction cost type (a` la Williamson, 1975) (Hos-
seini, 2005). On the one hand, structural imperfections result from the control of owner-
ship advantages of factors such as proprietary technology, privileged access to inputs,
scale economies, control of distribution systems and product differentiation. Essen-
tially, these are endogenous to the firm and arise from barriers to entry to new compe-
tition that give rise to monopoly rents (Hosseini, 2005). On the other hand, transaction
cost imperfections, also known as natural or endemic imperfections, arise naturally and
are assumed to be exogenous to the multinational firm.3 They occur as a consequence
of the market’s inability to organise the transactions in the optimal way or whenever it
is difficult to predict the behaviour of participants. Furthermore, transactional market
failure emerges when the market cannot value the benefits and costs associated with a
transaction or when the market is insufficiently large to capture the economies of scale
(Dunning, 1988).
McManus (1972), Buckley and Casson (1976) and Dunning and Rugman (1985)
develop the transaction cost theory of FDI and argue that the assumptions of perfect
competition and perfectly-informed agents are incompatible with FDI activity. Ac-
cording to Norman (2001), the basic idea in the transaction cost model of FDI is that
“incomplete contracts and missing markets give rise to the possibility of opportunis-
tic behavior in an arms-length exchange (Williamson, 1975) and so to the preference
by the firm to replace external contracts by direct ownership and internal hierarchies”
(p. 3). In essence, the transaction cost theory insists on the profit-maximising firm’s
desire to economise on transaction costs as a factor that influences the choice of institu-
tional involvement of the multinational firm. In the situation when the costs of utilising
‘arms-length exchange’ exceed the costs incurred from internalising the exchange, es-
tablishing a foreign affiliate is the preferred form of involvement of a multinational firm
over that of licensing. Iammarino and McCann (2013) consider the transaction cost the-
ory “the most influential set of contributions on the question of ‘how’ multinational
activities are organized” (p. 51).
A theory of FDI that emerged from the market failure argument is the internali-
sation paradigm. As pointed out by Barclay (2000), it adopted a perspective similar to
that of the transaction cost theory, but the focus of the paradigms differ. In the inter-
3Essentially, this type of imperfection arises as a result of asymmetric and incomplete information pos-
sessed by agents, which in turn give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
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nalisation theory, the emphasis is placed on the process of internalisation of the market
instead of the transaction itself. The theory posits that a firm internalises the supply of
an intermediate good whenever this market fails. For instance, if the cost of coordinat-
ing with the supplier and hence internalising the market of production of intermediate
or raw materials is less than the cost of buying such goods in the market, then the firm
decides to internalise and control these activities that were previously governed by the
market. The internalisation of markets across national borders results in the creation of
the multinational firm. An important pre-requisite for internalisation is the existence of
an imperfect market (Hosseini, 2005).
Although influential in how multinational activities are organised, the internali-
sation and transaction cost perspectives remain silent about the spatial patterns of MNE
activity and location factors. Iammarino and McCann (2013) admit that “in part, this
is the consequence of the emphasis on transactional imperfections, which tend to over-
look the structural imperfections related to socio-economic and institutional geograph-
ical contexts” (p. 52). However, Iammarino and McCann (2013) recognise that the im-
portance that these theoretical perspectives attach to organisational issues, and oppor-
tunity costs associated with internal transactions and external exchanges makes them
suitable for identifying and distinguishing between the different economic geographies
where MNEs may choose to locate.
2.3.3 The Eclectic Paradigm
The ‘eclectic paradigm’ combines the transaction cost and internalisation theories with
the monopolistic advantage theory of Hymer (1960, 1976), and offers a comprehensive
explanation of the magnitude and pattern of international production (Dunning, 1977).
Cantwell and Narula (2001) maintain that the paragim offers the leading explanation
for the growth of multinational activity that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. The eclec-
tic paradigm is the first to explicitly model location dimensions in the theoretical frame-
work of FDI activity. Although the eclectic paradigm offers a general framework for
establishing the magnitude and pattern of international production, it is not intended
to be a theory of FDI per se but rather a paradigm that covers a range of explanations
for FDI activity of MNEs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The eclectic model assumes
that the necessary condition for a firm to invest abroad is the fulfillment of three condi-
tions. First, the firm must possess a firm-specific asset that puts it in an advantageous
position over indigenous firms (‘ownership’ advantage). Second, the benefit from em-
ploying this firm-specific asset in the production facility in a foreign country has to be
greater than the benefit of using it in the domestic market (‘location’ advantage). Third,
to fully exploit the firm-specific asset in the foreign market, the optimal strategy for the
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firm is to transfer it internally to a foreign affiliation unit rather than rely on licensing
and hence overcome market imperfections (‘internalisation’ advantage).
This is known as the OLI framework, and each of the ownership (O), locational
(L) and internalisation (I) advantages have to be present to explain the FDI activity
of the firm.4 Table 2.2 gives examples for the three types of advantages of Dunning’s
(1977) OLI framework. On the first of these, the firm-specific asset encompasses re-
sources and capabilities that allow the firm to generate income streams and include
both tangible assets (such as resource endowments, access to labour and capital) and
intangible assets (superior technology and know-how, organisational structure, infor-
mation). These ‘ownership’ advantages correspond to the firm-specific advantage of
Hymer’s (1960; 1976) monopolistic advantage. On the second, a location possesses
location-specific characteristics that all firms with production facilities in that location
can benefit from, such as resource endowments, political, judicial, financial and institu-
tional system, government incentives, cultural environment.
Table 2.2: Summary of OLI advantages
Ownership-specific (O) advantages (internal to enterprise of one nationality)
Size of firm
Technology and trade marks
Management and organisational systems
Access to spare capacity
Economies of joint supply
Greater access to markets and knowledge
International opportunities such as diversifying risk
Location-specific (L) advantages (internal to a given location, all firms with pro-
duction facilities in that location can benefit from)
Distribution of inputs and markets
Costs of labour, materials and transport costs between countries
Government intervention and policies
Commercial and legal infrastructure
Language, culture and customs (i.e. psychic distance)
Internalisation-specific (I) advantages (overcoming market imperfections)
Reduction in search, negotiation ad monitoring costs
Avoidance of property right enforcement costs
Engage in price discrimination
Protection of product
Avoidance of tariffs
(source: Jones and Wren, 2006)
4According to the eclectic paradigm “the multinational enterprise and foreign direct investment repre-
sent a response to high transactions costs by firms with unique assets/capabilities which have value when
utilised in production facilities located in foreign markets” (Teece, 1986, p. 27).
25
In subsequent work, Dunning (1983; 1985; 2008) elaborated on his concept of
O-advantages further, and classified this into three subgroups: asset-ownership ad-
vantages (Oa) that arise from proprietary ownership of a specific intangible asset, e.g.
know-how related to production management and organisation system; transactional-
ownership advantages (Ot), which relate to the ability of firms to capture the trans-
actional benefit and minimise the transaction costs to realise the greatest benefit from
transaction; and institutional-asset advantages (Oi), which include firm-specific corpo-
rate norms and values, as well as norms and values of the human and institutional
environment in which a firm conducts its activities (Dunning, 2002).
Tolentino (2001) remarks that the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1977) and the
internalisation theory of Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985) and Rugman (1981, 1985,
1986) offer contrasting views on the role played by the O-advantages in the existence
and growth of multinational firms; i.e. whether the O-advantages are exogenous or
endogenous. Tolentino (2001) argues that in the eclectic framework the Oa advantages
arise from endogenous structural imperfections that are created by MNEs to sustain
the process of inter-firm competition in the final product market. It means that the Oa
advantages are endogenous to firms and separable from internalisation. By contrast,
the internalisation theory argues that both the Oa and Ot advantages emerge as a result
of internalisation. Therefore, in the view of internalisation theory, the O-advantages are
exogenous to firms and originate from the process of internalisation.
The differences between the two theories are manifested in their views on the
existence and growth of multinational firms. On the one hand, Tolentino (2001) states
that “the existence and growth of international production in internalisation theory
achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of the multinational corporations
across national borders is geared solely to reduce transaction costs or the costs of market
transactions (Chandler, 1977a,b, 1980; Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985; Teece, 1980, 1981,
1987)” (p. 198). On the other hand, the eclectic paradigm asserts that the existence and
growth of multinational corporations is a consequence of a process of strengthening
O-advantages of the firm through overall restructuring and rationalisation of produc-
tion, for instance, reduction of transaction costs, lowering unit labour costs, improving
value-added capabilities of the firm.
To sum up, Dunning’s OLI paradigm offers a basis for explaining the patterns
of international production and FDI activity and is a simple framework that combines
both micro- and macroeconomic perspectives, and accommodates “different theoret-
ical strands under a unifying umbrella” (Iammarino and McCann, 2013, p. 35). As
illustrated by Tolentino (2001), the central thesis of the eclectic paradigm is that firms’
international economic transactions are determined by the possession of ownership-
specific advantages, by the desire of these firms to internalise these advantages and by
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comparative location-specific advantages of foreign vis-a`-vis domestic countries. More
desirable O-advantages of a domestic country’s enterprise (relative to those of another
country) give a greater incentive to internalise them, leading to more outward FDI as
firms are more inclined to exploiting their O-advantages in a foreign market (Dunning
and Lundan, 2008). The dynamic application of the paradigm predicts that changes in
any of OLI advantages directly cause a change in the inward or outward FDI position
of the country (Dunning, 1977).
2.3.4 The Motives for FDI
Building on his 1977 OLI framework and drawing on the work of Behrman (1972), Dun-
ning (1993) developed a taxonomy of four types of MNE activity, where the primary
motive underlying the FDI is the distinguishing feature. Importantly, the taxonomy
of the four motives for FDI sheds light on why locating production in a foreign coun-
try may be preferred to licensing or exporting as a strategy of firms to serve markets
abroad. The taxonomy identifies four types of FDI as follows, where the first three are
initially identified by Behrman (1972):
1. Market-seeking FDI
2. Resource-seeking FDI
3. Efficiency-seeking FDI
4. Strategic asset-seeking FDI
The ‘market-seeking’ firms engage in FDI to serve local market demand in the
foreign country. In some instances, that market may have been previously served by
exports but an increase in the cost of supplying from a distance may have encouraged
the ‘market-seeker’ to locate abroad. Characteristics such as market size and market
growth prospects attract market-seeking firms, but they are also encouraged by the
presence of the main suppliers, main customers and main competitors in that market.
Market-seeking FDI is argued to be the most responsive to cultural differences, given
that it occurs when goods are adapted to local tastes and preferences to efficiently serve
the local market demand (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Franco et al., 2008). Market-
seeking FDI is demand-side oriented.
The ‘resource-seeking’ firms invest where they can acquire higher quality re-
sources and/or factors of production at the lower real cost, which is a main motivation
for investing abroad. Importantly, access to these resources is a source of comparative
advantages for the investing multinational firm, making it more profitable and compet-
itive to operate in the foreign markets. Commonly sought resources include physical
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natural resources, such as minerals, fuels, metals or agricultural products, inexpen-
sive unskilled or semi-skilled labour, as well as technological capability or managerial
and organisational skills. Unlike market-seeking FDI, the ‘resource-seekers’ are supply-
side oriented. In this category, Iammarino and McCann (2013) distinguish between
‘general-asset seekers’ that aim at host locations’ physical resources and cheap labour,
and ‘specific-asset seekers’ that aim to acquire technological capabilities, management
and marketing expertise or organisational skills.
The ‘efficiency-seeking’ firms (also known as ‘rationalised FDI’) are concerned
with promoting the efficiency of the MNE global or regional structure by means of
reducing production costs or enhancing the efficiency of the division of labour or
the process of specialisation. The benefits are achieved by exploiting economies of
scale. Efficiency-seeking multinational firms essentially take advantage of differences
in factor costs, factor endowments, institutional arrangements, governmental policies,
market structures and consumer demand that exist between markets. Typically, the
‘efficiency-seekers’ tend to set up production facilities in a limited number of loca-
tions, from where they serve multiple markets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Efficiency-
seeking FDI is often sequential to the resource-seeking or market-seeking FDI activity
(Dunning, 2000). In this category, Iammarino and McCann (2013) distinguish between
‘global value chain efficiency seekers’ that take advantage of international differences
in factor costs and endowments between locations at different stage of economic devel-
opment, and ‘scale and scope economies seekers’ that take advantage of differences in
institutional settings, market and industrial structures, and policies between locations
at similar levels of economic development.
The ‘strategic asset-seeking’ firms (also known as knowledge-seeking FDI) seek
investment abroad as a strategy to promote their long-term goals by means of acquir-
ing strategic foreign assets. The long-term strategic objective of these firms is to pre-
serve or improve global competitive position, for example through the augmentation
of their global portfolio of physical assets and human competencies (Cuervo-Cazurra
and Narula, 2015). Importantly, an engagement in FDI helps to strengthen the O-
advantages of the firm or alternatively weakening the O-advantages of competitors.
The strategic asset-seeking motive for FDI may resemble that of efficiency-seeking FDI,
given that in both cases MNE restructure their asset portfolio to fulfill their strategic
targets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
The four motives for FDI can be subdivided into two types. The first three are
‘asset-exploiting’ in nature since the main objective of MNE is to generate a higher profit
stream through the use of existing firm-specific O-advantages. The fourth motive for
FDI is a situation in which the firm’s objective is to add to its existing portfolio of assets.
Dunning (1993), who developed the taxonomy, building on Behrman (1972), also linked
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the four FDI motives to a set of O, L and I advantages of the eclectic paradigm. Impor-
tantly, the OLI configuration differs between countries (regions), industries and firms,
but equally it differs between individual motives for FDI activity and this is demon-
strated in Table 2.3. The purpose of Table 2.3 is to show examples of O, L and I advan-
tages typical for each of four types of multinational firms: ‘market-seekers’, ‘resource-
seekers’, ‘efficiency-seekers’ and ‘strategic asset-seekers’. Essentially, for each motive
for FDI Table 2.3 shows the ‘why’ of FDI activity, the ‘where’ of MNE activity and the
‘how’ of MNE activity. Table 2.3 also reports on the strategic long-term objectives, typ-
ical for each type of FDI.
2.4 The New Economic Geography
International business scholars place emphasis on the firm-specific determinants of in-
ternational economic activity (Dunning, 1998) and “on the unique characteristics of
MNEs as organisational entities rather than on the extent and geographical pattern
of their foreign activities (Dunning, 2009, p. 21). In other words, these scholars tend
to downplay the L-advantages of the eclectic paradigm in their studies of the determi-
nants of FDI and MNE activity (Dunning, 2009). The dramatic rise in global FDI activity
during the 1980s and 1990s led to the shift of focus away from MNE as an organisational
unit towards the spatial aspects of FDI activity, and the impact that globalisation had
on the geography of FDI. Towards the end of 1990s, Dunning (1998) recognised that
the new research agendas, particularly new economic geography, not only paid more
attention to the spatial aspects of FDI activity, but also sought “to incorporate these as-
pects to into the mainstream thinking about the growth and competitiveness of firms,
the relationship between trade and FDI, and the economic structure and dynamic com-
parative advantage of regions and countries” (p. 46).
Fujita and Krugman (2004) recognise that “the defining issue of the new eco-
nomic geography is how to explain the formation of a large variety of economic ag-
glomeration (or concentration) in geographical space” (p. 140), where the agglom-
eration and clustering of economic activity is found to occur at many different geo-
graphical levels. The theory relies on four inherent elements that underpin the general
functioning of the NEG models and collectively work to explain the spatial agglomer-
ation of industrial location: increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, non-
zero trade costs and external economies of scale (see: Ascani et al., 2012). Pioneered
with the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991), which shows that a country can
endogenously become differentiated into an industrialised ‘core’ and an agricultural
‘periphery’, the NEG literature combines traditional trade theory with agglomeration
economies. Procher (2009) notes that while traditional trade theory explains the for-
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Table 2.3: Types of international production - dominant motives
Types of interna-
tional production
O L I Strategic long-term objec-
tives of MNEsOwnership advantages:
(the ‘why of MNE activ-
ity)
Locational advantages:
(the ‘where’ of MNE
activity)
Internalisation advan-
tages: (the ‘how’ of MNE
activity)
Resource-seeking
FDI
Capital, technology, ac-
cess to markets, comple-
mentary assets, size and
bargaining strengths
Possession of natural re-
sources and related trans-
port and communication
advantage, tax and other
incentives
To ensure stability of sup-
plies at right price; to con-
trol markets
To gain privileged ac-
cess to resources vis-a`-vis
competitors
Market-seeking
FDI
Capital, technology, infor-
mation, management and
organisational skills, sur-
plus R&D and other ca-
pacity, economies of scale,
ability to generate brand
loyalty
Material and labour costs,
market size and charac-
teristics, government pol-
icy (e.g. with respect to
regulations and to import
controls, investment in-
centives, etc.)
A desire to reduce trans-
action costs, buyer igno-
rance or uncertainty, to
protect property rights
To protect existing
markets, counteract be-
haviour of competitors,
to preclude rivals or
potential rivals from
entering new markets
Efficiency-seeking
(rationalised) FDI
a) Of products
b) Of processes
As above, but also access
to markets, economies of
scope, geographical di-
versification and/or clus-
tering, and international
sourcing of inputs
a) Economies of product
or process specialisation
b) Low labour costs, in-
centives to local produc-
tion by host governments,
a favourable business en-
vironment
a) As for second cate-
gory, plus gains from
economies of common
governance
b) The economies of
vertical integration and
horizontal diversification
As part of regional or
global product rationali-
sation and/or to gain ad-
vantages of process spe-
cialisation
Strategic
Asset-seeking
(knowledge-
seeking) FDI
Any of first three that of-
fer opportunities for syn-
ergy with existing assets
Any of the first three that
offer technology, organi-
sational, and other assets
in which firm is deficient
Economies of common
governance, improved
competitive or strategic
advantages, to reduce or
spread risks
To strengthen global in-
novatory or production
competitiveness, to gain
new product lines or mar-
kets
(source: Dunning and Lundan, 2008)
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mation of industrial clusters using the concept of comparative advantage, NEG breaks
some of the assumptions of the traditional theory and affirms that the spatial concentra-
tion of economic activity is a result of an interplay between increasing returns to scale
and trade costs across space.
The spatial externality concept of ‘agglomeration economies’ that features in the
NEG theory can be traced back to Marshall (1890) and his “informal discussions of
‘external economies of scale’ ” (Johansson and Quigley, 2004, p. 165). According to
Marshall (1890), agglomeration engenders economies that are external to a firm, but
internal to a small geographical area, or ‘locality’ (see: Guimaraes et al., 2000). The
agglomeration economies refer to the benefits to firms from locating near to each other,
creating clusters of industrial activity (Glaeser, 2010). The benefits associated with this
type of externality include among others: proximity to the suppliers of intermediate
goods or to the customer base, access to more stable labour market and qualified pool
of workers, and knowledge spillovers between firms.
The NEG offers a micro-founded approach to spatial economics literature and
evidence as to why proximity matters. The theory assumes a market structure that is a
monopolistic competition with numerous and symmetric firms, where the goods pro-
duced by different firms are imperfect substitutes. Assuming non-zero costs of trade
across space, a profit-maximising firm chooses its location from where it can serve most
of its consumers. Trade costs are assumed to increase monotonically with distance due
to shipping costs and time in transit. Increasing returns to scale at the firm level lead to
clustering of firms in a few locations, as a consequence of positive technological exter-
nalities such as knowledge spillovers. Importantly, the positive productivity spillovers
are assumed to be better transmitted within dense configurations of economic activity
rather than within sparse and fragmented ones, recognising that proximity is good for
productivity: a fundamental building block of the NEG (Venables, 2006). Venables illus-
trates that firms locate where productivity is high, increasing local productivity further
and contributing to an uneven distribution of economic activity in geographic space,
leading to spatial income disparities.
The NEG theory emphasises the role of input-output relations between firms.
If the structure of production is vertical, meaning that one or more upstream sectors
produce and supply factors of production for one or more downstream sectors, then
backward and forward linkages between industries are present (assuming upstream
and downstream producers are each subject to increasing returns and trade costs).
Surico (2001) notes that the dichotomy of backward-forward linkages was developed
by Hirschman (1958). Backward linkages (also known as cost linkages) capture incen-
tives for economic agents, who demand final or intermediate goods, to locate close
to suppliers of these goods, which is where the upstream sector is located. Forward
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linkages (also known as demand linkages) capture incentives for producers of final or
intermediate goods to locate close to their consumers, which is where the downstream
sector is located. Factors like knowledge spillovers and backward and forward link-
ages generate ‘centripetal forces’ (i.e. agglomeration or clustering forces) that lead to a
spatial concentration of economic activity in a location.
Once a threshold is reached, an increasing concentration of firms in a location
can have a negative impact on the attractiveness of the location, thus generating ‘cen-
trifugal forces’ of agglomeration. These dispersion forces push the economic activity
apart and emerge as a consequence of the negative externalities, such as congestion or
immobile factors of production. The interplay between the centripetal and centrifugal
forces means that the relation between the spatial concentration of activity in a given
location and how attractive it is to a marginal investor resembles an inverted U-shape
profile (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). Where the relation is positive, the agglomeration
forces exceed the dispersion forces. Table 2.4 lists the main types of centripetal and
centrifugal forces.
Table 2.4: Forces affecting geographical concentration and dispersion of firms
Centripetal forces Centrifugal forces
Linkages Immobile factors
Thick markets Land rent/commuting
Knowledge spillovers and other pure ex-
ternal economies
Congestion and other pure diseconomies
(source: Fujita and Krugman, 2004)
Although Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010) classify the agglomeration economies as
one of the neoclassical location factors, a distinction between these is made by Wheeler
and Mody (1992), who consider the former a non-ergodic process and the latter one
an ergodic process. An ergodic system always returns to its initial state when the ini-
tial conditions are reproduced, which is regardless of the developments in the interim
period (Wheeler and Mody, 1992). The neoclassical location factors such as market
demand variables, supply-side characteristics or geographical features of the location,
imply an ergodic system. By contrast, a non-ergodic system exhibits strikingly different
and irreversible evolutionary responses to small changes in initial conditions (Wheeler
and Mody, 1992). The agglomeration economies imply a non-ergodic system. Both
ergodic and non-ergodic systems can result in the creation of spatial clusters of eco-
nomic activity, but agglomeration economies only arise under a non-ergodic system
when a gradual concentration of firms increases the attractiveness of a location (Jones
and Wren, 2006).
32
2.4.1 The Classification of Agglomeration Externalities
Boschma and Frenken (2011) argue that since the seminal paper by Glaeser et al. (1992)
the literature on agglomeration economies has attempted to determine if the strength
of agglomeration externalities and regional growth depend on the sectoral composition
of firms in a location. Essentially, the fundamental question is whether a firm benefits
more from other local companies of the same sector or from a diverse regional net-
work of industries. Marshall (1890), who pioneered the discussion on agglomeration
economies by specifying the advantages from geographical clustering of firms, listed
three main sources of benefits for a firm: the existence of close input-output relations
between firms (backward-forward linkages), the development of a pool of specialised
workforce and positive externalities resulting from spillover effects between firms (e.g.
technological or knowledge spillovers).
The agglomeration externalities arising from the knowledge spillovers feature
in the New Growth Theory (also known as the endogenous growth theory) developed
by Romer (1983, 1986, 1990), which attributes economic growth to technological change
and innovation. Jones and Wren (2010) note that knowledge flows between firms in the
same sector occur due to its inappropriability (Arrow, 1962b), but only within a lim-
ited geographical distance, and since spillovers occur through social interaction and in
proximity to a knowledge source (Ellison et al., 2010), then this suggests that they are
bounded to small areas where new knowledge is created (Beaudry and Schiffauerova,
2009; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999). Originating from the work of Marshall (1890),
Arrow (1962a) and Romer (1986), and later formalised by Glaeser et al. (1992) as the
Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) knowledge spillover, these occur predominantly within
an industry. Subsequently, these intra-industry spillovers came to be known as MAR
externalities, also referred to as ‘localisation externalities’ or ‘specialisation externali-
ties’.
On the contrary to the intra-industry knowledge spillover hypothesis, Jacobs
(1969) argues that knowledge spillovers occur not only within an industry, but actually
span complementary industries since the ideas developed by one sector can be appli-
cable in another one (van der Panne, 2004). As a consequence, a diversified sectoral
composition of firms in a location gives rise to urbanisation (diversification) externali-
ties that occur between industries. These inter-industry spillovers are usually referred
to as Jacobs externalities. Table 2.5 identifies and summarises the types of agglomera-
tion externalities. The externalities of Marshall (1890) correspond to economies of scale
that are external to a firm, but for completeness Table 2.5 discusses those economies of
scale that are internal to a firm. Internal economies capture the decreasing average cost
as the scale of production increases.
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Table 2.5: Classification of the economies of scale:
Type of economy of scale Example
Internal
1. Pecuniary Being able to purchase intermediate inputs at volume discounts
Technological
2. Static technological Falling average costs because of fixed costs of operating a plant
3. Dynamic technological Learning to operate a plant more efficiently over time
4. ‘Shopping’ Shoppers are attracted to places where there are many sellers
5. ‘Adam Smith’
specialization
Outsourcing allows both the upstream input suppliers and downstream firms
to profit from productivity gains because of specialization
Static
Localisation 6. ‘Marshall’ labour
pooling
Workers with industry-specific skills are attracted to a location where there is a
greater concentration
Dynamic 7. ‘Marshall-Arrow-
Romer’ learning by doing
Reductions in costs that arise from repeated and continuous production activity
over time and which spill over between firms in the same place
External or
agglomeration
8. ‘Jane Jacobs’ innovation The more that different things are done locally the more opportunity there is
for observing and adapting ideas from others
9. ‘Marshall’ labour
pooling
Workers in an industry bring innovations to firms in other industries; similar
to no. 6 above, but the benefit arises from the diversity of industries in one
locationStatic
Urbanisation 10. ‘Adam Smith’ division
of labour
Similar to no. 5 above, the main difference being that the division of labour is
made possible by the existence of many different buying industries in the same
place
Dynamic 11. ‘Romer’ endogenous
growth
The larger the market, the higher the profit; the more attractive the location to
firms, the more jobs there are; the more labour pools there, the larger the market
- and so on
12. ‘Pure’ agglomeration Spreading fixed costs of infrastructure over more taxpayers; diseconomies arise
from congestion and pollution
(source: The World Bank, 2009)
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2.4.2 Core-Periphery Models
As indicated above, a pioneering contribution to the NEG literature is the core-
periphery model of Krugman (1991). This shows that a country can endogenously
become differentiated into an industrialised ‘core’ and an agricultural ‘periphery’. A
simple two-region model with two kinds of production, agriculture and manufactur-
ing, is designed to address an important question of economic geography, specifically
why and when activity becomes concentrated in a few locations, leaving others rela-
tively underdeveloped.5 The importance of the Krugman model is that it initiated a
new class of core-periphery type of agglomeration models, some of which such as a
two-country, three-region NEG model developed by Bruelhart et al. (2004) can be used
to study the impact of regional economic integration on industrial location.
Krugman (1991) shows that the emergence of core-periphery pattern of indus-
trial location depends on the transportation costs, economies of scale and the share of
manufacturing in national income. Krugman (1991) observes that reasons for the lo-
calisation of industries in space are threefold. First, the clustering of firms in a single
location offers a pooled market for labour with industry-specific skills that ensures a
lower probability of unemployment and labour shortage. Second, localised industrial
clusters support the production of non-tradable specialised inputs. Third, knowledge
and information spillovers that occur over small areas promote a more efficient pro-
duction within clusters of economic activity rather than in isolation.
The core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) is a two-region model with two
sectors. Agriculture is characterised by a constant returns to scale and intensive use of
immobile land. An exogenous distribution of land determines the geographical pat-
tern of agricultural production. Manufacturing is characterised by increasing returns
to scale and a modest use of land, implying that manufacturing production is not re-
stricted to areas where land is available. Krugman (1991) shows that the increasing
returns to scale imply that manufacturing production takes place at only limited num-
ber of sites and non-zero transport costs cause production to locate in areas with a large
local market demand. Assuming the demand for manufactures comes from agricul-
tural and manufacturing sectors, Krugman notes that the market is large where other
manufacturing firms are concentrated, reinforcing a clustering of manufacturing pro-
duction in that area.6 Krugman (1991) explains that this ‘circular causation’ is created
by backward linkages, that is further reinforced by forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958),
as ceteris paribus the firms want to locate near the consumers of their goods and equally
5Economic geography studies the location of economic activity in geographic space and considers the
impact of the resulting spatial distribution on the actions of economic agents.
6This phenomenon is described by Myrdal (1957) as a ‘circular causation’ and by Arthur (1990) as
‘positive feedback’.
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near to the suppliers of their inputs.
An assumption of the Krugman model that helps to generate the core-periphery
pattern of industrial location is that it is pecuniary externalities (i.e. market-based)
rather than purely technological externalities (non-market based) lead to the emergence
of industrial ‘core’ and agricultural ‘periphery’. Table 2.5 summarises the different
types of economy of scale above. The model of Krugman (1991) assumes two factors
of production, each specific to one sector. Peasants produce agricultural goods and are
immobile between regions, but the workers, who are employed in manufacturing, can
move between two regions and go where higher real wages are paid. Transportation
costs are zero for agricultural output, but the transport of manufactures incurs ‘iceberg’
type transport costs.7
Regional convergence or divergence in the Krugman model depends on the
value of the model parameters, such as the share of expenditure on manufactured
goods, the elasticity of substitution between products and the fraction of the good
shipped that arrives at the destination. As workers move between regions, three forces
emerge that determine what happens to the relative real wage between the regions.
First, the ‘home market effect’ promotes regional divergence, since ceteris paribus the
real wage is higher in a larger market (Krugman, 1980). Second, the existence of ‘com-
petition effects’ promotes regional convergence as the workers in the region with less
manufacturing labour face less competition for the local peasant market. Third, a ‘price
index effect’ promotes divergence as inflows of workers to a region lower the price in-
dex in that region and so raise the real wage. The simulations of Krugman (1991) reveal
that an economy that is characterised by high transport costs, a small share of manufac-
turing and weak economies of scale is likely to lead to a pattern of manufacturing ac-
tivity that depends on the distribution of agriculture, so that there is no core-periphery
pattern. Conversely, when the opposite applies then manufacturing agglomerates in
the region that emerges as an early-stage manufacturing production centre, leading to
a core-periphery pattern.
2.4.3 Agglomeration of Technological Innovation
Although the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) discusses the agglomeration
economies in the context of an industrialised ‘core’ and an agricultural ‘periphery’, a
parallel can be drawn to the agglomeration of technological innovation. To begin with,
technological innovation had been seen mainly as the source of an ex-ante advantage
that allows firms to expand abroad, but over time the attention shifted to the inter-
7‘Iceberg’ transport costs imply that only a fraction of a unit of manufacturing goods shipped from one
region to the other, arrives at the final destination.
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national dispersion of corporate activities as a means of creating of new technological
competencies (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005). Crucially, in a rapidly globalising econ-
omy, and particularly within integrated area such as the EU, the technological develop-
ment effort of the multinational firms lead to an increasing number of linkages between
regions within and across national borders (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2000, 2001). The
analysis in Cantwell and Iammarino (2001) shows that technological capacity and sec-
toral specialisation of different EU regional centres and their evolution over time led to
a geographical hierarchy of regional centres operating across national borders within
the EU. The technology transfer resulted in the differentiation of the core European re-
gions into those characterised by more mature clusters of activity and narrow speciali-
sation patterns, and those which have broadened their specialisation and have shifted
towards the fields of high technological opportunities (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001).
Cantwell and Iammarino (2000), who look at the geographical distribution of innova-
tive activity across the UK regions, show that networks for innovation and location
choices of multinational firms conform, particularly within the EU, to the geographi-
cal hierarchy of centres established across and within national boundaries and that the
technological specialisation of foreign-owned affiliates depends on whether the region
is a ‘higher-order’ or a ‘lower-order’ location.
Technological innovative activity has a strong tendency to agglomerate in few
locations because of the benefits that arise from knowledge spillovers, a factor that gen-
erate centripetal forces of agglomeration. The accumulation of skills, know-how and
knowledge operates within spatially bounded areas, which promotes an emergence of
innovation clusters. Through their tendency to establish internal and external networks
for innovation the multinational firms, which play an increasing role as creators of in-
novation, can exacerbate the agglomeration processes of innovative activity (Cantwell
and Iammarino, 2001). Essentially, the objective of an investing multinational firm is
to increase its global technological advantage from selected foreign sources (Cantwell,
1989, 1992b, 1994) and this leads to reorganisation of their cross-border operations. Im-
portantly, a high degree of economic integration within the EU Single Market that was
supported by the removal of non-tariff barriers, the adoption of the Single currency,
and the commitments to full economic and monetary integration, has promoted “the
reorganisation of operations of both European and extra-EU multinational corporations
located in the area to a much greater extent than elsewhere” (Cantwell and Iammarino,
2001, p. 1011). This is supported by Cantwell (1992a), who shows that the interdepen-
dencies between geographically separated areas in which multinational firms operate
is relatively higher in Europe, leading to far more established intra-firm networks and
linkages between foreign-owned affiliates and local firms.
The NEG theory, which implies non-ergodic systems, is suited to explaining the
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mechanisms behind the formation of spatial clusters of technological innovative ac-
tivity. Cantwell (1991, 2000) show that the technological change is characterised by
path-dependency, meaning that the probability of adoption of specific kinds of tech-
nologies are influenced by the past decisions which constraints the limits of existing
choices (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001). The proposition that technological innovation
also proceeds as a cumulative process, which tends to ‘lock in’ to a particular course,
is accepted by Cantwell and Iammarino (2001) following a formal empirical analysis.
Other hypotheses included the incremental progression of innovation (i.e. firms tend to
progressively shift between related sectors), and differentiation of innovation between
firms and locations (i.e. the path of technological development that is followed by firms
in a location is distinctive and location-specific). The fifth enlargement, which led to the
widening of the integration in Europe, and the process of deepening of the integration
between the EU Member States (see: Chapter 3) makes it an interesting episode to study
the effects of innovation and technology transfer driven by multinational firms, espe-
cially if the motive for investment is knowledge-seeking.8
2.5 Location Factors
The eclectic paradigm that introduced the concept of three OLI advantages is the first
theoretical framework that explicitly models the location dimension of FDI activity. To-
gether with the typology of FDI motives of Dunning (1993), it provides the theoretical
underpinnings of the location choice decision of an investing multinational firm. Essen-
tially, the location factors are explored that affect the spatial distribution of FDI activity
and determine the choice of a host location. In this manner, the eclectic paradigm offers
a clear link between the theories of FDI and MNE on the one hand, and the empirical lit-
erature on FDI location choice on the other hand, which is discussed in the subsequent
sections of this chapter.
Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010) note that the location of FDI activity has mainly
been analysed from three theoretical perspectives: neoclassical, institutional and be-
havioural. The neoclassical perspective emphasises the role of profit- and cost-driving
location factors such as agglomeration economies of the NEG theory, while the insti-
tutional perspective focuses on the role of judicial and regulatory systems. The be-
havioural theories highlight the importance of investor-specific preferences in the lo-
cation choice decision of firms. In that respect, both the neoclassical and institutional
theories are based on factors that are ‘external’ to the firm, while the determinants of
8Although technology transfer is a relevant issue to be studied in the context of the fifth enlargement
and FDI location, this objective is not formally pursued due to the lack of data to capture innovation on a
scale of EU-25 countries and regions, which is a limitation of this thesis.
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FDI of behavioural strand are of an ‘internal nature’ (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). Start-
ing with the neoclassical perspective, these theories are discussed in the subsequent
sections of this chapter.9
2.5.1 The Neoclassical Location Factors
Neoclassical theory supposes that agents are rational and perfectly-informed, and that
they optimise by choosing a location that maximises profits or minimises costs. The
fundamental neoclassical location factor is market demand; otherwise known as the
market potential of a location (Procher, 2009). The most commonly used economic
indicators that capture market demand are GDP, GDP per capita, total population or
the GDP growth. The GDP and population terms capture the absolute size of the local
market. On the contrary, the GDP per capita is a better approximation for the relative
purchasing power of the population in the location. Finally, the growth of GDP reflects
on the economic performance of the location.
Crozet et al. (2004) maintain that when dealing with small geographical units the
use of local GDP as a proxy for market demand is problematic. At a disaggregated level
such as regions, it is plausible that investing multinational firms are seeking to serve
consumers beyond the regional borders of a chosen location. In such circumstances,
the market potential variable of Harris (1954) is perhaps a better way to capture the
features of a location choice decision. Importantly, Harris’ market potential variable
assumes that an investing firm not only takes into account the market size (GDP) of a
chosen location but also the income in all other locations weighted by the distance to the
chosen location. The distance serves as a proxy for the trade costs, which are assumed
to be monotonically increasing with the distance. Sometimes, the market potential term
accounts for the income level of the chosen location and the inverse-distance weighted
sum of incomes of the adjacent regions only, especially in situations when the number
of location alternatives is large. This helps to avoid over-complexity of estimation when
the number of regions is large.
In addition to demand-side considerations, the optimisation strategy of a ratio-
nal investor is influenced by supply-side conditions that affect the production costs,
and hence profitability. These supply-side characteristics encompass factors such as
labour costs, skills, the quality of the labour force and productivity. The manufactur-
ing wage rate is typically used as a proxy for the unit labour costs. Furthermore, the
unemployment rate is often included among supply-side variables, although its effect
on FDI is ambiguous. Disdier and Mayer (2004) argue that high unemployment can be
9Although I give examples of location factors most frequently employed in the formal analytical work,
a detailed review of the empirical literature is done in later sections of this chapter.
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interpreted as a signal of the availability of a large pool of workers (in which case, high
unemployment is a factor that attracts the investment), but it can also be viewed as the
sign of rigid labour market and poor quality labour force (a factor that discourages the
investment). This causes the expected effect of unemployment on the probability of
FDI location to be ambiguous. Finally, education attainment can be used as a measure
for the human capital endowment and skills, and proxy for the quality of the regional
pool of workers.
The neoclassical perspective highlights the importance of trade costs that are as-
sociated with investment and advocates the use of measures such as infrastructure and
distance in the location choice analysis. The most commonly employed proxy for the
quality of the infrastructure is the extent of road (or rail) infrastructure, normally ex-
pressed as the kilometres of motorways (railways) per kilometre squared. By enhancing
the distribution of goods and services in the region and facilitating the access to mar-
kets, a well-developed transport infrastructure is assumed to attract investment. Al-
though a well-developed transport infrastructure reduces trade costs, Jones and Wren
(2006) advise that any interpretation of the infrastructure variable should be treated
with caution, given that in addition to the reduction of trade costs, a well-developed
infrastructure is associated with high level of urbanisation, and thus a wide customer
base and congestion.
2.5.2 The Institutional and Behavioural Location Factors
The institutional theories extend the neoclassical set-up and emphasise the role played
by a network of economic relations (i.e. between MNEs and their clients, rival firms,
suppliers, public administration and local authorities), as well as the judicial and reg-
ulatory system in place. Although “the importance of economic institutions for eco-
nomic performance and investments is widely acknowledged in the political economy
literature” (Ascani et al., 2014, p. 6), there is limited attention in the empirical studies
on FDI location to the importance of these factors in shaping the final investment deci-
sions. Ascani et al. (2014) distinguish between two channels through which institutional
factors influence the operations of multinational firms abroad: direct and indirect. The
first emphasises the role of institutions in directly influencing the returns on investment
and the associated risk. The second emphasises the impact of institutions on other FDI
location determinants such as human capital and infrastructure.
Ascani et al. (2014) recognise three dimensions of institutional factors that have
a potential direct impact on the location decisions of foreign investors: regulatory mar-
ket conditions (i.e. labour market and business regulations), the legal environment (i.e.
property rights and contract enforcement) and the role of public expenditure in the
40
economy. Poor-quality institutions that are characterised by features such as corrup-
tion, poor enforcement and low levels of protection for property rights, are considered
by Disdier and Mayer (2004) to be an implicit tax on the investor, which discourage po-
tential FDI inflows. The analysis in Ascani et al. (2014) confirms the strong preference
that multinational firms attach to the enforcement of contracts. It also shows that a large
proportion of investors attach a positive value to the effective business regulation, but
fails to confirm that investors prefer more flexible labour markets. Finally, it recognises
that a significant preference heterogeneity exists between investors in their valuation of
the protection of property rights.
Beyond the three dimensions of institutional framework identified in Ascani
et al. (2014), other institutional location factors encompass characteristics such as taxes,
regional promotion incentive programs and environmental regulation (Arauzo-Carod
et al., 2010). The tax rate is one of the most common macroeconomic factors included
in the literature on FDI location choice determinants (Jones and Wren, 2006). Dev-
ereux and Griffith (1998), who advocate an effective average tax rate as a measure of
the impact of taxation on discrete FDI location choices, suggest that while “the cost of
capital, reflecting the effective marginal tax rate, is generally not significant in any of
the strategic choices (. . . ), the effective average tax rate does play an important role in
the choice of location” (p. 362). Although higher taxes imply a lower profitability of
investment, high-tax locations with better provision of public goods and services may
be preferred by multinational firms (Gabe and Bell, 2004). The regional incentive pro-
grams can be used to encourage inward investment and these can take different forms:
financial incentives (public subsidies), tax incentives (tax breaks and tax holidays), and
labour-promotion incentives (Basile et al., 2004). Although used to attract inward FDI,
the success of these incentive programs is not clear-cut and may depend on their design.
Finally, the behavioural perspective highlights the role of the preferences of the
entrepreneurs in their location choice. The ‘internal’ nature of the behavioural location
factors hinders a formal analysis owing to the difficulty in finding appropriate investor-
specific and firm-specific data. As a consequence, the behavioural perspective of FDI
location is relatively less studied empirically and is not formally considered in the re-
mainder of this thesis.
2.6 Empirical Literature
Empirical studies of FDI location typically use one of two research designs (Reinert
et al., 2010). The first uses aggregate count data on FDI flows into different countries
and applies a panel data methodology such as fixed and random effects models, as
well as the Poisson model, negative binomial model or zero-inflated Poisson model to
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examine the correlation between aggregate FDI flows and location factors. The second
type of design uses firm-level data to study decisions of multinational firms to set up
foreign production affiliates in a specific location, and uses a discrete choice method-
ology such as conditional, multinominal or nested logit. The first type of study offers
an insight into the location characteristics that attract inward investment, but it con-
ceals individual firm-specific attributes that underlie a location decision of a firm that
chooses to invest abroad. The second type of analysis offers more valuable information
about the location choice decisions of investing multinational firms, but publicly and
widely available data on FDI decisions are not widespread.
Looking at the empirical studies of FDI location, what is remarkable is that while
there are many studies of inward FDI for the US and UK (for the US: e.g. Little, 1978;
Arpan and Ricks, 1986; Glickman and Woodward, 1987; Coughlin et al., 1991; Wood-
ward, 1992; Friedman et al., 1992; and for the UK: e.g. Dicken and Lloyd, 1976; Mc-
Dermott, 1977; Watts, 1982; Hill and Munday, 1992; Taylor, 1993) - and more recently
for other European countries (e.g. Crozet et al., 2004 on France; Kalotay, 2008 on Bul-
garia and Romania; Chidlow et al., 2009 on Poland; and Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005 and
Kiss, 2007 on Hungary) - there are remarkably few cross-country studies at the Euro-
pean level. With the exception of Alegria (2006), to the best of my knowledge there
has been no other attempt made yet to model and understand the determinants of lo-
cation choices of multinational companies within a set of countries that is as large as
the European Union of 25 Member States. The aim of this section is to provide the
reader, through selective reference to some of the empirical literature, with a better
understanding of how the spatial economics literature has developed over time. This
will help to place this study in this strand of economic research and thereby provide the
background information needed to understand the study and highlight what is original
in what I am proposing to do in this thesis.
2.6.1 Early Empirical Evidence: Location of FDI in the US
The early empirical work on investment location investigates the determinants of lo-
cation choice of domestic and foreign-owned firms that set-up their production facili-
ties in the United States. A pioneering figure in industrial location research is Dennis
W. Carlton (Guimaraes et al., 2002). In his study Carlton (1983) emphasises the fact
that business location is a subject of great interest: not only to investors who want to
know where it is best to locate their plants, but also to policymakers who want to know
how best to attract these investors. Despite all the interest, Carlton (1983) argues that
economists at the time knew very little about the factors influencing new business lo-
cation. Part of the reason for the economists’ unfamiliarity with the factors influencing
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industrial location is, according to Carlton (1983), a lack of data on new business for-
mation.
Although Carlton (1983) does not focus on foreign investment but on new busi-
ness location as a whole, the innovative aspect of Carlton’s research is that he was
the first to apply McFadden’s conditional logit model to study firms’ location, thus
opening-up this area of applied location research. The discrete choice modelling ap-
proach, which is now the well-established methodology in the industrial location lit-
erature, was first employed by Carlton (1979), when he noticed parallels between the
location decision of firms and the shopping trip mode and destination decisions of in-
dividuals. The latter two of these are used by McFadden (1974), as an example of a
consumer choice area that can be analysed using conditional logit methodology.
As noted by Guimaraes et al. (2003), in practice the application of conditional
logit methodology to model industrial location choice poses problems related to the
exact definition of the spatial choice set. Large geographical areas inevitably imply a
substantial heterogeneity that exists within them, while the sourcing of data becomes
more problematic at more disaggregated levels such as regions. This issue is recog-
nised by Carlton (1983), who attempted to model the location choices of firms looking
at individual plants in narrowly-defined industries (i.e. 4-digit SIC code) and narrowly-
defined geographical units (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area - SMSAs). The fo-
cus on small geographical units and narrowly-defined industries, in addition to using
the multinomial logit methodology, constitutes Carlton’s second significant and long-
lasting contribution to analysing firms’ location choice (Guimaraes et al., 2002).
In his pioneering study Carlton (1983) uses the Dun and Bradstreet data - a firm
database, reporting information on location, employment created and four-digit SIC
industry code - to model location and the employment choices of new branch plants
of manufacturing firms in the US. The main findings of this study suggest that en-
ergy costs have a large and negative effect on firms’ location decision and that existing
concentration of employment (firm agglomeration) promotes subsequent investment.
Carlton (1983) argues that a large negative energy cost effect can either be a sign of
energy-intensive technology of new firms or that energy is a proxy for prices of other
heavily energy-dependent factors of production. As far as labour cost is concerned, this
study is unable to precisely measure the wage effect on industrial location. Similarly,
the effect of unemployment is ambiguous. The findings of Carlton (1983) also do not
support the important role played by public policy in the attraction of investment, as
low taxes and state incentive programs do not appear to have a positive and significant
effect on the location of firms.
Following Carlton (1983), there are more studies of the regional location of firms
in the US that utilise the conditional logit methodology. A study of location decisions
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for new manufacturing plants in the US by Bartik (1985), just like that of Carlton (1983),
uses the Dun and Bradstreet business directory and employs a conditional logit model
to analyse the determinants of new manufacturing investment. Bartik (1985) exam-
ines how the firm location decision is influenced by unionisation, taxes and other state
characteristics. Among the regressors, Bartik (1985) includes labour force characteris-
tics such as wages and education, and the existing level of manufacturing activity to
capture agglomeration economies.
The main finding is that a high unionisation rate of workers has a strong nega-
tive and statistically significant effect on firm location. High level of taxes - corporation
and property taxes - are also found to be a factor that discourages investment; the ef-
fect of other taxes, such as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, is
generally found to be ambiguous. Bartik (1985) concludes that existing manufacturing
activity has a significantly positive effect on location, while wages have a significantly
negative effect. The effect of education and energy prices is found to be inconclusive.
Finally, Bartik (1985) formulates and finds support for the ‘dartboard theory’ of indus-
trial location, where the land elasticity of new branch plants is approximately one. In
other words, a state with twice as many potential location sites as another state has a
double probability of hosting a new investment, ceteris paribus (Coughlin et al., 1991).
One of the first studies to specifically focus on the inward FDI is Luger and
Shetty (1985), who analyse the location of new foreign plant start-ups in three sepa-
rate three-digit manufacturing industries in the US over the years 1979 and 1981-83.
The authors make it clear that the small number of observations does not allow them
to conduct the analysis at the four-digit industry level, like Carlton (1983). Their arti-
cle examines the effect that agglomeration economies, urbanisation economies, labour
market conditions and state promotional activities have on the location of FDI. The last
of these factors is the main object of their attention given the considerable growth in
US states’ expenditure on the attraction of FDI activities over the course of the 1970s.
Luger and Shetty (1985) claim that this growth in spending on FDI promotion is a reflec-
tion of the importance attached to the employment creation potential of multinational
enterprises.
Using the effort index that is constructed to summarise the variety of programs
used by US states to attract FDI and a tax variable to capture the effect of public policies,
Luger and Shetty (1985) conclude that public policies do not appear to have a uniform
effect on the location of FDI in different industries. Their result is in line with the pre-
vious finding in Carlton (1983). The fundamental finding of Luger and Shetty (1985)
is that the two most important determinants of new plant location are agglomeration
economies, which authors capture by the level of industrial activity in total man-hours,
and the wage rate. While the former result is in line with Carlton (1983), the latter is
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contrary to Carlton (1983) and suggests that labour costs do indeed matter in firms’ lo-
cation decision. While the results of their research correspond with economic intuition,
Friedman et al. (1992) criticise the study of Luger and Shetty (1985) for producing re-
sults with only limited statistical significance given a small sample size (21, 27 and 28
observations respectively for three manufacturing industries considered).
Following Carlton (1983), Bartik (1985) and Luger and Shetty (1985), Coughlin
et al. (1991) analyse the location of manufacturing FDI in the US over the period 1981-83
using the conditional logit model. Specifically, they model the state-level determinants
of the frequency distribution of FDI across the 50 US states. Coughlin et al. (1991) note
that although their research of FDI location is of “increasing importance to the United
States public in general and is of direct relevance to the economic development efforts
of individual states” (p. 681), only a handful of studies analyse the location of FDI
throughout the US empirically.10
Focusing on the manufacturing FDI, Coughlin et al. (1991) find that the US states
with higher income per capita (a measure of market demand) and higher manufactur-
ing density (a proxy for market demand and agglomeration economies) attract more
inward FDI. The characteristics of the labour market are important in that higher wages
discourage investment, whereas higher unemployment and higher unionisation attract
it. Overall, taxes act as a deterrent of inward FDI location, although more extensive
transport infrastructures (which depends on public funding) and larger state promo-
tional expenditure are associated with increased probability of FDI location. Finally,
Coughlin et al. (1991) find relatively little support for Bartik’s (1985) ‘dartboard theory’
of industrial location with respect to inward FDI.
A focus on the specific origin country of FDI is a distinctive feature of Woodward
(1992), who investigates the location decisions of Japanese-affiliated manufacturing in-
vestments in the US. Using Japan Economic Institute (JEI) micro data on 540 Japanese
manufacturing plants investing in US states over 1980-89, Woodward (1992) analyses
the determinants of investment location using a conditional logit model. As highlighted
by Woodward (1992), over the course of the 1980s Japanese FDI in the US rose substan-
tially, growing faster than inward investment from any other country. Starting from
being the seventh largest inward investor in the US in 1980, Japan became the second
largest investor by the end of the 1980s. Furthermore, as argued by Woodward (1992),
Japanese investors tend to prefer to build new ‘greenfield’ plant, as opposed to acquir-
ing existing assets. With greenfield start-ups requiring an explicit location choice, it is
worthwhile to understand the rationale behind the location decision.
10Among those studies Coughlin et al. (1991) mention Little (1978), Luger and Shetty (1985), Glickman
and Woodward (1987) and Coughlin et al. (1990). Rather than FDI, more studies exist that analyse the
location of aggregate economic activity.
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The state-level regression estimates in Woodward (1992) suggest that the unioni-
sation rate has a very pronounced negative impact on Japanese industrial location, after
controlling for other state attributes. This finding is consistent with the result presented
in Bartik (1985). Woodward (1992) also introduces a market size variable that is mea-
sured as the state’s own income and the sum of the income of all other states, weighted
by distance. This variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on Japanese
FDI. Woodward (1992) attempts to measure the effect of state promotion activities on lo-
cation by introducing the promotion effort index previously constructed by Luger and
Shetty (1985) and a dummy for the presence of US state promotion office in Japan.11
The former is found not to have a statistically significant effect on FDI, consistent with
Luger and Shetty (1985), but the latter has a positive and statistically significant effect.
Woodward (1992) also runs county-level regressions, in which he introduces
variables to capture agglomeration and urbanisation economies. Agglomeration
economies are proxied by the existing number of manufacturing plants, while urban-
isation economies are captured by population density. Both of these variables have a
positive and statistically significant effect on FDI, confirming that Japanese investors
are drawn to densely populated areas with existing strong manufacturing base. Wood-
ward (1992) concludes that cities typically create advantageous external economies for
locating firms, by offering adequate utilities, good transport and communication links,
as well as a base of professional services. The econometric approach used by Wood-
ward (1992), however, is heavily criticised by Friedman et al. (1992), who highlight
that Woodward (1992) uses independent variables that are measured at one point in
time, 1980, to explain the determinants of Japanese FDI location decision over the en-
tire 1980-89 period. Woodward’s (1992) argument for following this approach is that
most investment decisions are made in the early to mid-1980s period and that a similar
approach is used in other studies of this nature. Considering that this approach is not
followed in more recent studies of industrial location it clearly points to the progress
that has been made.
Friedman et al. (1992) study the location choices of Japanese and European multi-
national companies across US states between 1977-88 and opt for a different approach.
They arrange their FDI location data into three distinct sub-periods: 1977-80, 1981-85
and 1986-88, and in the empirical analysis pair these three sub-periods with the 1976,
1980 and 1985 values of independent variables respectively. In the words of Friedman
et al. (1992), this approach recognises that there exists a lag between the information and
final decision of multinational companies to invest such that the 1976 values of indepen-
dent variables may not be relevant to a plant location decision in 1988. Friedman et al.
(1992) identify market size, manufacturing wage rate, transportation infrastructure and
11In Luger and Shetty (1985), the corresponding index is referred to as the ‘effort index’.
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state promotional activities as four major factors determining the location of investment
in the US. The innovation and originality of the Friedman et al. (1992) approach derives
from conducting separate analyses of investment location determinants for Japanese
and European multinationals, as well as for all investors. The authors draw the conclu-
sion that while the direction of influence and statistical significance of the independent
variables for Japanese FDI are consistent with these of the all-country model, the invest-
ment determinants are substantially different for European multinationals. Friedman
et al. (1992) suggest that different estimates can stem from dissimilarities in industrial
composition of FDI from these different source areas.
The location decisions of Japanese manufacturing firms in the US is once more
the focus of research, this time by Head et al. (1995). Just like Woodward (1992),
Head et al. (1995) focus on the location choices of Japanese firms over the period 1980-
89. The methodology is a conditional logit model, and the choice set for investors is
US states. Their dataset contains 751 investment decisions in 225 different four-digit
manufacturing industries. A distinguishing feature of their paper is that it analyses
the effect of four types of agglomeration economies on the probability of subsequent
Japanese investment, i.e. agglomeration of US activity, Japanese activity, industrial
group (‘keiretsu’) member activity and border state activity. With the inclusion of the
border state agglomeration, Head et al. (1995) seek to determine whether the agglom-
eration effects cross state boundaries and if their magnitude declines with distance.12
The inclusion of the distance-weighted market power of the other regions, as in Wood-
ward (1992), seems an appropriate approach. Head et al. (1995) argue that previous
studies have not distinguished between endowment and industry-agglomeration ef-
fects. They argue that manufacturing activity (the variable used to capture agglom-
eration economies in Bartik, 1985) is likely to be correlated with unmeasured location
factors, so that the coefficient on manufacturing activity partly captures the effect of
unobserved endowments.
The empirical estimates in Head et al. (1995) suggest that the location of Japanese
investment in the US is significantly influenced by previous Japanese investment in the
same industry and/or ‘keiretsu’. This, according to Head et al. (1995), demonstrates the
‘follow-the-leader’ strategy of Japanese investors. This result implies that “any benefits
received from attracting a single investment will be magnified by an increased probabil-
ity of attracting subsequent similar investments” (Head et al., 1995, p. 243). As regards
the US activity agglomeration economies it turns out to be important, but findings of
the study show that Japanese firms do not simply mimic the geographical pattern of
US manufacturing plants. Lastly, the estimated magnitude of the border-state activity
12This puts into question the analysis of industrial location at a very disaggregated geographical level
without taking into account economic activity in neighbouring areas, such as in Carlton (1983).
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has up to two-thirds of the attractive power of in-state activity, which in the words of
Head et al. (1995) discredits the anecdotal accounts of agglomeration effects operating
over small geographical areas only.
2.6.2 Location of FDI in the ‘Old’ EU Member States
While a lot of early location studies are undertaken for the US and generally at the
state-level, regional studies of FDI location are also undertaken for some individual Eu-
ropean countries. Some of the most prominent examples of early studies of investment
location in a single European country include Dicken and Lloyd (1976), McDermott
(1977) and Watts (1982) - all carried out with reference to investment location in the
United Kingdom. These three key early studies were later referred to by Hill and Mun-
day (1992), who analyse the regional distribution of FDI within the UK. As summarised
by Hill and Munday (1992), Dicken and Lloyd (1976) observe the heavy concentration
of US manufacturing activity in the South East of England, while acknowledging some
shift of investment towards the peripheral regions since the 1940s. A similar trend is
noted by McDermott (1977), who notices a greater propensity of foreign manufactur-
ing firms to locate in the UK Assisted Areas during the 1960s. Finally, the analysis of
the regional distribution of investment in the 1970s by Watts (1982) also concurs with
this location trend, but remarks on the apparent reluctance of foreign firms to locate
between the South East and the peripheral regions.
Hill and Munday (1992), using the Invest in Britain Bureau (IBB) data on new
investment projects and new jobs for the time period 1979-89, find a shift in FDI em-
ployment shares away from the South East, with the South West and the North gaining
most. However, the authors admit that working with IBB data requires a degree of
caution, as in reality figures relate to announced new investment projects and the pre-
dicted long-term employment associated with these projects, implying that at times the
data may not be a genuine representation of the actual investment and jobs generated,
although Jones and Wren (2004) find these data are reliable. Moreover, the IBB data is
likely to over-represent those investment projects for which firms actively seek some
financial assistance, meaning that inward investment in the South East of England may
be relatively under-recorded, considering this region is not eligible for any form of cen-
tral government financial assistance.
The empirical approach adopted by Hill and Munday (1992) is to regress the de-
pendent variable (either the regional share of new FDI projects relative to the regional
share of total employment or the regional share of new FDI jobs relative to the regional
share of total employment) on three independent variables: the regional share of to-
tal UK Regional Preferential Assistance expenditure, the ratio of regional average male
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earnings to the UK average and the regional share of spending on road transport infras-
tructure. Independent variables are lagged one year to reflect the possibility of a delay
between regional information being available to investors and the final investment de-
cision being taken. The empirical approach of Hill and Munday (1992) differs to that
taken by most of the early empirical US studies of investment, which employ discrete
choice models, as they use aggregate regional FDI data.
The results of Hill and Munday (1992) suggest that both regional financial incen-
tives and the road transport system have a positive and statistically significant effect on
investment location. The labour cost variable is found to be insignificant. The results,
to some degree, echo those of Friedman et al. (1992), who at the similar point in time
but using a conditional logit model, find that transportation infrastructure and state
promotional activities are among the main determinants of FDI location in the US. The
studies differ, however, in their prediction regarding the effect of labour costs. In con-
clusion, Hill and Munday (1992) raise the possibility that the UK regions along with
other European regions may engage in competitive bidding for inward FDI. Hill and
Munday (1992) also claim that despite growing interest, the data limitations at the time
prevented the empirical analysis of the distribution of inward investment across Euro-
pean regions.
The location of Japanese inward investment, which is studied by academics such
as Woodward (1992), Friedman et al. (1992) and Head et al. (1995) in the US, was also of
interest in Europe. Taylor (1993) notes that inflows of Japanese investment into the UK
experienced rapid growth during the 1980s and he attempts to identify the factors that
determine the spatial distribution of Japanese manufacturing plants in the UK over
1984-91. While there are previous studies on Japanese investment in Europe, Taylor
(1993) argues that “much of this previous work, however, has been concerned with the
question of why Japanese investors have chosen to locate in the EC and why they have
chosen to locate in some countries rather than in others (Dicken, 1987; Morris, 1988;
Kumar, 1991)” (p. 1209), but without trying to understand what factors actually drove
the location choice.
Contrary to Woodward (1992), Friedman et al. (1992) and Head et al. (1995) who
employ a conditional logit model, Taylor (1993) analyses project data as counts and un-
dertakes a multivariate statistical analysis based on the Poisson model to analyse the
inter-county variation in the number of Japanese plants locating in each UK county
during two separate time periods: 1984-88 and 1989-91. In addition to understanding
what factors influence the location decisions of Japanese investors, this study attempts
to evaluate the effectiveness of UK regional policy. Recalling the paper by Hill and
Munday (1992) as well as early US studies, it is evident that at the time regional pol-
icy attracted a fair degree of attention. The dependent variable of Taylor (1993) is the
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frequency of Japanese manufacturing firms selecting a particular geographical location
(UK county) during the time period under consideration. Taylor (1993) explains that
with the dependent variable being a non-negative integer the Poisson model seems
a suitable technique, highlighting the fact that the non-normal distribution of the de-
pendent variable makes the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression unsuit-
able.13 Quoting the earlier work of Kumar (1991), Taylor (1993) points to a strong
‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of Japanese companies that perpetuates the concentra-
tion of Japanese establishments in specific geographical areas. Taylor (1993) argues that
this is explained by buyer-supplier linkages.
As mentioned earlier, Taylor (1993) splits the sample into two sub-periods: 1984-
88 and 1989-91. The year 1988 saw the abolishment of the Regional Development Grant
scheme, which was a significant change to UK regional policy. Taylor (1993) notes
that when locating in the UK Japanese firms appear to strongly favour locations with
assisted-area status, where these grants are available, with only 24% of firms selecting
locations that are not classed as an assisted area. The results confirm that over both time
periods Japanese industrial location is strongly influenced by the assisted area status of
a location, recognising the success of UK regional economic policy, and a diverse in-
dustrial base. The second of these results suggests that good supply linkages together
with an appropriately-trained workforce matter to potential investors (Taylor, 1993).
The analysis of the industrial location choices of investors for European coun-
tries is not limited to the UK. Guimaraes et al. (2000) analyse the regional distribution
of FDI in Portugal. They note note that, with few exceptions such as Hill and Munday
(1992), most studies of FDI regional location have been conducted for the US. For that
reason the empirical study of Guimaraes et al. (2000) has become one of the key studies
of regional location of FDI for the case of a European country. Guimaraes et al. (2000)
admit that the modelling of plant location choices requires highly-disaggregated indus-
trial and spatial data and that reliable data on new plant locations are rare, which are
two major factors that have hampered research on the location decisions of firms.
Guimaraes et al. (2000) use a discrete choice framework to examine the location
decisions of foreign-owned manufacturing plants in Portuguese concelhos (regions)
over the 1985-92 period. They focus on ‘greenfield’ investment only, i.e. new start-ups.
A factor that the authors consider important for the location decisions of ‘greenfield’
investment and which becomes a focus of their study is the existence of agglomeration
economies. Guimaraes et al. (2000) argue that agglomeration economies in the form
of the presence of other firms in the same industry and the presence of other foreign
13Taylor (1993), however, identifies a potential problem with using the Poisson model, which assumes
that each firm’s choice is independent of other firms’ choices. This assumption is invalidated whenever
there is mimicking behaviour by firms.
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firms and services, can help multinational enterprises to reduce their information and
search costs, and risks associated with investing in an unfamiliar location. The existing
industrial clusters of economic activity can signal a set of favourable conditions, such
as availability of specialised workforce, intermediate suppliers and natural resources.
Four variables for agglomeration economies are included in the empirical anal-
ysis: manufacturing agglomeration economies (total manufacturing employment per
kilometre squared), industry-specific agglomeration (share of manufacturing employ-
ment in the same three-digit SIC industry), foreign-specific agglomeration (share of
total employment in foreign plants) and service agglomeration (share of total employ-
ment in the service sector). This resembles the approach taken by Head et al. (1995),
who emphasise the inadequacies of lumping together different types of agglomeration
economies and capturing them with a single variable. Other regional characteristics
considered in the analysis are education variables, labour cost, population density and
average travel time distance to major economic centres (Porto and Lisbon), as well as
Lisbon and Porto dummies. Taxes are not relevant as they are set at a national level
in Portugal. Finally, Guimaraes et al. (2000) justify their decision for not including lo-
cal demand variables by arguing that Portuguese concelhos are too small geographical
areas for the market served by foreign firms to coincide with their geographical bound-
aries. Furthermore, Guimaraes et al. (2000) suspect that foreign manufacturers that are
located in Portugal are actually serving international markets - primary those in the rest
of the EU.
The findings of this study suggest that agglomeration economies are a major de-
terminant of ‘greenfield’ manufacturing investment location decisions, a result that is
consistent with Head et al. (1995) for Japanese manufacturing firms in the US states. The
magnitude of this effect is strongest for service agglomeration, followed by industry-
specific agglomeration. Total manufacturing agglomeration also has a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on FDI, but its magnitude is much smaller. Foreign-specific
agglomeration is insignificant, which Guimaraes et al. (2000) believe is the effect of con-
trolling for locational ‘pull’ of the largest cities - Lisbon and Porto. The distance to
Portugal’s main cities proves to be statistically significant, implying travel costs matter
for investors. Other variables such as population density or labour costs do not seem
to influence the location of investment. Guimaraes et al. (2000) conclude that the ‘pull’
of the largest urban centres and the importance of travel costs suggest a crucial role
for public policy, especially in relation to infrastructure investment, which can help to
reduce travel time and hence, help to disperse economic growth through the attraction
of private investment to new localities.
Count data models are applied by Basile (2004) to examine the determinants of
FDI location in Italy over the period 1986-99. A distinguishing feature of the study by
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Basile (2004) is that it contrasts the location determinants of ‘greenfield’ and acquisi-
tions FDI. This is the novelty of his approach in the sense that the majority of the previ-
ous studies analyse the location choices of either aggregate investment (e.g. Coughlin
et al., 1991) or ‘greenfield’ plants only (e.g. Guimaraes et al., 2000). Friedman et al. (1992)
argues that not distinguishing between the mode of investment entry is the main weak-
ness of the study of Coughlin et al. (1991) considered above. Quoting Head et al. (1995),
Basile (2004) argues that with some rare exceptions, such as O´ Huallacha´in and Reid
(1997), acquisitions are largely ignored in industrial location literature as they play a
secondary role in regional industrial development policies, while this mode of entry
is constrained by the supply of acquisition candidates. Basile (2004) notes that while
‘greenfield’ investment has a direct effect on job creation, acquisitions are important
for technological and organisational knowledge transfer. In addition, the majority of
inward FDI in Italy over the period is in the form of acquisitions (Basile, 2004).
The empirical analysis is conducted for 95 Italian provinces (NUTS 3 regional
level). The dependent variable is the number of firms acquired and created by foreign
companies in Italian provinces and the random-effects negative binomial model is used
to analyse this data. The explanatory variables are grouped into five categories: market
demand, agglomeration economies, asymmetric information, infrastructures and local
labour market. While the agglomeration economies refer to the total number of man-
ufacturing establishments, asymmetric information relates to the number of foreign-
owned manufacturing plants. Basile (2004) adopts a novel approach for measuring
market demand, which is approximated using total electrical consumption of firms
and households. Basile (2004) claims that this approach helps to accurately measure
the role of the Italian underground economy, whose role is normally underestimated
when regional GDP is used.
The results show that the determinants of location differ between acquisitions
and ‘greenfield’ investment. Acquisitions are positively affected by both general and
foreign-firms agglomeration, with the effect of the latter being stronger, suggesting that
the attractive effect of prior foreign investment exceeds that of prior domestic invest-
ment (Basile, 2004). Greenfield investment, on the other hand, is influenced by previous
foreign manufacturing investment only. This contrasts with Head et al. (1995), who find
that domestic firms’ activity has a positive effect on FDI location, although not as strong
as foreign firms’ activity. Basile (2004) also shows that for acquisitions the agglomer-
ation effects cross provincial boundaries, while operating over small, within-province
distances for ‘greenfield’ plants. The latter of the results once again contradicts that
of Head et al. (1995), who find that border-state activity has up to two-thirds of the
attractive power of in-state activity.
An extension of the Basile (2004) paper offers an insight into the role of public in-
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frastructure investment for the attraction of investment. The fact that the geographical
distribution of FDI in Italy is imbalanced, with a strong concentration in the North-
West and sparsely in the Southern provinces of Mezzogiorno, provides a scene for the
exploration of this issue. Basile (2004) runs three separate quantitative simulations to
investigate how FDI location choices would be affected under three different scenarios:
160% increase in the existing public infrastructure stock in the South (to match that of
Milan’s province), 80% increase in the existing public infrastructure stock (to match that
of an average province) and a modest increase of 10%. Assuming endogenous agglom-
eration economies are in operation, the results of the simulations confirm that only a
substantial change in the attractiveness of the peripheral Southern provinces can suc-
ceed in attracting industrial activity. Basile (2004) concludes that growth-stimulating,
regionally-diversified fiscal policy is likely to play an important role in the attraction of
investment to the most backward areas.
At about the same time as Basile, Crozet et al. (2004) study the determinants of
location choices of foreign investors in France. A significant contribution of Crozet et al.
(2004), somewhat linked to and expanded on what is the concluding remark in Basile
(2004), is that the effects of European Structural Funds and grants on investment loca-
tion are examined.14 As argued by Crozet et al. (2004), regional policies are increasingly
being used by European, national and regional authorities in an attempt to influence
the location of economic activity in favour of the lagging regions, which provides the
rationale for exploring the degree to which they succeed in attracting FDI. Crozet et al.
(2004) have access to a large sample of about 4,000 foreign manufacturing investment
projects locating in France over 1985 to 1995. The large dataset allows a detailed anal-
ysis of investment determinants according to the industry or the origin country of in-
vestor to be conducted. To examine the location choices of investors over all 92 French
de´partements (NUTS 3 level) Crozet et al. (2004) employ a conditional logit model and,
what is another key contribution of this paper, the nested logit methodology. That con-
firms the progress that has occurred since Carlton (1983) was writing his famous paper,
when the widespread use of conditional logit with its assumption of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) was dictated by the computational power of the existing
technology.15
In addition to investigating the role of regional policy and grant variables, this
study tests for the presence of agglomeration economies. In their study Crozet et al.
14Specifically considered are Objective 2 and Objective 5b funds, the Community Initiative fund and
PAT regional policy grants.
15McFadden (1974) recognises that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is a
major shortcoming of the conditional logit model. Essentially, IIA assumption imposes a uniform pattern
of substitutability between alternative locations but does not hold when two location alternatives are con-
sidered closer substitutes than other locations. The IIA assumption is considered in more detail in Chapter
4 where I introduce data and discuss the methodology.
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(2004) distinguish between three types of agglomeration economies: agglomeration of
French firms, agglomeration of origin country firms and agglomeration of other foreign
firms. Some ‘traditional’ neoclassical location factors such as Harris’ (1954) distance-
weighted market potential, labour cost and distance from host to home country are
also included. An analysis on the complete sample of FDI projects shows that all types
of agglomeration economies have a positive and statistically significant effect on the
location of foreign firms, providing evidence for the positive spillovers between firms.
What is remarkable is the fact that the French firm agglomeration appears to affect the
location choices of investors more strongly than any other agglomeration. This finding
is not consistent with that of Basile (2004) and Head et al. (1995). Crozet et al. (2004)
seek an interpretation of this result referring to a concept of ‘informational externali-
ties’ (Banerjee, 1992; DeCoster and Strange, 1993). Assuming that French firms have
better information than foreign firms on the ‘true’ comparative advantages of French
de´partements it would imply that it is better for foreign investors to follow the location
strategy of their French rivals.
The analysis of the influence of regional policies on location choice shows that
community initiative grants and PAT grants (the latter being the main tool of French
regional policy) have a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI location but
the size of the effect is smaller and largely outweighed by agglomeration economies
or market potential. On the other hand, pooled results in Crozet et al. (2004) leave no
support for the hypothesis of EU Structural Funds having a major role in reshaping the
location patterns of FDI. Crozet et al. (2004) argue that other empirical studies also find
no evidence of the success of EU regional policy in promoting regional attractiveness
and economic growth, referring specifically to the publications of Boldrin and Canova
(2001), Ferrer (1998) and Martin (1998). Crozet et al. (2004) continue their argument
saying that the result does not imply that EU regional policy funds are inefficient. What
the result might confirm, however, is that EU regional policy is not able to “actually
influence or even reverse the ‘natural’ location patterns of economic activity in Europe”
(Crozet et al., 2004, p. 48).
2.6.3 Location of FDI in the ‘New’ EU Member States
The empirical analyses of investment decisions for the case of a Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Country (CEEC) are a more recent addition to the literature, owing to the fact
that until the end of 1980s CEECs were under Communism and received virtually no
FDI inflows. Naturally the process of transition and associated market reform dramat-
ically changed the scene and as the economies of these countries opened to the ‘West’,
FDI started to flow in. Further, the process of accession negotiations with the European
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Union (EU) helped CEECs to transform their economies. As CEECs gradually became
an emerging market - it potentially offered a first-mover advantage - academics have
increasingly turned to study FDI in the transition economies.
Resmini (2000) examines the determinants of the size of FDI inflows from the
EU to 12 CEECs at the sectoral level over the period 1990-95. Resmini (2000) notes that
this early transition period in the first half of the 1990s was characterised by strong
growth in the level of EU FDI inflows to CEECs as market reforms and transition to-
wards democracy and a market economy began. Preliminary analysis of FDI data for
that period reveals that Germany, Austria and Italy (as of 1995 onwards the three most
eastern outposts of the EU-15) are the most active investors in the region. Similarly, the
greatest share of FDI, both in terms of number of projects and value of investment, is
concentrated in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - three countries that share
a common border with at least one of three key investor countries. In that sense, the
distance between home and host country appears to be one of the factors driving the in-
vestment. Moreover, Resmini (2000) highlights that the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland are the three countries that were deemed to be the most successful in reforming
their economies during the transition.
The dataset that Resmini (2000) uses for the purpose of this research contains
approximately 3,000 investment projects that are classified by four-digit NACE sec-
tors. This study concentrates on manufacturing FDI, which in the analysis is grouped
into four sectors: traditional sectors, scale-intensive sectors, high-tech sectors and spe-
cialised producers. As highlighted by Resmini (2000) manufacturing accounts on av-
erage for approximately 65% of total FDI undertaken in CEECs in the first half of the
1990s. The empirical methodology used in this paper is the fixed-effect panel data
model. FDI inflows, measured in US dollars, for each sector, country and year is the
dependent variable, while variables such as GDP per capita, population, distance, risk,
wage differential, the degree of openness and the size of the manufacturing sector rel-
ative to GDP are included among the regressors. The inclusion of the risk variable is
important not only in respect of the long-term nature of FDI, which makes FDI sensi-
tive to risk perceptions (Resmini, 2000; Singh and Jun, 1995), but also considering the
instability of the political and economic system of countries in transition.
The results of the estimations suggest that factors that affect FDI flows vary by
sector. This is most evident with respect to wage differentials between the EU and
CEECs, which have a negative sign for the case of traditional manufacturing and spe-
cialised producers and a positive sign for scale-intensive and high-tech sectors, and
are only statistically significant for the latter group. Factors such as openness of the
economy and industrial clusters of economic activity matter more for traditional sec-
tors. Resmini (2000) also finds that the host country’s progress towards a market econ-
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omy, alongside with a geographical proximity to the countries of Western Europe, has a
strong effect on the size of FDI inflows especially in science-based and capital-intensive
sectors. Resmini (2000) concludes that the progress in structural reforms and trans-
forming an economy towards that of a market economy are important preconditions
for attracting FDI into the countries in transition.
The volume of FDI inflows into transition economies of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope is also the focus of the study by Bevan and Estrin (2004). In particular, this paper
considers FDI flows from 18 market economies (the EU-15 with Belgium and Luxem-
bourg considered together, plus Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the US) to 11 transition
countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine) between 1994 and 2000. Bevan
and Estrin (2004) highlight that investment inflows into the CEECs originate predomi-
nantly from the countries of continental Western Europe and are highly concentrated in
three transition economies - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - an observation
made by Resmini (2000). Investment inflows from the major global economies such as
Japan, the UK and the US are lower.
The methodology employed in the study is a random-effects panel estimation
and the set of variables used in the analysis includes total GDP of both source and
host country, the real interest rate differential, the distance between source and host
countries, a measure of the openness of the host economy, unit labour costs and a risk
term that captures a vector of institutional, legal and political factors. The results of the
estimation show that the market size of both origin and host country, proximity and
labour costs are the most important factors influencing the size of FDI flows. Despite
the fact that Bevan and Estrin (2004) do not examine the determinants of the geograph-
ical location choices of investors but only look at the volume of FDI, their work is seen
as a crucial reference for EU FDI location, owing to the fact that they examine the ef-
fect that the EU integration process has on the size of FDI inflows into CEECs. Bevan
and Estrin (2004), referring to the work of Mayhew (1998), argue that the prospect of
EU membership for the transition economies may be an important determinant of FDI,
since accession negotiations are an important political and economic signal. In essence,
the prospective entry into the EU reduces the risk of the CEECs since the Copenhagen
Criteria for EU accession (see: Chapter 3) involves an external validation of the quality
of both the economic management and institutional development.
Over the period 1994-2000 ten out of eleven transition countries considered in
this study formally applied for EU membership and subsequently started their acces-
sion negotiations with the EU (see: Chapter 3), and this provides a natural environment
for exploring the prospective EU membership and its effect on FDI. On this basis, the
eleven countries are grouped into three distinct categories according to how advanced
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they were in their negotiations. The categories that Bevan and Estrin (2004) use are: the
countries likely to join the EU very soon, the countries that will join but only after a
longer period, and finally, those countries unlikely to ever join. As part of testing for
the EU integration effect Bevan and Estrin (2004) re-estimate the original econometric
model, in which they include an announcement dummy. This new variable refers to the
Cologne European Council meeting in 1998, which Bevan and Estrin (2004) view as one
of the key milestone events in the process of accession negotiations with the transition
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The announcement dummy takes the value
of zero for all countries prior to 1998. For 1998 and after, this dummy variable is as-
signed a value of three for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia,
i.e. Luxembourg Group countries that are deemed to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria
and are allowed to begin the formal accession negotiations.16 Latvia, Lithuania and the
Slovak Republic are excluded from the Luxembourg Group but are evaluated as coun-
tries that make good progress and likely to be invited to start the formal negotiations
at a later date. Consequently, these countries are assigned a value of two. Bulgaria and
Romania are assigned a value of one on the basis that there are judged not to have made
sufficient progress to open the accession negotiations. Finally, the Cologne announce-
ment dummy takes a value of zero for Ukraine, which is considered unlikely to enter
the EU.
The estimation of the model specification with the Cologne announcement
dummy produces results similar to that of the baseline specification. Again, the positive
and statistically significant coefficients on both source and host country GDP, as well as
the negative and statistically significant effect of the distance variable confirm that the
volume of FDI is determined by the gravity factors. This finding, as highlighted by Be-
van and Estrin (2004), is consistent with a transaction cost analysis of FDI according to
which the flows of FDI are attracted by the larger economies, with the benefits of setting
up production abroad diminishing with the distance from the home country. Labour
costs have a statistically significantly negative impact on FDI, while capital costs and
country risk prove to be insignificant. The Cologne announcement dummy is found to
have a positive and significant effect on the size of FDI inflows, in both contempora-
neous and lagged formulations of the model, thus confirming the greater likelihood of
a country joining the EU, the more attractive a country is in the eyes of the potential
investors.
Following the article of Bevan and Estrin (2004) investment in the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe gained more attention as it has become a
more widely explored topic among academics. A study by Boudier-Bensebaa (2005)
16Chapter 3 sets out the process of EU enlargement and formally defines the Luxembourg Group coun-
tries in the context of the EU enlargement.
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focuses on the location of FDI in Hungarian regions and assesses the contribution
that agglomeration economies have in attracting FDI into the country. Boudier-
Bensebaa (2005) admits that the measurement of agglomeration economies in transi-
tion economies is likely to be questionable owing to data collection problems and the
relatively short period of transition in the CEECs. In the empirical analysis Boudier-
Bensebaa (2005) employ a panel data methodology owing to the difficulty of gathering
firm-level data on investment location decisions in Hungary. Boudier-Bensebaa (2005)
draws attention to the fact that panel data models were successfully used to examine
the determinants of FDI, arguing that they are informative and their great variability
allows for several competing hypotheses to be tested.
Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) examines the determinants of FDI stocks in 20 Hungar-
ian counties between 1991 and 2000. The independent variables are lagged one year.
A Hausman specification test rejects the use of the random-effects model in favour of
fixed-effects panel estimation. Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) admits that the main limitation
of the study is that the data do not distinguish between different types of investment
mode and different source country of investment. Furthermore, the lack of sectoral in-
dustry data is yet another weakness of the study since it is reasonable that the motiva-
tions for investing abroad are determined by the specific characteristics of the industry
that the investing firm belongs to (Horst, 1972). The results show that the locations
with higher labour availability, greater industrial demand, higher density of manufac-
turing activity and inter-industry agglomeration economies attract investment. There
is a positive and significant coefficient on unit labour cost, but when the geographical
division between the capital-intensive northern and western regions and the labour-
intensive southern and eastern regions is allowed for, the coefficient on this is negative
and statistically significant for the latter regions.
Another study worth considering is Kalotay (2008), who reviews the main fea-
tures of inward FDI into Bulgaria and Romania in the wake of their accession to the
EU in 2007. Kalotay (2008) acknowledges that the transition process in Bulgaria and
Romania was slow and difficult because of the privatisation process. Combined with
economic instability in Bulgaria and Romania in the 1990s, high inflation and the fi-
nancial crisis in 1997, inward FDI into these countries grew slowly at the beginning of
the transition period (Kalotay, 2008). The absence of trade agreements with their neigh-
bours may also have added to political uncertainty. An interesting feature of the pattern
of investment into Bulgaria and Romania is the high concentration of investment (al-
most 75%) in the period after the Thessaloniki European Summit in 2003, which locked
1 January 2007 as the entry date of these countries into the EU. Kalotay (2008) argues
that this feature could offer strong support for both the integration with the EU and
the announcement about accession to positively impact on the degree of business con-
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fidence, leading to increased investment. Kalotay (2008) also claims that the progress
in the integration of Bulgaria and Romania with the EU, and the final extension of the
EU territory into Bulgaria and Romania, has had a stabilising effect in the Balkans, a
region with a long tradition of conflicts.
Kalotay (2008) argues that the evident geographical advantage of Bulgaria and
Romania is that they provide a land link between Greece and the majority of the re-
maining EU Member States. Geographical proximity could be responsible for high
level of investment from Greece, which was the second largest investor in Bulgaria
and fourth largest investor in Romania over the period of transition (Kalotay, 2008).
The largest investor in Bulgaria, with more than a third of inward FDI stock, was Aus-
tria, which also held the second position in Romania (Kalotay, 2008). While Kalotay
(2008) provides only a general review of the features of inward FDI into Bulgaria and
Romania, a study by Hilber and Voicu (2010) actually explores the determinants of FDI
location in Romania using a conditional logit model. It is based on the location de-
cisions of 1,540 foreign-owned ‘greenfield’ plants that were established in Romanian
counties over 1990-97. Like Kalotay (2008), Hilber and Voicu (2010) find that there was
an initial reluctance on the part of foreign firms to invest in the country after the over-
throw of the communist regime in Romania in 1989, which could be attributed to the
political and economic instability and the slow start of economic reforms in Romania.
According to the data that Hilber and Voicu (2010) use, FDI only increased around 1994,
with the start of macroeconomic stabilisation.
Hilber and Voicu (2010) focus on evaluating the contribution that different types
of agglomeration economies have on FDI location in a transition country similar to
Boudier-Bensebaa (2005). They define four types of agglomeration economies along-
side border-county versions of these variables, comprising: industry-specific foreign
and industry-specific domestic agglomeration, service agglomeration and economies
arising from industrial diversification. They claim that service economies are largely
ignored in the location literature, but argue that an easy access to local business ser-
vices is likely to be particularly important in transition economies, where potential in-
vestors face opaque bureaucracies, corruption and unstable institutional systems. They
capture industry-specific foreign (domestic) agglomeration using the total number of
foreign (domestic) plants in the same industry as the investor per squared kilometre.
Since they are unable to distinguish between foreign and domestic service agglomera-
tion, a ‘generic’ service agglomeration is estimated as total service sector employment
per square kilometre. Finally, industrial diversity externalities are captured by the inter-
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industry version of the Herfindahl index.17
The econometric analysis employs a conditional logit model and supports the
initial hypothesis of Hilber and Voicu (2010). It confirms that service agglomeration
plays an important role in attracting foreign manufacturing firms into Romania. A sim-
ilar effect is found for foreign and domestic industry-specific agglomeration. While not
explicitly referring to any specific study, Hilber and Voicu (2010) note that the positive
effect of both service sector and industry-specific agglomerations is a result that is rep-
resentative of other transition economies. The effect of the inter-industry knowledge
spillovers and diversity on FDI is inconclusive, as it depends on whether county-fixed
effects are included in the model. The inspection of the effect that border-county ag-
glomeration has on FDI gives only partial support to agglomeration economies cross-
ing the county boundaries since only the border-country domestic industry-specific ag-
glomeration has a significant effect on FDI location. That, in the view of Hilber and
Voicu (2010), provides support for the claim that in general agglomeration economies
in transition economies are geographically localised. Other variables included in the
model show a large degree of variability depending on the specification used, suggest-
ing a potential problem with omitted variable bias.
Chidlow et al. (2009) analyse the determinants of investment location in Poland,
and support the view that foreign investment made an important contribution to the
process of transition in Central and Eastern European Countries from centrally-planned
communist countries to the market economies. The benefits associated with the inflow
of foreign investment include the inflow of capital, job creation, knowledge spillovers,
transfer of technology and increasing trade. Chidlow et al. (2009) argue that Poland
is a particularly interesting case for studying the investment location choices, as it re-
ceived the largest share of FDI compared to other transition economies in the region.
Nevertheless, the geographical distribution of FDI in Poland is uneven, with the re-
gions in the east being disadvantaged in terms of the amount of FDI that they receive.
Chidlow et al. (2009) use a sample of 852 foreign firms that established their activity
in Poland before 2003, obtaining the primary data on the investment motives using an
online questionnaire. They ask foreign investors to assess thirteen motives on a scale
of five from ‘very important’ to ‘not sure’, which are then grouped into five different
categories, comprising geographical factors, agglomeration factors, efficiency-seeking,
knowledge-seeking and market-seeking factors.
Using a multinomial logit model, which takes into account investors’ specific
characteristics, Chidlow et al. (2009) show that if agglomeration, knowledge and mar-
17The Herfindahl index is a measure of geographical industrial concentration developed by Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) and captures an extent to which an industry is concentrated in space. It is formally dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.
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ket factors are the most important motives for firms investing in Poland, then the most
preferred location is the capital region of Warsaw. This result is not surprising consider-
ing that the Warsaw metropolitan region is the largest market in Poland, with the high
concentration of service firms and a highest number of R&D institutions and universi-
ties (Chidlow et al., 2009). However, when efficiency and geographical factors are the
prime considerations for foreign firms, then locations other than the capital region tend
to be chosen. For example, the north-east region is valued by investors on the basis its
geography, namely access to the Baltic Sea and proximity to the new EU members of the
Baltic States. Chidlow et al. (2009) suspect that the efficiency-seeking motives such as in-
put costs and labour availability are dominant motives for labour-intensive FDI, while
agglomeration economies and knowledge factors matter more for capital-intensive and
high-value added investment. If this is correct then the regional distribution of FDI is
likely to further deepen the regional imbalances between the capital and other Polish
regions.
Pusterla and Resmini (2007) consider the location choices of foreign manufac-
turing plants in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania between 1995 and 2001. It is
a good example of a multi-country study of location in transition countries. Pusterla
and Resmini (2007) highlight that since the early years of the transition, CEECs have
received an increasing amount of FDI, which “played an active and dynamic role in en-
hancing the industrial restructuring process and driving the (re)integration of CEECs
into the world economy” (p. 836). In this respect, understanding the factors that attract
investment into the regions and countries is valuable as it has the potential to channel
investment into the more-disadvantaged locations and help to correct regional imbal-
ances. Despite this, Pusterla and Resmini (2007) observe that empirical evidence on
foreign firm location choices in Central and Eastern Europe is scarce, owing to data
on plant location and on the economic and social characteristics of narrowly-defined
locations not being easily available.
Pusterla and Resmini (2007) use data on 2,269 foreign manufacturing projects to
examine the determinants of FDI location at the NUTS2 regional level using a nested
logit model. Despite each included country being a transition economy, Pusterla and
Resmini (2007) argue that they are a heterogenous group. Hungary and Poland ad-
vanced much faster in the accession negotiations and were in a position to join the EU
in 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania proceeded more slowly and only acceded in 2007.
From a different perspective, Bulgaria and Hungary are much smaller economies than
Poland or Romania, and the countries also differ in the composition and distribution
of FDI that they receive. This heterogeneity between countries provides a rationale for
testing different nesting structures of the investors’ location decisions, as this choice is
in some sense arbitrary (Louviere et al., 2000). The nesting structure that turns out to
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be most appropriate is Hungary and Poland versus Bulgaria and Romania.18 This sug-
gests that regions belonging to the EU are seen as more similar to each other than to
regions outside of the EU, implying that degree of competition for a potential investor
is fiercer within a sample of EU regions and within a sample of non-EU regions than it
is between the two groups. Pusterla and Resmini (2007) conclude that the implication
of progressing economic and political integration in Europe is that the national borders
cease to shape the FDI location choices.
The results of the estimation of the nested logit model on the full sample reveal
that the probability of an investment location in a region increases with the concentra-
tion of foreign and domestic firms operating in the region. The coefficient on the for-
eign firm agglomeration term is almost double that of the domestic firm agglomeration.
Basile (2004) and Head and Mayer (2004) also establish a relatively greater potential of
foreign firm agglomeration economies to attract subsequent investment into a location.
The analysis confirms that investors prefer to establish their production facilities in re-
gions with high market potential and easy access to surrounding markets. A negative
and significant coefficient on a kilometres of public roads per capita term is explained
by Pusterla and Resmini (2007) as a tendency of foreign firms to locate in densely-
populated areas, so that urbanisation economies rather than congestion costs matter
for investors. With respect to the local input market, the results show that an abun-
dant and cheap workforce positively affects the probability of FDI location in transition
economies, while the education level of the workforce does not influence the invest-
ment location decision. Lastly, the country risk rating and Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) have negative effects. The former suggests that investors locating in a region
are not risk-averse and prefer high profit in exchange for higher risk, while the latter
that the policies aimed at attracting FDI adopted in CEECs are ineffective (Pusterla and
Resmini, 2007).
A valuable insight of Pusterla and Resmini (2007) is the comparison of the fac-
tors that affect the investment choices of low- and high-technology foreign firms. While
the results are on average unchanged for the sample of low-technology sectors, the
high-technology firms show a different pattern of behaviour in their location choices.
Importantly, Pusterla and Resmini (2007) show that high-technology multinational
companies distinguish between capital, border and other regions, thus implying a dif-
ferent nesting structure. The results of the analysis demonstrate that high-technology
sectors are attracted by locations with high market potential and good connectivity to
surrounding markets, where they can exploit the benefits of agglomeration with other
18This uses an inclusive value parameter (IV), which is a measure of perceived degree of dissimilarity
between locations within a nest. It represents a measure of correlation between error terms within a nest.
It is discussed in Chapter 4.
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foreign firms. Equally these firms are attracted by increased country risk. Finally, the
cost considerations alongside with the quality and availability of the labour force, and
the potential of exploiting the linkages with the domestic firms do not encourage the
location of high-technology firms.
2.6.4 European Multi-Country Studies
As compared to the single-country studies of FDI location, multi-country analyses are
a more recent addition to the literature, again linked to the availability of FDI project
data. In this context, Disdier and Mayer (2004) make an important contribution to the
understanding of the determinants of investment location in Europe. The pioneering
nature of their study lies in an attempt to contrast the location choices of firms in West-
ern and Eastern Europe, and to answer the question of how different they are from one
another. Using the nested logit methodology, Disdier and Mayer (2004) test whether
the decision of an investor has a nested structure: first, investors choose whether they
want to locate in the East or in the West (upper-level decision: East-West), and second,
they select a country within the nest of their choice in which they want to invest (lower-
level decision: a country). Disdier and Mayer (2004) note that since the beginning of
the 1990s the CEECs have attracted a growing amount of FDI, which of course coin-
cides with the beginning of transition. They consider the CEECs to be an interesting
case study, anticipating that EU enlargement is going to affect the agglomeration and
dispersion forces in Europe.19
Disdier and Mayer (2004) work with a sample of 1,843 location choices by French
multinational firms in 19 countries (13 ‘old’ EU countries and 6 CEECs – Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the former Czechoslovakia). What is remarkable
is that a mere 274 projects go to the CEECs, suggesting data truncation. Although
the period is 1980-99, FDI in the CEECs was virtually non-existent prior to 1990. The
authors use both conditional and nested logit models to conduct their analysis. In addi-
tion to analysing the determinants of FDI location on the entire sample of 19 European
countries, Disdier and Mayer (2004) estimate the conditional logit model separately for
the 13 EU countries and CEECs and provide a commentary on the main differences
between ‘West’ and ‘East’ samples. First, GDP has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on FDI location, but a much weaker effect in the EU than in the CEECs. On
the contrary, the agglomeration forces are weaker in CEECs, indicating fiercer competi-
tion between firms in CEECs (Disdier and Mayer, 2004). The authors maintain that the
weaker agglomeration result can be explained by reference to forward and backward
19Table 2.4 summarises the agglomeration and dispersion forces, otherwise known as centrifugal and
centripetal forces, as discussed earlier in this chapter in the New Economic Geography model.
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linkages if affiliates in the CEECs rely on intermediate products from France and other
EU countries. The negative effect of distance on FDI is particularly strong in CEECs,
which is in addition to higher transport costs associated with location in the East may
also reflect the presence of information asymmetries, cultural differences and unfamil-
iarity with the legal framework associated with investment in the East. Differences
between the ‘East’ and ‘West’ are also marked in respect of the labour market, as wages
exert a stronger negative influence on FDI location in CEECs, implying that labour cost
considerations are more important. The unemployment rate has a negative influence
on investment location in CEECs but positive in the EU.
In addition to this descriptive view on the differences in FDI determinants in
the two regions of Europe, Disdier and Mayer (2004) explicitly test for the relevance
of the East-West divide in the process of location choice among European countries.
By estimating a nested logit model separately for the time periods 1991-93, 1994-95
and 1996-99 they find a gradual increase in the inclusive value coefficient towards one.
While the value of this coefficient consistently falls within a range of zero and one,
which implies the validity of East-West nesting structure, an increase towards one over
the period considered suggests that the nesting structure becomes less relevant over
time. Notably, the inclusive value parameter for the final sub-period is not statistically
different from one, indicating the collapse of the nested structure. Disdier and Mayer
(2004) conclude that this result demonstrates that over time, as the transition process
advanced, the Eastern and Western European countries gradually have become more
similar in the eyes of potential investors.
Location choices of Japanese investors, previously analysed by Woodward
(1992), Friedman et al. (1992) and Head et al. (1995) for the US and by Taylor (1993) for
the UK, are also examined in the European multi-country setting by Head and Mayer
(2004). Unlike Disdier and Mayer (2004), Head and Mayer (2004) consider only a set
of Western European countries. The determinants of FDI location are studied in con-
junction with location choices of 452 Japanese-owned affiliates that established in nine
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the UK) over 1984-96. The data used for this study are from the 1996 Survey
of Current Manufacturing Operations of Japanese Firms in Europe, made available by the
Japan External Trade Organisation. Head and Mayer (2004) consider a smaller set of
countries than Disdier and Mayer (2004), but they conduct the analysis at a disaggre-
gated regional level in the multi-country setting, comprising 57 NUTS 1 regions, which
is a major contribution of this paper. They observe a general trend of Japanese investors
locating in the economic core of each country (e.g. clusters of Japanese multinational
firms around London in the UK, Paris in France, Milan in Italy and Barcelona in Spain),
so that they formulate the hypothesis that market potential is a key determinant of FDI
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location decision, which essentially is responsible for the formation of the industrial
clusters of economic activity.
Starting with the estimation of trade equations that account for exporter and
importer fixed effects, distance, common border and common language, equations that
subsequently help with estimating Krugman’s-type market potential measure, Head
and Mayer (2004) then progress to analysing the location choices of Japanese investors
using a conditional logit analysis, but unlike Head et al. (1995) they use a nested logit
model. The results of the conditional logit analysis reveal the absence of a significant
and negative wage effect on Japanese FDI location in all econometric specifications.
Head and Mayer (2004) find this ‘disappointing’, although they refer to other examples
of empirical work unable to find consistently negative and significant effects of wages,
such as Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head et al. (1999). Similarly, the evidence
of the effect of unemployment on investment location is inconclusive. Variables such
as the corporate tax rate and government-imposed charges contributing to true labour
cost (i.e. payroll taxes and pension contributions) both have a negative and statistically
significant on location decisions, but none of these results are robust to the inclusion
of the country-fixed effects. Government subsidies, captured by an Objective 1 eligi-
bility dummy variable, turn out to be insignificant - a result resembling that of Crozet
et al. (2004), who do not find any support for the hypothesis of the EU regional pol-
icy, proxied by Objective 2 and Objective 5b funds, reshaping the regional patterns of
investment in France.
In their empirical analysis, Head and Mayer (2004) also examine the role of three
different measures of market demand on FDI location. In the most simplistic case, mar-
ket demand is captured by regional GDP, which is found to have a positive and highly
significant effect on investment. However, Head and Mayer (2004) argue that regional
GDP is “hardly an adequate proxy for demand, for few firms would go to the trouble
of setting up an overseas factory to serve a single region” (p. 967). This finds an echo
in the study by Guimaraes et al. (2000) and is cited as the main reason for not including
a measure of market demand in the empirical analysis. A second measure of market
demand that Head and Mayer (2004) examine is Harris’ (1954) distance-weighted mar-
ket potential. While the overall fit of the model is slightly reduced with the use of
the distance-weighted measure of market potential, the coefficient on Harris’ market
potential is also positive and statistically significant and its magnitude is more than
double that of regional GDP. Head and Mayer (2004) claim that this result confirms the
relative attractiveness of core regions in Europe - those with a high level of local de-
mand, as well as close to other markets. Head and Mayer (2004), however, recognise
the weaknesses associated with using the Harris-type market potential, which essen-
tially does not account for ‘border effects’ (see below), variations in distance costs and
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market crowding due to local competition. Head and Mayer (2004) suggest that the
measure of market potential proposed by Krugman (1991) is able to handle all three is-
sues. Krugman’s market potential has a positive and significant effect on FDI location,
and the size of the coefficient lies between that of regional GDP and Harris’ market
potential. The overall goodness of fit, however, worsen with the use of Krugman’s
market potential, as compared to the cases when either regional GDP or Harris’ market
potential measures are used.20
In a separate specification, Head and Mayer (2004) also test for the existence of
agglomeration effects. Three measures of agglomeration - domestic industry, Japanese
industry and network (‘keiretsu’) - are included in the model, alongside Krugman’s
market potential. The results of the estimation suggest that all measures of agglom-
eration economies have a positive and significant effect on the probability of a subse-
quent location of Japanese firms, with the magnitude of this effect being strongest for
‘keiretsu’, followed by generic Japanese agglomeration. This finding closely resembles
that of Head et al. (1995), who obtain similar results in relation to the effect of differ-
ent types of agglomeration economies on the location of Japanese firms in US states.
Head and Mayer (2004) interpret the strong effect of network agglomeration in refer-
ence to input-output linkages (Venables, 1996). Head and Mayer (2004) argue that the
large coefficient on the ‘keiretsu’ agglomeration term is a sign that “this type of vertical
linkages might offer more solid empirical explanatory power than the simple version
of the Krugman (1991) model primarily based on final demand linkages” (p. 968). The
coefficient on Krugman’s market potential term remains positive and significant, but
its magnitude is much smaller.
A further important contribution to our understanding of FDI location determi-
nants in the EU is a study by Alegria (2006). The emphasis of this paper is on examining
the differences between location choices of investors at the country-level and regional-
level (NUTS2). Alegria (2006) maintains that gaining a better understanding of the
location process of multinationals, at both levels, is crucial for policy. He claims that it
is the first study to examine the determinants of FDI location choices of all EU Mem-
ber States at the NUTS2 regional level (excluding Cyprus and Malta). He focuses on
intra-European FDI between the 25 Member States of the EU between 1998 and 2005,
arguing that intra-EU FDI has not received much attention in the literature. Alegria
(2006) sources a sample of 4,803 manufacturing foreign investment projects from the
European Investment Monitor (EIM) that established in 246 regions of the EU-25. The
database considers new creations or extensions and new co-locations of already exist-
20The nested logit in Head and Mayer (2004) produces results similar to that of conditional logit and
shows that Harris’ market potential once more outperforms Krugman’s market potential in both the mag-
nitude and overall fit of the model. Head and Mayer (2004) argue that this shows that the downstream
linkages emphasised by Krugman (1991) are not the main cause of agglomeration.
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ing FDI projects only, i.e. ‘greenfield’ investment, which enables attention to be focused
on a specific entry mode of investment.21 This supports the claim made by Basile (2004)
that acquisitions are largely ignored in industrial location literature, although Friedman
et al. (1992) disapproves of mixing different types of entry mode of investment.
Alegria (2006) determines whether the sign and strength of agglomeration and
dispersion forces differ between the country and regional levels. He observes a ten-
dency for the core-periphery location pattern to be less important between countries,
but more important within individual countries of the EU. These suggest that the dis-
persion forces are dominant at the country-level, but that agglomeration forces are more
dominant at a disaggregated geographical level as the core regions within the host
countries typically attract significantly more investment projects than the rest of the
regions. The methodology employed in this study is the conditional logit model. The
set of independent variables include GDP (internal market potential), a Harris-type ex-
ternal market potential, GDP per head, population density, wage, unemployment rate,
manufacturing density and foreign agglomeration, as well as corporate taxes and a gov-
ernance effectiveness index at the national level. All of these variables are lagged one
period and logged, but with the exception of governance index which is not a continu-
ous variable. Alegria (2006) emphasises that owing to the lack of comparable sectoral
disaggregated dataset for EU Member States and regions, it is not possible to account
for the forward and backward linkages of the localisation economies.
In general, the country- and regional-level results of the conditional logit model
are similar in both the sign and statistical significance of the parameter estimates. Both
internal and external market potential measures have a positive and statistically signif-
icant influence on FDI location, while GDP per capita is insignificant. Wages exert a
negative and significant effect on investment at both levels of spatial aggregation, but
the unemployment rate is insignificant. The previous agglomeration of foreign firms
captured by Basile (2004) or Crozet et al. (2004) has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on investment location. Manufacturing density and population density are
the only variables that exhibit different behaviour depending on the level of geograph-
ical aggregation. The former has a negative but insignificant effect at the country-level
but a positive and significant influence on FDI at the level of NUTS2 regions, while
population density is insignificant at the country-level and negative and statistically
significant at the regional-level. Alegria (2006) concludes that economic integration be-
tween countries encourages multinational activity to locate in peripheral locations, but
that it agglomerates at the regional-level within countries.
A study similar to that of Head and Mayer (2004) with respect to a set of coun-
tries considered is the work of Basile et al. (2008). Using data on 5,509 foreign sub-
21Mergers and acquisitions, licence agreements and joint ventures projects are not included.
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sidiaries that located in 50 NUTS1 regions of 8 EU countries (France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) over the period 1991-99, Basile
et al. (2008) analyse the determinants of location choices of multinational firms using the
mixed logit methodology. Given that the choice set does not include CEECs, Basile et al.
(2008) admit that a potential source of bias arises from not including all possible loca-
tions into the choice set. However, Basile et al. (2008) also remark that in the first half of
the 1990s CEECs received relatively low amount of investment. Therefore, they think
it reasonable to suppose that the CEECs were not in the choice set of multinational
companies investing in Europe in the period 1991-99.
Basile et al. (2008) is a key paper on the impact of EU integration on FDI loca-
tion owing to its specific focus on the role of EU Cohesion Policy in attracting foreign
investors from both within and outside of Europe. They argue that an important mo-
tivation for the EU regional policy measures, among them the Structural Funds and
Cohesion Fund, is that the benefits of economic integration in the EU appear to benefit
some regions disproportionately, potentially leading to social and economic disparities
within the EU. The aim of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund is to help trans-
form and modernise the structure of relatively poorer regions, and to prepare them for
competition within the EU Single Market (European Commission, 1996). As noted by
Basile et al. (2008) while none of the instruments of the EU regional policy is dedicated
to attracting FDI per se, foreign firms may still benefit from funds channelled to public
investment. Basile et al. (2008) highlight that prior to their work there is little evidence
on the impact of the EU Structural Funds on the investment location. As examples of
cross-country studies, they refer to the work of Breuss et al. (2003), who analyse OECD
investment in the EU-15 and CEECs over 1986-97, and Hubert and Pain (2002), who
look at German FDI in the EU in the 1990s, but note that these studies limit their atten-
tion to relatively simple correlations between FDI and the Structural Funds.22
The novelty of the Basile et al. (2008) approach is that their study is the first to
employ a mixed logit model to analyse the location decisions of multinational compa-
nies. Mixed logit models (also called random-parameters or error-components logit)
are a generalisation of standard logit that allows the parameter associated with each
observed variable to vary across individuals and that does not exhibit the ‘restrictive’
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property (Revelt and Train, 1998). In
mixed logit models, the parameters β are considered to be specific to the individual,
handling the unobserved heterogeneity in the valuation of attributes among individu-
als (Rouwendal and Meijer, 2001) and reflecting the distribution of tastes (Revelt and
22Basile et al. (2008) admit that there are studies that use more detailed data but that they limit their
attention to a single recipient country, listing the study of investment location in French de´partements of
Crozet et al. (2004) as an example of a valuable contribution.
68
Train, 1998). Basile et al. (2008) argue that, “the computational burden of simulation
techniques has discouraged scholars from applying [the mixed logit] to empirical ap-
plications on large datasets” (p. 331). Data on investment is sourced from the Elios
dataset (European Linkages and Ownership Structure), which was assembled at the
University of Urbino and based on Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom. Basile et al.
(2008) note that while the single largest investor country is the US (25%), the majority
of investors are from the EU countries (60%).
The results of the empirical estimation on the full sample of investors reveal
that the probability of a foreign firm locating in one region increases with the regional
market size and external market potential, with the strength of the agglomeration
economies, higher R&D intensity and with lower taxation on labour (Basile et al., 2008).
The estimates also suggest that the investors prefer to locate closer to their country of
origin, although they caution that this may just pick-up that the majority of investors
are from within the EU and so closer to the host region. Most importantly, the results
show that the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund allocated to the EU lagging regions
make a significant contribution to promoting the attractiveness of these regions, and in
particular for attracting FDI. This is in contrast with Crozet et al. (2004), who for French
NUTS3 regions find that the EU regional policy measures are ineffective in attracting
multinational firms. However, since Crozet et al. (2004) look only at a subset of Struc-
tural Funds instruments - Objective 2 fund and Objective 5b fund - the results might
not be directly comparable.
Interestingly, these EU regional policy tools and other determinants turn out
to have different effects when the mixed logit estimation is conducted separately for
the samples of European and non-European investors. In essence, while the amount
of Structural Funds matters more for the non-European investors, the Cohesion Fund
is positive and significant only for European investors. Basile et al. (2008) claim that
the latter result demonstrates the higher propensity of European multinational firms
to locate in Portugal and Spain, which are the largest recipients of the EU Cohesion
Fund. Basile et al. (2008) argue that the overall estimation results demonstrate that
European and non-European investors are undertaking FDI for different reasons. Eu-
ropean multinational firms are seeking a combination of low production costs and good
market access, which suggests that they re-organise production to serve the EU market,
but non-European investors appear to be attracted by rich markets with skilled workers
and strategic assets (Basile et al., 2008).
In another paper using the Elios database, Basile et al. (2009) explore the role
played by national boundaries with respect to the location of multinational firms in
Europe. The study focuses on 5,102 subsidiaries that located their activity in one of 47
NUTS1 regions of the five largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the
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United Kingdom) during 1991-99. The issue that Basile et al. (2009) address is whether
within an integrated economic area, such as the EU, national boundaries continue to
significantly affect the location decisions of multinational firms. They seek to find out
whether the regions within national boundaries are closer substitutes than the regions
across these borders. To test this, Basile et al. (2009) estimate a nested logit model, where
the regions are grouped within individual country nests, and it is examined whether
the inclusive value (IV) parameter lies between zero and one. As highlighted by Basile
et al. (2009), this study can be seen as an extension of Head and Mayer (2004), who also
estimate a nested logit model of the location choices in nine European countries, but for
a single source only, i.e. Japanese-owned affiliates.
The results from estimating the nested logit reveal that the imposed country-
region nesting structure is not correctly specified, since the IV parameters fail to fall
regularly within the zero-one interval. Since some of the IV parameters exceed one,
this implies that the country-region nesting structure is not consistent with the profit-
maximising behaviour of firms, and suggests that foreign investors consider “regions
belonging to different countries as closer substitutes than regions within the national
boundaries” (Basile et al., 2009, p. 9). In view of this, Basile et al. (2009) define a new
nesting structure than spans different countries with ostensibly similar geo-economic
characteristics: the Northern countries that includes France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, and the Southern countries that includes Italy and Spain. The estimation
is correctly specified and suggests Spanish and Italian regions are closer substitutes for
each other compared to French, German or UK regions, and vice versa. Basile et al. (2009)
argue that this shows that regions have to compete to attract FDI more across rather
than within national borders in an economically integrated EU. It supports Pusterla
and Resmini (2007), who find that EU integration diminishes the role of the national
borders within samples of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, although Basile et al. (2009)
find that national boundaries appear to still play some role in the location choices of
non-European investors. Finally, Basile et al. (2009) advocate a degree of caution when
considering the results of their study, since it examines inward investment in only five
countries out of 27 EU Member States, none of which is a ‘new’ member from Central
and Eastern Europe, but which is an avenue for future research.
2.7 The ‘Border Effects’ of Regional Economic Integration
The analysis of the importance of national borders is part of a separate strand of lit-
erature on border effects. Beugelsdijk and Mudambi (2013) compare national borders
to “‘qualitative discontinuities’ in space, that is, points at which spatial heterogeneity
changes abruptly” (p.413). Owing to the ‘liability of foreignness’ described by Hymer
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(1976) as the cost of doing business abroad, the national borders are the points in
geographic space where spatial transaction costs increase in a discontinuous manner
(Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013). Recognising that both international and subnational
spatial heterogeneities impact on the location choices of multinational firms, Beugels-
dijk and Mudambi (2013) distinguish between discrete border effects and continuous
distance effects, emphasising that both subnational and national dimensions are impor-
tant in understanding the location choices of border-crossing multi-location enterprises
and bringing the international business and the NEG perspectives on the FDI location
choices together.
In the context of regional economic integration, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) refer
to border effects as a curious economic phenomena and one of the ‘six major puzzles
in international economics’. A ‘border effect puzzle’ was first identified by McCallum
(1995), who recognised that the Canadian provinces traded over 20 times more with
each other than they did with US states of the same size and distance (Mayer and Head,
2002). Hanson (2001) notes that the proliferation of regional integration arrangements
(RIAs), such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European
Union (EU), has led to a renewed interest in the effects of economic integration and the
impact of borders. Importantly, RIAs reduce trade barriers between integrating coun-
tries and are likely to augment trade (Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran, 2004) and to alter
the economic geography of industrial location (Hanson, 2001). One of the purposes of
this thesis is to explore the ‘border effect puzzle’ of EU integration in the context of the
industrial location of FDI, for which the review of the literature reveals a significant
gap in the spatial economics literature. Frequently, the border effect is investigated in
relation to trade and regional economic activity, but to the best of my knowledge not to
FDI.
The pioneering work of McCallum (1995) makes use of data on interprovincial
trade flows between ten Canadian provinces and international trade flows between
Canadian provinces and US states. Although data on trade flows are available for each
pair of the 10 Canadian provinces and 50 US states, McCallum (1995) limits his analy-
sis to 30 US states (20 states with the largest population and all border states). These
account for more than 90% of Canada-US trade in 1988, when the Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) between Canada and the US was signed. Using gravity model equations,
where trade between two countries is assumed to depend on the GDP of exporting and
importing countries, the distance between them and the national border, McCallum
(1995) shows that ceteris paribus trade between two Canadian provinces is more than 20
times larger than international trade between a Canadian province and a US state. In
particular, in 1988 the mean trade shares for Canadian provinces are: within-province,
44%; interprovincial, 23%; with the US, 24% and rest of the world, 9%. However, if
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there were no Canada-US border, the gravity model estimates suggest that interprovin-
cial trade would shrink to 4% and trade with the US would increase to 43% (assuming
these continue to account for 47% of all trade). Canada and the US exhibit similar cul-
tures, language and institutions, but notwithstanding this, McCallum (1995) finds that
a significant home bias exists in trade related to the national borders.
Although they were first studied with reference to international trade, the bor-
der effects of economic integration are found to shape the location of industrial activity
within countries (Hanson, 2001). The pioneering study on the impact of regional eco-
nomic integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity within a country is
Hanson (1996), which examines how integration between the US and Mexico affected
the location of industrial activity in the US. Hanson (1996) maintains that frontier re-
gions, such as border areas and port cities, have low-cost access to foreign markets and
consequently emerge as natural production sites, making them “natural laboratories
in which to study economic integration” (p. 942). Using data on economic activity in
US-Mexico border city pairs, Hanson (1996) finds that export-manufacturing growth
in Mexican border cities makes a significant contribution to the expansion of manufac-
turing employment in US border cities. Specifically, a 10% increase in Mexican export
manufacturing activity results in 3.8% manufacturing employment growth in the US
border cities. Non-manufacturing US employment is not affected by the expansion of
Mexican export manufacturing. Hanson (1996) insists that the growth of export manu-
facturing production in Mexican border cities essentially makes US border cities a nat-
ural production site for complementary manufacturing activities and argues that the
stagnation of US-wide manufacturing employment growth is a sign that a large part of
US manufacturing production is relocating to the border regions near Mexico.
In a subsequent paper, Hanson (2001) examines US and Mexican border-city
pairs to see if economic integration between the US and Mexico contributes to the ex-
pansion of industrial activity along the US-Mexico border. At the level of summary
statistics, Hanson (2001) finds that economic activity in the US relocated to cities in
proximity to the US-Mexico border and notes that growing employment in US border
cities coincides with a rapid expansion of export assembly plants (‘maquiladoras’) in
Mexico’s border cities. Hanson (2001) builds upon his earlier analysis and in addition
to the impact of export manufacturing in Mexico’s border regions on the employment
growth in US border cities, he considers the impact on employment growth in US in-
terior cities and on average wages in US border cities. This analysis is conducted for
a period 1975-97. The results show a strong and positive correlation between the ex-
pansion of export manufacturing in Mexican border cities and employment growth in
US border cities, but no statistically significant effect on US interior cities or wages in
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the US border states.23 Nevertheless, Hanson (2001) finds a specialisation pattern in US
border cities according to city size. Specifically, while smaller US border cities appear
to serve the role of transportation and distribution hubs, the larger cities are bases for
manufacturing operations. Importantly, in concluding, Hanson (2001) notes that the
approach of the paper “could be replicated for European cities, where the process of
economic integration is more advanced and we would expect binational regional pro-
duction networks to be more developed” (p. 286), which recognises the applicability of
the methodology to studying the effect of EU integration.
The effect of economic integration within Europe on the location of industrial
activity is a focus of Overman and Winters (2006), who study the impact of the UK
accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) on the spatial distribution of
UK manufacturing. Establishment level production data is combined with trade data
on seaports and airports to examine if the accession altered manufacturing activity and
re-distributed it towards ports that are close to EEC Member States. Broadly, Overman
and Winters (2006) investigate three questions concerning the UK EEC accession: a) did
it re-orient UK trade by origin and destination country and did it re-orient the pattern of
trade by UK port; b) did it change import competition, export and intermediate market
access and did this vary by geographical area; and c) did it result in a re-distribution
of manufacturing activity in the UK? In an earlier paper, Overman and Winters (2005)
study the geography of UK international trade and find that EEC accession re-oriented
UK trade towards ports in the South-East of Britain that are closer to EEC countries,
although they recognise that this re-orientation was not uniform across all industries.
Using UK trade data by port and commodities over 1970-92, Overman and Winters
(2006) examine the employment and location of manufacturing establishments, and the
allocation of international trade by British port. They find that UK accession to the EEC
changed the composition of UK trade and altered the ports through which trade entered
and exited the UK, benefiting ports in the South and East of Britain most, although this
depends on the composition of trade.24 For up to a third of manufacturing industries
the sectoral employment responded negatively to increasing import competition and
positively to improved intermediate good and export market access.
The impact of European integration on the internal geography of trade is a fo-
cus of Lafourcade and Paluzie Hernandez (2005), who use a gravity model to study
an asymmetry between the border and interior regions of France and Spain. Specifi-
cally, Lafourcade and Paluzie Hernandez (2005) concentrate on the trade performance
of French and Spanish border regions relative to the performance of interior regions
23The latter is consistent with an elastic labour supply.
24To illustrate this, ports on the Thames and in Kent are strongly, positively influenced by trade with
France; the ports of East Anglia trade more with Scandinavia; Sussex and Hampshire with France and
Belgium; but London ports are less dependent on trade with neighbouring European countries.
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and analyse export and import flows at the disaggregated level of NUTS3 regions.25
The time span considered is 1978-2000 for France and 1988-2000 for Spain, encompass-
ing several political milestones of EU integration, such as the 1986 Single European
Act, the 1990 Schengen Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Lafourcade and
Paluzie Hernandez (2005) argue that it is possible to examine the changes in the re-
gional allocation of trade that is a consequence of the EU accession of Spain in 1986.
Controlling for size, proximity and other location characteristics, the analysis reveals
that French border regions trade on average 62% more with neighbouring countries
than their interior counterparts, but Spanish border regions do not appear to have an
advantage over interior regions in trade with neighbours. Lafourcade and Paluzie Her-
nandez (2005) consider FDI as one of the channels through which regional economic
integration can affect the pattern of trade within countries. They find that all French
regions benefited from the trade-creating effect of inward FDI, and that the location of
foreign affiliates from neighbouring countries led to positive trade differentials.26 The
average trade-creating effect of inward FDI in France amounts to 12.7% on average, and
is larger for imports (15.0%) than for exports (10.5%). Although the trade-creating effect
of inward FDI is not significantly larger for border regions than their interior counter-
parts, Lafourcade and Paluzie Hernandez (2005) recognise that inward FDI explains a
significant part of the trade advantage of French border regions.
Bruelhart et al. (2004) argue that in the context of EU enlargement in 2004, Eu-
rope’s economic ‘centre of gravity’ is shifting eastwards. The research question is how
changes in the relative market access resulting from the Eastern enlargement of the EU
is likely to affect the spatial geography of economic activity in the peripheral regions of
the ‘old’ EU Member States. Using market potential measures based on Harris (1954),
Bruelhart et al. (2004) examine the impact of these on regional GDP per capita and re-
gional manufacturing employment. The simulation results show that the market access
effects of EU enlargement in 2004 is likely to be small for GDP per capita, i.e. on aver-
age increasing incomes by 0.93% in the Objective 1 peripheral regions of incumbent EU
Member States and by 0.65% in non-Objective 1 peripheral regions. However, the sim-
ulated effect of the EU enlargement on manufacturing employment is much larger, i.e.
32.7% for Objective 1 regions and 23.4% for non-Objective 1 regions. Crucially, Bruel-
hart et al. (2004) find that the economic impact of enlargement differs depending on the
geographic location of a region relative to the ‘new’ EU Member States, being strongest
25The export and import flows are for 94 continental French NUTS3 regions over the period 1978-2000
and 48 Spanish NUTS 3 regions over 1988-2000.
26The question of trade-creating impact of inward FDI could not be formally analysed for Spanish re-
gions owing to data availability. For France, only a time period of 1993-2000 is considered.
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for the regions close to the ‘new’ EU.27
The implications of EU enlargement on the internal geography of economic ac-
tivity are also studied for ‘new’ EU countries. Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran (2004)
examine Romania, and argue that it is an interesting country to study given that at the
beginning of the 1990s economic activity tended to cluster in Eastern regions. Looking
at the annual growth rate of the urban population share for 41 regions within Roma-
nia over the period 1991-97, Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran (2004) find that access to
the Romanian market is not a statistically significant determinant of urban population
growth. Conversely, population growth is driven by access to the markets of the EU
and the CEECs. In that respect, economic integration is found to favour the spatial
concentration of economic activity in the border regions that possess significant market
access advantage (Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran, 2004).
A broader study that examines the impact of deepening integration between the
EU-15 and CEECs is Niebuhr (2005), who considers the spatial distribution of economic
activity in two integrating groups of countries over the period 1995-2000. With a focus
on border regions, Niebuhr (2005) asks whether the benefits of integration are higher for
internal border regions owing to their favourable market access and whether external
border regions in the CEECs are in danger of lagging behind due to their peripheral
position.28 Niebuhr (2005) analyses the effects of integration that arise from changing
relative market access and declining trade barriers, where the benefits of EU integration
are captured by increasing regional income per capita. A simulation analysis considers
reductions in border impediments from reduced travel time, and reveals significant
heterogeneity between the regions of the enlarged EU from improved market access.
A greater benefit of EU integration is realised by the CEECs rather than incumbent
EU-15 countries, which suggests that EU integration promotes economic cohesion and
convergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States. However, the simulation
results suggest that regions in peripheral CEECs (e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania)
achieve a modest growth of market access and GDP per capita, and that the benefits are
stronger for regions in the core CEECs (i.e. Czech Republic and Slovenia). The border
regions are found to achieve higher integration benefits compared to their non-border
counterparts, while significant per capita income gains are found for external border
regions. Niebuhr (2005) admits that the positive income effects of EU integration that
arise due to improved market access are small in magnitude.
The spatial implications of EU enlargement on regional industrial location are
27The simulation analyses of Bruelhart et al. (2004) find that the effect of EU enlargement on GDP per
capita is six times stronger in the most affected Objective 1 region (Burgenland, Austria) compared to the
least affected one (South Yorkshire, UK). For manufacturing employment, the difference is seven-fold.
28Niebuhr (2005) defines internal border regions as those that share a common border with a foreign EU
country. Conversely, external EU regions are those that are located alongside the external EU border.
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the focus of Resmini (2003a). Based on the CEECs of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and
Romania, Resmini (2003a) seeks to understand what types of region are the winners or
losers from the EU integration process. Special attention is given to border regions and
how likely they are to be affected by integration. Resmini (2003a) notes that location
theory has traditionally considered the border regions to be disadvantaged in terms
of their attractiveness, considering their peripheral position within a country. The pa-
per hypotheses that the regions most likely to benefit from enlargement and increased
growth prospects are regions in accession countries that directly border the ‘old’ EU or
other accession candidate countries. Conversely, the regions bordering countries not
involved in EU enlargement are expected to suffer from enlargement, with the internal
regions being only marginally affected.
The econometric approach of Resmini (2003a) is a two-stage model. In the first
stage, the determinants of manufacturing regional employment are analysed, and in
the second stage, the growth rate in regional manufacturing employment and factors
that drive this are analysed. Explanatory variables such as distance to the nearest EU
border crossing and distance to the capital city, both relative to that of other regions,
are included. Within a heterogenous set of border regions those bordering the EU-
15 countries have better growth prospects, since proximity to the EU appears to have
stimulated a catching-up process, which compensates for their peripheral position with
respect to the capital cities. Distance from the EU-15 penalises economic activity in re-
gions bordering other candidate countries currently negotiating accession. Overall, the
study finds that “regions bordering the EU-15 and external border regions have bet-
ter prospects for growth than regions bordering other candidate countries and internal
regions, other things being equal” (Resmini, 2003a, p. 220).
A focus on the effects of economic integration with the EU on the regional pat-
tern of industrial location is once again considered in Resmini (2007). Like in the earlier
paper, Resmini (2007) concentrates on the countries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and
Romania in the 1990s, a period when these countries underwent transition and a pro-
cess of economic and political integration with the EU that reoriented their economies
towards the ‘West’ and the EU. Resmini (2007) notes that while international trade the-
ory predicts increasing concentration of economic activity and increasing specialisa-
tion of national and regional economies as a by-product of integration, it is not known
whether this is true for the CEECs. Referring to Campos and Coricelli (2002) and Lan-
desmann (2000), Resmini (2007) acknowledges that the transition process resulted in
sectoral changes in employment and produced a more even distribution of manufac-
turing activity across regions. A factor that Resmini (2007) claims was responsible for
changing industry concentration is FDI. Furthermore, the results of the econometric
analysis confirm that, “on average, economic integration with the EU has changed pat-
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terns of industry location in transition countries” (Resmini, 2007, p. 758), as distance
to the EU border exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on regional manu-
facturing employment. There is only a weak effect of the distance to the former Soviet
Bloc border - a variable that tries to account for the existence of the legacies from the
past.
In conclusion, Resmini (2007) confirms that European integration has led to spa-
tial decentralisation of employment in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Romania, as in
the 1990s industries in these countries moved away from ‘autarkic’ industry location
centres (capital cities and internal regions) to a number of other locations offering a
better access to EU markets. This trend also implies a change in regional industrial
specialisation, as previously ‘peripheral’ border regions start to attract manufacturing
activity on the basis of its proximity to the EU markets. The relocation of industry in the
1990s, however, also has a negative side, as it appeared to deepen the divide in the eco-
nomic development between the western and eastern parts of the countries considered.
Resmini (2007) explains that the eastern regions, which are closer to the former Soviet
Bloc, become the losers of the changes in industrial patterns, as they emerge as locations
with greater concentration of labour-intensive industries. Resmini (2007) is unclear as
to whether the continued economic integration with the EU will be able to reverse the
unfavourable trend of growing divide between western and eastern regions.
A novel approach to studying border effects is adopted by Brakman et al. (2012),
who analyse the population effects of EU integration along national borders. Two kinds
of integration events are considered by Brakman et al. (2012) that change market access:
five EU enlargements and the introduction of the euro currency.29 Brakman et al. (2012)
note that central to their paper is, “the notion that cities and regions that are close to
the border are most affected by these changes in EU integration, as they are especially
confronted with changes in market access, whereas the effects for cities and regions fur-
ther away from the border are more subdued” (p. 41). The hypotheses of Brakman et al.
(2012) are: (a) cities and regions in close proximity to a national border that was affected
by EU integration experience growth in population share; (b) border integration effects
differ for large and small border regions; (c) border integration effects are stronger for
EU enlargement than for the euro; and (d) border integration effects diminish as dis-
tance to the national border increases. Brakman et al. (2012) allow for a general negative
border effect and a positive border effect associated with EU integration. The border
regions are defined as those regions that are affected by an EU integration episode and
contiguous to the EU land border. Border cities are those cities that are located within
29The EU enlargements are: 1973 (Denmark and the UK joined); 1981 (Greece); 1986 (Portugal and
Spain); 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden); 2004 (eight CEECs, Cyprus and Malta); and 2007 (Bulgaria
and Romania). The reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 is also considered as a policy event
that affected the continental national land borders in a sample period.
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a maximum road distance of 70 kilometres to the affected land border.
Brakman et al. (2012) employ a difference-in-difference approach to compare the
population share growth in European border areas (treatment group) and other Euro-
pean non-border areas (control group). The estimation results confirm that the popu-
lation share growth is -0.21% per annum for border cities and -0.31% a year for border
regions (Brakman et al., 2012). The EU enlargement episodes are found to add about
0.15% per annum to the population share growth in border regions and cities; which is
insufficient to offset the negative general border effect. Brakman et al. (2012) confirm
that the positive EU integration border effect associated with EU enlargement applies
to both incumbent EU Member States and accession countries, but applies for a limited
distance and time period, of a maximum of 70 kilometres and for up to 30 years. It is
stronger for large cities and regions. A positive border effect associated with the adop-
tion of the Single Currency is not found. Overall, the paper finds support for each of its
four hypotheses.
Germany is an interesting case study for looking at the border effects, where
almost 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of formerly sep-
arated West and East Germany, a significant heterogeneity in economic performance
exists between federal states on both sides of the former border (Spies, 2010). Refer-
ring to the size of inward FDI to Germany over period 1997-2005, Spies (2010) note that
only 10% of all investing multinational firms chose to establish their foreign affiliates
in East Germany, half of which located in Berlin. Also, in per capita terms, East Ger-
man federal states significantly lagged behind their Western counterparts in attracting
foreign investment. The conditional and nested logit model estimation confirmed that
the common border worked to the advantage of the Western federal states in attracting
investment from France and the Netherlands. It also confirmed that investors from the
UK, the US and Switzerland were strongly attracted by the industry clusters of firms
from the same country, emphasising the importance of agglomeration economies and
network effects. As argued by Spies (2010), the importance of networks partly explains
the weak performance of East Germany in attracting multinational activity, which also
lacks the adjacency to strong investing countries. Among the policy recommendations,
Spies (2010) considers the promotion of industry clusters and targeting of FDI from
emerging markets such as Russia and Poland to help East Germany overcome its ‘lock-
in’.
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed developments of a theoretical and empirical nature under-
pinning the study of FDI. The intensification of FDI activity during the 20th century
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coincided with attempts by scholars to formalise the reasons for a firm to engage in
FDI and emerge as a MNE. Starting as a strand of international trade theory, but also
discussed in the context of the theory of international capital markets and the theory
of the international firm, FDI activity was treated as part of a micro-founded stand-
alone theory of MNE. Essentially, there are three questions: (i) Why do domestic firms
choose to serve a market abroad? (ii) Why is FDI preferred to exporting or licens-
ing? (iii) What factors determine the FDI location choice? A key theoretical framework
that formalises FDI is the eclectic (OLI) paradigm of Dunning (1977), which specifies
three necessary conditions that a firm must fulfill to emerge as a multinational firm.
An ownership-advantage arising from a firm-specific asset that is best utilised in a for-
eign rather than domestic market (the location-advantage) and that it is optimal for
the firm to transfer internally to a foreign affiliation unit rather than rely on licensing
(the internalisation-advantage). Following this ‘eclectic paradigm’ Dunning (1993) de-
veloped a taxonomy of four types of MNE activity: market-, resource-, efficiency- and
strategic asset-seeking. The motivation to engage in FDI differs between these four
types of FDI, and it represents a theoretical underpinning for my applied research in
Chapter 5.
To complement this theoretical formalisation of FDI, numerous attempts have
been made by researchers to study inward investment activity empirically. Starting
with simple studies of FDI location in a single-country and for a limited number of ob-
servations, gradually over time the studies of FDI location choices have become more
sophisticated, growing to consider multiple countries and disaggregated spatial units
such as regions, and considering a specific entry mode of FDI or origin country of the
investor. In the context of the spatial economics literature, a pioneering figure is Carlton
(1979), who first applied the conditional logit model methodology to study the location
choice decisions of new firms, and that is now a well-established modelling technique
in the context of industrial location. Data availability has often hampered the multi-
country study of FDI location choice. In the early 1990s, Hill and Munday (1992) ad-
mitted that the empirical analysis of the distribution of FDI activity across European
regions, despite growing interest, was not possible. A few years later, Guimaraes et al.
(2000) argued that modelling of plant location choices required highly disaggregated
industrial and spatial data and that reliable data on new plant locations was rare. In
2007 Pusterla and Resmini (2007) admitted that the empirical evidence on FDI loca-
tion in CEECs was scarce, owing to the unavailability of plant-level data on investment
projects and location data for narrowly-defined spatial units.
Although over time, spatial economics research has become more elaborate, con-
sidering more FDI projects, more location alternatives and more disaggregated spatial
units, to the best of my knowledge studies that consider EU-wide inward investment
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location choice are rare. A notable exception is Alegria (2006), who analyses the location
decisions of European multinational firms locating in the EU-25 between 1998 and 2005.
Just like Alegria (2006), my research is at both the country-level and regional-level, and
it focuses on the location choice decisions of MNEs at the level of EU-25 countries and
260 NUTS2 regions. Unlike Alegria (2006), my research is not restricted to intra-EU
FDI and includes FDI projects originating from outside the EU. Another key paper in a
multi-country setting is Disdier and Mayer (2004), who study the determinants of FDI
location for a sample of 19 European countries, of which 13 are ‘old’ EU countries and 6
are CEECs. Importantly, it attempts to contrast the location choices of investors in West-
ern and Eastern Europe, seeking to explore how different is Eastern Europe. Estimation
of a conditional logit model on a full sample of countries is followed by estimations on
the restricted samples of ‘West only’ and ‘East only’ countries.
With regard to the impact of the EU integration process on FDI in transition
economies, Bevan and Estrin (2004) is an important contribution. Although Bevan and
Estrin (2004) do not examine the determinants of FDI location choices but only consider
the aggregate volume of FDI, their work offers valuable insights into the effect of EU
integration on the size of FDI inflows into the CEECs. Essentially, Bevan and Estrin
(2004) establish that the attractiveness of CEECs to investors increases as the EU acces-
sion negotiations advance and as the prospect of EU entry becomes more probable. The
authors believe that the prospective EU entry reduces risk due to meeting the Copen-
hagen Criteria for accession. Another study, by Kalotay (2008) demonstrates that a high
inflow of FDI into Bulgaria and Romania coincided with ‘locking’ their accession date,
recognising a strong and positive impact of the EU accession announcement on inward
FDI. In the context of the impact of the EU on FDI location, some studies examine the
impact of the EU policies on the location choices of multinational firms. Regional pol-
icy is the focus of Crozet et al. (2004) who find that the Objective 2 and 5b funds do
not affect the location of FDI in France, and of Basile et al. (2008), who show that the
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund successfully promote the lagging regions of the
EU, helping to attract inward FDI.
The literature on border effects explores the impact of national borders on the
spatial distribution of economic activity. Beugelsdijk and Mudambi (2013) compare
national borders to ‘qualitative discontinuities’ in space, where spatial heterogeneity
changes abruptly. The ‘border effect puzzle’, captured by the theoretical core-periphery
model of Krugman (1991) and first formally identified by McCallum (1995) with respect
to Canadian-US trade flows, has an application to the location of inward investment,
although the literature review reveals that econometric research on the impact of border
effects on FDI activity is rare. The simulation results of Bruelhart et al. (2004) show that
the economic impact of EU enlargement on economic activity in the peripheral regions
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of the ‘old’ EU differs, depending on the geographic position of that region relative
to the accession countries, and is likely to be strongest in locations that are relatively
close to the ‘new’ EU. Basile et al. (2009) explore whether national borders continue to
significantly affect the location decision of MNEs within an integrated economic area
such as the EU. Although they find that national borders continue to have an impact
on the location choices of non-European MNEs, generally the borders become more
‘blurred’ as integration deepens, implying that regions compete for inward FDI with
other regions more across rather than within their national border. This supports the
conclusion of Pusterla and Resmini (2007) that economic and political integration in
Europe mean national borders cease to shape FDI location choices.
Finally, the impact of EU enlargement on the spatial distribution of industrial
location in the CEECs is the focus of Resmini (2003a), who attempts to identify the
winners and losers of the EU integration for regions in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and
Romania, giving special attention to border regions that are traditionally viewed as dis-
advantaged by their peripheral location. Resmini (2003a) presumes that border regions
adjacent to the ‘old’ EU and other accession countries are expected to gain from EU en-
largement, but border regions adjacent to non-EU countries are expected to suffer, while
interior regions may be only marginally affected. The analysis confirms that distance
from the EU border has a negative and statistically significant effect on manufacturing
employment, whereas a weak effect is detected for the distance from the former Soviet
block border. In another study, Pusterla and Resmini (2007) find that during the 1990s,
the European integration process re-shaped the spatial distribution of economic activity
in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Romania, leading to a shift of industry employment
from ‘autarkic’ centres, such as capital cities and internal regions, to other locations that
offered better access to EU markets. Conversely, the eastern regions closer to the former
Soviet block became losers, as they retained mainly labour-intensive industries.
Importantly, Beugelsdijk and Mudambi (2013) bring the international business
and economic geography perspectives together by arguing that in the context of border-
crossing multi-location enterprises, discrete border effects at the national level and con-
tinuous distance effects at the subnational level both impact on the location choice de-
cisions of these firms. The hypothesis that is tested in this thesis is that the western
border regions of the accession countries are the ‘winners’ of the fifth enlargement and
that the foreign investment activity agglomerates close to the former West-East bor-
der because of the location advantage of these regions, i.e. the relative proximity to
the core of the EU Single Market. This ties in with the observation of Resmini (2003a,
2007) that the economic activity in the CEECs shifted away from the ‘autarkic’ centres
towards other locations that offer better access to the EU markets. This is reminiscent
of the spatial patterns of economic activity discussed by the core-periphery models of
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the NEG theory, emphasising the complementarities between the international business
perspective, which offers more insight into the national dimension of FDI location, and
the NEG perspective, which explains the formation of industrial clusters at the sub-
national levels. This thesis will explore both discrete border effects and continuous
distance effects.
Overall, while the subsequent empirical work focuses on FDI location in the
CEECs in relation to EU enlargement, the broad and expansive literature review on
FDI location shows that many issues are relevant to this. These are multi-country di-
mensionality (e.g. Alegria, 2006), an ‘West-East’ divide in the motives for FDI (e.g.
Disdier and Mayer, 2004), country- and region-level determinants of investment (e.g.
Alegria, 2006), the impact of EU integration and enlargement on FDI location (e.g. Be-
van and Estrin, 2004; Kalotay, 2008), the impact of EU regional policy (e.g. Crozet et al.,
2004; Basile et al., 2008), border effects and the pattern of FDI activity (e.g. Basile et al.,
2009; Pusterla and Resmini, 2007; Resmini, 2003a), and the winners and losers from EU
integration (Resmini, 2003a).
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Chapter 3
The Process of EU Enlargement
3.1 Introduction
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) occurred in two waves in 2004 and
2007. It was an unprecedented event in the history of the European Community since
its establishment with six founding members in 1957. The enlargement added ten new
countries to the existing fifteen Member States in a first wave on 1 May 2004 and a
further two new Member States in a second wave less than three years later on 1 Jan-
uary 2007, resulting in a political and economic union of 27 independent countries.
The accession of ten former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe and
two Mediterranean countries added to the cultural diversity of the ‘old’ EU of fifteen
Member States (EU-15). While the ‘new’ EU Member States did not participate in the
initial creation of the European Community, they share many of the same historical and
cultural roots as the ‘old’ EU Member States.
The fifth enlargement was “the culmination of a long accession process leading
to the reunification of Europe” (European Commission, 2007, no pagination) that has
long been split into two parts by the ‘Iron Curtain’. The symbolic fall of the Berlin
Wall on 9 November 1989, which marked the disintegration of the communist regime
in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), was the beginning on the path to-
wards European reunification. After the CEECs recovered their liberty in 1990s, it soon
became apparent that EU accession was the priority objective for these countries (Land-
aburu, 2007). Between March 1994 and June 1996 ten CEECs submitted EU member-
ship applications. The Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta submitted their
applications in June 1990. From the date that the applications for EU membership were
submitted it was a long process, which took ten years or so to complete. The candidates
had to undergo a complex process of screening exercise and formal accession negotia-
tions. Naturally, within this time frame there were also internal EU developments that
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impacted on the progress of preparing for enlargement.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and reflect on the process that pre-
ceded the fifth EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, which resulted in the addition of
twelve ‘new’ EU Member States. The intention is to give the reader a detailed account
of how the accession process progressed, starting from the submission of the formal
applications for EU membership to EU accession. In the context of subsequent analysis
of FDI in the enlarged EU, a reflection on the accession process helps to understand the
complex interplay between integration and the perception of accession countries by the
foreign investors, seeing that the preparation for EU membership entailed building a
stable institutional and judicial systems, aligning the national laws with that of the EU
and ensuring a fully-functioning market economy in the candidate countries.
I start this chapter by explaining why I think the fifth EU enlargement was an
event unprecedented in the history of the EU. Subsequently I discuss the process that
prepared the EU for the accession of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although in
the context of the empirical analysis, the time frame starting from 1997 is most relevant,
I focus on the period that began with the meeting of the European Council in Copen-
hagen in June 1993, which set out the ground-rules for the accession negotiations with
the candidate countries. I discuss the EU enlargement process in detail up to the Euro-
pean Council in Copenhagen in December 2002, which marked the end of the accession
negotiations with ten candidate countries and formally announced that the first wave
of the fifth enlargement of the EU would take place on 1 May 2004. Finally, I also con-
sider the internal developments within the ‘old’ EU-15 that preceded and coincided
with the accession process of the ‘new’ Member States to the EU.
3.2 Unprecedented Enlargement
The first wave of the fifth enlargement was exceptional in the sense that ten ‘new’
countries simultaneously joined the European Union, thus representing a two-thirds
increase in the number of EU Member States. Together, the two waves of EU enlarge-
ment of 2004 and 2007 resulted in the addition of 105 million citizens to the existing
EU-15 of 380 million people. However, while total EU population increased by nearly
28% (and 19% for 2004 wave only), the 2004 enlargement added a mere 9.5% to the
existing level of EU-15 GNP (in PPP terms). Landaburu (2007) notes that if GNP at cur-
rent exchange rates was considered, total GNP of the EU increased by only 4.6% with
the 2004 enlargement. The collapse of Communism in the CEECs started the trans-
formation process from centrally-planned economies towards fully-functioning market
economies. It also revealed the need to undergo complex reform of the entire insti-
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tutional and judicial system. To support the impressive reform effort undertaken by
CEECs, in 1989 the EU created PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance
for Re-structuring their Economies) aimed at promoting the reform process in CEECs
through economic assistance. Initially, PHARE provided funds to Poland and Hungary
only, but shortly afterwards this was extended to cover all CEECs undergoing the trans-
formation process, becoming the largest assistance programme in Central and Eastern
Europe (Christoffersen, 2007d).
Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999) recognise that during the socialist pe-
riod the command economies of the CEECs faced considerable trade barriers in the
EU, including import quotas and high tariffs. The beginning of the transformation
process in the early 1990s, however, saw the gradual reorientation of all CEECs to-
wards the democracies of the EU, leading to the removal of long-standing import
quotas, granting of trade preferences and conclusion of cooperation agreements with
those countries, which promoted the economic and political transformation in the re-
gion (Christoffersen, 2007d). The reorientation of CEECs towards the EU led to Europe
Agreements (i.e. bilateral association agreements) between European Community and
ten CEECs.1 For Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999), the Europe Agreements were
“more ambitious than the Association Agreements the EU had previously concluded
with other countries” (p. 744), since in addition to the standard trade liberalization
component they covered aspects such as political dialogue, movements of workers and
services, capital flows and various forms of economic, financial and technical coopera-
tion. In that respect CEECs differed significantly from the two Mediterranean countries
of Cyprus and Malta which also joined the EU during the fifth enlargement in 2004,
and that signed their Association Agreements with the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) in 1972 and 1970 respectively.
The reform process aimed to transform the CEECs into functioning market
economies and the trade integration between the EU and the CEECs played a role in
the attraction of FDI, which at the beginning of 1990s was virtually zero. The close rela-
tionship between CEECs and the EU quickly revealed fact that the membership of the
EU was a priority for these countries. As discussed by Landaburu (2007), the accession
of CEECs into the EU contributed significantly to the attraction of FDI into the region,
which in effect was the pre-condition for economic growth. The conclusion of Europe
Agreements with the ten CEECs implied the recognition by the EU of the aspiration of
these countries to one-day join the Union. Thirteen potential candidate countries (ten
CEECs, plus Cyprus and Malta, but also Turkey) called for the adoption of the set of
formal criteria for EU membership.
1In chronological order, between December 1991 and June 1996 Europe Agreements were signed with
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
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3.3 The Criteria for Entry and Assistance
An early principle of the Treaty of Rome (1957) was that any European country could
join the European Community. The Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 reinforced that
principle by agreeing that any European country can accede to the European Union
regardless of its level of economic development. To assess the thirteen potential can-
didatures for EU membership the European Council in Copenhagen defined a set of
more specific accession criteria to gauge the readiness of a candidate country to join
the EU. These criteria, or the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ as they are known (after the 1993
Copenhagen European Council meeting), are that a candidate country must:
• possess a stable institutional set-up that guarantees democracy, the rule of law,
provision and protection of human rights, as well as the respect for and the pro-
tection of minorities (the ‘political criterion’);
• posses a fully-functioning market economy and the capacity to sustain the com-
petitive pressures and market forces within the Single Market of the EU (the ‘dou-
ble economic criterion’); and
• be able to assume the obligations of the membership by accepting the acquis com-
munautaire of the EU, including the adherence to the aims and objectives of the
political, economic and monetary Union (the ‘legislative criterion’).2
Later, the Madrid European Council of 1995 expanded on the third Copenhagen Cri-
terion by announcing that a country wanting to accede to the European Union must
implement all necessary adjustments to its administrative and judicial structures to be
able to successfully adopt, implement and finally effectively enforce EU’s acquis com-
munautaire. The Copenhagen European Summit also remarked on the EU’s ‘absorptive
capacity’ to accept new member states being an important consideration for both the
EU and the candidate countries.
Christoffersen (2007d) notes that the European Council in Copenhagen of 1993
demonstrated that the prospect of CEECs joining the EU was no longer a question of
‘if’ but of ‘when’. In particular, the presidency conclusions stated:
“the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall
become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon
as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by
satisfying the economic and political conditions required” (European Coun-
cil in Copenhagen, 1993, p. 13).
2This refers to the cumulative body of European Community laws. All acquis communautaire must be
adopted, implemented and enforced before the country is allowed to join the EU.
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Following the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 a more formal ‘structured re-
lationship’ was established between the CEECs and the institutions of the EU as part
of the pre-accession strategy aimed at bringing these countries closer to the EU. This
‘structured relationship’ was defined in detail and formally approved at the European
Council in Essen in December 1994 as a part of the ‘Essen Pre-Accession Strategy’. It
was acknowledged that this ‘structured relationship’ between the EU and the asso-
ciated countries should serve as a tool preparing for accession. The objective of the
‘Essen Pre-Accession Strategy’ was to set up the broad strategy for continuing the inte-
gration between the associated countries and the EU. For that reason, a series of short-
and medium-term measures was formulated that would help the potential candidates
prepare for integration in EU’s internal market.3 Consequently, the formal request was
put to the European Commission to prepare a white paper that would outline the mea-
sures that the associated countries would need to adopt to align their legislation with
that of the EU Single Market. Subsequently, the ‘White Paper on the Internal Market’
was presented at the European Council in Cannes in June 1995.
In essence, the EU-CEECs ‘structured relationship’ approved in Essen involved
holding meetings between these two parties on matters of common interest.4 Accord-
ing to Christoffersen (2007d), the purpose of these meetings was to serve a purely psy-
chological and pedagogical function to the potential new EU candidates. Furthermore,
it was agreed that training in community law should be offered to the officials from the
associated countries since it was argued that “the success of future accession negotia-
tions would depend very much on the capacity of officials in the candidate countries
to fully understand community law and practices” (Christoffersen, 2007d, p. 28). As
decided in Essen, the presidency of the European Council should issue the timetable
for the number of meetings with the CEECs at the ministerial level. It was agreed that
heads of state and government of the associated countries should be invited once a year
to the meetings at the margins of the European Council, and twice a year the meetings
of foreign ministers of the EU member states and the candidate countries should con-
vene (Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2011). Furthermore, the regular meetings of the other
ministers should be held in order to discuss the matters of the pan-European impor-
tance.
To facilitate the provision of targeted assistance to the associated countries, the
Commission’s ‘White Paper on the Internal Market’ proposed the new instrument
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange). TAIEX, which became op-
3Briefing No 24 of the European Parliament (1994): ‘Pre-Accession Strategy for Enlargement of the
European Union’ specified that these short- and medium-term measures included trade protection instru-
ments, state aid policy, competition and internal market issues.
4These included energy, environment, foreign and security policy, home and justice affairs, culture and
education.
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erational from 1996, was a EU-funded programme whose objective is to facilitate and
fund visits between EU public sector officials and their counterparts in pre-accession
countries. By supporting the exchange of the officials, TAIEX offered expert advice, tai-
lored to the individual needs of the candidates, on the application, implementation and
enforcement of the EU legislation (Christoffersen, 2007b). The Essen European Summit
and the ‘Essen Pre-Accession Strategy’ were very important milestones towards the
future enlargement of the EU. The European Council in Essen in December 1994 recog-
nised that one of the priority areas was:
“ensuring the lasting peace and stability of the European continent and
neighbouring regions by preparing for the future accession of the associ-
ated countries of Central and Eastern Europe and developing in parallel the
special relationship of the Union to its other neighbours, particularly the
Mediterranean countries” (European Council in Essen, 1994, p. 8)
3.4 Membership Applications
The year that immediately followed the Essen European Council meeting turned out
to be crucial for the future shape of the EU. In addition to the fourth EU enlargement
on 1 January 1995, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined, the same year also saw a
significant number of EU membership applications from the CEECs. Strictly speaking,
between March 1994 and June 1996 ten CEECs submitted their accession applications.5
Coupled with the fact that Cyprus and Malta both submitted their membership ap-
plications in 1990, the EU now had thirteen formal accession applications to consider.6
Table 3.1 records the date of EU membership application submission alongside the date
of signing of Europe Agreement/Association Agreement for the candidate countries.
Although a substantial number of accession applications were received, accord-
ing to Christoffersen (2007d) much of the EU’s attention between 1995 and 1997 was
devoted to the internal development and institutional debate. The main focus was on
a treaty to implement essential amendments to the previously-ratified Treaty of the
European Union (i.e. the Maastricht Treaty) that was signed in 1992, and the Treaties
establishing the European Community. The aim of this new treaty was to foster the in-
tegration process and implement the necessary reforms of the EU’s institutional frame-
work in the run-up to enlargement (Christoffersen, 2007d). These negotiations resulted
in signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.
5In chronological order, the EU membership applications were received from Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovenia.
6Turkey has held the associated country status since 1963 and submitted the formal EU membership
application in 1987.
88
Table 3.1: Signing of Europe Agreement/Association Agreement and application for
accession: dates
Country Signing of Europe Agreement
or Association Agreement
Date of application for
accession
Bulgaria 01.03.1993 14.12.1995
Cyprus 19.12.1972 03.07.1990
Czech Republic 06.10.1993 17.01.1996
Estonia 12.06.1995 24.11.1995
Hungary 16.12.1991 31.03.1994
Latvia 12.06.1995 13.10.1995
Lithuania 12.06.1995 08.12.1995
Malta 05.12.1970 03.07.1990
Poland 16.12.1991 05.04.1994
Romania 08.02.1993 22.06.1995
Slovakia 06.10.1993 27.06.1995
Slovenia 10.06.1996 10.06.1996
(source: European Commission, 2007)
Despite the intensive EU-internal negotiations on drafting of the Amsterdam
Treaty, progress was still made with respect to the future enlargement. During the
European Council in Madrid in December 1995, it was confirmed that accession nego-
tiations with Cyprus and Malta would start six months after the end of the intergov-
ernmental conference on Amsterdam Treaty (European Council in Madrid, 1995). This
was a decisive statement seen as a strong and firm assurance that the EU was willing to
‘open its doors’ towards the two Mediterranean candidates. Sajdik and Schwarzinger
(2011) emphasise that the declarations of the Madrid European Council left the CEEC
candidates with the hope that their preliminary accession negotiations could coincide
with the negotiations of Cyprus and Malta. Importantly, the Madrid Summit requested
the European Commission to prepare its opinion on the membership applications of
all candidate countries and be ready to present this after the conclusion of an intergov-
ernmental conference on the Amsterdam Treaty. The Commission was also asked to
produce an overall (or ‘composite’) paper on enlargement and to undertake a detailed
analysis of the potential effects of future EU enlargement, focusing in particular on the
expected financial implications.
A year and a half after the European Council in Madrid, in July 1997, the Euro-
pean Commission published its opinion on each candidate’s membership application.
This considered the ability of individual candidate countries to assume the obligations
of EU membership and their readiness to start the accession negotiations. A single and
detailed report, ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’, was published cover-
ing all aspects of the accession negotiations and enlargement process. The document
89
proposed a new financial framework for the time period 2000-06, with a special atten-
tion given to the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and regional policy
(Structural and Cohesion Funds) in the context of an enlarged EU. The reform of the
regional policy was required given the much lower average economic development of
the candidate countries.7 Similarly, in the context of the prospective EU enlargement a
reform of CAP was regarded as a matter of urgency. It was widely acknowledged that
extending the CAP in its current form to all applicant countries would have consider-
able implications for the budgetary position of the EU. The relatively high share of the
agricultural sector in the ten candidate CEECs (7.0% of total GDP versus 1.7% in the
EU-15 in 1996) and the high agricultural employment (22% of total employment versus
5.1% in the EU-15 in 1996) highlighted the important role played by agriculture in the
social-economic structure of all CEECs (Pezaros, 1999).
Given that regional policy and the CAP were the most important policies of the
EU, absorbing about 85% of the EU budget and contributing significantly to the eco-
nomic and social cohesion within the EU (Pezaros, 1999), a strategy for reforming both
of these policies was necessary for the fifth enlargement to take place. Accordingly,
Agenda 2000 proposed the creation of two pre-accession instruments: the Special Ac-
cession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD), concerned with
agriculture and rural development, and the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession (ISPA), concerned with the improvement of infrastructure and the environ-
ment.
3.5 Selection of the Candidates: The Luxembourg Group
The European Council in Amsterdam in June 1997 officially confirmed that “the way
is now open for launching the enlargement process in accordance with the conclusions
of the Madrid European Council” (no pagination). This preceded by a few weeks the
formal presentation of Agenda 2000 and the publication of the European Commission’s
opinions on membership applications, which gave a ‘green light’ for the negotiations
to begin. In the lead-up to the Commission presenting its opinion, debate had already
begun among the EU Member States on which candidates should be permitted to start
the accession negotiations. There were two contrasting views. On the one hand, there
was a ‘regatta model’, which envisaged that the accession negotiations should start
with all candidate countries. On the other hand, a ‘wave approach’ suggested opening
7Landaburu (2007) highlights that at the time of their EU accession in 2004, approximately 92% of the
populations of ‘new’ EU Member States lived in regions where GNP per capita was less or equal to 75% of
the average of the enlarged EU of 25 countries (EU-25), while more than two-thirds lived in regions where
GNP per capita was less than 50% of EU-25 average.
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accession negotiations with selected candidates based on an assessment of their readi-
ness for membership. The dominant view among the EU-15 and within the European
Commission was that the latter approach was the better.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were generally considered the
‘strongest’ candidates for accession: the Czech Republic and Hungary due to the per-
ception that they had made most progress on economic reform; and Poland due to its
size and significance to the region and its historical importance in the ending of the
communist rule in CEECs (Christoffersen, 2007d). Cyprus and Malta were also other
strong candidates owing to the promise that had been made at the Madrid European
Council, although Malta had decided to freeze its EU membership application after the
general elections on 26 October 1996.8 The Commission’s evaluation of the degree of
compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria was based on the information provided by
the candidates, supplemented with data from organizations such as IMF, OECD, OSCE
and Council of Europe. As a result, it recommended that accession negotiations should
be opened with Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
To justify its selection of the candidates for the opening of negotiations with
some and rejection of others, the Commission decided that the Political (Copenhagen)
Criterion had to be fulfilled before the negotiations could begin, whilst the Economic
Criterion had to be fulfilled from the time of entry (see: section 3.3). Such reasoning
justified the elimination of Slovakia from the first wave, where the government was
accused of a breach of constitution in respect to human rights and minorities’ protec-
tion. The evaluation of the candidates’ compliance with the Economic Criterion led to
the rejection of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania from the first wave on the ba-
sis that these countries were ‘not yet sufficiently economically developed’ (Sajdik and
Schwarzinger, 2011). The rationale was that there was no purpose in the opening of the
negotiations with any country, which in the medium-run might not be able to join the
European Union due to the economic considerations.
Christoffersen (2007d) remarks that the Commission’s opinions were well re-
ceived among the EU-15, especially among the countries that supported the view that
negotiations should start only with the limited number of candidates. However, coun-
tries such as Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom argued that the ‘wave ap-
proach’ to enlargement could take away the pressure for reform in the countries that
were not recommended for the start of negotiations by the Commission. Austria and
Denmark proposed the solution that the second group of countries should be permit-
8‘The European Council reiterates that the accession negotiations with Malta and Cyprus will com-
mence, on the basis of the Commission proposals, six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergov-
ernmental Conference, and will take its results into account’ (European Council in Madrid, 1995). The
Labour Party of Malta replaced the Nationalist Party in the new government and chose to freeze Malta’s
application for EU membership but not completely withdraw it.
91
ted to go through the screening exercise. This was a preparatory phase of negotiations
that involved a detailed examination of the chapters of the acquis communautaire in or-
der to identify where national laws had to be amended to be consistent with EU laws.
Although it was not intended that the negotiations should be opened simultaneously
with all countries, the rationale for allowing all candidates to go through the screening
process was to speed up the preparations for future negotiations (Andrews, 2000).
The European Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 officially confirmed
that negotiations should begin with six candidates on 31 March 1998. These were
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, which became to be
collectively known as the ‘Luxembourg Group’. This meant that the ‘wave approach’
won over the ‘regatta model’. However, it was formally decided that all eleven candi-
dates would be invited to the launching of the accession process on 30 March 1998 and
that Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia would go through the screening
process in parallel with the Luxembourg Group. One of the conclusions of the presi-
dency was that all candidates were destined to join the European Union on the basis
of the same criteria (European Council in Luxembourg, 1997b). Moreover, the Luxem-
bourg Summit decided that starting from the end of 1998 the Commission would sub-
mit regular reports to the Council, reviewing the progress of CEECs applicant states
towards accession, essentially assessing the progress in adopting the acquis and fulfill-
ing the Copenhagen criteria.
In response to the launching of the enlargement process by the Luxembourg Eu-
ropean Council, a decision was made to increase pre-accession aid substantially under
the existing programme of community aid to the CEECs, PHARE. The pre-accession
priorities of PHARE were ‘institution building’ (30% of funds channelled for this pur-
pose) and investment related to the adoption and application of acquis communautaire
(70% of funds). The characteristic aspect of the fifth enlargement, which distinguishes
it from the previous enlargements, was that part of the EU budget was channelled into
assisting the candidates with adoption of acquis communautaire even before the enlarge-
ment took place. The explanation for this lies in the much lower level of economic
development of the candidates.9 An instrument for achieving tangible and sustainable
results with respect to institution building, the ‘twinning’ programme, was launched in
May 1998. It provided a platform for collaboration between public administration and
semi-public organizations in the Member States and candidate countries. In practical
terms, the EU-15 seconded teams of experienced civil servants, who were responsible
for familiarising themselves with local working practices and were expected to form
9By the time accession negotiations started in 1998, GDP per capita in most candidate countries was
below 30% of EU-15 average (Vassiliou and Christoffersen, 2007). In all previous enlargements the EU
budget remained intact until the enlargement.
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views of the scope for improvements, and in cooperation with the local partners drive
the reform process towards the desired result.
3.6 Opening of the Accession Negotiations
In early 1998 the EU adopted its Negotiations Framework, setting out the guiding prin-
ciples for accession negotiations. This was formally presented to the six Luxembourg
Group candidates at the opening of their accession negotiations on 31 March 1998. The
framework re-stated the basic principle that “accession implied the full acceptance by
the applicant countries of the actual and potential rights and obligations derived from
accession to the Union system and its institutional system (the acquis)” (Christoffersen,
2007b, p. 46). This signalled the requirement for the accession candidates to implement
the EU acquis communautaire prior to enlargement and to enforce it from the time of
entry. The Negotiation Framework mentioned the principle of differentiation, whereby
negotiations with the candidates would be conducted separately and according to the
individual merits of each state, but based on the same set of criteria.
Essentially, 31 March 1998 marks the formal opening of the accession negotia-
tions with the Luxembourg Group, although admittedly the initial progress of the nego-
tiations with Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia was lim-
ited (Christoffersen, 2007b). What followed the opening of the accession negotiations
almost immediately was the analytical examination, i.e. ‘screening’, which checked
for the compliance of national laws of candidate countries with the acquis communau-
taire. For the purpose of the screening, the acquis communautaire was broken down into
chapters, each corresponding to and covering a specific policy area.10 The acquis com-
munautaire screening is only a preparation step for the enlargement negotiations and
does not constitute a formal part of the actual negotiations.
This screening process with the Luxembourg Group started in April 1998, and
as promised at the Luxembourg Council the remaining candidates were also invited
to participate in the screening, although arguably in a less intensive manner (Sajdik
and Schwarzinger, 2011). Given that nearly 100,000 pages of legal texts had to be gone
through this left the experts skeptical as to whether the process could be completed
10The negotiations in the fifth enlargement were based on the following chapters: 1: Free Movement
of Goods; 2: Free Movement for Persons; 3: Freedom to Provide Services; 4: Free Movement of Capital;
5: Company Law; 6: Competition Policy; 7: Agriculture; 8: Fisheries; 9: Transport Policy; 10: Taxation;
11: Economic and Monetary Union; 12: Statistics; 13: Social Policy and Employment; 14: Energy; 15:
Industrial Policy; 16: Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises; 17: Science and Research; 18: Education and
Training; 19: Telecommunications and Information Technologies; 20: Culture and Audio-visual Policy; 21:
Regional Policy; 22: Environment; 23: Consumer and Health Protection; 24: Justice and Home Affairs; 25:
Customs Union; 26: External Relations; 27: Common Foreign and Security Policy; 28: Financial Control;
29: Financial and Budgetary Provisions; 30: Institutions; and 31: Other.
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by the end of 1998. Essentially, the formal accession negotiations on each individual
chapter could only begin after the screening of that chapter had been completed and
both the EU and the candidate country had defined their negotiation position.11 Thus,
the screening exercise was only finalised with the Luxembourg Group in July 1999.
In accordance with the decisions of the Luxembourg European Council, the
Commission prepared and presented in November 1998 the first Progress Reports
(‘Regular Reports’) on all applicant countries and their progress towards accession.
In addition to the individual country reports, the Commission also produced a com-
posite paper that provided an overall assessment and general conclusions. Sajdik and
Schwarzinger (2011) note that these reports were awaited by Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Romania and Slovakia in the hope that the Commission would recommend their
advancement into the Luxembourg Group. However, the reality was disappointing as
no reference was made to the possibility of the group of the negotiating candidates to
be extended. In the second half of 1998, the pro-European Nationalist Party of Malta
regained power and reactivated its membership application, which was suspended in
1996. The Commission was asked to review its opinion on the Malta application, but it
refrained from making any firm recommendation.12
3.7 The Helsinki Group
Having been involved in the less-intensive version of the screening exercise, it was de-
cided to start the full screening with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia
in early 1999. Given the relative good track record of reform in these countries, the
screening was broadly finalised by the end of 1999. In the second half of 1999 the Euro-
pean Parliament elected a new President and Commission, so that while in theory this
had only a limited role in the accession process, in practice it was an important factor
(Christoffersen, 2007a). It made the enlargement a priority, creating the post of a Com-
missioner for Enlargement, reflecting the complexity and political importance attached
to the prospect of the fifth enlargement (Christoffersen, 2007b).
The composite paper on the annual Progress Reports in 1999 reflected a new at-
titude of the Commission towards enlargement (Christoffersen, 2007a). It was aware
that the prospect of the end of the screening process with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania and Slovakia, initially seen as an important incentive for the internal prepara-
11The negotiation position for the chapter under consideration set out the ‘action plan’ for the adoption
and implementation of acquis communautaire of that chapter.
12The Commission argued that owing to the two-year freeze of Malta’s application, it readiness for EU
membership differed considerably from that of the other candidate countries. The Commission decided to
hold on and produce a detailed report on the state of Malta’s preparedness for accession to be submitted
alongside the regular progress reports on the other applicant countries towards the end of 1999.
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tion for accession, could demotivate these countries from carrying out further reforms
unless the EU made ‘a new offer’. In that sense, the Commission recognised the risk of
“tensions that may arise if negotiations are postponed too long” (European Commis-
sion, 1999, p. 30). It also acknowledged that most candidates not included in Luxem-
bourg Group “made great effort to accelerate their legislative alignment in order to be
admitted to negotiations” (p. 30). Having concluded that Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania and Slovakia fulfilled the political Copenhagen Criterion and were ready to
take the measures to comply with the Economic Criteria, the European Commission
recommended the opening of negotiations with these remaining candidate countries in
2000.13 The composite paper did not state the target date for the entry, but it considered
it possible to conclude accession negotiations with more-advanced countries by the end
of 2002 (European Commission, 1999).
The European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 formally approved a deci-
sion to open accession negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania
and Slovakia in February 2000. On the account of the ending of the Finnish presidency,
this group of candidate countries would be from then on referred to as the ‘Helsinki
Group’. The Council highlighted the importance of the principle of differentiation,
whereby each candidate country would be judged on its own merits, and which in-
fluenced the decision on which chapter of the acquis communautaire should be opened
with each country during the phases of the enlargement negotiations. Importantly, it
also enabled more-advanced countries of the Helsinki Group to catch-up with the ne-
gotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia of
the Luxembourg Group, while allowing other applicants to proceed at their own pace.
A key declaration of the Helsinki European Summit in December 1999 was that “the
Union should be in a position to welcome new member states from the end of 2002”
(European Council in Helsinki, 1999, no pagination).
3.8 The Nice Treaty and the ‘Road Map’
Portugal took over the presidency of the EU in the first half of 2000 and after the
Helsinki Group had opened their negotiations with the EU on 15 February 2000 it faced
the challenge of coordinating these negotiations with the two groups of countries. Al-
though the Helsinki Group started the accession negotiations nearly two years after
the Luxembourg Group, most countries from that group set themselves an ambitious
13Malta, which had reactivated its application for EU membership in 1998 and had started the screening
process in May 1999, was invited alongside Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia to join the
negotiation process already underway with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and
Cyprus since March 1998 (European Parliament, 2000).
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target date for their EU accession.14 Nevertheless, following the progress made in the
enlargement process under the Finnish presidency, the year 2000 was characterised by
a slowdown in the accession negotiations (Christoffersen, 2007a). The priority of the
EU, both under Portuguese and French presidency, was the drafting of a new treaty,
which later became known as the Nice Treaty.15 It laid the foundations for the institu-
tional change in the enlarged the EU, but before the Nice Summit at the end of 2000
the Commission presented alongside the annual Progress Reports a strategy paper that
it referred to as the ‘Road Map’. This outlined the schedule for the accession negotia-
tions in the coming eighteen months and it became a guidance tool for the subsequent
Presidencies. The ‘Road Map’ proposed that most chapters in the negotiations should
be closed in 2001, with only those remaining with major financial implications for the
EU budget left to the first half of 2002, making the prospect of concluding the accession
negotiations by the end of 2002 a realistic target. However, it was not clear whether the
Helsinki Group would adhere to the ‘Road Map’ and conclude negotiations by the end
of 2002 alongside the Luxembourg Group (Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2011).
The Nice European Summit in December 2000 endorsed the ‘Road Map’ and
confirmed that the strategy contained in the ‘Road Map’, coupled with the completion
of the institutional reform, should allow the EU “to welcome those new Member States
which are ready as from the end of 2002, in the hope that they will be able to take part
in the next European Parliament elections [in June 2004]” (European Council in Nice,
2000, no pagination), reaffirming the commitment of the EU to the objectives set by
the Helsinki European Council in 1999. In the first half of 2001, the accession nego-
tiations showed substantial progress as the ‘Road Map’ set of priorities were adhered
to (Christoffersen, 2007a). The Sweden presidency and European Commission pushed
for the progress in the accession negotiations with the Helsinki Group candidates by
inviting them to specify the chapters they were ready to negotiate on. Sajdik and
Schwarzinger (2011) note that despite the fact that the ‘Road Map’ strategy was ‘tailor-
made’ for the Luxembourg Group, the Helsinki Group made impressive progress in
their accession negotiations, catching-up with the first group.
Despite the impressive speed of enlargement negotiations under the Swedish
presidency, a threat to the EU enlargement came after the rejection of the Nice Treaty
in the Irish referendum. This was seen as a serious obstacle on the way to the next en-
largement. The negative result of the treaty referendum in Ireland did not prevent the
14Target entry dates for the second group of countries were as follows: Latvia and Malta - 01/01/2003;
Lithuania and Slovakia - 01/01/2004; Bulgaria believed it could join the EU by the end of 2006; Romania
- 01/01/2007 (Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2011).
15The Nice Treaty was approved at the Nice European Council in December 2000. The issues covered
by the treaty included the weighting of votes in the European Council and the distribution of seats in the
European Parliament in the enlarged EU of 27 Member States.
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Go¨teborg European Council in June 2001 signalling to the candidates its commitment to
enlargement by reassuring the applicants that “the enlargement process is irreversible”
and that “the ratification process for the Treaty of Nice will continue” (European Coun-
cil in Go¨teborg, 2001a, p. 2). It was confirmed that provided progress was sustained,
the completion of negotiations would be achievable by the end of 2002, allowing the
new members to participate in the European Parliament elections in 2004. Belgium
took over the presidency of the EU in the second half of 2001, and despite facing the
difficulty of opening the more-critical chapters it generally adhered to the strategy set
out by the ‘Road Map’. A significant achievement of the Belgian presidency was the
publication of a strategy paper ‘Making a Success of Enlargement’, which for the first time
named ten countries that should be in the position to finish their negotiations by the end
of 2002, on the basis of steady progress being maintained. The group of ten countries
were known as the ‘Laeken10’, comprising Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The Laeken European Council in December 2001 reinforced its commitment to
enlargement by declaring that: “The European Union is determined to bring the acces-
sion negotiations with the candidate countries that are ready to a successful conclusion
by the end of 2002, so that those countries can take part in the European Parliament
elections in 2004 as members” (European Council in Laeken, 2001b, p. 3). Importantly,
for the first time, it named individual candidate countries that were deemed to be on
course to conclude the accession negotiations by the end of 2002:
“The European Council agrees with the report of the Commission, which
considers that, if the present rate of progress of the negotiations and re-
forms in the candidate States is maintained, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovenia could be ready. It appreciates the efforts made by Bulgaria
and Romania and would encourage them to continue on that course.” (p. 3)
This meant that the prospect of EU accession of these countries was highly probable.
At the same time, the Laeken Summit encouraged Bulgaria and Romania to continue
maintaining their efforts in the accession negotiations to be able “to open negotiations
on all chapters with those countries in 2002” (European Council in Laeken, 2001b, p. 3).
3.9 The Decisive Phase of the Negotiations
The year 2002 was critical for the success of the accession negotiations. Owing to the
achievements of Swedish and Belgian presidencies in 2001 and their adherence to the
‘Road Map’ priorities, the negotiations entered their decisive stage, with the budget-
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related aspects next on the agenda. The priority schedule for the first half of 2002 under
the Spanish presidency included the provisional closure of the chapters such as agri-
culture, regional policy, financial and budgetary provisions and institutions. Moreover,
the Spanish presidency faced the task of aligning the Financial Framework for 2000-
06 with the current working hypothesis of EU enlarging in 2004 with ten ‘new’ EU
Member States.16 The Spanish presidency generally adhered to the high expectations
of the ‘Road Map’ (Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2011). The administrative and judicial
systems of the candidate countries were assessed at the Sevilla European Council in
June 2002, which decided that the final list of acceding countries would be determined
at the meeting of the European Council in October 2002. The Sevilla Summit envisaged
the continued drafting of the Treaty of Accession, with this being ready for signing in
spring 2003 (European Council in Sevilla, 2002c). It was confirmed that a second refer-
endum on the Nice Treaty would be held in Ireland in autumn 2002, the ratification of
which was a condition for enlargement taking place within the scheduled timescale.
Denmark took over the presidency of the European Union in second half of 2002,
and had the task of concluding the negotiations within the following six months, which
was regarded as a matter of credibility (Christoffersen, 2007c). It set out a detailed
action plan, which assumed the conclusion of negotiations on all chapters, except for
those linked to finance and institutional questions before the Brussels European Council
meeting in October 2002, when the final list of acceding first wave countries was going
to be determined. A period of extensive budget negotiations followed the European
Council in Brussels and finished with the Copenhagen European Council in December
2002, which formally brought the negotiations with the first wave of countries to a
close. The recommendation of the Commission was to finish the negotiations with
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia (the ‘Laeken10’ countries) by 2003, which was endorsed in Brussels.17
At the Brussels meeting the EU-15 discussed the possibility of postponing the
enlargement date from the previous target date of 1 January 2004 to 1 May 2004. The
reason for this was for both financial and legislative considerations.18 Meanwhile,
while the final list of new member states was drawn up, the second referendum on the
Nice Treaty in Ireland approved the new treaty, thus clearing the way for the Eastern
enlargement of the EU. What followed were weeks of intensive negotiations with the
16The previous hypothesis, in operation since the common Financial Framework for 2000-06 was agreed
in Berlin in 1999, assumed an enlargement in 2002 with six new members only.
17For the purpose of defining the final list of new entrants in Brussels in October 2002, the Commission
was asked to present its annual Progress Reports earlier than in previous years: in early October rather
than late November. The Commission met this obligation, submitting the Progress Reports and Strategy
Paper on 9 October 2002.
18Provided the conclusion of negotiations with ten candidates at the end of 2002, this left very little time
for drafting and signing of the final Accession Treaty, as well as national referenda.
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ten candidates, crowned by success at the Copenhagen European Council in December
2002. This Council formally announced that the fifth enlargement of the EU would take
place on 1 May 2004, when ten new countries - Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia - would join the EU. The
Copenhagen Summit also endorsed a new Road Map for Bulgaria and Romania, with
the view that these countries would join in a second wave of the fifth enlargement on
1 January 2007. The declaration ‘One Europe’ promised that the negotiations with Bul-
garia and Romania “will continue on the basis of the same principles that have guided
the accession negotiations so far, and that each candidate country will be judged on its
own merits” (European Council in Copenhagen, 2002a, p. 4).
After formal approval by the European Parliament, a Treaty of Accession was
signed by the EU Member States and the ten acceding countries in a ceremony in
Athens on 16 April 2003. The final decision on accession was made by the citizens of
the acceding countries in national referenda.19 The results of the national referenda are
reported in Table 3.2 and they show that in all accession countries a majority voted in
favour of joining the EU, with the lowest support for EU membership recorded in Malta
(54%) and the strongest support in Slovakia (92%). This paved way for the historic EU
enlargement on 1 May 2004.
Following the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia continued accession negotiations for two years until their conclusion on 14 Decem-
ber 2004. The European Council meeting in Brussels immediately followed the end of
the accession negotiations and confirmed that negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania
were concluded and that the EU looked forward to welcoming these as members from
January 2007. The Treaty of Accession was signed on 25 April 2005 in Neumu¨nster
Abbey in Luxembourg. Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU in the second wave of
Eastern enlargement on 1 January 2007, thus bringing to a close the fifth enlargement of
the European Union. It represented “the incredible sum of many individual efforts and
achievements” (Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2011, p. 152) and according to Rasmussen
(2003) it marked the opening of a new chapter in European history.
3.10 1986-2004: Internal Developments in the ‘Old’ EU-15
The long and complex accession process that brought the twelve ‘new’ Member States
into the EU did not happen in isolation. Internal developments within the ‘old’ EU-15
deepened the economic and political integration within the EU and occurred in parallel
19Cyprus was the only country from the group of 10 ‘new’ EU countries that decided not to hold national
referendum on the Accession to the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007, also
chose not to hold a national referendum.
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Table 3.2: EU Accession Referendum in CEECs: Results
Country % in favour of accession Date of referendum
Malta 54% 08/03/2003
Slovenia 90% 23/03/2003
Hungary 83% 12/04/2003
Lithuania 91% 10-11/05/2003
Slovakia 92% 16-17/05/2003
Poland 77% 07-08/06/2003
Czech Republic 77% 13-14/06/2003
Estonia 67% 14/09/2003
Latvia 67% 20/09/2003
Cyprus 1/ . . . . . .
Bulgaria 1/ . . . . . .
Romania 1/ . . . . . .
(source: D@dalos Chronology)
Notes:
1/ No referendum on the Accession to the European Union was held in
Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania.
to the accession of the ‘new’ Member States, making it difficult to disentangle the effect
of the ‘widening’ versus the ‘deepening’ of European integration. Equally, there was an
interplay between the accession process of the CEECs and what was happening within
these countries internally.
Throughout this chapter I referred to the accession process of the CEECs with the
EU but technically speaking the EU did not come into existence until 1 November 1993.
It was created by the Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on European Union) that
was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, the Netherlands, by the twelve members
of the European Economic Community (EEC). The Maastricht Treaty was a milestone
in the political and economic integration of Europe. Upon entering into force on 1
November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty renamed the EEC as the European Community
(EC) and embedded it as one of the three pillars of the EU.20 The Maastricht Treaty also
introduced a concept of European citizenship, which gave every citizen of the Union
the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, and the
right to vote in the municipal elections in the Member States where they reside.
The year of signing the Maastricht Treaty also coincided with the creation of the
Single European Market (SEM). An objective of establishing the SEM was formulated
in the Single European Act (SEA) that was signed on 17 February 1986 in Luxembourg
and on 28 February 1986 in The Hague. The SEA came into force on 1 July 1987 and
20The other two pillars of the EU included common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters. The European Community pillar also included the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
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it set the objective of establishing the SEM by 31 December 1992. The SEA was the
first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the EEC, the ESCS and
the Euratom. With its provisions, the SEA was the start to the creation of the world’s
largest trading bloc. Compared to the later treaty changes (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty),
with its economic goals the SEA was not controversial and European business strongly
favoured the proposal to create the SEM, especially because the Member States were
becoming increasingly dependent on the intra-EEC trade (McCormick, 2008). The SEA
significantly reduced barriers to trade within the EEC by introducing the four freedoms,
a building block of the SEM. The four freedoms allowed the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labour. Therefore, the SEA can be seen as a first attempt at creating
Europe without borders and a first commitment by Member States to create a ‘European
Union’.
An important step towards the creation of borderless Europe was the signing
of the Schengen Agreement on 14 June 1985, which led to the creation of Europe’s
borderless Schengen Area. Initially, the Schengen Agreement was signed by five of
the ten Member States of the EEC (Belgium, France, West Germany - later Germany
- Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The Schengen Agreement, which McCormick
(2008) argues provided for “the fast-track removal of border controls” (p. 99), proposed
the gradual abolition of border checks at the common borders of the signatories, with
an ultimate goal of allowing free movement of persons between countries within the
Schengen Area. In 1990 the Schengen Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen
Convention, which proposed the abolition of internal border controls and the intro-
duction of a common visa policy. The Schengen Agreement came into effect in March
1995.
Year 1995 also saw the widening of the integration within the EU, with the ac-
cession of Austria, Finland and Sweden on 1 January 1995. A national referendum on
joining the EU was also held in Norway but the majority voted against the member-
ship. These four countries were previously involved in the negotiations on the creation
of the European Economic Area (EEA), which intended to extend the terms of the SEA
to the seven members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Austria, Fin-
land, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland). These negotiations
were completed in February 1992 and the EEA came into existence in January 1994.
However, following the Swiss referendum in December 1992, which turned down the
EEA membership, only six EFTA countries became members of the EEA upon its entry
into force.
Deepening of economic integration within the EU was achieved by the creation
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), also known as the eurozone. The foundations
for the EMU were laid by the Maastricht Treaty, which proposed the creation of the
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Single currency, the euro. The five convergence criteria (i.e. Maastricht convergence
criteria) that the EU Member States were required to comply with prior to adopting
the Single currency were outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. The five criteria focused
on inflation, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability, government budget deficit
and government debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1997 the Growth and Stability Pact was agreed,
a framework designed to ensure price stability and fiscal responsibility, defining rules
and penalties for eurozone members for breaches of the deficit and debt rules. The
aim of the Stability and Growth Pact was to impose a fiscal discipline to facilitate and
maintain the stability of the EMU.
In 1998 the European Central Bank (ECB) was established in Frankfurt am Main,
Germany, with the responsibility as part of the European System of Central Banks
for setting monetary policy for the eurozone countries and managing their foreign
exchange reserves.21 In 1998 it was decided that 11 of the EU-15 Member States ful-
filled the Maastricht convergence criteria, and on 1 January 1999 the euro was formally
launched as the national currency of these countries.22 The euro coins and banknotes
were finally introduced into circulation on 1 January 2002 in twelve of the EU-15 Mem-
ber States.
The introduction of the Single currency was important in achieving economic
integration within the EU. At the same time, greater political integration was achieved
through the signing of Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and Nice Treaty in 2001. The 1997
Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, made amendments to the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, abolishing a number of national vetoes in the European Coun-
cil and replacing them with the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).23 It also gave in-
creased powers to the European Parliament, and formally incorporated the Schengen
Agreement into the treaties. Importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty prepared the EU for
the future accession of the ‘new’ Member States. (McCormick, 2008) argues that the
Amsterdam Treaty “was less important than either the SEA or Maastricht” (p. 113) in
that it was designed to implement institutional and political changes ahead of the fifth
enlargement and hence, “focused on consolidation rather than innovation” (p. 113).
Saryusz-Wolski (2001) compares the outcome of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations to
“the adjustment of existing structures to the sufficient degree” (p. 57) rather than “the
fundamental reform of the institutions” (p. 57). More comprehensive reform of the
institutional structure and decision-making in the EU in preparation for the fifth en-
largement was achieved through signing of the 2001 Nice Treaty, which entered into
21The predecessor of the ECB, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was created in 1994. The EMI
oversaw the coordination of the monetary policies of national central banks.
22The eleven countries included Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Up until 2002, the euro only existed as a virtual currency.
23The QMV was first introduced by the SEA in 1987.
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force on 1 February 2003 following two referenda in Ireland.
3.11 Conclusions
The in-depth discussion of the EU fifth enlargement process in this chapter has identi-
fied a number of important milestones. A European Council meeting held in Luxem-
bourg in December 1997 decided that accession negotiations would begin with Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (the ‘Luxembourg Group’),
and these commenced at the end of March 1998. The other six candidates were invited
to participate in the ‘informal’ screening process, but it was not until the Helsinki Eu-
ropean Council of December 1999 that Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and
Slovakia (the ‘Helsinki Group’) were invited to open their accession negotiations with
the European Union. Their negotiations commenced in February 2000. Accession was
a long drawn-out process and it was not until 2007 that all twelve countries acceded.
The EU has tended to emphasise its commitment to enlargement, but the
prospect of this only became likely after the European Commission published a strategy
paper ‘Making a Success of Enlargement’ in November 2001. For the first time this named
the ten countries that were on course to conclude their accession negotiations by the
end of 2002, comprising Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (the so-called ‘Laeken10’). The European Com-
mission’s recommendations were formally approved at the Laeken European Summit
in December 2001 and the declaration of the first wave of enlargement was made at
the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002, where it was confirmed that
they would join the EU on 1 May 2004. This reaffirmed the commitment to continuing
accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania. In May 2004 Cyprus, Malta and
eight former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe joined the EU, but
the fifth enlargement was only completed two years later with the accession of Bulgaria
and Romania in January 2007.
The CEECs that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 are the former communist coun-
tries that upon the start of their political integration with the EU were in the process
of transition towards the market economy. The transition process involved a set of
deep structural reforms, such as privatisation, price liberalisation, financial liberalisa-
tion, trade liberalisation, industrial restructuring and law reform. In many countries
these reforms coincided with the sudden acceleration of inflation, steep and fast decline
in output, and fast rise in unemployment but the CEECs overcame the first stage of the
transitional recessions by 1995 (Podkaminer, 2013). Importantly, the preparation for ac-
cession provided the CEECs with substantial and consistent incentives for reform and
ensured that the process of political, institutional and economic reform in the CEECs
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continued beyond the ‘shock therapy’ stage of transition. Falcetti et al. (2005) show that
the progress in market-oriented reforms is linked to higher cumulative growth across
transition countries, and that “the new EU members on average have enjoyed higher
cumulative real growth than other transition countries since 1989” (p. 1).
In the context of inward FDI, the accession process of ‘new’ Member States co-
incided with the reconfiguration of inflows of FDI to the EU (see: Figure 1.1 in Chapter
1). This is well illustrated in the case of the CEECs, which at the beginning of the 1990s
attracted virtually zero inward FDI but have experienced growing inflows of FDI since.
As set out by the Copenhagen criteria, before joining the EU the candidate countries
were required to build a stable institutional set-up that guarantees democracy and rule
of law, and have a fully functioning market economy with a capacity to sustain the
competitive pressures of the European Single Market. Essentially, the process of meet-
ing the criteria and the determination of the candidates to join the EU helped to build an
environment beneficial for prospective investors and arguably, may have significantly
contributed to the increasing recognition of the ‘new’ EU as a destination for inward
FDI. It is this that is subsequently explored in this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Data and Methodology
4.1 Introduction
The theory of FDI emphasises that the location of FDI activity is influenced by factors
that are both ‘external’ (neoclassical and institutional perspective, where the former in-
cludes the agglomeration economies of the New Economic Geography (NEG) theory)
and ‘internal’ to the firm (behavioural perspective). This chapter focuses on the ‘exter-
nal’ location factors and discusses the data that are collected and constructed to under-
stand the determinants of FDI location in the European Union (EU). These are informed
by theoretical perspectives on location factors. Importantly, to conduct the empirical re-
search I construct an original dataset on location factors available at both the country
and NUTS2 regional level. The theory of FDI motives of Dunning (1993) provides a
logical framework for the purpose of organising these data. Specifically, to account
for the neoclassical profit and cost-driving factors a distinction is made between vari-
ables that are important to the market-seeking and resource-seeking FDI respectively.
Furthermore, macroeconomic variables account for institutional factors, while industry
variables capture the agglomeration factors of the NEG theory. A separate category of
variables is defined for distance and border factors that are used in the regional analysis
and that do not formally belong to these theoretical perspectives.
Although the ‘internal’ location factors that encompass investor-specific pref-
erences are likely to impact on the location of investment activity, the preferences of
investors are often unobservable and difficult to model empirically. Furthermore, de-
tailed firm-level data to account for investor-specific preferences is less readily avail-
able. Admittedly, in my research it is possible to indirectly account for investor-specific
‘internal’ location factors by distinguishing between different types of investors, such
as investment originating from within and outside of the EU, new investment and ex-
pansions. Alongside data on location factors, I discuss the project-level data on FDI that
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are sourced from the European Investment Monitor (EIM). The EIM data gives infor-
mation on cross-border investment projects across Europe. An analysis is undertaken
of the spatial distribution of inward investment activity at the country and region level
by examining the features of the FDI data, such as the number of FDI projects, share
of FDI projects and the location quotients. The impact of the fifth EU enlargement on
mean annual levels of FDI before and after the EU enlargement in 2004 are also exam-
ined. The analysis of these helps to understand which of the countries and regions of
the EU are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the fifth EU enlargement.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology that is used to analyse FDI location at the country and region level. Sec-
tion 4.3 provides information on the regional classification system NUTS and the con-
cept of a region. Section 4.4 describes the FDI data, presenting a preliminary analysis
of spatial distribution of FDI activity within the EU. Section 4.5 discusses the data on
location factors that are collected. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 4.6.
4.2 Methodology
In modelling the FDI location decision the convention of a three-tiered hierarchy of
‘MNE/exporters/domestics’ has emerged (Cieslik and Ryan, 2009). Firstly, a firm
makes a decision as to whether to serve a foreign market. Secondly, if a decision to
supply a foreign market has been taken, the next step is to determine the best strategy
to do so. The firm can choose from a range of possibilities, such as exporting, licensing,
collaborative agreement and FDI. Lastly, if a firm decides to undertake FDI, it has to
choose a location of its production facilities. Typically, studies focus on the one partic-
ular node of this decision making process, with research on the determinants of FDI
location choices usually being conditional on MNEs having already decided to invest
abroad. In this thesis I focus on the last node of the decision tree, so that it is assumed
that the investing multinational firm has already decided to invest abroad, and in par-
ticular in an EU country. The subsequent analyses consider the determinants of the
location choice of the firm, both at the country and region level. The analyses employ
two different methodological approaches. First, a discrete choice methodology is used
to study the probability of inward investment location in country j, and second, panel
data methodology is used at the NUTS2 region level to analyse the count data on re-
gional FDI.
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4.2.1 Discrete Choice Models
The discrete choice model is well established as the prevailing empirical method un-
derlying industrial location studies (Guimaraes et al., 2003). Importantly, the economic
decision of a firm studied in theoretical models of industrial location choice is by nature
discrete (Crozet et al., 2004): from among a set of several location alternatives the firm
chooses one location. McFadden (1974) developed discrete choice models based on
the microeconomic theory of firm behaviour and Carlton (1983) was the first to apply
the discrete choice methodology to model the firm location choice in the Random Util-
ity Maximisation (RUM) setting of discrete choice models. Although industrial loca-
tion modelling has improved significantly since the McFadden-Carlton seminal works
(de Propris et al., 2005), the conditional logit model remains a commonly used econo-
metric technique in studying the location choice decisions of firms. Guimaraes et al.
(2003) maintain that the popularity of this methodological approach is explained by
the fact that the econometric specification of the conditional logit model is obtained di-
rectly from the RUM framework of McFadden (1974). The model assumes that firms
maximise their utility by choosing a single location that provides the highest profit from
a set of available alternatives:
Π∗ij = maxpiij; j = 1, . . . , L, (4.1)
where firm i chooses location j as it yields the greatest profit among a set of L different
locations:
piij > piil∀l 6= j(l = 1, . . . , L). (4.2)
The profit function can be decomposed into a deterministic part (Vij) that is as-
sumed to depend linearly on the observable attributes of location (X), and a stochastic
part (ε ij), which accounts for the investor-specific idiosyncrasies and any unobservable
characteristics that affect investors’ location choice:
piij = Vij + ε ij = β
′
Xij + ε ij. (4.3)
Hence, profit maximisation implies that the probability of firm i investing in location
j is simply the probability that locating the production in location j generates greater
profit for firm i than any alternative location:
Pij ≡ Pr(piij ≥ piil) = Pr(Vij + ε ij ≥ Vil + ε il) = Pr(Vij −Vil ≥ ε il − ε ij)∀l 6= j(l = 1, . . . , L).
(4.4)
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Although the real profit yielded by alternative locations cannot be observed, what is ob-
served is the actual location choice of each firm and the characteristics of the alternative
locations (Crozet et al., 2004).
If the error terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(iid) across firms and locations, and follow an Extreme Value Type I distribution, the
probability of firm i choosing location j is:
PCLij =
exp(Vij)
L
∑
l=1
exp(Vil)
∀l 6= j(l = 1, . . . , L), (4.5)
which is known as the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). Utilising this formula
for the probability of investing in each location, the coefficients on location attributes
are estimated by maximum likelihood (Crozet et al., 2004). McFadden (1974) demon-
strates that the log-likelihood function with these choice probabilities is globally con-
cave in parameters β, which makes the estimation by maximum likelihood procedure
relatively easy (Train, 2003).
The major shortcoming of the conditional logit model is the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which imposes a uniform pattern of substi-
tutability between alternative locations. If the IIA assumption holds, the ratio of prob-
abilities of a firm selecting any two locations j and l, PijPil , is only attributable to the char-
acteristics of these two locations j and l, and is independent of the attributes of a third
location in the choice set. However, as emphasised by Head et al. (1995), unobserved
heterogeneity that affects the uniform perceptions of the substitutability between loca-
tions and make some choices closer substitutes than other choices in the eyes of certain
investors, leads to the violation of IIA and results in biased estimates. The famous
red-bus-blue-bus-problem discussed by Train (2003) illustrates the reasons why the IIA
assumption may not hold. Basile et al. (2009) maintain that in order to mitigate the
problem of the IIA, the use of a nested logit model provides a partial solution.1
Although the limitation of the conditional logit model when the IIA assumption
does not hold across all location alternatives is recognised, in my empirical analysis I
do not employ the nested logit model owing to the computationally-intensive nature of
this technique. Admittedly, this is a weakness of the econometric approach in the study
of the motives of FDI location choice but it is largely beyond my control.
1The nested logit model allows for some correlation between errors within mutually exclusive groups
(nests), while maintaining the hypothesis of no correlation across nests, implying that IIA assumption
holds across the nests but not within them (Basile et al., 2009).
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4.2.2 Panel Data Models
To analyse FDI activity in NUTS2 regions, panel data techniques are employed. I de-
cided against using conditional logit model at the regional-level owing to a large num-
ber of observations as the estimation of the conditional logit model is computationally
burdensome. The dependent variable is the regional number of FDI projects, although
the EU-25 regional share of FDI is also considered. This is a balanced panel data with
a cross-sectional dimension of 260 NUTS2 regions and a relatively short time dimen-
sion of fourteen years. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) maintain that increased precision in
estimation is a major advantage of panel data owing to combining or pooling several
time periods of data for each individual, or in this case each region, that produces a
greater number of observations.2 For a valid statistical inference, a possible correlation
of regression model errors for a region over time needs to be controlled for, in addition
to heteroskedasticity of error terms (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
A general linear panel data model allows for a variation of the intercept and
slope over both regions and time:
yjt = αjt + xjt′β jt + ujt, j = 1, . . . , L, t = 1, . . . , T. (4.6)
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) recognise, however, that this model specification is not
estimable since the number of parameters to be estimated exceeds the number of ob-
servations. This calls for additional restrictions to be imposed on how intercept αjt and
slope β jt are allowed to vary over both the cross-sectional and time dimension.
The most restrictive model is a pooled model that assumes constant coefficients:
intercept α and slopes β:
yjt = α + xjt′β + ujt. (4.7)
Assuming that the model is correctly specified and that independent variables are un-
correlated with the error, this model specification can be consistently estimated using
pooled OLS estimator. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) admit that it remains likely that the
error term is correlated over time for a given individual (region), leading to downward
biased standard errors and inflated t-statistics. In consequence, pooled OLS estimator
is inconsistent in the presence of individual fixed effects.
A variant of the pooled OLS model allows for a variation of intercepts across
2The definition of an ‘individual’ in the panel data context refers to a cross-sectional unit dimension and
in my framework corresponds to NUTS2 regions. The subscript for a cross-sectional regional dimension
is j; the subscript for a time dimension is t.
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regions and over time (αj and γt), while slope terms continue to be constant (β):
yjt = αj + γt + xjt′β + ujt. (4.8)
Alternatively, equation (4.8) can be written as:
yjt =
L
∑
A=1
αAdA,jt +
T
∑
B=2
γBdB,jt + xjt′β + ujt. (4.9)
where L regional dummies dA,jt equal one if j = A and zero otherwise, (T − 1) time
dummies dB,jt equal one if t = B and zero otherwise (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). An
inclusion of a constant term requires that one regional dummy is dropped in addition
to dropping one time dummy. This method of controlling for unobserved individual
heterogeneity is referred to as the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator,
which Roodman (2009b) considers as “an intuitive first attack on the fixed effects” (p.
102).3 The LSDV estimator extracts the individual heterogeneity of the error by entering
dummies for each region.
Other techniques that are suited to handle individual fixed effects include a
within estimator (otherwise known as a fixed effects estimator) and first-differences
estimator. The within transformation eliminates individual fixed effects (αj) by de-
meaning the data, producing the fixed effects model that measures the relationship
between region-specific deviations of regressors from their time-averaged values and
region-specific deviations of the dependent variable from its time-averaged value:
yjt − y¯j = (xjt − x¯j)′β + (ε jt − ε¯ j), j = 1, . . . , L, t = 1, . . . , T. (4.10)
The unobserved region fixed effects can also be removed by first differencing the data.
The region-specific one-period changes in the dependent variable are then regressed on
the region-specific one-period changes in regressors in the first-differences estimator:
yjt − yj,t−1 = (xjt − xj,t−1)′β + (ε jt − ε j,t−1), j = 1, . . . , L, t = 1, . . . , T. (4.11)
Although both the within estimator and first-differences estimator produce consistent
estimates of β in the fixed effects model, the weakness of both techniques is their in-
ability to identify parameter estimates on time-invariant variables.4 In that respect, the
LSDV approach is superior.
3Alongside idiosyncratic shocks, fixed effects are one of the orthogonal components of the error term.
4In the analysis of regional FDI activity I include a time-invariant dummy variable for capital cities.
Seeing that neither the within estimator nor the first-differences estimator is able to identify parameter
estimates on time-invariant variables justifies my decision for not employing within and first-differences
estimators in my analysis.
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For a statistical inference to be valid, the usual assumption is that error terms
are identically and independently distributed (iid). However, in the panel data set-up
it is plausible that observations within group j are correlated in some unknown way,
inducing correlation in ε jt within j, whilst observations across groups j and l remain
uncorrelated. This requires the use of panel cluster-robust standard errors, which are
clustered on the cross-sectional unit dimension of the panel data. While clustering cor-
rects for the correlation in individual errors, the ‘robust’ option implies that the errors
are also adjusted for heteroskedasticity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Although the LSDV estimator appears to be the most appropriate empirical
method owing to its ability to identify coefficients on time-invariant variables, it is not a
flawless technique. Following on the observations of Nerlove (1967), Nickell (1981) es-
tablished that in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables such as serially and
spatially lagged dependent variables, the LSDV estimator produces biased parameter
estimates on endogenous explanatory variables due to their correlation with the fixed
effects. The bias of the LSDV estimator is referred to as the ‘Nickell bias’, where the size
of the bias is inversely related to time dimension (‘T’) of the panel data. A Monte Carlo
study by Judson and Owen (1999) shows that biases of as much as 20% remain even
when the time-series dimension is as large as 30 observations (T ≥ 30).
Perhaps the most appropriate estimators that handle important modelling con-
cerns such as fixed effects and endogeneity of regressors, while avoiding the ‘Nick-
ell bias’ in panels with wide individual-dimension (‘N’) and short time-dimension
(‘T’), are the difference and system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators
(Roodman, 2009a). The flexible GMM framework is able to accommodate short, un-
balanced panels with serially and spatially dependent variables, fixed effects and mul-
tiple predetermined and endogenous explanatory variables (Roodman, 2009a), which
explains the growing popularity of GMM estimators, also in the spatial econometrics
context. When written in vector form, a generalised dynamic model in space and time
is:
yt = τyt−1 + δWyt + ηWyt−1 + xtβ1 + Wxtβ2 + xt−1β3 + Wxt−1β4 + ztθ + νt, (4.12)
where a set of endogenous explanatory variables consists of the dependent variable
lagged in time (yt−1), the dependent variable lagged in space (Wyt) and the dependent
variable lagged in space and time (Wyt−1) (Elhorst, 2012).
GMM estimators use the assumptions about the moment conditions of the ran-
dom variables to derive an objective function and provide population moment condi-
tions. Data are used to compute the analogous sample moment conditions and param-
eter estimates are derived by finding the parameters that make the sample moment
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conditions as true as possible, through means of minimizing an objective function. By
defining and solving a set of moment conditions that need to be satisfied for the values
of the parameter estimates to be unbiased and consistent, a set of exogenous variables
that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but uncorrelated with
the error term is obtained (Elhorst, 2012). The Arellano and Bond (1991) difference
GMM estimator first differences the data to eliminate the fixed effects and uses lagged
variables in levels to instrument the differenced equation. Typically, difference GMM
estimator instruments ∆yi,t−1 with yi,1 up to yi,t−2 (GMM style instruments) and xi,1 up
to xi,t−1 (standard IV style instruments) (Elhorst, 2012). The system GMM estimator by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) augments difference GMM
and simultaneously estimates differenced and level equations, where lagged variables
in levels continue to instrument the differenced equation, whilst lagged differences are
used to instrument equation in levels. Typically, ∆yi,1 up to ∆yi,t−2 and ∆xi,2 up to
∆xi,t−1 are used to instrument yi,t−1 (Elhorst, 2012).
Since yi,1 is the only instrument available for the first-differenced equation for
period t = 3, but both yi,1 and yi,2 can be used as instruments in the first-differenced
equation for period t = 4 (Bond, 2002), the model is overidentified when the time di-
mension exceeds three (T > 3). The validity of the overidentifying restrictions can
be checked using the Sargan (1958) test and the Hansen (1982) J-test. In view of the
instrument proliferation that arises as the time dimension of the panel data goes up,
Roodman (2009a) advocates the use of the difference-in-Hansen test for the validity of
instrument subset. This computes the increase in the Hansen J-test when a subset of
instruments is added to the estimation set-up. Although there is no precise guidance
on the ‘correct’ instrument count (Mehrhoff, 2009; Roodman, 2009a), as a rule of thumb
the number of instruments should be less than or equal to the number of cross-sectional
units to avoid finite sample bias caused by overfitting (Roodman, 2003).
The consistency of the difference and system GMM estimators relies on the as-
sumption of no serial autocorrelation in the error terms and therefore, it is imperative
to check for second-order serial autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, which
essentially implies no autocorrelation between the error terms in the levels equation
(Elhorst, 2012). The Arellano and Bond (1991) test is used for second-order autocorrela-
tion in the first-differenced errors. Second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced
residuals implies that yi,t−2 is no longer a valid instrument in the first-differenced equa-
tion, but yi,t−3 and longer lags remain available as instruments (Bond, 2002).
In a spatial context Monteiro and Kukenova (2009) and Jacobs et al. (2009)
demonstrate that the system GMM estimator reduces the parameter bias on the spa-
tially lagged dependent variable (spatial lag). The system GMM estimator offers in-
creased efficiency and less finite sample bias compared to difference GMM estimator
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(Elhorst, 2012) and as argued by Sun et al. (2010) it is the best estimator to deal with the
joint problem of serial and spatial endogeneity. A two-step robust system GMM esti-
mator applies Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance
matrix.
4.3 The NUTS Regions
The Statistical Office of the European Communities, Eurostat, seeks to provide the EU
with high-quality and harmonised statistical information, which is compiled and dis-
seminated to the EU Member States for a range of purposes. Eurostat also publishes
European regional data that covers a range of economic, socio-demographic and struc-
tural business statistics. The NUTS (‘Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics’)
provides a reference classification used by Eurostat for the collection and harmonisa-
tion of the regional statistics, as well as for any regional-level data analysis. A ‘region’
is “a tract of land with more or less definitely marked boundaries, which often serves
as an administrative unit below the level of the nation state” (Eurostat, 2010, p. 3).
However, as noted by Eurostat (2010), despite regions having an identity made up of
specific features like landscape, climate, language, ethnic origin or history, the bound-
aries based on these features are often ‘fuzzy’. For that purpose the frontiers of the
region are typically determined by natural, historical and administrative boundaries.
At the beginning of the 1970s Eurostat set up the NUTS classification as “a sin-
gle, coherent system for dividing up the European Union’s territory in order to produce
regional statistics for the Community” (Eurostat, 2010, p. 5). It provides a harmonised
hierarchy of regions in the EU Member States. The NUTS classification sub-divides a
Member State into NUTS1 regions, where each NUTS1 region is further sub-divided
into NUTS2 regions, and these in turn into NUTS3 regions. The national level is some-
times referred to as the NUTS0 level. The NUTS classification gained legal status in
2003, being previously managed under a series of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ between
the EU Members and Eurostat. A minimum requirement of three years for each NUTS
breakdown was imposed. A first regular amendment was the replacement of the 2003
NUTS version by the 2006 version on 1 January 2008.5 All regional data collected below
follow the 2006 NUTS revision of regional classification (4.5). In addition to the amend-
ments, regulations determine the upper and lower population size thresholds for the
NUTS regions, as shown below.
By its nature the EU is diverse, made up of 27 countries (EU-27) as of 2010. Some
countries are very small (e.g. Malta with a population of about 400,000 in 2010) and
5More recently, the second regular amendment formalized the 2010 NUTS regions from 1 January 2012,
and as of 1 January 2015 the 2010 NUTS is replaced with the 2013 NUTS regions.
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Table 4.1: NUTS regions: population size thresholds
Level Minimum Maximum
NUTS1 3,000,000 7,000,000
NUTS2 800,000 3,000,000
NUTS3 150,000 800,000
(source: Eurostat, 2010)
some very large (Germany has about 82 million citizens). Under the 2006 revision, six
Member States are so small that they consist of one NUTS2 region only.6 At the other
end of the spectrum Germany has 39 NUTS2 regions. Table 4.2 presents the differences
between the EU-27 Member States with respect to the number of NUTS regions and
their population size. In total, there are 97 NUTS1 regions, 271 NUTS2 regions and
1,303 NUTS3 regions in the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2010). The regional analysis below consid-
ers 260 regions, excluding some regions owing to data availability and lack of inward
investment to these NUTS2 regions.7 Furthermore, due to FDI dataset limitations I
am unable to distinguish between FDI projects that locate in Inner and Outer London,
which means a single NUTS1 region is used for London. Strictly speaking this implies
that the regional analysis consists of 259 NUTS2 regions and one NUTS1 region.
While the size of the regions differs between countries, a regional analysis is still
a good option if the disparities in size between countries are large. Artige and Nicolini
(2005) emphasise the benefits of using the disaggregated-level data stating that “a lot
of interesting characteristics or changes are simply hidden at more aggregate levels”
(p. 3), meaning that the national data hides a lot of regional variation within a country.
Moreover, analysing data at a more disaggregated-level significantly boosts the number
of observations and increases the power of statistical tests.
4.4 FDI Data
The data on the location of FDI investment is sourced from the Ernst and Young Euro-
pean Investment Monitor (EIM) database.8 This is an online information provider, which
tracks and records cross-border investment in Europe. Data is collected for all European
countries that were EU members at 2010 for each year from 1997 to 2010, but exclud-
ing Cyprus and Malta, for which data were not collected prior to 2004 (Defever, 2012).
Each project is recorded individually and identified by the project type: new invest-
6These are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta.
7These are Cyprus, Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta, Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla, Guadeloupe, Mar-
tinique, Guyane, Re´union, Malta, Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores, Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira.
8The EIM database is obtainable from: http://www.eyeim.com/. The EIM data is used in Alegria (2006)
and Defever (2006, 2012).
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Table 4.2: NUTS regions in the EU: cross-county comparison
Number of regions Average population size of
regions (in 1,000)
NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3 NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3
Belgium 3 11 44 3,542 966 241
Bulgaria 2 6 28 3,830 1,277 274
Czech Republic 1 8 14 10,334 1,292 738
Denmark 1 5 11 5,461 1,092 496
Germany 16 39 429 5,142 2,109 192
Estonia 1 1 5 1,342 1,342 268
Ireland 1 2 8 4,357 2,178 545
Greece 4 13 51 2,798 861 219
Spain 7 19 59 6,411 2,362 761
France 9 26 100 7,092 2,455 638
Italy 5 21 107 11,875 2,827 555
Cyprus 1 1 1 784 784 784
Latvia 1 1 6 2,276 2,276 379
Lithuania 1 1 10 3,376 3,376 338
Luxembourg 1 1 1 480 480 480
Hungary 3 7 20 3,352 1,437 503
Malta 1 1 2 409 409 205
Netherlands 4 12 40 4,095 1,365 410
Austria 3 9 35 2,772 924 238
Poland 6 16 66 6,353 2,383 578
Portugal 3 7 30 3,536 1,515 354
Romania 4 8 42 5,387 2,693 513
Slovenia 1 2 12 2,018 1,009 168
Slovakia 1 4 8 5,397 1,349 675
Finland 2 5 20 2,663 1,065 264
Sweden 3 8 21 3,049 1,144 436
United Kingdom 12 37 133 5,082 1,648 458
EU-27 97 271 1,303 5,119 1,832 381
(source: Eurostat, 2010)
ments, new co-locations and expansions. This is narrower than the OECD definition in
Chapter 2, but it reflects the purpose of the database, which is to capture ‘productive’
investments that involve some new capacity. A ‘co-location’ is a new function that is
co-located near an existing activity under the same ownership, while an ‘expansion’
is a project that increases capacity at an existing function. Overall, 67% of projects are
new (‘greenfield’) investments, 27% are expansions and 6% co-locations.
The EIM is a commercial database that is mainly used by economic development
agencies. The main sources for the data are national investment agencies, newspapers,
and financial information providers (such as Reuters). The data are believed to be repre-
sentative of this investment, and include a good number of smaller investments (where
the job size is known, about 30% of projects have no more than ten associated jobs). It
excludes information on mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures (unless they result
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in new facilities or jobs), licence agreements, extraction of ores, minerals and fuels, and
portfolio investments. In addition to project type, the EIM data provide information on
a range of other characteristics of projects and this is shown in Table 4.3. The categories
cover the company name, date and host location of investment, the origin of parent
company, the industry of the investment project, number of jobs and investment scale.
The information on the industrial coverage is given by the NACE code, sector
name and industry group categories. The industry groups covered by the EIM dataset
include agriculture (0.17% of projects), energy (1.03%), manufacturing (57.97%), con-
struction (0.53%), retail and hospitality (1.95%), transport (7.63%), services (29.90%),
education and health (0.34%) and recreation (0.49%).9 The two digit NACE codes are
reported for all projects, with the exception of pharmaceuticals, automotive assembly
and automotive components sectors, for which three digit NACE codes are reported.
Furthermore, for all projects a short description of activity is provided. The EIM covers
both intra- and extra-EU FDI, where FDI originating from the EU (inclusive of the ‘new’
EU Member States) makes approximately 46% of all projects. Adding the remaining
countries in Europe, the European FDI accounts for 51% of projects. The single largest
investing country is the US, where approximately 32% of all projects originated from.
Although applied studies on FDI location extensively employ the count of in-
vestment projects as a measure of inward FDI, Crescenzi et al. (2015) acknowledge
that this count variable exacerbates measurement bias problem because the variable
based on the count of FDI projects gives equal weighting to major and minor invest-
ment projects. Furthermore, Crescenzi et al. (2015) note that investment carried out in
some sectors may be a response to the depreciation of the previous investments, which
a simple count variable is unable to account for. The use of data on investment scale to
capture the size of inward FDI makes it possible to control for the magnitude and ‘rele-
vance’ of investment, i.e. major versus minor project. Despite the validity of arguments
used by Crescenzi et al. (2015) to highlight the inadequacy of count data to appropri-
ately measure inward FDI, in this thesis I do not capture FDI using the financial flows
data. Although I consider it to be a limitation of the methodological approach, the in-
vestment scale in the EIM database is known for only about 30% of projects, owing
to commercial confidentiality, and for this reason is not used as a dependent variable.
The jobs, which can be considered another measure of investment scale, are known for
about 60% of projects. Of the other categories, missing entries are also found for start-
up date, origin city and origin state; however, my analysis does not utilise this detailed
information.
The EIM dataset does not report NUTS2 region information per se, but it is possi-
9Table A.4 in the Appendix offers more detailed breakdown on the industrial coverage of the EIM
dataset.
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Table 4.3: Categories of EIM database
Database Category Description
(A) Company Name
Company Name Name of company undertaking the investment
Parent Company Name Ultimate parent company (in the case of joint ventures, all parent
companies are listed)
(B) Date
Year Investment project announcement year
Week Investment project announcement week
Financial Year Investment project announcement financial year (from 1 April
Year 1 to 31 March Year 2)
Announcement Date Date when investment project was announced in press/press re-
lease
Startup Date Actual or estimated launch of operation (month/year)
(C) Location
City Location City/Town of country receiving the investment
NUTS3 Name and NUTS3
ID
EU classification of third tier regional level of country receiving
the investment. NUTS3 ID reported in EIM database does not
correspond to NUTS3 code under the official NUTS classification.
RDA Name and RDA ID Name and ID of Regional Development Agency covering invest-
ment location (if not available national development agency or
country name is reproduced)
NUTS1 Name and NUTS1
ID
EU classification of first tier regional level of country receiving
the investment. NUTS1 ID reported in EIM database does not
correspond to NUTS1 code under the official NUTS classification.
NUTS0 Name and NUTS0
ID
Name and code of country receiving the investment
(D) Origin
Origin City City of origin of parent company
Origin State State of origin of North American parent company
Origin Country Country of origin of parent company (in the case of multiple
parent companies, which originate from different countries, all
countries are listed)
Origin Global Region Global region in which parent company is based (in the case of
multiple parent companies, which originate from different global
regions, all global regions are listed)
(E) Employment
Employment Number of jobs created
Employment Band Number of jobs created coded into employment bands
(F) Expenditure
Expenditure Value of investment (typically reported in the national currency
of the recipient country)
Capital Expenditure Value of investment (reported in millions USD)
(G) Industry
SIC NACE Code Sector classification by NACE industry code
Sector Name Sector name by NACE industry code
Industry Group Based on Standard Industrial Classifications UK 1992
Project Type Project type of investment (new, new co-location, expansion)
Activity Project activity or function category
Activity Description Description of the investment project
(H) Extra
Additional Classifications Biotech, nanotech and renewable investment projects
(source: Ernst & Young/Oxford Intelligence, 2009)117
ble to establish this based on the published NUTS3 region data. An additional difficulty
is that the recorded NUTS3 region name does not always correspond to the actual re-
gion label under the NUTS territorial breakdown. Therefore, in a limited number of
cases, identification of the correct NUTS2 region was obtained using the available city
location information. For smaller cities this implied the need to perform Internet-based
searches of information on an individual FDI project to confirm the geographical lo-
cation of the investment and hence the NUTS2 region. Furthermore, the information
in the EIM dataset makes it impossible to distinguish between investment projects lo-
cating in Inner and Outer London (UKI2). Despite these imperfections, the EIM data
provides comprehensive information on cross-border investment projects in Europe,
offering a disaggregated panel data set that contains information on 35,155 individual
projects. These kind of data are increasingly used in studies of FDI location (Wren and
Jones, 2011). In the following sections I use the data to examine FDI in the ‘old’ and
‘new’ EU Member States. This is both in absolute terms (number and share of projects)
and relative to output using location quotients.
4.4.1 Inward FDI by Regional Groups
The database covers 35,155 FDI projects in all EU-27 countries over period 1997- 2010.
In analysing this I include Cyprus and Malta, which acceded in 2004, but for which
the FDI data were not recorded prior to 2004. However, this is of no real significance,
as these countries received virtually no ‘productive’ FDI prior to 2004 and the analysis
below shows they also received very little FDI after EU membership.
Figure 4.1 shows that there is strong variation in FDI in the EU-27 over time.10 In
1997, which is the year when the EIM started recording FDI, a total of 2,421 investment
projects were carried out in the EU-27. There is an overall downward trend between
1997 and 2003, falling from 2,421 to 1,730 projects. After this time, a dramatic increase
in the number of projects is observed, which is particularly marked in 2004 when there
is a year-on-year increase of about 900 FDI projects. In the following years, the num-
ber of projects continues to rise, but more gradually. It reaches a maximum of 3,270
investment projects in 2008, although declining to 2,869 in 2009, which can arguably be
attributed to the global economic downturn. In the following year, inward FDI in the
EU-27 rises again, reaching 3,260 projects in 2010, about the same as 2008.
The distribution of investment projects is highly unbalanced between the ‘old’
and ‘new’ EU Member States. For the purpose of this section, I define three regional
groups: the EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2. This follows the terminology used in the EU
literature and I consider those 15 countries that joined the EU prior to 2004 as the ‘old’
10The figures are reported in Table A.1.
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Figure 4.1: Number of FDI projects in EU-27, 1997-2010
(source: EIM dataset, author’s own elaboration)
Member States, using an abbreviation the ‘EU-15’. The countries that accede in 2004
and 2007 are regarded as the ‘new’ Member States and termed as either the ‘EU-10’
(2004 entrants, including Cyprus and Malta) or the ‘EU-2’ (2007 entrants).11 Table 4.4
summarises the included countries and accession date for each of these (see: Chapter
3).
Table 4.4: EU Member States - regional groups
Subgroup Joined Countries
EU-15 founding members Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands
1 January 1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
1 January 1981 Greece
1 January 1986 Portugal, Spain
1 January 1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden
EU-10 1 May 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
EU-2 1 January 2007 Bulgaria, Romania
EU-27 N/A EU-15+EU-10+EU-2
(source: author’s own elaboration)
Figure 4.2 shows the trend in inward FDI project numbers for the ‘old’ (EU-15)
11Later in the thesis, Cyprus and Malta are dropped from the analysis and the term EU-10 is adopted to
apply to all accession countries, both in the first and second waves.
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and ‘new’ (EU-10 and EU-2) Member States between 1997 and 2010. The ‘new’ Member
States of the EU account for only a small proportion of the total number of projects
when compared with the ‘old’ EU-15.
Figure 4.2: Number of FDI projects by regional groups, 1997-2010
(source: EIM dataset, author’s own elaboration)
In terms of absolute project numbers, the ‘old’ EU Members exhibit a declin-
ing trend in FDI, from 2,010 projects in 1997 to 1,310 projects in 2002. In subsequent
years FDI increases again, with the most dramatic year-on-year rise of over 500 projects
occurring in 2004. A maximum of 2,715 projects in the EU-15 is recorded in 2010. In
terms of FDI shares, for nearly all years between 1997 and 2010 the percentage share
of inward FDI of the EU-15 countries varies between 75% and 85% of total number of
EU-27 projects. The temporal variation in the absolute project numbers for the ‘new’
EU countries, i.e. EU-10 and EU-2, is much lower than for the EU-15 Member States.
For the EU-10, the number of projects ranges from 246 projects in 1999 to 560 projects in
2005. The most marked year-on-year change for the EU-10 occurs in 2004, when total
FDI rose from 277 to 558 projects, which coincides with the accession of these countries.
The years 2004 and 2005 are nearly identical with 558 and 560 projects, and between
2006 and 2010 the number of projects for the EU-10 remains relatively stable, ranging
between 450 and 500 projects. For the 2007 entrants, Bulgaria and Romania (EU-2),
the total number of FDI projects generally shows an upward trend in Figure 4.2. From
about 30 FDI projects a year over 1997-2000, the number of projects then increases, with
the greatest year-on-year increase in 2004 when a total of 155 projects were carried out.
The peak of FDI activity in the EU-2 also coincides with the year of their accession in
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2007, with a total of 213 projects. This number hardly changes over 2006-08, after which
it shows a dramatic decrease to 105 projects in 2009. The fall in project numbers for the
EU-2 continues into 2010 but the year-on-year change between 2009 and 2010 is much
smaller.
Table 4.5 shows that the percentage share of total inward investment projects dif-
fers substantially between the EU-10 and EU-2 countries. The average annual project
share of the EU-10 countries is about 15%, although it ranges from as low as 11% in
2009 to as high as 21% in 2004 (the accession year). For the EU-2 countries, the average
share of total projects is at a low of 1.3% in 1997, reaching a maximum level of 6.6%
in 2007. After 2008, the shares for Bulgaria and Romania fall dramatically reaching an
average level of approximately 3% over 2009-10. To complement the discussion on the
project numbers and project shares, the time period 1997-2010 is split into three sub-
periods in Table 4.5: 1997-2003, 2004-06 and 2007-10. The first of these precedes the
fifth enlargement; the second captures the period between the first and second wave of
the enlargement; and the last looks at the period between the end of the enlargement
and the latest available data. Table 4.5 shows that the FDI project shares for the ‘new’
Member States (EU-10 and EU-2) are the highest over the time period 2004-06, sug-
gesting that in these years investing in the ‘old’ EU countries becomes relatively less
attractive. However, in the years following the 2007 enlargement, the attractiveness
of the EU-10 countries appears to be reduced, as project shares fell markedly. While
the project shares over 2007-10 also fall for the EU-2 in relation to 2004-06 period, this
change is small relative to that experienced by the EU-10. Evidently, the investment
attractiveness of the ‘old’ EU-15 rises relative to the ‘new’ entrants in the most recent
time period.
Table 4.5: Project numbers and shares by regional groups and sub-periods
Subgroup 1997-2003 2004-2006 2007-2010 1997-2010
EU-15
11,502 6,457 10,266 28,225
82.39% 75.52% 81.19% 80.29%
EU-10
2,149 1,612 1,768 5,529
15.39% 18.85% 13.98% 15.73%
EU-2
309 481 611 1,401
2.21% 5.63% 4.83% 3.99%
Total
13,960 8,550 12,645 35,155
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(source: EIM dataset, author’s own elaboration)
While the number of FDI projects might be a reasonable measure for the at-
tractiveness of a country to investors, it is not without flaws, as ceteris paribus larger
economies are expected to receive more inward FDI. As a means to account for this
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location quotients are used across regional groups (EU-15, EU-10, EU-2). A location
quotient accounts for the economic size of the host economy is defined as:
Location quotientGROUP =
FDIGROUP
∑27j=1 FDIj
GDPGROUP
∑27j=1 GDPj
, (4.13)
where GDP is a measure of the economy’s size.12 These are plotted in Figure 4.3. A
ratio of unity indicates that a location receives as much investment projects as would
be ‘expected’ based on its GDP relative to the combined EU-27 GDP. A location quo-
tient greater than one implies that a location receives more inward investment than
the size of its economy would suggest (‘over-performance’), and conversely (‘under-
performance’).
Figure 4.3: Location quotients by regional groups, 1997-2010
(source: EIM dataset, author’s own elaboration)
Over the period 1997-2010, the location quotients are reasonably stable, at be-
tween 0.77 and 0.92. This implies that the ‘old’ Member States attracted fewer FDI
projects than the share of their combined GDP in total EU GDP would suggest. The
minimum value of the location quotient for the EU-15 is recorded in 2004, when the EU-
10 countries joined the EU, falling from 0.86 to 0.77 in 2004. This is despite an increase
in the absolute number of FDI projects in the EU-15. The implication is that the ‘old’
EU members attracted a lower share of the investment projects at the EU enlargement,
and were a relatively less attractive destination for inward investment as compared to
12The EIM database is used for the FDI project count and Eurostat is the source for the GDP data.
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the pre-accession period. However, after the enlargement the location quotient for the
EU-15 starts to grow, reaching a maximum of 0.92 in 2009.
The location quotient figures for the ‘new’ EU-10 and EU-2 members are greater
than unity throughout the period, indicating that the accession countries ‘over-perform’
and attract larger share of inward FDI than might be anticipated based on their eco-
nomic size. The location quotients are also more volatile, ranging from 1.82 to 4.58 for
EU-10 and from 2.14 to 7.70 for EU-2. The location quotients for the EU-10 vary over
period 1997-2003, but trend upwards, indicating that these countries become relatively
more attractive to inward investment prior to the enlargement. They reach a maxi-
mum value of 4.58 in 2004, which coincides with the year of their accession. Following
the fifth enlargement in 2004, the location quotient figure for the EU-10 members falls,
reaching a minimum of 1.82 in 2009. The largest year-on-year decline is recorded in
2006, when the location quotient figure declines from 4.01 to 2.91. The final value of
location quotient in 2010 is 2.17.
While the location quotients for the EU-10 exhibit a generally increasing trend
before 2004 and decreasing after 2004, it is significantly more erratic for the EU-2 mem-
bers. The location quotient is stable at around 2.5 until 2000, after which it grows sub-
stantially, reaching a peak of 6.96 is reached in 2002. Generally, the location quotient
pattern for EU-2 is volatile over 2000-06, and the highest value of the location quotient
is recorded in 2004, the year of the first enlargement wave. Although the EU-2 countries
did not join the EU at this time, it is likely that the accession of the first wave signalled
the likely accession of the EU-2. Over 2006-10, the relative attractiveness of the EU-2
decreases as these countries attract less inward investment relative to their economic
size. It is important to remember that a fall in the location quotient is a result of an
interplay of two forces: decreasing FDI project shares and increasing GDP shares. It is
possible that the decline in location quotient figures are predominantly attributable to
the increasing economic size of the EU-2 around the time of their EU accession in 2007.
The location quotient figure for the EU-2 continues to decline until 2010 when it reaches
a minimum of 2.14, roughly equal to a corresponding figure for the EU-10 members.
4.4.2 Inward FDI by Country
The analysis of the project numbers and the location quotients according to the EU-15,
EU-10 and EU-2 provides a good overview of the heterogeneity of the countries that
joined the EU in different waves of enlargement. However, it does not reveal the dis-
similarities of the countries belonging to a single regional group, and this is explored in
Table A.1. This shows the distribution of FDI projects in the EU-27 by country and year
over the period 1997-2010. The EIM database records information on 35,155 investment
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projects that located in the 27 EU Member States between 1997 and 2010, which is a
mean of 93 projects per country per year and 1,302 per country. However, there are
considerable disparities between the EU-27 countries. The UK is the main destination
for FDI, attracting 8,343 FDI projects between 1997 and 2010 (an average of 596 projects
per annum), while Luxembourg gets only 90 projects. FDI for Cyprus and Malta is
known only from 2004, but these receive only 50 projects between them.
To explore the country-level heterogeneity in inward FDI, location quotients are
calculated for individual countries using (4.13), and reported as line and pie charts in
the Appendix Figures A.1 to A.9. To ensure the clarity of presentation the data are
smoothed using moving averages for project numbers and location quotients, which
takes into account the first lag value, the actual value and first lead value. Since the
data are erratic this enhances the identification of trends, but to identify the project size
at a specific point in time the actual figures are given in Tables A.1, and any discussion
of the trends identified by line and pie charts in Figures A.1 to A.9 is supported by these
data.
The countries are allocated to three groups, as presented in Table 4.6. I no longer
consider Cyprus and Malta that received little inward FDI. Given the exclusion of these
from further analysis, for simplicity I refer to the remaining ‘new’ EU countries collec-
tively as the EU-10, rather than make a distinction between those that joined in 2004
and 2007. This new definition captures the ten CEECs. Although I treat all the ‘new’
EU-10 members as a single group, I choose to split the EU-15 countries into ‘major’
and ‘minor’ recipients of FDI. The ‘major’ EU-15 recipients are the strong and average
performers that receive more than 1,000 investment projects over period 1997-2010. The
‘minor’ EU-15 recipients are all remaining EU-15 countries that receive fewer than 1,000
projects over the same period.
Table 4.6: EU-25 Member States - country groups
‘Major’ EU-15 recipients ‘Minor’ EU-15 recipients ‘New’ Member States
United Kingdom Sweden Poland
France Italy Hungary
Germany Austria Czech Republic
Spain Denmark Romania
Belgium Portugal Slovakia
Ireland Finland Bulgaria
Netherlands Greece Lithuania
Luxembourg Estonia
Latvia
Slovenia
(source: author’s own elaboration)
124
Examination of the data identifies three major recipients of FDI among the EU-
25: these are the United Kingdom (a total of 8,343 projects), France (6,022) and Germany
(3,491). Fewer but still a significant proportion of projects is received by Spain (2,124)
and Belgium (1,812). After Spain and Belgium the next two major recipients of FDI are
among the ‘new’ EU-10 countries: Poland (1,613) and Hungary (1,413). Another group
of three countries that receive more than 1,000 investment projects over period 1997-
2010 consists of Ireland (1,270), Netherlands (1,242) and the Czech Republic (1,152), but
all remaining countries receive fewer than 1,000 projects. The performance of Roma-
nia (931) is comparable to that of Sweden (982) and Italy (812). A number of countries
attract approximately 500 projects: these include Denmark (568), Slovakia (529), Bul-
garia (470) and Portugal (422); Austria receives more (696). Finally, there is a group of
countries that attract few FDI projects. These are Finland (251), Lithuania (239), Estonia
(234), Latvia (181), Slovenia (118), Greece (100) and Luxembourg (90). The EU-15 coun-
tries receive 80% of all investment projects, of which 69% locate in the ‘major’ EU-15
recipients and 11% in the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients.
The United Kingdom, France and Germany are by far the leading recipients of
inward FDI to the EU-25, given that their combined share in EU-25 FDI equals 51%
(they receive 17,856 out of 35,105 projects). This implies that these three countries cap-
ture approximately 73% of all projects received by the ‘major’ EU-15 recipients. How-
ever, there is a significant degree of over-time variation in the size of inward FDI re-
ceived by these countries. A clear drop in inward FDI to the United Kingdom (top
destination for inward FDI in the EU-25) occurs in 2002. Alongside Ireland, the United
Kingdom is one of the two countries of the ‘major’ EU-15 group that receive less FDI
in 2010 than in 1997; other countries that exhibit a similar pattern include Hungary
and Latvia of the CEECs category. Unlike the United Kingdom, France and Germany
receive substantially more FDI in 2010 than in 1997, meaning that they significantly nar-
row the gap with the United Kingdom. A definite upward trend in inward investment
to Germany from 2004 onwards is interesting considering its proximity to the ‘new’ EU
countries that acceded to the EU in 2004. Although the size of inward FDI to Germany
in 2004 (163) is much lower than that received by France (490), by 2010 Germany (560)
catches up with France (562).
Although total FDI figures identify the leading destinations for foreign invest-
ment in Europe in absolute terms, they fail to account for the economic size of a coun-
try. This is precisely the aim of the location quotient, which expresses the size of inward
FDI relative to the economic size of the host country. Although in absolute terms the
size of inward investment hosted by the United Kingdom is outstanding by compari-
son to other EU countries, with the location quotient figure ranging from 1.20 to 2.20
its performance relative to the economic size is no longer exceptional. France attracts
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approximately as many investment projects as expected based on its economic size (lo-
cation quotient equals unity), but Germany ‘under-performs’ (0.45). Among the ‘over-
performing’ countries, Ireland attracts my attention. With a location quotient figure in
excess of one throughout the period 1997-2010, the value of location quotient for Ireland
in 1997 equals 7.60 but it declines rapidly, reaching 1.92 in 2003. Thereafter, it oscillates
around two. Another ‘over-performing’ country among the ‘major’ EU-15 recipients is
Belgium, whose location quotient is stable over time and fluctuates around two. The
‘under-performing’ ‘major’ EU-15 recipients include Germany, Netherlands and Spain,
whose location quotient figures tend to be less than unity.
Approximately 78% of the inward FDI to the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients is cap-
tured by Sweden, Italy, Austria and Denmark but combined together these countries
account for less than 9% of the EU-25 FDI. It is remarkable that in as much as Italy is
considered one of the largest economies of the EU-25, it receives relatively little FDI and
is classed as the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipient. The low point for Italian economy is year 2003,
when only 23 projects choose to locate in Italy. The location quotient figure for Italy
averages 0.17 over period 1997-2010 meaning that Italy attracts only 17% of projects
relative to how much investment it is expected to receive based on its economic size.
The relative performance of Greece is weaker, whose average location quotient figure
over period 1997-2010 equals 0.16. In relative terms, this places both Greece and Italy
among the two weakest performers. Greece also attracts little FDI in absolute terms
and alongside Luxembourg receives least inward investment among the ‘old’ EU-15
Member States. Although Luxembourg receives little FDI in absolute terms, relative to
its economic size the performance of Luxembourg is better than that of Greece and Italy
given that its location quotient occasionally exceeds unity. Importantly, I recognise that
Austria ‘over-performs’ in attracting FDI over period 1998-2002 but ‘under-performs’
in 1997 and over period 2003-2010. Given that the four countries neighbouring Aus-
tria joined the EU in 2004, it is plausible that Austria lost a share of FDI at the expense
of the accession countries. On the whole, the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients tend to ‘under-
perform’ in attracting FDI as their respective location quotient figures often fall below
one. With an average location quotient of 1.05, Sweden is the only country among the
‘minor’ EU-15 recipients that over the period 1997-2010 attracts more inward FDI than
expected relative to its economic size.
Among the accession countries, the four largest economies (Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic and Romania) account for 74% of inward investment to the CEECs;
their combined share in the total EU-25 inward investment equals 15%. The pattern
of over-time variation in inward FDI to Poland (the largest recipient of FDI among the
CEECs) resembles that of the United Kingdom, in that Poland starts from a high level in
1997 but a drop in investment occurs in 2002. The FDI activity in Poland picks up there-
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after and the increase in FDI coincides with the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004.
Between 2003 and 2004 the inward FDI to Poland grows at a fastest rate and the largest
number of investment projects is attracted by Poland in 2005 (180). By contrast, the size
of inward investment to Romania starts from a low level in 1997 (in 1997 Romania re-
ceives 18 projects; Poland receives 142) but it rises sharply from 2000 onwards, reaching
a peak in 2007 when Romania attracts 150 FDI projects (by comparison, Poland attracts
146 projects in 2007). The peak in inward FDI to the neighbouring Bulgaria occurs in
2006 when Bulgaria attracts 68 projects. This implies that the peak in FDI activity in Bul-
garia and Romania occurs around the time of their accession to the EU in 2007. Other
CEECs that receive largest inflow of FDI around the time of their EU accession include
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia that attract most investment projects in 2004, and the
Czech Republic (largest inflow in 2005).
Among the ‘new’ EU-10, the majority of countries receive more inward invest-
ment than expected by their respective economic size. The only ‘new’ EU-10 country
that temporarily ‘under-performs’ is Slovenia before its EU entry in 2004. The size of
inward investment to Slovenia is very low before 2004 (an average of three projects
per annum over the period 1997-2003) but it is higher after the accession in 2004 (an
average of fourteen projects per annum over the period 2004-10). The leader among
‘over-performing’ accession countries is Estonia, which in 2001 receives sixteen times
more investment than it is expected judging on its economic size. Admittedly, the lo-
cation quotient for Estonia declines thereafter, reaching a minimum of 1.69 in 2007 but
it remains to be defined as an ‘over-performer’. Other highly performing ‘new’ EU-10
countries include Bulgaria (maximum location quotient equals 12.70 in 2004) and Slo-
vakia (9.88 in 2004). The relative performance of Hungary, which in 1998 attracts ten
time more investment projects than expected by its economic size, is characterised by
a declining trend. At its lowest point, the location quotient figure for Hungary reaches
a minimum of 2.87 in 2009. However, the average location quotient for Hungary over
1997-2010 remains high at 6.24. Poland, which alongside Hungary is the largest recipi-
ent of inward FDI among CEECs in absolute terms, performs less favourably in relative
terms. To be precise, the location quotient figure for Poland fluctuates around two.
To summarise, heterogeneity exists in the amount of FDI going to different EU-
25 Member States. Although the ‘old’ EU-15 countries receive the majority of invest-
ment in absolute terms, when it is expressed relative to economic size their superior
performance in attracting FDI is no longer evident. In particular, the location quo-
tients usually exceed unity for most ‘new’ EU-10 Member States in most years. On the
other hand, the relative performance of the ‘old’ EU-15 countries is varied. Some ‘over-
perform’ as hosts of inward FDI, most notably Ireland, but others receive far fewer
investment projects than might be expected, i.e. Greece and Italy. Interestingly, for a lot
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of the accession countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the peak of their inward
investment activity occurs around the time of their EU entry.
4.4.3 Economic Geography of FDI by Country
In this section I undertake a visual inspection of the pattern of inward FDI in the EU-25
countries using maps. A full examination of the economic geography of FDI location
requires an econometric analysis, but it is believed that there is added-value in looking
at the descriptive statistics of FDI data and illustrating the spatial distribution of FDI.13
This enables the spatial pattern of FDI location across the EU-25 to be identified, before
a formal empirical analysis is conducted. These are based on the number of investments
in each country, based on the FDI data that is sourced from the EIM. Unless otherwise
stated, the classes are based on quintile FDI amounts.
Figure 4.4 shows the number of FDI projects in each country over the period
1997-2010. It shows the heterogenous performance of EU countries in attracting FDI.
It reaffirms the findings of section 4.4.2 in that the major recipients of FDI in the EU-
25 are (in descending order): the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and Bel-
gium. None of these countries belongs to the ‘new’ EU-10 category. The lowest quintile
includes five relatively small economies (in ascending order): Luxembourg, Greece,
Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia. The best-performing recipients of FDI among the ‘new’
EU-10 are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which belong to the fourth quin-
tile. The remaining countries of the fourth quintile include the Netherlands and Ireland.
Overall, it mainly reflects country size, so that the large economies of the EU-25 belong
to the highest quintile and the small economies to the lowest quintile.
To examine the impact of the fifth enlargement on the size of inward FDI and
its location within the EU, the mean annual number of FDI projects in the EU-25 coun-
tries is calculated for two periods: 1997-2003 and 2004-10 (i.e. before after the 2004
EU enlargement). These data are graphed in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). The discussion
that follows focuses on the five quintile classes before and after the enlargement. In
fact, the country composition of the quintiles is broadly unchanged between periods
1997-2003 and 2004-10, and it closely resembles the quintile composition for total FDI
series that was discussed earlier. The composition of the highest quintiles remains the
same in both periods, comprising the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and
Belgium. The leading FDI recipient, the United Kingdom, receives an average of 533
projects per annum before the enlargement and 659 afterwards. Again, the spread be-
tween the lower and upper bounds is greatest for the highest quintile. Owing to greater
13All maps used in this section are based on a template sourced from GISCO. All
files are available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/
administrative-units-statistical-units.
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Figure 4.4: Total FDI by country: number of projects (1997-2010)
(source: GISCO NUTS2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries,
author’s own elaboration)
size of inward FDI after 2004 the quintile lower and upper bounds shift up for all five
quintiles.
The composition of the fourth quintile features Czech Republic, Hungary, the
Netherlands and Poland in both periods. Ireland, which was in the fourth quintile
country prior to 2004, drops to the middle quintile after 2004, and is replaced by Roma-
nia, which was in the middle quintile. In addition to Ireland and Romania, the other
countries that move between quintile classes are Austria (it drops from the third to sec-
ond quintile), Estonia (from the second to the lowest), Lithuania (from the lowest to the
second) and Slovakia (from the second to the middle quintile). From this perspective,
Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania are the three countries that improve their relative po-
sition as recipients of inward FDI after the fifth enlargement in 2004, in that they move
to a higher quintile. On the other hand, the relative performance of Ireland, Austria
and Estonia worsens as they fall to a lower quintile.
As a second analysis, the change in the mean annual FDI is examined. The rela-
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Figure 4.5: Mean FDI per annum by country
(a) 1997-2003 (b) 2004-2010
(source: GISCO NUTS2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries, author’s own elaboration)
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Figure 4.6: Change in mean FDI per annum by country (1997-2003 and 2004-2010)
(a) Percentage change (b) Absolute change
(source: GISCO NUTS2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries, author’s own elaboration)
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tive and absolute changes in the mean annual FDI between the pre- and post-accession
periods (i.e 2004) are mapped in Figures 4.6(a) and 4.6(b). As changes are now analysed
the classes are defined differently. The bottom class is now all countries for which the
change is negative, while the countries that experience a positive change are split into
four classes. It means the countries that have a negative change in FDI are easily dis-
tinguishable. It is important that both the percentage and absolute change figures are
consulted as the percentage change is ‘inflated’ whenever the starting point is low. For
instance, if Greece and the United Kingdom were both to get an extra ten FDI projects
per year, the percentage change is significantly higher for Greece because it starts from
a much lower base.
The maps reaffirm that Austria and Ireland are the countries that experience
a negative growth rate in FDI. In the case of Figure 4.6(a) it shows that the negative
growth rate is strongest for Ireland, which loses 9.6% of inward FDI after 2004, which
equates to a decline in mean annual FDI in magnitude of 9.1 projects per year - a sub-
stantial loss. All the remaining EU-25 countries gain more investment after the enlarge-
ment. In descending order of the percentage increase in mean annual FDI, these are
Slovenia (390%), Romania (312%), Slovakia (198%), Bulgaria (170%) and Luxembourg
and Greece (both 133%). The lowest gainers in ascending order are Hungary (12.8%),
Estonia (22.9%), the United Kingdom (24%), the Czech Republic (27%), the Netherlands
(27.1%), Finland (43.7%) and Portugal (43.9%).
The examination of the absolute change in Figure 4.6(b) supports the concern
raised above. Although the percentage change in FDI in the United Kingdom is weak,
it gains an average of 126 projects per annum after 2004 and is in the highest quartile
of the distribution. The other countries in the top quartile are France (a gain of 211
projects), Germany (160), Romania (81) and Poland (69). The bottom quartile in as-
cending order are Estonia (3.4), Luxembourg (5.1), Greece (5.7), Finland (6.4), Latvia
(6.7) and Lithuania (9.6). It is evident that the composition of quartile classes of the
absolute change distribution differs significantly from that of the percentage change
distribution. On the one hand, Greece and Luxembourg have the highest percentage
change in FDI but low absolute changes, while the United Kingdom does the opposite.
On the other hand, a group of countries such as Romania (strong growth), Estonia and
Finland (weak growth) do not move between the classes, regardless of whether the ab-
solute or percentage change distribution is considered. It appears that Romania, with
the percentage change of 312% and an absolute change of 81 projects is the country that
gains most, even though it did not join the EU until 2007.
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4.4.4 Economic Geography of FDI by Region
The national data hide a lot of regional variation within a country (Artige and Nicol-
ini, 2005) and to broaden the analysis the spatial distribution of investment activity in
the EU-25 is analysed at the NUTS2 region level. As in the previous section, the mean
annual number of FDI projects for 1997-2003 (Figure 4.7(a)) and 2004-10 (Figure 4.7(b))
is examined to contrast the pre- and post-enlargement performance of regions. These
maps use quintile classes, and show that non-negligible differences exist in the num-
ber of inward FDI projects that the regions receive. To assess country performance in
attracting FDI I previously identified countries that moved between classes, but in the
case of the 260 regions I focus on those that received a lot of FDI before and after 2004,
and those that received a small amount. I also systematically group regions into cat-
egories such as ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10 regions, capital city regions and border
regions, and examine what percentage of regions in the respective categories increase
or decrease their FDI flows after 2004. The relative (Figure 4.8(a)) and absolute (Figure
4.8(b)) regional change in the mean annual FDI between the pre- and post-enlargement
periods are also shown on maps to identify the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of enlargement.
Over the period 1997-2003, the largest recipient of FDI is London with 136
projects per annum, which is a NUTS1 region, while the second strongest perform-
ing region is Southern and Eastern Ireland, which includes Dublin and has an average
of 75 projects per annum. Other large recipients of FDI between 1997 and 2003 are
Ile-de-France, with Paris (68 projects per annum), Cataluna, with Barcelona (64) and
Kozep-Magyarorszag, with Budapest (38), which is the best performing region of the
‘new’ EU-10 countries. The list of largest recipients of FDI after 2004 is similar, and
includes London (244), Ile-de-France (184), Rhone-Alpes, with Lyon (78), Southern and
Eastern Ireland (70) and the capital region of Spain, Comunidad de Madrid (67), which
is followed closely by Cataluna (65). Again, the ‘new’ EU-10 region that receives largest
FDI flow after 2004 among CEECs is Kozep-Magyarorszag (44). This demonstrates that
the regions hosting capital cities often make the top end of the FDI distribution and
tend to receive a substantial amount of FDI, but often capital cities are chosen as the
hosts of company headquarters within the respective countries.
Some capital regions do not perform so well. The three weakest performing
capital regions include Attiki, with Athens, Luxembourg (Grand-Duche) and Zahodna
Slovenija, with Ljubljana, which each failed to achieve more than nine projects per an-
num throughout the period 1997-2010. However, on the whole Greece, Luxembourg
and Slovenia receive small amount of inward FDI. There is also a tendency for the cap-
ital region to emerge as the top destination for inward investment in their respective
countries, which holds for most of the EU-25 Member States with the exception of Bel-
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Figure 4.7: Mean FDI per annum by region
(a) 1997-2003 (b) 2004-2010
(source: GISCO NUTS2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries, author’s own elaboration)
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Figure 4.8: Change in mean FDI per annum by region (1997-2003 and 2004-2010)
(a) Percentage change (b) Absolute change
(source: GISCO NUTS2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries, author’s own elaboration)
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gium, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.14
The three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania perform favourably
well as destination for inward investment when a comparison is made with other
NUTS2 regions rather than countries.15 Another ‘new’ EU-10 country that performs
well is the Czech Republic, where most regions are in the fourth and the highest quin-
tile./footnoteIt is worth noting that alongside Slovenia, the Czech Republic is the west-
ernmost country of the ‘new’ EU-10, which may have contributed to its inward FDI.
Although I consider the regions that belong to the two highest quintiles as the strong
performers in attracting FDI, the lower and upper bounds of the top quintile are wide
apart, suggesting strong heterogeneity in annual FDI between regions in this class. The
highest quintile of the mean annual FDI distribution for 1997-2003 period ranges from
11 to 136 projects, but for 2004-10 these are 17 and 244 projects.
A lot of regions receive few investment projects. In the pre-enlargement period,
20% of the 260 NUTS2 regions receive at most one project per annum. After 2004, 20% of
regions receive at most two projects per annum. The weakest performing regions of the
lowest quintile include regions of Greece (with the exception of capital region, Attiki)
but also the regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno and northern Finland and Sweden. Even
though Germany is a major host of inward investment in the EU-25, it is astonishing
that a substantial proportion of German regions belong to the lowest quintile of the FDI
distribution, so its regional performance is much weaker. This highlights that variations
at the regional level may be hidden at the country level.
To determine the degree to which the performance of regions improves after the
enlargement in 2004, the percentage (Figure 4.8(a)) and absolute (Figure 4.8(b)) change
in mean annual FDI per annum are examined. A small number of regions feature in
the ‘No data’ category. This is because these regions do not receive FDI before 2004, so
their percentage change in mean FDI cannot be calculated. Table 4.7 shows that for the
EU-25 as a whole, nearly 70% of regions increase their FDI flows, nearly 23% experience
a decrease in FDI, while 8% of regions see no change in FDI. In numerical terms, this
translates to 59 out of 260 EU-25 regions experiencing a decline in mean annual FDI per
annum, and further 20 regions seeing no change.16
14In Belgium, the NUTS2 Region de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest ‘loses’ to Prov.
Antwerpen; in Germany, Berlin is outperformed by Darmstadt, with Frankfurt am Main; in Italy, Lazio,
with Rome attracts less FDI than Lombardia, with Milan; and in Spain, between 1997 and 2003 Cataluna,
with Barcelona attracts more FDI than the capital region of Madrid, although it is outperformed by Madrid
in the period 2004-10. In Slovenia, two regions, Vzhodna Slovenija and Zahodna Slovenija, show a similar
performance in attracting FDI. Finally, in Slovakia the capital region Bratislavsky kraj performs worse than
its neighbouring region Zapadne Slovensko, with Nitra.
15Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are each a single NUTS2 region owing to their small population size.
Therefore, all three are classed as capital regions.
16Nine of these regions do not receive a single investment project throughout the period 1997-2010.
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Table 4.7: Before and after 2004: regional FDI to the EU-25 regions
Region type Number
of regions
Number
of regions:
FDI↑
Number
of regions:
FDI ↓
Number
of regions:
FDI ¬∆
Share of
regions:
FDI↑
Share of
regions:
FDI ↓
Share of
regions:
FDI ¬∆
EU-25 regions 260 181 59 20 69.62% 22.69% 7.69%
‘Old’ EU-15 regions 206 137 50 19 66.50% 24.27% 9.22%
‘New’ EU-10 regions 54 44 9 1 81.48% 16.67% 1.85%
Capital regions (EU-15) 15 13 2 0 86.67% 13.33% 0.00%
Capital regions (EU-10) 10 10 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
BORDER regions (EU-10) 12 9 3 0 75.00% 25.00% 0.00%
BORDER regions (EU-10) 8 8 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%(excluding the Czech Republic)
BORDER regions (EU-15) 14 8 4 2 57.14% 28.57% 14.29%
(source: author’s own elaboration)
The proportion of regions that have higher FDI inflows after 2004 equals 66.5%
for EU-15 regions and 81.5% for EU-10 regions. This means that on the whole, the
likelihood of growth in FDI inflows in the post-accession period is higher for the regions
of the accession countries. As far as the capital regions are concerned, FDI inflows to the
capitals of the EU-15 are generally higher after 2004, with the exception of the Dublin
and Vienna regions, where FDI inflows are lower. This equates to 87% of the capital
regions of the EU-15 receiving more inward FDI after 2004. In contrast, all of the capital
regions of the EU-10 see increased level of inward FDI in the post-accession period.
Table 4.7 also singles out a set of border regions within the ‘new’ EU-10 and the
‘old’ EU-15 Member States, which are contiguous to the (former) West-East border that
prior to the fifth enlargement in 2004 separated the EU (i.e. EU-15) and the non-EU (i.e.
EU-10) countries. Within the group of EU-10 border regions, three quarters increase the
size of investment after 2004. This proportion is lower than it is for the EU-10 regions as
a whole, although it would seem plausible that the proximity to the markets of the EU-
15 would lead to a substantial growth of investment after the accession. Upon closer
examination of the maps (i.e. Figure 4.8(a) and Figure 4.8(b)), I identify a cluster of
border regions within the Czech Republic with negative (or non-positive) FDI growth
rates. By drawing these regions out of the definition of a border region, I find that
FDI inflows increase in all border regions within the ‘new’ EU-10 in the post-accession
period. In that respect, the economic geography of inward FDI to the regions of the
Czech Republic differs from that of other EU-10 countries.
The ratio of regions where FDI is higher after the enlargement in 2004 to re-
gions where it is lower is less favourable for the EU-15 border regions, and is equal to
2:1. From a total of 14 border regions of the EU-15 contiguous to the West-East border,
eight regions receive more FDI after 2004, four receive less FDI, and in two regions the
size of the inward FDI does not change between pre- and post-accession periods. The
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four EU-15 border regions that ‘lose’ inward FDI after 2004 include Burgenland and
Oberosterreich in Austria, and Brandenburg - Nordost and Brandenburg - Sudwest
in Germany. Among the eight EU-15 border regions that attract more FDI after 2004,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia region in Italy starts from a low base and achieves a percentage
increase in mean FDI per annum equal to 1500%. In absolute terms, this translates to an
extra two projects per annum. Across the border in neighbouring Slovenia, inward FDI
to Vzhodna Slovenija and Zahodna Slovenija regions increases by a factor of 12.5 and 3
respectively, resulting in an addition of more than six projects per annum in Vzhodna
Slovenija and more than four projects per annum in Zahodna Slovenija.
The regions that gain the most FDI projects after 2004 in absolute terms include
the French capital region Ile-de-France, that gains an extra 116 FDI projects per year,
followed closely by London (108). After Rhone-Alpes (45) and Comunidad de Madrid
(44), in fifth position the Romanian capital region of Bucuresti-Ilfov attracts 32 projects
per annum more after 2004, which is the largest absolute increase for the ‘new’ EU-10
(a more than fourfold increase). This demonstrates a strong turnaround in investor
confidence regarding some CEEC regions. With the exception of the five regions of
the Czech Republic, three regions of Hungary and two regions of Poland, all of the
remaining regions of the CEECs receive more FDI after 2004. All but one region in
Bulgaria, all Romanian, Slovakian and Slovenian regions, more than double the number
of inward investment projects after 2004.
Last but not least, an observation can be made about distance. Consider Bia-
lystok, the regional capital of NUTS2 region Podlaskie in north-east Poland, and Cluj-
Napoca, the capital of the Nord-Vest region in Romania. Both are located about 600km
away from the West-East border. Over 1997-2003 both received broadly similar mean
annual FDI levels and all but one project were manufacturing investment. Over 2004-10
investment inflows to these regions diverged substantially. While FDI in Podlaskie con-
tracted, Nord-Vest experienced an average gain of 12 FDI projects per annum, which
equates to a 654% increase in its FDI. Although both regions have a similar position
relative to the West-East border, a lot more inward FDI chose to locate in the western-
most region of Romania rather than easternmost region of Poland. The three most
represented sectors in Nord-Vest Romania after 2004 were automotive components,
electronics, and machinery and equipment. Although all three sectors represent manu-
facturing investment, the Nord-Vest region also attracted some service sector FDI after
2004, which with the exception of a single service sector project Podlaskie struggled to
achieve. What makes this result more surprising is that while Podlaskie became part
of the EU in May 2004, Nord-Vest did not formally join until January 2007. This sug-
gests that the effect of EU membership and distance from the West-East border on FDI
location may not be homogenous across the CEECs.
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4.5 Data Collection
The FDI data are project-specific information (i.e. case-specific), but for the purpose
of carrying out the empirical analysis it is essential to supplement the EIM data with
location-specific information (i.e. alternative-specific). As the set of location choices
encompasses EU Member States, the main choice of location data provider is Eurostat
- the Statistical Office of the European Communities. Data were collected on a range
of location factors that potentially influence the decision to invest at both the national
and region level (NUTS2). Data were sought for each year over 1996-2010, giving a
year’s worth of lagged explanatory data in the regression analysis. However, the grad-
ual process of EU enlargement means the availability of the statistical data tends to be
shorter in time span for the ‘new’ Member States than for the ‘old’ Members, so that it
is incomplete for some countries, particularly at the regional level. The purpose of this
section is to describe the data. To facilitate this, the discussion is organised around five
categories, as suggested by the review of Chapter 2:
1. Market potential variables
2. Resource variables
3. Macroeconomic variables
4. Industry variables
5. Additional variables
The first two correspond to motives of FDI identified by Behrman (1972) and formalised
by Dunning (1993), and capture profit and cost-driving neoclassical factors. The third
captures location factors from the institutional perspective, and the fourth focuses on
the agglomeration economies of the NEG theory. A fifth category encompasses those
regressors that are not formally considered within the theoretical literature on location,
but that are used to examine the regional spatial distribution of FDI activity. This is how
the location data are organised in the empirical analyses. Information on the variables
is summarised in tables at the end of each section. Three auxiliary dummies (‘dummy:
wage rate’, ‘dummy: Bulgaria-Romania’ and ‘dummy: Herfindahl index’) are men-
tioned briefly and these are created for the purpose of dummy variable adjustment.
This data cleaning technique popularised by Cohen and Cohen (1975) as a missing-
indicator method involves plugging in an arbitrary value (most frequently, zero) for all
missing data and including an auxiliary dummy variable in a regression model.
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4.5.1 Market Potential Variables
A decision to invest in a foreign country is often driven by market-seeking motives.
Multinational firms are attracted to a location if it is where they can secure new mar-
kets and profit from a high demand for their products and services. Among the market
potential controls I include: total real GDP as the size variable and a measure of inter-
nal market demand; real GDP per capita to gauge the richness of the local population;
population density to measure the degree of urbanisation and hence the size of the
consumer base; and real GDP growth to assess the state of the economy. In the context
of inward investment to the EU I also include a dummy variable for EU membership,
capturing the motivation of MNEs to invest in the EU for access to the Single Mar-
ket. I also include an East dummy to capture location preferences between the ‘old’
and ‘new’ EU and a ‘new’ EU dummy to capture the preferences to locate in the ‘new’
EU countries after the accession. Finally, in addition to the controls on internal market
potential, adjacent market GDP and a peripherality index are constructed to capture ex-
ternal market potential. I now discuss these variables in greater detail, and a summary
of the variables is given in Table 4.8.
Access to the EU Single Market may be an important driver of a multinational
firm’s decision to invest in the EU. As countries join the EU, they may become a more
attractive destination for inward FDI. This is because firms may locate in the new ac-
cession countries as an ‘export platform’ to take advantage of lower trade costs in the
presence of factor price differentials (Krugman and Venables, 1990), or because there are
no longer incentives for ‘tariff-jumping’ (Motta and Norman, 1996), causing firms to co-
locate their activities within an enlarged market (Neary, 2002). These are effects directly
associated with the accession, and to test this a dummy variable is constructed for ‘EU
membership’ that takes a value of one for all years if a chosen location is within the
EU, but zero otherwise. For the group of ‘old’ EU Member States the EU membership
dummy is equal to unity because these countries remained inside the EU throughout
the whole period between 1997 and 2010. For the ‘new’ EU Member States, the dummy
is equal to zero prior to their membership and one thereafter.17
It is of interest to know if the fifth enlargement has shifted the location pattern of
FDI within the EU, for which two dummy variables are constructed. The first is ‘East’,
which is equal to one for the group of ‘new’ EU Member States before and after their
EU accession in 2004 and 2007. Essentially, an East dummy determines how different
is the perception of the ‘new’ EU Member States vis-a`-vis the ‘old’ EU-15. The second
is called ‘new’ EU’, which is equal to one for the group of ‘new’ EU Member States
17The rule that I apply to assigning an appropriate value for the EU membership dummy in the enlarge-
ment year is to determine if the enlargement occurs within the first or second half of a year.
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Table 4.8: Market potential variables: summary
Variable Description Source
EU membership Dummy variable = 1 for location j in an EU
Member State; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
East Dummy variable = 1 for a location j in a ‘new’
EU Member State (joined during the fifth EU
enlargement in 2004 and 2007) before or after
the fifth enlargement; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
‘New’ EU Dummy variable = 1 for a location j in a ‘new’
EU Member State (joined during the fifth EU
enlargement in 2004 and 2007) after the fifth
enlargement; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
Internal market
GDP
Total GDP at constant prices, chain-linked
volumes, reference year 2005 (at 2005 ex-
change rates); expressed in millions of euro
(country-level analysis) or billions of euro
(regional-level analysis)
Eurostat
Income per capita GDP per capita at constant prices, chain-
linked volumes, reference year 2005 (at 2005
exchange rates); expressed in euro (country-
level analysis) or thousands of euro (regional-
level analysis)
Eurostat
Peripherality index Distance-weighted external market size in-
dex for an individual country j calculated as
∑l 6=j(
GDPl
Dl
× 1ω ), where D is within country
distance of country l (see: Amiti and Javorcik,
2008) and ω is a distance between the capital
of county j and the capital of country l; GDP
is measured at constant prices, reference year
2005 (at 2005 exchange rates) and expressed
in millions (country-level analysis) or billions
(regional-level analysis) of euro
author’s own construction;
Eurostat (data on land area
and GDP), AA Route Planner
(data on distance)
Adjacent market
GDP
External market size index calcu-
lated for an individual region j as
∑ADJACENT NUTS2
GDPl
Dl
, where l 6= j and
D is within country distance of country
l (see: Amiti and Javorcik, 2008); GDP is
measured at constant prices, reference year
2005 (at 2005 exchange rates) and expressed
in billions of euro (regional-level analysis)
author’s own construction;
Eurostat (data on land area
and GDP)
Population density Number (country-level analysis) or thou-
sands (regional-level analysis) of persons per
one squared kilometre of land area
Eurostat
Growth rate Growth rate of real GDP (national currency
for country-level data, euro for regional-level
data); expressed as % (country-level analysis)
or as a fraction (regional-level analysis)
Eurostat
(source: author’s own elaboration)
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after membership. The aim of including the East and ‘new’ EU dummies is to inves-
tigate how on a global scale of the EU-25 countries recent entrants performed against
the incumbent ‘old’ EU-15 Member States in attracting inward investment. Given the
examination of the FDI data in section 4.4 I expect a negative sign on the East dummy
but a positive sign on ‘new’ EU dummy.
Market potential reflects the market size and serves as a proxy for market de-
mand. Pioneered by Harris (1954), who compares market potential to “an abstract in-
dex of the intensity of possible contact with markets” (p. 321), the market potential of
location j is defined as the sum of market demands in accessible locations l divided
by the distances between location pairs j and l, ω: ∑
l 6=j
( GDPlω ). Essentially, the Harris’
market potential highlights that investors are not only interested in the internal market
demand of a host location but in the external market demand of other accessible mar-
kets. The internal market demand of countries and regions is captured by real GDP
(‘market size’) and real GDP per capita (‘prosperity’), but the external market demand
is captured either by a peripherality index (country analysis) or the adjacent market
GDP (regional).
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is frequently used in the literature to con-
trol for the internal market demand (e.g. Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Head and Mayer,
2004) and it is captured by the ‘internal market GDP’ variable. GDP is the value of the
final goods and services produced in a country or region, regardless of whether it is
attributable to resident or non-resident employed persons.18 GDP is also an indicator
of economic development and when measured at the level of regions, it also picks-up
the Objective 1 regions that benefit from the Cohesion and Structural Funds. The GDP
data are expressed at constant market prices in euros, where the national currencies are
converted into euros using the nominal exchange rate. For the Eurozone members this
is the official euro fixed conversion rate. The euro series does not fully account for the
price differentials between countries.
Given that the larger economies tend to be major recipients of FDI, a positive
sign is expected on the coefficient of the internal market measure. This scale effect is
a shortcoming of total GDP measure (Alegria, 2006). This is because the local market
demand, and hence market-seeking FDI activity, is greater in larger geographic areas
not only because of a higher GDP but because of a larger population. The positive
correlation between total GDP and population is the source of the scale effect bias.
Furthermore, Head and Mayer (2004) argue that total GDP is not an adequate measure
of market demand, especially when considering disaggregated spatial units. To address
this weakness I include adjacent market GDP and the peripherality index to capture the
18Eurostat defines resident producer units as economic units whose centre of economic interest lies
within a country’s economic territory.
142
effect of the external market demand.
Alongside real GDP, I also include real GDP per capita (formally labelled as
‘income per capita’) to examine how the prosperity of the local market affects the loca-
tion of inward investment. While GDP is an indicator of economic development, GDP
per capita is the proxy for the wealth and living standards of the population. For the
purpose of comparability I use the euro-series of GDP per capita, which is expressed
at constant market prices. I expect that relatively richer economies receive more FDI
projects, so that the sign is positive, although the accession to the EU of less-prosperous
countries could lead to a reversal of this.
The country-level measure of external market demand is a modification of the
‘peripherality index’ of Keeble et al. (1981, 1988), which is based on the gravity model.
The central assumption is that the potential for economic activity at a location is pro-
portional to the volume of economic activity (‘mass’) at another economic centre and
inversely related to the distance between them (Copus, 2000). All economic centres in
a system may affect the potential for economic activity in a location, as in Figure 4.9.
The ‘mass’ variable proposed by Keeble et al. (1981, 1988) is the regional GDP. I
adopt a modification of this peripherality index by weighting the ‘mass’ of an economic
centre by its approximate economic size, D. Unlike disaggregated spatial units such as
NUTS2 regions, whose size is bounded by minimum and maximum population size
thresholds, substantial heterogeneity exists in the economic size of countries. To ensure
the comparability of the external market demand measure, it is important to control for
the size of an economy as failing to do so results in a disproportionate boost to an exter-
nal market demand measure for those countries that neighbour other large economies.
The term D that weights the economic size of countries is defined as the within location
distance and follows the work of Amiti and Javorcik (2008). As in Leamer (1997) it is
assumed that the locations are circular, in which case the within location distance term,
D, can be thought of as a radius - a distance from the middle point of a circular location
to the boundary:
Dj =
√
Areaj
pi
, (4.14)
where:
Dj - within province distance of a location j
Areaj - total land area (in squared kilometres) of a location j.
The peripherality index is interpreted as a gravity-weighted measure of external
market potential. An alternative interpretation is that it is a GDP-weighted average
market distance of each country to its European partners. The economic ‘mass’, GDP,
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Figure 4.9: The concept of peripherality index - illustration
(source: author’s own elaboration, based on Copus, 2000)
weighted by size that is represented by diameter of circles in Figure 4.9, ensures that
smaller economies add significantly to the size of external market demand of a country
j as long as their economic size, GDP is large relative to the geographic size, D. The
economic centres contribute relatively less to the size of the external market demand of
a country j, as the distance, ω, from that country j increases. Lower values of the index
imply more peripheral location. Formally, the peripherality index for an individual
country j is calculated as:
Peripherality indexj =∑
l 6=j
(
GDPl
Dl
)× 1
ω
, (4.15)
where:
GDPl - total GDP of country l
Dl - within country distance of a country l (see: Amiti and Javorcik, 2008)
ω - distance between the capital of country j and the capital of country l, in kilometres.
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The distances in equation (4.15) are obtained using the AA Route Planner. As
compared to the application of distances between ‘functional centroids’ of locations
(largest towns or cities) derived from a simplified model of major road and ferry net-
work used by Keeble et al. (1981, 1988), the advantage of using the AA Route Planner
for estimating the distance between locations is its functionality of balancing between
the shortest and the quickest route between two locations. As the distance variable
used to calculate the peripherality index is typically the quickest route by motorways,
my peripherality index implicitly incorporates the approximate travel time. For each
country the capital city is treated as its ‘functional centroid’. A shortcoming of the AA
Route Planner is that it does not calculate the distance between between Cyprus and
Malta and all other EU Member States, so that these are excluded from the peripherality
index, but they are small island economies with their own markets.
It is possible to calculate the peripherality index for all 260 NUTS2 regions using
the same methodology, but the scope of this task is extremely large.19 Instead, I use
an alternative external market potential of region j that accounts for market demand of
adjacent regions. As I deal with small spatial units, I feel it is no longer necessary to
account for the distance, ω, between regional city pairs given that I assume that only
a set of adjacent regions rather than all economic centres present in the system affect
the size of the external market demand for the regions. I continue to use the term D
to weight external market demand of a neighbouring region l by its approximate size.
The regional market potential that I subsequently refer to as the ‘adjacent market GDP’
is calculated for a region j as:
∑
ADJACENT NUTS2
GDPl
Dl
; j 6= l. (4.16)
While establishing the set of neighbouring regions for any landlocked NUTS2
region is simple and involves using maps to look for pairs of regions that share a com-
mon border, it is often a matter of dispute for the coastal NUTS2 regions. I decided to
treat two regions separated by the sea as adjacent if transport links between them are
well developed (e.g. the connection of Kent with Nord - Pas-de-Calais region by Euro-
tunnel) or if they are deemed to have strong links (e.g the Greek mainland and Greek
islands). Nevertheless, this is an area subject to dispute and criticism as it is unclear
when the links between two regions start and cease to be strong enough to treat them
as neighbours. Finally, as mentioned in the earlier sections of this chapter, it is impossi-
ble to distinguish between the investment project locating in Inner and Outer London,
19To calculate the regional peripherality index for 260 NUTS2 regions requires checking the road dis-
tance for a total of 259 + 258 + 257 + . . . + 131 + 130 + 129 + . . . + 3 + 2 + 1 = 33, 670 city pairs.
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which led to a decision to merge these NUTS2 regions. This will affect the size of the
regional market potential for the NUTS regions of Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire, Es-
sex, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire, Surrey, East and West Sussex, and
Kent, which neighbour this NUTS1 region.
Among market potential variables, I also include ‘population density’, which is
measured by the number of inhabitants per land area. Population density reflects the
degree of urbanisation but also indirectly congestion, so that its effect on the location of
FDI activity can be considered from both these perspectives. For the purpose of calcu-
lating this, population is defined as all persons permanently residing in the territory of
the country, be it nationals or foreigners. Individuals temporarily absent from a terri-
tory are included, as are those staying or intending to stay for a minimum duration of
one year. As a rule, foreign students and members of foreign armed forces stationed in
a territory are excluded from the population count.
The urbanisation perspective emphasises that the more densely populated areas
have a location advantage, as the firms serving these markets can profit from a high
level of demand that is concentrated in geographical space, reducing transport costs, so
that a positive sign is expected. However, from the congestion perspective, population
density may exert a negative influence on investment, as at some point the pressure
on the transport infrastructure and resulting congestion might outweigh the benefits of
agglomeration. Further, in more densely populated areas individuals and firms start to
compete for limited land space, pushing up land costs, so that a negative relationship
exists. The empirical analysis should determine whether the urbanisation or congestion
effect of population density is relatively stronger.
Finally, the impact of economic growth on FDI location choices is considered.
The real GDP growth rate (labelled ‘growth rate’) is calculated based on the GDP series
expressed in national currency to eliminate any fluctuations in growth rates that are
attributable to swings in exchange rates rather than genuine fluctuations in economic
growth. However, data on regional GDP expressed in the national currency are not
available, requiring me to use growth rates based on euro-series of GDP instead. I antic-
ipate a positive sign on the growth rate, implying that faster-growing economies attract
more investment, but I acknowledge that the relationship between economic growth
and inward FDI might be non-linear. On the one hand, less-developed economies that
start from a lower level of GDP per capita are likely to achieve higher growth rates, but
may not attract more FDI than their more-developed counterparts. On the other hand,
negative growth rates are indicative of recession and may deter inward investment.
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4.5.2 Resource Variables
While demand-side factors are crucial for market-seeking MNEs, resource-seeking FDI
is more supply-side oriented. The main reason for resource-seeking MNEs to engage
in FDI is because higher quality resources (factors of production) can be acquired at a
lower real cost. These resources include physical natural resources, but also factors such
as unskilled and semi-skilled labour, as well as managerial and organisational skills.
For this reason it is important to take account of these supply-side factors. Among the
resource controls I include motorway density as a measure of physical infrastructure,
secondary and tertiary education attainment to capture skills, the unemployment rate
to reflect the labour market environment and the wage rate as a labour cost measure. A
summary of these variables is given in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Resource variables: summary
Variable Description Source
Physical infrastruc-
ture
Motorway network density, expressed as
kilometres (country-level analysis) or thou-
sands of kilometres (regional-level analysis)
of motorways per thousand squared kilome-
tres of land area
Eurostat
Secondary educa-
tion
A percentage (country-level analysis) or a
fraction (regional-level analysis) of labour
force aged 25-64 with secondary education
World Bank (1995-2009:
country-level only), Eurostat
(2000-2009: regional-level
only)
Tertiary education A percentage (country-level analysis) or a
fraction (regional-level analysis) of labour
force aged 25-64 with tertiary education
World Bank (1995-2009:
country-level only), Eurostat
(2000-2009: regional-level
only)
Unemployment
rate
A percentage (country-level analysis) or
a fraction (regional-level analysis) of total
labour force aged 15 and over that is unem-
ployed but currently available for work and
actively seeking employment
LaborSta (1995-1998:
country-level only), Eu-
rostat (1999-2009)
Wage rate Hourly compensation cost in manufactur-
ing at constant prices (deflator = price in-
dex, 2005=100, based on euro: both country-
level and regional-level analysis); original
data is expressed in USD and has been con-
verted into euro by applying nominal bilat-
eral EUR/USD exchange rate
International Labor Compar-
isons (ILC) database of U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), Eurostat (data on bi-
lateral EUR/USD exchange
rate)
Dummy: wage rate Dummy variable = 1 if wage rate is a missing
value for a given country j and time t; zero
otherwise
author’s own elaboration
(source: author’s own elaboration)
To capture the effect of physical transport infrastructure on inward FDI, data on
motorway density were collected. Formally labelled as ‘physical infrastructure’, these
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data are expressed as kilometres of motorways per thousand of squared kilometres of
land area. Eurostat collects data on railway network and navigable waterways, but
road data is preferred as the road passenger and freight transport by far dominates
other inland modes of transport in the EU Member countries.20 A well-developed road
network may be an attribute of a location that a resource-seeking FDI is looking to
exploit seeing that it reduces travel time and hence transport costs.21 Furthermore,
an appropriate road infrastructure that is capable of accommodating the existing level
of traffic reduces congestion. An inefficient transport network implies a waste of re-
sources, such as money, time, environment, which negatively affects the profits of op-
erating firms. I anticipate that a more dense motorway network attracts investment,
implying a positive parameter sign on the physical infrastructure term. However, it is
possible that locations with a less-developed transport infrastructure may attract more
FDI if it is more difficult to serve this local market from elsewhere in Europe.
Skills of the labour force can provide motivation for investment, although there
may be heterogeneity between investors in what skills they are seeking. While some
MNEs may be interested in relatively inexpensive unskilled or semi-skilled labour,
other firms may seek highly-skilled workers with technological capability or manage-
rial and organisational skills. To capture this heterogeneity I include two measures of
educational attainment: ‘secondary education’ and ‘tertiary education’. Educational
attainment is defined as the percentage of all persons in a given age group that have
completed the education level, which according to Eurostat normally implies a cer-
tificate or diploma.22 The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
forms the basis for collecting the data on education and ensures international compa-
rability.23 Secondary education is an indicator of medium-skills but tertiary education
signals high-skills. If low-skill industries invest in the ‘new’ EU and high-skill indus-
tries in the ‘old’ EU, then a positive sign is anticipated on secondary education and a
negative sign on tertiary education in the East, but the opposite for the West.
Unemployment statistics are among the most important indicators with both a
social and economic dimension. The ‘unemployment rate’ is included to capture the
interdependencies between labour market and the location of FDI. An unemployed
person is defined as anyone aged 15-74 who during a reference week remained with-
out work, but had actively looked for a job in the last four weeks and was able to start
20Eurostat (2011) shows that only for the case of three Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
- does freight transport by rail account for more than 50% of the market in 2000; although this share
diminished for all countries between 2000-08 in favour of the increasing freight transport by roads.
21Physical infrastructure may be considered a demand factor as it enhances the market potential.
22For the purpose of calculating education attainment only the highest education level is considered to
avoid double-counting.
23Population aged 25-64 with ISCED Levels 3 or 4 are those that are defined as having completed sec-
ondary education. Tertiary education attainment implies a completion of ISCED Levels 5 or 6.
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work within the next fortnight.24 The unemployment rate measures the proportion of
the total economically active population that is unemployed.25 The location literature
is not conclusive as to whether the effect of unemployment on inward investment is
positive or negative. On the one hand, a high unemployment rate may signal a large
pool of available labour force and therefore make the recruitment process of workers
less costly. On the other hand, foreign firms may not want to locate where the unem-
ployment rate is too high, as it indicates that a location is economically depressed, with
low level of market demand. Disdier and Mayer (2004) argue that high unemployment
demonstrates labour market rigidities and is undesirable.
Given that resource-seeking FDI wants to acquire resources at a lower real cost,
the manufacturing real wage rate is included as a measure of economy-wide labour
costs (labelled as ‘wage rate’). Labour cost is one of the largest components of produc-
tion costs and hence one the most important cost considerations for firms. The wage
rate is defined as hourly compensation cost in manufacturing and is expressed at con-
stant prices in euro.26 These wage data are not available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania and Slovenia, and my strategy is to record
the missing data as zero and construct an auxiliary dummy variable for these cases
(‘dummy: wage rate’). Furthermore, the wage data are not available for NUTS2 re-
gions, requiring me to use country-level wage data in the regional analysis. Although
this approach may be criticised, the non-availability of these wage data gives me no
other option.
Although average wages differ across industries, given that the majority of the
investment projects in the FDI database belong to manufacturing this is a good rea-
son for using manufacturing wage as a proxy for the economy-wide labour cost. Since
higher wages imply higher total costs and lower expected profits for firms, on average a
negative relationship between the real wage rate and inflows of FDI is expected. How-
ever, I acknowledge that some resource-seeking foreign firms may specifically seek for
a highly-skilled labour force (for example in high-tech industries) and be prepared to
accept higher wage demands of its employees. These firms may actually be attracted to
the locations where wages are higher since it is where more highly skilled workers are
to be found. Altogether, considering that the ‘new’ Member States of the EU is where
wages are lower, I expect that the countries in the East tend to attract labour-intensive
industries. The ‘old’ Member States of the EU, on the other hand, are expected to be
2416-74 in Spain, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (between 1995-2001).
25Only individuals aged 15-74 are considered for the purpose of calculating the unemployment rate,
while to estimate the employment rate and economic activity rate it is total working-age population aged
15 years and over that is taken into account.
26Wage data were sourced from International Labor Comparisons (ILC) database of U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), and converted to euros using the nominal bilateral exchange rate.
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more attractive to capital-intensive industries, which are seeking for highly-skilled and
highly-productive workforce. In consequence, a negative relationship between wages
and inward investment is expected in the East, but it is plausible that this relationship
may be positive in the West.
4.5.3 Macroeconomic Variables
The long-term nature of FDI fosters a high sensitivity to risk perception (Janicki and
Wunnava, 2004). Favourable macroeconomic conditions of a host country characterised
by political and macroeconomic stability reduce the risk and uncertainty associated
with investing abroad, and undoubtedly attract inward investment. Unlike market de-
mand and resource factors, a more stable macroeconomic and political environment is
likely to appeal to most long-term investors. Ascani et al. (2014) explain the importance
of the institutional set-up for investment, in that it affects the structure of incentives in
the economy, and in consequence influences the stability and predictability of market
and non-market transactions. The controls to capture the characteristics of the macroe-
conomic and political system include: the openness to trade, exchange rate, exchange
rate volatility, Single currency, corporate tax rate, EU Structural Funds and the politi-
cal risk. A full list of variables intended to capture the breadth of macroeconomic and
political characteristics of the host locations is summarised in Table 4.10.
Firstly, the ‘openness to trade’ variable measures the degree of integration of a
country into the world economy. It captures the dependence of domestic producers
on foreign markets (exports) and dependence of domestic demand on foreign supply
of goods and services (imports). The openness index is included to gauge whether as
economies become more open to trade, they attract increasing FDI inflows. In the case
of inward investment, two contrasting theories exist. The first emphasises that trade
and FDI are complements, so that more open economies receive more investment, but
the other viewpoint is that trade and FDI are substitutes. In accordance with the ‘sub-
stitute perspective’, Walch and Wo¨rz (2012) argue that trade openness discourages FDI
as it lowers the relative costs of serving foreign markets through exporting vis-a`-vis
FDI. Although incompatible with the static perspective of ‘MNE/exporters/domestics’
convention (see: Cieslik and Ryan, 2009), I tend to support the ‘complement perspec-
tive’ and agree with Conconi et al. (2013), who argue that “firms almost never establish
affiliates in a foreign market without having first tested it via exports” (p. 22). Assum-
ing that multinational firms have a higher propensity to export and are more likely to
engage in trade supports the theory that more open economies receive more FDI. The
index for the openness to trade of the host economy is defined as the sum of exports
and imports divided by GDP (trade-to-GDP ratio). Given that trade flows are avail-
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Table 4.10: Macroeconomic variables: summary
Variable Description Source
Openness to trade Degree of openness to trade of an economy;
calculated as exports+importsGDP ; expressed as a
percentage (country-level analysis) or a frac-
tion (regional-level analysis)
author’s own construction;
IMF (data on exports, im-
ports, GDP)
Exchange rate Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) series
for a basket of 36 countries (EU-27 + Aus-
tralia, Canada, United States, Japan, Nor-
way, New Zealand, Mexico, Switzerland and
Turkey); reference year 2005=100 (country-
level analysis) or 2005=1 (regional-level anal-
ysis)
Eurostat
Exchange rate
volatility
Variability of the Real Effective Exchange
Rate data; calculated as |REERt − REERt−1|
author’s own construction;
Eurostat (data on REER)
Single currency Dummy variable = 1 if the euro is the national
currency of a country; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
Corporate tax rate Adjusted statutory rate of corporate income
tax; expressed as a percentage (country-level
analysis) or a fraction (regional-level analy-
sis)
2011 edition of ”Taxation
Trends in the European
Union”, a joint publication
of Eurostat and Directorate-
General for Taxation and
Customs Union
EU Structural
Funds
EU Structural policies payments by Mem-
ber State and Fund (executed payments in
million ECU 1979-1998/in million EUR 1999-
2009 for country-level analysis; executed pay-
ments in billion ECU 1979-1998/in billion
EUR 1999-2009 for regional-level analysis) at
constant prices (deflator = price index, 2005 =
100, based on euro)
European Commission,
Directorate-General for
Regional Policy
Political risk Political risk rating of a country; most risk = 0,
least risk = 100 (country-level analysis), most
risk = 0, least risk = 1 (regional-level analysis)
The PRS Group, Inc., 1979-
2012, East Syracuse, NY,
13057 USA.
(source: author’s own elaboration)
able for countries as a whole, this indicator is not available for NUTS2 regions and it
is necessary to suppose that trade openness is identical for all regions within the same
country.
The exchange rate and its volatility are two indicators that reflect the state of
the macroeconomy, and importantly affect the relative production costs in a host coun-
try and therefore, final returns to investment. Both indicators are included to assess
how the strength of the host country’s domestic currency and its movement affect the
likelihood of investment in that host country. I utilise the real effective ‘exchange rate’
(REER) index - a trade-weighted measure of competitiveness against a basket of 36
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competitor countries - to measure the exchange rate.27 Importantly, changes in com-
petitiveness against other countries depends not only on exchange rate movements but
also on cost and price trends, which the REER index takes into account. Two versions
of the REER index are available, according to whether it is deflated using the consumer
price index or unit labour costs.28 Given that the wage data account for the labour
costs, I use the consumer price index measure. A rise in the index implies a loss of
competitiveness: an appreciation of the domestic currency.
Although not conclusive, the existing studies tend to support the view that a real
appreciation of the host economy’s domestic currency leads to less FDI. The rationale
is found in the relative wage effect (Klein and Rosengren, 1994). When the domestic
currency of the host country starts to appreciate, this raises the relative production cost
in the host country vis-a`-vis competitor countries as relative labour and capital costs
increase. Since the cost of undertaking FDI is higher and the overall rate of return to
foreign firms contemplating an investment in this host country falls, the implication of
real exchange rate appreciation is a lower likelihood of inward investment. A differ-
ent viewpoint emphasises the role of a real appreciation in increasing the purchasing
power of the economic agents, thus increasing the local market demand for the MNE’s
products. Although both perspectives are plausible, I believe that a real appreciation
of the domestic currency deters FDI, so that the expected sign on the REER index is
negative.
Kiyota and Urata (2004) note that while a few studies analyse the effect of ex-
change rate on FDI, the relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI is still
relatively unexplored. I construct a measure of ‘exchange rate volatility’, defined as
the absolute change in the value of REER index. This supposes that the effect of the
exchange rate volatility on investment is symmetric. The existing studies often do not
agree on what is the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI: Cushman (1985, 1988) and
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) find the effect of exchange rate volatility on inward FDI
to be positive, but Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2001) and Urata and Kawai (2000) identify it
as detrimental. Given the long-term nature of FDI and large sunk costs associated with
it, I expect investors to be risk-averse and prefer low exchange rate volatility, so that
its sign is negative. However, if trade and FDI are substitutes, exchange rate uncer-
tainty may actually stimulate inward investment as multinational firms choose to serve
markets abroad through FDI rather than exports.
Linked to exchange rate volatility is the question of how attractive is the Single
currency to investing multinational firms and whether it stimulates FDI in the countries
27This basket is for the EU-27 plus Australia, Canada, the United States, Japan, Norway, New Zealand,
Mexico, Switzerland and Turkey.
28These REER indices are also called the relative price and cost indicators, depending on the deflator.
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of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which I test using the Single currency dummy
variable The benefits of monetary union relevant for prospective investors include the
elimination of transaction costs when converting between two different currencies and
the lowering of the risk associated with exchange rate uncertainty. The Single currency
is expected to stimulate FDI growth when both home and host economies use the euro
as their national currencies. Since its introduction in 1999 the euro has established itself
as the major international currency, so that it is likely that also the investors originating
from outside of the eurozone may be attracted to the eurozone countries. Accordingly,
I anticipate a positive estimate on the Single currency dummy, confirming that mem-
bership of the EMU and the global presence of the Single currency act as a catalyst for
attracting inward investment. I construct a ‘Single currency’ dummy variable, which
takes a value of one if the euro is the official domestic currency of the host location,
zero otherwise. The majority of ‘old’ EU-15 countries formally joined the eurozone in
1999, with the exception of Greece that joined in 2002 after meeting the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria. Among the group of ‘old’ EU Members, Denmark and the United
Kingdom opted out of the Single currency, while Sweden still has not adopted the euro
despite no formal opt out clause. Among the group of twelve ‘new’ EU Member States,
four adopted the Single currency before the end of 2010.29
Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2005) recognise that tax policies are capable of affecting
both the intensity and location of inward investment owing to their direct impact on
the after-tax investment returns. For multinational firms, perhaps the most important
is the corporate income tax rate that directly determines the value of post-tax net prof-
its and this measure of tax is included to capture firms’ preferences between high-tax
and low-tax location. Given that a fundamental assumption of the conditional logit
model is profit-maximisation (see: section 4.2.1 on discrete choice methodology), the
corporate tax rate is likely to have a negative effect on location as it lowers the expected
return. However, there is a different perspective that emphasises the role of taxes in the
provision of public goods and services. Gabe and Bell (2004) argue that high-tax coun-
tries may actually attract a lot of investment on the account of having a better provision
of public goods and services, although I tend to favour the view that they discourage
FDI. The ‘corporate tax rate’ variable is defined as the adjusted top statutory tax rate on
corporate income.
Since MNEs may want to locate in relatively developed host economies, where
the provision of public goods and infrastructure are well developed, I consider the role
of EU regional policy in attracting inward investment. In particular, I include a measure
of the ‘EU Structural Funds’ payments to individual countries and NUTS2 regions. The
29The respective euro adoption dates for ‘new’ EU that occurred before the end of 2010 are: 1 January
2007 for Slovenia, 1 January 2008 for Cyprus and Malta, 1 January 2009 for Slovakia.
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objective of EU regional policy is to reduce disparities in the level of development and
to promote economic and social cohesion, so that less-prosperous countries and regions
receive more from the EU Structural Funds. As such, the Structural Funds variable is a
measure of regional backwardness by definition, and the negative correlation between
the size of EU Structural Funds payments per capita and the development of public
infrastructure is expected. If multinational firms are discouraged by the poor infras-
tructure and public goods and service provision, then a negative sign on the Structural
Funds variable is expected. Importantly, a country is entitled to receive the Structural
Funds only as an official EU Member State.
Assuming that foreign investors are risk-averse, in addition to the state of the
economy, they will react to the political risk of a host economy because it affects the pre-
dictability and stability of the entire political and institutional set-up of the host country.
Quoting Singh and Jun (1995), Resmini (2000) recognises that since inward investment
represents a long-term commitment on behalf of MNEs, “political and macroeconomic
stability together with transparent legal regulations concerning foreign ownership and
profit repatriation all matter to potential investors” (p. 676). Given that an unstable
political system is characterised by corruption, inefficient bureaucracy and low levels
of protection of property rights, countries that are politically unstable attract low levels
of foreign capital and inward investment. Disdier and Mayer (2004) argue that these
are the implicit taxes on the investor. I use the ‘political risk’ rating sourced from the
International Country Risk Guide of the PRS Group, Inc., to assess the impact of po-
litical stability on the probability of inward investment.30 The index is available at the
country-level only, and constructed using 12 weighted variables on political and social
attributes.31 The scores of the political risk rating are in the range 0-100, with a higher
score implying a lower political risk. The mean value of political risk for the EU-15
countries is 85, and the variance equals 32. For the EU-10 countries, the mean value
of the index is 76, and the variance is 21. Assuming a preference for politically stable
countries, a positive sign is expected.
4.5.4 Industry Variables
The composition of industry and the proximity to other firms in a host economy are
reckoned to influence its decision to establish a new foreign affiliate or to expand its ex-
isting operations in a foreign market. On the one hand, the spatial externality concept of
30Data on the International Country Risk Guide is available at https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/
our-two-methodologies/icrg.
31The following risk components and percentage weights are used to produce the political risk rating:
Government Stability 12, Socioeconomic Conditions 12, Investment Profile 12, Internal Conflict 12, Exter-
nal Conflict 12, Corruption 6, Military in Politics 6, Religious Tensions 6, Law and Order 6, Ethnic Tensions
6, Democratic Accountability 6, Bureaucracy Quality 4, Total 100.
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agglomeration economies embraces a range of benefits linked to the clustering of firms
in space, which include proximity to the suppliers, access to a qualified pool of workers
and knowledge spillovers between firms. These benefits are assumed to operate over
small geographical areas, and occur between firms in the same industry (intra-industry
agglomeration) and across different industries (inter-industry agglomeration). On the
other hand, the proximity to other firms entails an increased degree of competition, es-
pecially between firms in the same industry. Industry data on positive and negative ag-
glomeration externalities are not available as ‘raw’ economic indicators but I construct
them using datasets on sectoral employment (EU KLEMS dataset) and project-level
inward FDI (EIM dataset). The measures that I construct include foreign and domes-
tic specialisation variables to capture intra-industry agglomeration, the Jacobs term to
capture inter-industry agglomeration, and the Herfindahl index to measure industrial
competition and concentration. Table 4.11 summarises the industry variables.
Originally developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997), the ‘foreign specialisation’
and ‘domestic specialisation’ variables capture specialisation patterns in industrial ac-
tivities and aim to pick-up the agglomeration economies and positive spillovers that
occur between firms in the same industry over small geographical areas (Guimaraes
et al., 2009). Given that the existing literature (Head et al., 1995; Basile, 2004) finds that
domestic and foreign firm agglomeration affect inward investment location differently,
I construct two specialisation indices that measure agglomeration of domestic and for-
eign economic activity respectively. The formula used to calculate foreign specialisation
is:
Foreign specialisationm,j =
( FDIm,jFDIj )
( FDIm,EUFDIEU )
, (4.17)
where:
FDIm,j - number of FDI projects in industry m, in country j
FDIj - total number of FDI projects in country j
FDIm,EU - number of FDI projects in industry m, in the EU
FDIEU - total number of FDI projects in the EU.
The domestic specialisation is calculated as:
Domestic specialisationm,j =
( EMPm,jEMPj )
( EMPm,EUEMPEU )
, (4.18)
where:
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Table 4.11: Industry variables: summary
Variable Description Source
Foreign specialisa-
tion
Foreign specialisation index calculated as
(
FDIm,j
FDIj
)/( FDIm,EUFDIEU ) based on EIM FDI project
data to capture foreign industry specialisa-
tion in industry m in location j relative to that
of EU-average specialisation
author’s own construction
Domestic speciali-
sation
Domestic specialisation index calculated as
(
EMPm,j
EMPj
)/( EMPm,EUEMPEU ) based on EU KLEMS em-
ployment data to capture domestic industry
specialisation in industry m in location j rela-
tive to that of EU-average specialisation
author’s own construction
Jacobs term Inter-industry agglomeration index calcu-
lated as 1/(∑m| EMPm,jEMPj −
EMPm,EU
EMPEU
|) based on
EU KLEMS employment data to capture in-
dustrial diversity in location j relative to that
of EU-average diversity
author’s own construction
Herfindahl index Industrial concentration index calculated as
∑i s2i based on EIM FDI project data to cap-
ture plant employment share in total industry
m employment; a measure of industrial con-
centration in industry m in location j
author’s own construction
Dummy: Bulgaria-
Romania
Dummy variable = 1 if country = Bulgaria
or country = Romania; zero otherwise (EU
KLEMS data is unavailable for Bulgaria and
Romania)
author’s own construction
Dummy: Herfind-
ahl index
Dummy variable = 1 if Herfindahl index is
a missing value owing to the lack of FDI
projects for a given industry m, location j and
time t; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
(source: author’s own elaboration)
EMPm,j - industry m employment in country j
EMPj - total employment in country j
EMPm,EU - industry m employment in the EU
EMPEU - total employment in the EU.
The specialisation indices vary across industries and are calculated for 2-digit
NACE industries. The larger the value of a specialisation index the more specialised is
industrial production, and any value in excess of one implies that a country j hosts a
more specialised industry cluster than the EU.32 The sectoral employment data used
for constructing the ‘domestic’ specialisation index is sourced from the EU KLEMS
32Total statistics capture employment and FDI in all 27 EU Member States, including Cyprus and Malta
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database.33 The KLEMS records data for 72 industries up to 2007, and beyond this
year I use the Structural Business Statistics (SBS) data for industry employment avail-
able through Eurostat.34 The KLEMS data are not available for Bulgaria and Romania,
so that I replace the missing values of domestic specialisation data for Bulgaria and
Romania with zero and create an auxiliary dummy variable for these cases (‘dummy:
Bulgaria-Romania’). Information on FDI activity by industry is used for constructing
the foreign specialisation index and it is gathered from the EIM dataset, which for all
investment projects records sector name and sector classification by NACE industry
code (see: section 4.4 for details).
In principle, the domestic and foreign specialisation indices can be constructed
at both the country- and region-levels, but given that some regions receive few or no
investment projects the regional-level specialisation index is not feasible. Furthermore,
EU KLEMS sectoral employment data is not available for NUTS2 regions. This justifies
my decision to construct the specialisation index at the country-level only. To construct
the domestic specialisation I utilise the first lag of the EU KLEMS sectoral employment
data, but the past two years worth of FDI data to calculate the foreign specialisation
to increase the number of observations and better reflect the level of inward invest-
ment. Since the EIM dataset records information from 1997 onwards the 1998 foreign
specialisation values use the 1997 FDI data only.
Contrary to the specialisation indices that measure the agglomeration
economies that arise between firms belonging to the same industry (Marshall, 1890; Ar-
row, 1962a; Romer, 1986), the ‘Jacobs term’ captures inter-industry externalities (some-
times referred to as urbanisation economies) that lead to firms agglomerating in space
whenever the knowledge used in one industry has applications in other industries
(Henderson, 2003). The Jacobs term attempts to quantify the diversity of industrial
structure. I construct Jacobs term using EU KLEMS sectoral employment data but again
beyond 2007 the Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics data is used. The Jacobs term
is:
Jacobs termj =
1
∑
m
| EMPm,jEMPj −
EMPm,EU
EMPEU
|
, (4.19)
where:
EMPm,j - industry m employment in country j
EMPj - total employment in country j
33The EU KLEMS is accessed at http://www.euklems.net. O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) provide a
summary of the EU KLEMS database, which is used to explore EU productivity.
34The latest release of the EU KLEMS data for Poland, Portugal and Slovenia was not available for 2007,
for which 2006 employment data are used.
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EMPm,EU - industry m employment in the EU
EMPEU - total employment in the EU.
Given the lack of data, it is not possible to construct a regional Jacobs term. A
negative sign on the Jacobs term is expected to be consistent with a positive effect of
inter-industry urbanisation economies on inward investment.
In addition to the positive agglomeration externalities associated with clustering
of firms in space, the negative effect of product competition is captured. The ‘Herfind-
ahl index’ of industry plant size distribution captures the size of individual firms in
relation to the industry as a whole. It is a measure of industrial concentration and
an indicator of competition. It is calculated as the sum of squared plant employment
shares in total industry m employment.
Herfindahl indexm,j =
N
∑
i=1
s2i , (4.20)
where:
si - firm i plant employment share in total industry m employment
N - number of firms in industry m.
The Herfindahl index ranges from zero to one, where a value closer to zero im-
plies a large number of small firms, while a value of one implies a single monopolistic
producer. An increase in the Herfindahl index indicates an increase in market power
and less competition. Given that that foreign investors are expected to be more averse
to enter a market in the presence of an incumbent monopolistic producer in the host
market I anticipate a negative sign. It is calculated at the country-level for each 2-digit
NACE industry, but I decided against constructing it at the regional-level due to the
small number of observations. Given that plant employment data is not widely avail-
able, in light of a lack of alternative plant employment data sources I choose to use
FDI employment data from the EIM dataset.35 The shortcoming of my approach is
that plant employment data is not available for all investment projects recorded in the
EIM database (see: section 4.4 for further details). In that view, I choose to impose an
arbitrary assumption that all FDI plants for which employment data is not reported
generate a marginal employment equal to one. A further complication associated with
the Herfindahl index in the context of my FDI data is that the value of Herfindahl in-
dex cannot be calculated whenever a country j had not received industry m inward
35The EIM data record the sector classification by NACE industry code for each FDI project.
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investment in the previous two years.36 I replace any missing value of Herfindahl in-
dex with an arbitrarily small value of 0.0001 and construct an auxiliary dummy variable
(‘dummy: Herfindahl index’). This dummy equals one if for a given industry m, coun-
try j and time t Herfindahl index is a missing value
4.5.5 Additional Variables
A small subset of my explanatory variables is not formally considered by the theoretical
discussion on location factors, but rather the aim of these is to facilitate the analysis of
the spatial distribution of FDI at the NUTS2 level. Specifically, they account for factors
such as national borders, location inertia and contemporaneous spatial dependencies.
They are summarised in Table 4.12.
It is plausible that a model that most appropriately captures the features of in-
dustrial location choice is dynamic. Specifically, the location choice can exhibit a signif-
icant degree of inertia as those regions that receive a lot of inward investment perform
well historically, and vice versa. Furthermore, the distinctive location patterns can be
reinforced and intensified by spatial dependencies and interactions that exist between
regions. With the possible intertemporal correlation in the size of regional FDI inflows,
lagged dependent variable (LDV) is included. Depending on the dependent variable it
is expressed as either numbers or shares of FDI projects.
In the context of small geographic units, such as NUTS2 regions, the agglomera-
tion externalities that occur between firms that locate within industrial clusters in close
proximity are likely to cross regional boundaries. Essentially, inward investment to re-
gion j may grow as other neighbouring regions start to receive more FDI. Blonigen et al.
(2007) argue that spatial interdependency between small geographical units has been
largely ignored by the empirical FDI literature.37 Coughlin and Segev (2000) maintain
that standard regressions do not account for the spatial nature of geographic data.
To capture the spatial dependence and interactions between NUTS2 regions, I
construct the ‘spatial lag’ term that accounts for the dynamics of FDI location choice
in geographical space. Sometimes referred to as a spatially lagged dependent variable,
the spatial lag is a measure of spatial spillovers between neighbouring areas, which in
the context of my research amounts to contemporaneous correlation between the FDI
in one region and that in neighbouring regions (Blonigen et al., 2007; Ledyaeva, 2009).
Essentially, the spatial lag assumes that the attributes of neighbouring zones affect an
36To increase the number of observations, plant employment data for the preceding two years is taken
into account when calculating the Herfindahl index, with the exception of the period 1997-1998. For exam-
ple, the Herfindahl index for year 2000 is calculated using the plant employment data for the years 1998
and 1999.
37Alongside the study of Blonigen et al. (2007), notable exceptions include Coughlin and Segev (2000)
and Baltagi et al. (2007).
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Table 4.12: Additional variables: summary
Variable Description Source
LDV:
LN(number FDI)
Lagged Dependent Variable; expressed as ln(FDI +
1)j,t−1
author’s own construction
LDV:
LN(share FDI)
Lagged Dependent Variable; expressed as
ln(
(FDI+1)j,t−1
annualFDIEU−25,t−1 )
author’s own construction
Spatial lag:
LN(number FDI)
Spatial lag term, which captures spatial dependen-
cies between neighbouring regions; calculated for
an individual region j as ∑ADJACENT NUTS2 ln(FDI+1)l,tADJACENT NUTS2 COUNT
and where j 6= l
author’s own construction
Spatial lag:
LN(share FDI)
Spatial lag term, which captures spatial de-
pendencies between neighbouring regions;
calculated for an individual region j as
∑ADJACENT NUTS2 ln(
(FDI+1)l,t
annualFDIEU−25,t )
ADJACENT NUTS2 COUNT and where j 6= l
author’s own construction
Road distance to
EU border
Road distance from a capital of region j to the West-
East border; expressed in hundreds of kilometres,
quickest route is used
author’s own construction
Line distance to EU
border
Euclidean straight-line distance from a capital of re-
gion j to the West-East border; expressed in hun-
dreds of kilometres, shortest route is used
author’s own construction
Region count dis-
tance to EU border
A count of the number of regions that separate re-
gion j from the former West-East border
author’s own construction
BORDER Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country and lies
alongside the West-East border; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
BORDER 01 Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country, lies along-
side the West-East border or separated from this
border by at most one other region; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
BORDER 02 Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country, lies along-
side the West-East border or separated from this
border by at most two other regions; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
BORDER 11 Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country, separated
from the West-East border by one other region; zero
otherwise
author’s own construction
BORDER 22 Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country, separated
from the West-East border by two other regions;
zero otherwise
author’s own construction
BORDER 12 Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is a border NUTS2
region that is located in a EU-10 country, separated
from the West-East border by one or two other re-
gions; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
Capital city (‘new’
EU)
Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is hosts the capital
city of a ‘new’ EU country, which at time t is offi-
cially part of the EU; zero otherwise
author’s own construction
Capital city (‘old’
EU after 2004)
Dummy variable = 1 if a region j is hosts the capital
city of an ‘old’ EU country in 2004 and thereafter;
zero otherwise
author’s own construction
(source: author’s own elaboration) 160
investor’s location decision. Buczkowska and de Lapparent (2014), who study the lo-
cation choice of newly-created establishments within the Paris metropolitan area, find
that the spatial spillovers improve model performance. Their conclusion is that an es-
tablishment does not act in isolation in its decision-making process and that other estab-
lishments located nearby are likely to influence the location decision. Spatial spillovers
become more influential for disaggregated spatial units and they decay with distance
(Moreno et al., 2004). I assume contemporaneous spatial dependencies between NUTS2
regions.
I construct two separate versions of the spatial lag term for a single region j us-
ing the EIM data on inward investment. The first is for the number of FDI projects in
contiguous NUTS2 regions ( ∑ADJACENT NUTS2 ln(FDI+1)lADJACENT NUTS2 COUNT , where j 6= l) and second considers
the shares of FDI (
∑ADJACENT NUTS2 ln(
(FDI+1)l
annualFDIEU
)
ADJACENT NUTS2 COUNT , where j 6= l). I assume that spatial dynam-
ics between NUTS2 regions are contemporaneous in the sense that inward investment
projects that the adjacent regions receive influence FDI to a region in the same year.
To illustrate how I construct the spatial lag term, consider region A, which has
three neighbouring regions: region B, region C and region D. Spatial lag (share FDI) for
region A is calculated as follows:
(4.21)Spatial lag (share FDI)A =
ln
(
(FDI+1)B
annualFDIEU
)
+ ln
(
(FDI+1)C
annualFDIEU
)
+ ln
(
(FDI+1)D
annualFDIEU
)
3
.
After rearranging, equation (4.21) can be written as:
(4.22)Spatial lag (share FDI)A =
ln(FDI + 1)B + ln(FDI + 1)C + ln(FDI + 1)D
3
− ln(annualFDIEU).
The first term in equation (4.22) is exactly the value of the number-version of the spa-
tial lag (i.e. spatial lag (number FDI) = ∑ADJACENT NUTS2 ln(FDI+1)lADJACENT NUTS2 COUNT , where j 6= l), and the
second term is the value of the difference between spatial lag (number FDI) and spa-
tial lag (share FDI). Logarithmic transformation used in the construction of spatial lag
is dictated by the use of log-lin model specification in my study of border effects (see:
Chapter 6). Seeing that some NUTS2 regions receive zero FDI, it is necessary to add
one to the regional count of FDI before I can perform the logarithmic transformation.
On the contrary to the regional market potential measure, I do not use the term D to
weight the scale of foreign firm agglomeration in neighbouring regions; neither do I
take account of the distance, ω. The coefficient on the spatial lag measures how FDI
activity in neighbouring regions affect the regional inward investment. I anticipate the
effect of spatial spillovers on regional FDI activity to be positive.
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A set of three distance variables and six border dummies is constructed to anal-
yse the effect of the EU enlargement in 2004 and the significance of continuous dis-
tance and discrete border effects (see: Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013) in shaping the
spatial distribution of FDI activity at the level of the regions. The aim is to establish
if FDI activity is drawn closer to the former West-East border within the EU in the
post-enlargement period. Among the distance variables I distinguish between ‘road
distance’ and ‘line distance’. The first is calculated as the shortest road distance (in
kilometres) between the capital of region j and the former West-East border (prior to
the 2004 enlargement). The second is the shortest Euclidean distance, i.e. ‘as the crow
flies’ (in kilometres) from the West-East border. To calculate the road distance, Google
Maps are used, while the line measure is obtained using a Distance Calculator.38 Simi-
lar to agglomeration externalities and spatial spillovers, whose effect is regarded to be
strongest over small geographical areas and decay with distance (Moreno et al., 2004),
it is anticipated that the ‘integration effect’ weakens with distance, meaning that the
strongest impact of EU enlargement is felt close to the former West-East border, so that
a negative sign is expected on these.
A third distance variable is the ‘region count distance’. Essentially, it is an auxil-
iary measure that counts the number of regions that separate region j from the former
West-East border. Although I do not explicitly employ this distance measure in the
subsequent econometric analyses, it is used as a criterion for defining a set of six bor-
der dummies. The border regions are defined for the EU-10 members. The aim of the
border dummies is to test the significance of national borders in shaping the spatial
distribution of FDI activity among the NUTS2 regions of the accession countries after
the fifth enlargement. A full set of six border dummies are presented in Figure 4.10
that shows how the set of the border regions changes according to these six different
definitions.
The dummy variable BORDER takes the value of one for all NUTS2 regions
located in the EU-10 after the fifth enlargement, which meet a strict continuity criterion
of being located alongside the former West-East border; zero otherwise. Essentially, the
strict continuity criterion is satisfied when the auxiliary region count distance equals
zero. The BORDER 01 dummy is a ‘medium’ definition; the region count distance for
this border region equals zero or one. The BORDER 02 is a ‘broad’ definition; the region
count distance equals zero or one or two.
To assess how the size of the border effect changes with distance, BORDER 11,
BORDER 22 and BORDER 12 are defined. All three measures exclude those border
regions that satisfy the strict continuity criterion but include those regions that are lo-
38Google Maps are available at http://maps.google.com. Distance Calculator is available at http:
//www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm.
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Figure 4.10: Visualisation of border regions as defined by BORDER (pink), BORDER 01 (blue), BORDER 02 (green), BORDER 11
(orange), BORDER 22 (purple) and BORDER 12 (red) dummies
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cated further away from the West-East border. The region count measure equals one for
the BORDER 11 dummy (one region away from the West-East border) and two for the
BORDER 22 dummy (two regions away from the West-East border). The final BORDER
12 dummy includes all regions that are designated as either BORDER 11 or BORDER
22. The differentiation in the definition of a border region enables me to examine if any
border effect decays with distance from the West-East border.
Overall, my aim is to determine if asymmetries exists in the spatial distribution
of FDI activity in the border and interior regions of the accession countries after the
fifth enlargement and whether the enlargement altered the economic geography of FDI
within the enlarged EU. Importantly, the fundamental question is whether the border
regions of the accession countries are in a stronger position to attract FDI after the EU
enlargement owing to their proximity to the core of the European Single Market. The
border effect is analysed for the regions of the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States alongside
the West-East border between EU-15 and EU-10 countries.39 A positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient on the border dummies would confirm that after the fifth
enlargement border regions of the accession countries tend to attract more inward FDI
than other regions, capturing a shift in the ‘centroid’ of FDI activity after 2004. The pos-
itive sign on the border dummies would also identify the border regions of the ‘new’
EU-10 countries as the ‘winners’ of EU enlargement and recognise that a positive and
significant border effect shapes the spatial distribution of regional FDI location.
Finally, to account for the distinctive character of the NUTS2 regions hosting
national capitals that were identified in section 4.4.4 as the leaders in attracting FDI
to the respective countries, two dummies are constructed for the capital regions. The
first is called ‘capital city (‘new’ EU)’ and the second is called ‘capital city (‘old’ EU
after 2004)’. The aim is to capture the performance of the capital regions after 2004. A
distinction is made between the capital regions in ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10 to allow
for asymmetric responses to the enlargement. The capital regions are not necessarily
located closest the West-East border within CEECs and it is of interest to determine if
a significant capital region ‘premium’ in the size of the inward FDI exists in the post-
accession period or whether their role diminishes in favour of those regions that are
geographically closer to the West-East border.
4.6 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to outline the nature of the FDI data that are sourced from the
EIM database, along with the other country and regional variables that are collected.
39A feasible extension would be to look at the border affected by the 2007 enlargement but this is not
done in this thesis.
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The chapter also sets out the methodology that I intend to employ to analyse the loca-
tion of FDI activity in the EU-25 at both the country and regional level. The European
Commission NUTS classification underpins the regional analysis and FDI location is
subsequently analysed for 25 EU countries and 260 NUTS2 regions.
The chapter outlines the nature of the FDI data and undertakes a detailed pre-
liminary analysis of these data. This reveals substantial heterogeneity between coun-
tries and regions of the EU-25 in attracting investment. The distribution of projects
is highly unbalanced: 80% of multi-national firms chose to locate in the ‘old’ EU-15
over the period 1997-2010, although the shares vary over time. Importantly, when the
inward investment is measured relative to the size of an economy using a location quo-
tient analysis, the superiority of ‘old’ EU-15 countries versus ‘new’ EU-10 in attracting
FDI is no longer unambiguous. Location quotients less than unity indicate that as a
whole the EU-15 ‘under-perform’, attracting fewer FDI projects than expected based
on their economic size. Interestingly, the location quotient for ‘new’ EU countries that
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 is highest in 2004, which is the year of the first wave of
the fifth EU enlargement.
The spatial distribution of investment activity changes over time and it differs
before and after the EU enlargement in 2004. I identify that mean FDI per annum for
Austria and Ireland is lower after 2004, suggesting that these two countries are the
‘losers’ of the fifth EU enlargement. By contrast, the largest recipients of FDI in the
EU-25 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) record the largest absolute increase
in FDI between the pre- and post-enlargement periods. Among the ‘new’ EU-10, the
largest increase in FDI is recorded by Poland and Romania. However, a number of
smaller economies such as Finland, Greece, Luxembourg and the three Baltic countries
see little change in mean FDI per annum before and after 2004.
At the regional level, the capital city regions tend to receive more than the mean
level of FDI and emerge as the top destination for investment in their respective coun-
tries, which holds for most of the EU-25 countries. In that category, the Romanian cap-
ital region of Bucuresti-Ilfov is a strong performer that features among the few NUTS2
regions that on average gain more than 30 additional investment projects each year af-
ter 2004. It demonstrates a strong turnaround in investors’ perception of Romania’s
suitability as a host for productive investment, given that this country received little
FDI before 2004. Other regions that achieve similar growth of inward investment in-
clude French regions Ile-de-France and Rhone-Alpes, Dusseldorf in Germany, Madrid
in Spain and the NUTS1 region of London.
A remarkable feature of the data is that five out of the eight Czech regions ex-
perience negative growth rates of inward FDI, despite their strong position as ‘leaders’
in attracting inward investment among all accession countries in the pre-enlargement
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period. Across the border in Austria, a stagnation in FDI characterises the performance
of six out of nine Austrian regions too. Furthermore, my analysis of regional FDI un-
derlines the relative importance of distance and national borders, which is illustrated
by the performance of the Podlaskie region in north-eastern Poland and the Nord-Vest
region in Romania. Although the two regions are positioned similarly relative to the
former West-East border and attract similar number of FDI projects before 2004, they
exhibit a contrasting performance in the post-enlargement period. It calls for a formal
econometric analysis of the motives for FDI location and the impact of distance and
borders in shaping the spatial distribution of FDI activity in the enlarged EU-25.
Two main empirical approaches to analysing the data on FDI location were re-
viewed in the chapter: the discrete choice and panel data methodologies. First, the
discrete choice methodology is a well-established empirical technique underlying in-
dustrial location studies. It is rooted in the Random Utility Maximisation model that
assumes firms maximise their utility by choosing a single location that provides the
highest profit from a set of available alternatives. Conditional and nested logit models
are often used to analyse discrete choice data on FDI location. I propose to use the con-
ditional logit model to study the motives for FDI location in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU at
the country-level. Second, I propose to use panel data techniques to analyse the eco-
nomic geography of FDI activity at the level of NUTS2 regions and the role of border
effects. These include a LSDV estimator but also the GMM approach that better han-
dles modelling concerns such as fixed effects and the endogeneity of regressors, while
it avoids bias in panels with a wide regional-dimension and short time-dimension.
To undertake these analyses the chapter also discusses the construction of the
dataset on location factors. These include the neoclassical and institutional location
factors at the country and NUTS2 regional level. It involved collecting data on market
potential and resources that appeal to demand-side market-seeking FDI and supply-
side resource-seeking FDI. Further, I also collected data on macroeconomic and po-
litical factors that affect the risk associated with investing abroad, and implying that
stable institutional set-up attracts investment. Most of this data is collected from Euro-
stat. Moreover, I construct a set of industry variables to account for the agglomeration
economies of the NEG theory. These controls include intra- and inter-industry exter-
nalities. All in all, the discussion of this chapter puts me in a good position to analyse
these data in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 5
Motives for FDI Location Choice
Between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe
5.1 Introduction
The fifth enlargement of the EU involved the accession of ten new members from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and two small Mediterranean countries. On 1 May 2004 ten
countries, mostly the former transition economies of the Central and Eastern Europe,
joined the European Union (EU) with the Union growing from 15 to 25 members. On
1 January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania entered in the second wave, bringing the to-
tal number of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in the EU to ten (see:
Chapter 3 for a discussion of the enlargement process). The fifth enlargement of the EU
made it the largest single market in the world with a population of 500 million inhab-
itants. As the largest combined economy in the world, the EU ranks first as the source
and destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the world, accounting for
34% and 42% of global inward and outward FDI stocks respectively in 2012 (UNCTAD,
2013).
Given the status of the EU as a prime destination for FDI, it is surprising that
analysis of the motives that drive multinational firms’ decisions to locate within the
EU is virtually non-existent.1 While there exist many empirical studies that analyse the
determinants of FDI location for individual European countries (e.g. Hill and Munday,
1992 for the UK; Guimaraes et al., 2000 for Portugal; Basile, 2004 for Italy; Crozet et al.,
2004 for France; Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005 for Hungary; and Kalotay, 2008 for Bulgaria
1One of the main reasons for this has been the lack of data availability to analyse the cross-country
location decisions of FDI. Notable exceptions are Alegria (2006) and Disdier and Mayer (2004); the for-
mer analysed the location choices of European multinational firms at the country and region level in 25
European Member countries but only from 1998 to 2005; the latter was limited to a sample of French
multinational firms that invested in Europe over the period 1980-99.
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and Romania), such studies fail to take a broader EU perspective. The aim of this chap-
ter is to fill this research ‘gap’ and analyse the motives explaining the location decisions
of multinational firms investing in the EU.
It is reasonable to suspect that multinational firms view the ‘old’ EU-15 countries
differently from the recent ‘new’ EU entrants, and that the same location factor may
have different impacts on the probability of investment in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ EU.
This chapter explores the possibility of a ‘West-East divide’ (see: Disdier and Mayer,
2004) in the location decisions of foreign investors by explicitly allowing for the hetero-
geneity in the preferences of investors locating in the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ EU Member
States (West-East heterogeneity). For example, assuming international factor price dif-
ferentials existing between the West and the East, it is plausible that with the entry of
CEECs into the EU and the resulting reduction in trade costs in the enlarged EU the
‘new’ EU Members began to attract multinational firms interested in serving not only
the local markets of CEECs but also those of the neighbouring countries, thus becom-
ing export platforms (see: Ekholm et al., 2007). Conversely, for the case of the ‘old’ EU
Members, such market access opportunities may have been exhausted in the past and
hence motives other than pure market access may drive FDI location in the West.
The chapter analyses the location of FDI projects in the 25 EU Member States
(EU-25) between 1997 and 2010. The countries in the choice set are the ‘old’ 15 coun-
tries that joined the EU by 1995 (EU-15) and the remaining ‘new’ 10 countries that
joined as part of the fifth enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (EU-10). The data is at the
individual project level, sourced from the Ernst and Young European Investment Monitor
(EIM) and discussed in Chapter 4. The EIM data records information for 35,155 inward
FDI projects, but the analysis excludes fifty projects that located in Cyprus and Malta
and two projects from the Faroe Islands resulting in a total of 35,103 projects.2 The
EIM captures all project-based productive investment but excludes mergers and acqui-
sitions so that the focus of the analysis is on productive investment i.e. excludes asset-
augmenting FDI. The theoretical framework for the analysis is the International Busi-
ness literature, which identifies three motives for asset-exploiting FDI: market-seeking,
resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but also in-
cludes macroeconomic and industry variables to control for other country-level factors
that affect FDI. Given the project-level nature of the data the conditional logit model
is used as the appropriate econometric model to analyse the motives for FDI location
choice.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the observed
2Faroe Islands are an autonomous region of Denmark but are not included in the statistical territory
of Denmark. All statistical data for Denmark does not include data on the Faroe Islands or Greenland,
another autonomous region of Denmark.
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location choices of multinational firms in the EU-25 based on a preliminary descrip-
tive investigation of the FDI data. These choices are analysed from a range of project-
specific characteristics such as the project type (new investment or re-investment) and
origin region of investor. These characteristics are used later in the analysis chapters to
account for the heterogeneity of project types. Section 5.3 outlines the main theoretical
framework of the study and discusses it in the context of the data and variables. Sec-
tion 5.4 presents the econometric framework used in the chapter, including the model
specification, and provides a justification for using the discrete choice methodology to
analyse the motives for inward FDI location. The results of the econometric analysis
are presented in section 5.5 and conclusions are drawn in section 5.6.
5.2 FDI Location: Project-Specific Characteristics
An investigation of the FDI project-level data reveals that the distribution of FDI
projects between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States is unbalanced. Table 5.1 shows
that over the period 1997 to 2010 the EIM records 28,223 FDI projects in the EU-15 and
6,880 projects in the EU-10, which represents 80% and 20% in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU
respectively. Further analysis by three sub-periods, 1997-2003 (time prior to the first
wave of the fifth enlargement in 2004), 2004-2006 (in between two waves of the fifth
enlargement in 2004 and 2007) and 2007-2010 (time after the second wave of the fifth
enlargement in 2007), reveals that the EU-15 appeared to be a relatively less attractive
destination for inward FDI in the period that immediately followed the EU enlargement
in 2004, attracting 76% of all projects carried out between 2004 and 2006, as compared
to the corresponding figure of 82% for the time period 1997-2003. In the period follow-
ing the completion of the second wave of fifth enlargement in 2007, the pattern of FDI
has returned to that of the pre-enlargement period.
Table 5.1: Project numbers and shares by regional subgroup and by sub-period
Subgroup 1997-2003 2004-2006 2007-2010 1997-2010
‘Old’ EU-15
11,500 6,457 10,266 28,223
(82.4%) (75.6%) (81.5%) (80.4%)
‘New’ EU-10
2,458 2,086 2,336 6,880
(17.6%) (24.4%) (18.5%) (19.6%)
All countries
13,958 8,543 12,602 35,103
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
(source: author’s own elaboration of EIM data.)
The FDI dataset distinguishes between three project type categories: new invest-
ments (67% of all projects), expansions (27%) and new co-locations (6%). The difference
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between expansions and co-locations is that while the former results in an increase in
capacity of existing functions at their present location, the latter involves new func-
tions that are co-located at or near an existing activity.3 Grouping expansions and
co-locations together gives a ‘broad’ measure of the re-investment activities of firms,
compared to a more ‘narrow’ measure if co-locations are excluded. Table 5.2 shows the
distribution of FDI projects by project type and regional subgroup, and finds that new
investments account for about two thirds of total projects. It also demonstrates that the
distribution of projects is unbalanced between the EU-15 and EU-10, supporting the
pattern in Table 5.1. The ‘new’ EU-10 countries receive only 20% of total new invest-
ment projects and the East lags further still behind that of the West for re-investments,
as only 18.5% of expansions are recorded to take place in the ‘new’ EU-10 (17% if co-
locations are excluded).
Table 5.2: Project numbers and shares by regional subgroup and by project type
Subgroup New investment Expansions and Expansions All
co-locations
‘Old’ EU-15
18,624 9,599 7,834 28,223
(79.9%) (81.5%) (83.1%) (80.4%)
‘New’ EU-10
4,699 2,181 1,588 6,880
(20.1%) (18.5%) (16.9%) (19.6%)
All countries
23,323 11,780 9,422 35,103
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
(source: author’s own elaboration of EIM data.)
Inward FDI from outside the EU-27 may be different in nature to intra-EU FDI
because of the larger information asymmetries for the former type of investment. The
reduced information asymmetries for international firms operating in the EU facilitate
investing in other EU countries, meaning these firms can more easily choose locations
within the EU.4 The EIM data records information on the origin country of the parent
company and this data is used to determine the preferences of investors from inside
and outside the EU-27 to locate in the ‘old’ EU-15 versus the ‘new’ EU-10 countries.
Location preferences can also be different when multiple partners are involved, for ex-
ample due to the potential for risk sharing, so consequently location strategies can differ
between single and multiple parent company ownership. It is possible to distinguish
between projects with more than one parent company in the EIM data and Table 5.3
3The EIM data uses the following categories to describe the FDI functions: contact centre (customer
support functions), education & training, headquarters, internet data centre, logistics, manufacturing,
research & development, sales & marketing, shared services centre (administrative support functions),
testing & servicing.
4Defever (2006) studies location choices of non-European firms in the 23 countries of the enlarged EU
to focus on horizontal and export platform investments.
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gives the distribution of FDI projects by five different origin subgroups, distinguishing
between one or more partners from inside and outside the EU and a ‘mixed’ category
where both inside and outside EU countries are involved in the investment.
Table 5.3: Project numbers and shares by regional subgroup and by origin category
Subgroup inside EU inside EU outside EU outside EU ‘mixed’ All
(1 partner) (≥ 2 partners) (1 partner) (≥ 2 partners) partners
‘Old’ EU-15
10,855 493 16,369 77 429 28,223
(71.8%) (74.4%) (87.7%) (74.8%) (78.9%) (80.4%)
‘New’ EU-10
4,267 170 2,302 26 115 6,880
(28.2%) (25.6%) (12.3%) (25.2%) (21.1%) (19.6%)
All countries
15,122 663 18,671 103 544 35,103
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
(source: author’s own elaboration of EIM data.)
Table 5.3 shows that FDI from outside the EU is more sizeable than EU-27 FDI,
with approximately 53.5% of all FDI projects. There are only 544 projects that have
‘mixed’ partners (at least one parent company from the EU-27, and at least one parent
company from outside of the EU-27) and these account for approximately 1.5% of the
sample. Within samples of European and non-European investments, those projects
involving multiple parent companies are a small minority, with 663 and 103 projects
respectively. Table 5.3 shows that multinational firms originating from inside the EU-27
are more likely to invest in the ‘new’ EU-10 compared to investors from outside the EU-
27 (28% compared to 12% for outside investors). More detailed analysis of FDI data by
origin category reveals that around 62% of projects in the ‘new’ EU-10 are from the ‘old’
EU-15 countries, 18% are from North and South America (mainly US), 10% are from
Asia (mainly Japan) and virtually all of the remaining investment is from elsewhere in
Europe (10%), of which 4% is cross-border investment within CEECs.5
5.3 Motives for FDI Location: Data
The theories of FDI that were developed to explain the reasons for the emergence and
location of FDI can be summarized by the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1977), as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. Building upon the OLI framework and drawing on the work of
Behrman (1972), Dunning (1993) developed a taxonomy of four types of MNE activity,
where the classification depends upon the primary motive underlying the investment.
The typology of FDI motives provides a logical framework for analysing multinational
firms’ location decisions and it offers the main theoretical underpinning of this study on
5These detailed data are not reported in the thesis but are available on request.
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the motives for FDI location choice in the EU-25.6 The typology identifies the market-
seeking motive, resource-seeking motive, efficiency-seeking motive and strategic asset-
seeking motive for FDI. The fourth and final motive for FDI, strategic-asset-seeking FDI,
is different in nature to the first three types as the primary purpose of the investment is
to acquire a new foreign asset rather than to exploit existing assets. Given that the data
captures productive investment but excludes mergers and acquisitions, the final motive
is of no direct relevance to the research and is not considered further. Importantly, the
Dunning typology governs the choice of explanatory variables that is included in the
econometric model to analyse the motives for inward FDI location choice in the EU-25.
Market-seeking multinational firms consider FDI as a strategy of serving de-
mand in markets abroad, are demand-side oriented and driven by determinants such
as market size and market growth prospects. Market-based determinants of FDI lo-
cation are seen as the fundamental location determinant as they capture the market
potential of the host economy (Procher, 2009) and market-seeking firms are tradition-
ally attracted to those locations as they can benefit from large demand (Alegria, 2006).
The variables explaining the market-seeking motives for FDI are grouped together as
market potential variables and outlined below (they are explained in detail in section
4.5.1 of Chapter 4).
Among the market potential variables, the EU membership dummy controls for
an access to the EU Single Market as a motive for investment. By locating in a host
country that is a Member State of the EU, an investing multinational firm gains not
only access to the local market of its host economy but also importantly an unlimited
access to the European Single Market of 500 million consumers. As a consequence,
access to the EU Single Market is likely to be a factor that attracts FDI to individual EU
Member States. Investing firms are also likely to consider the actual size of the demand
in the other economies of the Single Market (Alegria, 2006) and also to consider EU-
wide market access. A measure of external market access is therefore included through
a peripherality index, i.e. a gravity-weighted market size measure of external market
potential. The index attempts to quantify how central/peripheral a location is and
its relative position to the other markets. Alongside measuring the external market
potential, the peripherality index is a proxy for transport costs within the EU-25 and
complements the EU membership dummy, which indirectly captures the reduction in
overall trade costs associated with the removal of internal trade barriers for CEECs
within the EU-25 (e.g. tariffs).
Real GDP (labelled as ‘internal market GDP’) is a proxy for the size of the local
market demand, and it is included to control for access to the local market of an indi-
6The typology of FDI motives underpinning this study are discussed in length in section 2.3.4 of Chap-
ter 2.
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vidual EU-25 host country as a motive for investment. Seeing that the market-seeking
FDI is demand-oriented and the size of demand is an important consideration in choos-
ing where to locate, real GDP per capital and real GDP growth rate are also part of the
econometric model because both influence the local market demand. Real GDP per
capita (labelled as ‘income per capita’) captures the relative purchasing power in the
local market and the real GDP growth rate (labelled as ‘growth rate’) is an indicator of
the sustainability of the economic performance and the economic prospects (Procher,
2009, 2011). Population density indirectly captures the market potential, as it measures
the degree of urbanisation and therefore, the size of the consumer base. A more dense
population allows a firm to serve a larger consumer market within a given geographical
space and may appeal to market-seeking FDI. Lastly, for policy purposes it is of interest
to know if FDI has shifted its location within the EU in response to the fifth enlarge-
ment due to new market opportunities becoming available. An East intercept dummy
captures how different is the perception of the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States vis-a`-vis the
‘old’ EU-15 and controls for this unobserved East-West heterogeneity.
Resource-seeking multinational firms consider FDI as an optimal strategy of ac-
quiring higher quality resources and/or factors of production at lower real cost, which
affects production costs. Resource-seeking FDI is supply-side oriented, for whom ac-
cess to resources such as physical natural resources, inexpensive unskilled or semi-
skilled labour, and technological capability or managerial and organisational skills is
the motive for the FDI location choice. Iammarino and McCann (2013) make a dis-
tinction between ‘general-asset seekers’ that aim at host locations’ physical resources
and cheap labour, and ‘specific-asset seekers’ that aim to acquire higher skills such
as technological capabilities, management and marketing expertise or organisational
skills. The access to these resources is also a source of comparative advantage of
resource-seeking multinational firms. The resource-based determinants of FDI loca-
tion are grouped together as the resource variables (see: section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4 for a
detailed discussion), and outlined below.
Among the resource variables, motorway density (labelled as ‘physical infras-
tructure’) is used as a proxy for the quality of the physical infrastructure, i.e. one of
the resources that FDI seeks to benefit from, as it facilitates the transport of goods and
leads to a trade cost reduction for firms. A location choice of resource-seeking firms is
also determined by the skills of the workforce, which on the one hand may search for
higher range skills such as technological capability or managerial and organisational
skills (‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking firms), or for lower and middle range skills on
the other hand (‘general-asset’ resource-seeking firms). The model includes two mea-
sures of education attainment of the working-age population (secondary and tertiary)
to control for the different skill requirements of these firms. The unemployment rate
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is included to capture the availability of workforce, as well as its quality. Disdier and
Mayer (2004) note that a high rate of unemployment can be interpreted as a signal of
the availability of a large pool of workers, but it can also be viewed as the sign of a
rigid labour market and poor quality labour force. Finally, resource-seeking FDI often
searches to acquire higher quality resources and factors of production at a lower real
cost and to capture this the real wage rate in manufacturing is included. Generally,
labour costs are one of the largest components of production costs and hence, one of
the most important cost considerations for firms. An increase in wages leads to a fall
in profit margin for firms, ceteris paribus, and therefore the expected effect of wages on
inward investment is negative. However, it is also plausible that multinational firms
are attracted to high labour cost locations as this is where a highly skilled workforce
may be found (Procher, 2011).
The main motivation for efficiency-seeking multinational firms to invest abroad
is to promote the efficiency of the MNE global or regional structure. The increase in
efficiency is achieved by adding scale for the purpose of achieving greater economies
that help to reduce production costs and enhance the efficiency of the division of labour
or the process of specialisation. Although it was relatively simple to collect demand-
and supply-side factors that may appeal to market-seeking and resource-seeking FDI
respectively, it was more problematic for efficiency-seeking FDI. On the one hand,
efficiency-seeking FDI takes advantage of differences in the availability and costs of
traditional factor endowments in different countries (Dunning, 1993) and in that re-
spect is seen as overlapping with the resource-seeking motive. On the other hand,
it exploits economies of scale and scope (Dunning, 1993), and occurs subsequent to
market- or resource-seeking motives (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 72). Reinvest-
ments can be measured in two ways: either a ‘broad’ based measure that includes both
expansions and co-locations or a ‘narrow’ measure that focuses on expansion projects
only. It is therefore possible to investigate the efficiency-seeking motive for FDI location
by examining the differences between ‘greenfield’ new investment and re-investment
projects.
It is also important to include in the analysis other control variables of FDI lo-
cation choice that have been dictated by the theoretical underpinnings of the spatial
choice literature. Specifically, to account for the institutional perspective on location
choice a set of macroeconomic variables are included that consist of openness to trade,
exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, a dummy variable for the Single currency, cor-
porate tax rates, EU Structural Funds and political risk. A set of industry variables
are also included to control for the positive and negative agglomeration externalities
identified by the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature (see: section 2.4 of Chap-
ter 2). These variables are based on an industry level and cover foreign and domestic
174
specialisation, Jacobs spillovers and the Herfindahl index. Again, these variables were
discussed in length in sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 of Chapter 4.
5.4 Motives for FDI Location: Econometric Framework
The conditional logit model is used to estimate the location choice of FDI (see: section
4.2.1 of Chapter 4) and is a technique that has been frequently used to study the de-
terminants of industrial location (see: section 2.6 of Chapter 2). The conditional logit
model is appropriate for a number of reasons. The model focuses on a single node of the
three-tiered hierarchy of ‘MNE/exporters/domestics’ decision-making process (Cieslik
and Ryan, 2009), and so is conditional on MNEs having already decided to invest in the
EU-25. It accounts for modelling the discrete choice nature of the location decisions of
MNEs (Crozet et al., 2004) and links the location choice of a profit-maximising firm to
the attributes of the locations.
In the conditional logit model, an individual firm chooses a single location j
from a set of of L different locations. For the location j to attract inward investment
at time t it must possess a set of attributes such that an investing firm i can accrue a
level of profits higher than profits that it would have derived from locating elsewhere:
piijt > piilt; ∀l 6= j. The profit function is decomposed into a deterministic part (Vijt),
which is assumed to depend linearly on the observable attributes of a location (Xijt),
and a stochastic part (ε ijt) that captures the investor-specific idiosyncrasies, unobserved
heterogeneity and a measurement error.7 Profit maximisation behaviour implies that
locating the production in location j generates the greatest profit for firm i among the
set of alternatives:
(5.1)
Pijt ≡ Pr(piijt>piilt) = Pr(Vijt + ε ijt > Vilt + ε ilt)
= Pr(βXijt + ε ijt > βXilt + ε ilt)
= Pr(βXijt − βXilt > ε ilt − ε ijt)
= Pr(β(Xijt − Xilt) > ε ilt − ε ijt), ∀l 6=j,
where β is the parameter associated with the location attributes X.
The conditional logit model is used to estimate the following baseline model
specification for the 25 countries of the EU over the period 1997 to 2010:
(5.2)yijt = β1Xjt−1 + β2EUjt + β3EUROjt + β4jcountryj + ε ijt,
where yijt is a binary dummy variable that captures the outcome choice for firm i in
country j at time t. The dependent variable equals one when location alternative j is
7Crozet et al. (2004) highlight that “while the real underlying profit yielded by alternative locations can-
not be observed, what is observed is the actual choice of each firm and the characteristics of the alternative
locations” (p. 31).
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chosen by investor i, and is zero otherwise. The right hand side variables Xjt−1 include
market- and resource-based controls that attempt to capture the market- and resource-
seeking location motives of inward FDI location, as well as the macroeconomic and in-
dustry controls, all of which vary by location alternative. The explanatory variables are
lagged one year to account for the possibility that a rational firm selecting a location
of its foreign affiliate at time t makes use of location-specific characteristics that were
known to it at time t − 1. However, the EU membership and Single currency dum-
mies are not lagged since EU/EMU membership is announced in advance and the full
benefits associated with membership are available to a firm only upon the EU acces-
sion/euro adoption and thereafter.8 To illustrate, if I was to expect the access to the
European Single Market to be an important motive for investment, I would expect a
surge in FDI to occur around the time of the EU accession and not before. Furthermore,
as EU accession and euro adoption are announced in advance, this gives a prospective
investor a chance to strategically time their entry. Country fixed effects countryj are
included in the model specification. The conditional logit model, where i = 35, 103 FDI
projects, j = 25 countries (EU-25) and t = 14 years from 1997 to 2010, gives n = 877, 575
observations across all projects and countries.
To allow for West-East heterogeneity the model can be extended whereby the
predictor variables are allowed to differ between the ‘old’ EU-15 (West) and ‘new’ EU-
10 (East) countries:
(5.3)yijt = β5East + β6West × β1Xjt−1 + β5East × β1Xjt−1
+ β2EUjt + β3EUROjt + β4jcountryj + ε ijt.
Model (5.3) is referred to as the West-East heterogeneity model and is used to deter-
mine if the motives for FDI location choice differ between the ‘old’ EU-15 and the ‘new’
EU-10 Member States. Essentially, this model introduces slope dummies for the West
and the East countries, i.e. interactions between West and East dummies and the ex-
planatory variables, and inform on whether an individual variable has a statistically
significant effect on FDI location in the West and in the East. Alongside the West-East
heterogeneity model, I also estimate the models that allow for the slopes on the predic-
tor variables to differ depending on the project type (project type heterogeneity) and
the origin of FDI (origin hetereogeneity). Furthermore, project-specific attributes are
explored further as I perform the estimations on the restricted samples.
As a final note, the major shortcoming of the conditional logit model and the ma-
jor counterargument against its use is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
8In the model (5.2) above, I draw the EU membership dummy (EUjt) and the Single currency dummy
(EUROjt) out of the vector of explanatory variables (Xjt−1) to emphasise that unlike the remaining right-
hand side variables, the EU membership and the Single currency dummies are not lagged one period.
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assumption, which must hold for the unbiased and consistent parameter estimates to
be produced (see: section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4). If there is suspected correlation across
locations that lead to the violation of the assumption of the error terms being inde-
pendent across both individual firms and spatial choices, the nested logit methodology
should be used instead of conditional logit. Admittedly, the estimation of a nested logit
model is computationally intensive and may be infeasible in this set-up.9 However, the
defence for using the conditional logit model is that the violation of the IIA assump-
tion becomes less likely when spatial choices are analysed at larger geographical units,
which is the case in this study, compared to when the location alternatives get smaller
in scale and the unobserved site characteristics are more likely to extend their influence
beyond the boundaries of the considered spatial units (Guimaraes et al., 2004).
5.5 Empirical Results
This section discusses the empirical results of the analysis. Initially, I analyse the loca-
tion attributes that attract and discourage inward FDI in the EU-25 (Table 5.4), before I
examine the differences in motives for FDI between the West and the East (Table 5.5).
Given that the motives for FDI may differ significantly between project types, I compare
new investment and re-investment projects to establish if the efficiency-seeking motive
is the primary driver of expansionary investment (Table 5.6). Subsequently, I analyse
the motives for FDI location in the EU-15 and EU-10 depending on the project type (Ta-
ble 5.7). Finally, I compare the motives for FDI that influence the investment decisions
of multinational firms from outside the EU-27 and from inside the EU-27 (Tables 5.8
and 5.9).
5.5.1 Location Choice Motives in the EU-25
To begin with the model is estimated on a full sample of countries and all FDI projects in
order to investigate the motives for FDI location choice across the EU-25. This is consid-
ered the base model and is estimated firstly without the country fixed effects (Table 5.4,
column (I)), but these are subsequently added in column (II). Including country fixed-
effects controls for the average differences across countries in any observable or unob-
servable predictors and so greatly reduces the threat of omitted variable bias. Therefore,
in all subsequent specifications country fixed effects are included in the econometric
model. Columns (III) and (IV) are variations of the base model and offer an insight into
the sensitivity and robustness of the base model results, where an interaction term of
9Considering the number of cases (35,103 FDI projects) and alternatives (25 EU Member States), the
estimation of nested logit model is computationally demanding.
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the peripherality index with the EU membership and East dummies is included in (III),
and the EU Single currency dummy is excluded in (IV).
The effect of the country fixed effects is investigated first by comparing the re-
sults in columns (I) and (II). It is evident that a large part of the market potential vari-
ables are affected by the inclusion of the country fixed effects both with respect to the
coefficient sign and statistical significance. I notice that the only market potential vari-
able that is not affected by the inclusion of the country fixed effects is the growth rate,
whose positive and statistically significant coefficient is consistent across both mod-
els. With regards to the remaining market potential variables, the results are mixed.
For example, the model without country fixed effects demonstrates that multinational
firms prefer markets close to the core but not necessarily within the EU Single Market,
however the model with fixed effects suggests that peripheral locations within the EU
Single Market are preferred. The size of the market, captured by internal market GDP,
has a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI location in column (I), but with
country fixed effects included (column (II)) the sign on the internal market GDP is neg-
ative. The reverse is observed for income per capita. Population density is negatively
signed in both models but it is statistically significant only in column (I).
Given these results, a further explanation is required with respect to the counter-
intuitive behaviour and signs on GDP, GDP per capita ( GDPPOP ) and population density
( POPkm2 ). Essentially, these three terms are potentially related, which therefore may con-
strain the estimates on these. To see this, these terms can be written as follows:
(a + b + c) ln GDP− (b + c) ln( GDP
POP
)− c ln( POP
km2
). (5.4)
Applying the logarithmic properties, the above can be rewritten as:
(a + b + c) ln GDP− (b + c)(ln GDP− ln POP)− c(ln POP− ln km2). (5.5)
Equation (5.5) simplifies further to:
a ln GDP + b ln POP + c ln km2. (5.6)
Given that GDP, POP and km2 all capture country size it is plausible that the estimates
on a, b and c are positive, which in equation (5.4) implies that the signs can be positive
(GDP), negative ( GDPPOP ) and negative (
POP
km2 ), and this is what is found when estimating
the model without country fixed effects in column (I). It gives some motivation for why
some signs can be counter-intuitive. Equation (5.6) is not regressed as these terms are
correlated and also difficult to interpret, while intuitive meaning can be given to the
terms in (5.4).
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Table 5.4: FDI location choice across the EU-25 countries
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Column: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Market potential variables
EU membership 0.028 0.259*** -0.380 0.264***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.408) (0.049)
Peripherality index 0.812*** -5.751*** -5.182*** -3.540**
(0.033) (1.493) (1.535) (1.413)
Peripherality index * EU * East - - 0.181 -
(0.115)
Internal market GDP 0.941*** -3.936*** -3.618** -3.404**
(0.019) (1.446) (1.459) (1.443)
Income per capita -0.317*** 2.590* 2.365* 2.181
(0.045) (1.415) (1.420) (1.413)
Population density -0.251*** -1.268 -1.754 -0.882
(0.017) (1.423) (1.455) (1.421)
Growth rate 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure -0.021 0.456*** 0.460*** 0.447***
(0.016) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Secondary education -0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education 0.016*** 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment rate -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Wage rate -0.289*** -0.622*** -0.787*** -0.879***
(0.039) (0.166) (0.197) (0.158)
Dummy: wage rate -0.365*** -10.888*** -11.513*** -10.783***
(0.087) (2.130) (2.163) (2.133)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate volatility -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002
Single currency -0.287*** 0.200*** 0.186*** -
(0.020) (0.043) (0.044)
Corporate tax rate -0.025*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EU Structural Funds -0.034*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.065***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Political risk -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Domestic specialisation 0.152*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Jacobs term 0.012 -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.083***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Herfindahl index -1.223*** -1.031*** -1.032*** -1.032***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.585*** 7.095** 6.813** 7.145**
(0.076) (3.477) (3.477) (3.481)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -1.620*** -1.381*** -1.383*** -1.383***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -90,322.7 -89,644.5 -89,643.2 -89,654.9
Wald statistic 36,007.3 38,044.7 38,044.7 38,015.9
N 877,575 877,575 877,575 877,575
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance
level
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Turning to the resource factors, the inclusion of the fixed effects again changes
the results, suggesting their inclusion is of importance with regards to omitted variable
bias. Focusing on the results with the fixed effects included (column (II)), the quality
of the physical infrastructure captured by the motorway density attracts FDI across
the EU-25, while for education there is evidence for the role of secondary education
but no compelling evidence for tertiary education. This suggests that in the EU-25
multinational firms seek a workforce with middle skills but are not interested in higher
skills. The two remaining variables in the resource category encompass unemployment
and wage rates. FDI avoids locations with high levels of unemployment, possibly as
such locations are considered to have a rigid labour market and poor quality workforce.
As expected, FDI is negatively influenced by labour costs, so that multinational firms
are interested in reducing their costs.
With regards to the macroeconomic factors, the model with fixed effects in col-
umn (II) does not show a relationship between trade and inward FDI, as the openness
to trade index is insignificant. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on
the exchange rate is consistent across columns (I) and (II) and demonstrates that the
probability of inward FDI is reduced when the domestic currency of a host economy
experiences a real appreciation. The real effective exchange rate appreciation implies a
loss in competitiveness and discourages FDI whenever the size of the operating costs
and willingness to re-export from a location are important considerations for an invest-
ing firm. There is however no significant effect, when fixed effects are included, for
exchange rate volatility. Columns (I) and (II) offer contradictory evidence on the role
of the EU Single currency, but when fixed effects are included the Single currency in-
creases the probability of inward FDI location. It may be more intuitive to expect that
the eurozone membership increases the probability of FDI location as investors may
want to benefit from the removal of transaction costs and the elimination of exchange
rate risks that are associated with the currency, so that the fixed effects model again
appears to be the better specification. The size of the corporate tax rate has a negative
effect on the probability of location, i.e. locations are preferred when the tax burden is
low. Negative effects are also found for the EU Structural Funds payments, showing
that EU regional policy fails to attract more FDI (although it is not an explicit objective
of the EU regional policy). Finally, the political risk index of a country does not affect
the location choices of multinational firms.
The industry variables generally have the expected signs, with positive ef-
fects found for foreign and domestic specialisation and a negative sign on the Jacobs
agglomeration term, demonstrating that FDI is higher for locations where multina-
tional firms can benefit from specialisation externalities of intra-industry agglomeration
(both agglomeration of foreign and domestic firms) and diversification externalities of
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inter-industry agglomeration. An industrial structure resembling that of a monopoly
(Herfindahl index closer to one) discourages FDI, so that market structure also affects
FDI location.
In column (III) an extra term is included, the interaction of the peripherality in-
dex with the EU membership and East dummies. This interaction term attempts to
measure how close to the core of the EU Single Market the multinational firms want to
locate in CEECs in the post-accession period. Given that the interaction term is statisti-
cally insignificant suggests that the multinational firms are indifferent between core and
peripheral locations in CEECs after the accession of these countries to the EU. Further-
more, the EU membership term becomes insignificant. Given that the EU membership
term is included in the construction of the interaction term suggests that the two terms
may be related and cannot be included in the regression model together. Although all
other results remain unaffected by the inclusion of the new interaction term, I choose
not to include it in the subsequent model specifications. Finally, in column (IV) the
EU Single currency dummy is dropped to check how if it may alter the effect of EU
membership on FDI location choice. However, the EU membership dummy remains
positive and statistically significant and in comparison with column (II), the results in
column (IV) are largely robust.
5.5.2 Location Choice Motives and the ‘West-East Divide’
In Table 5.4 it was assumed that the effect of each predictor variable (i.e. the slope co-
efficients) was identical across all countries. By allowing the slopes to differ between
the ‘old’ EU-15 countries and the ‘new’ EU-10 countries, the heterogeneity of the pref-
erences of investors locating in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ is investigated. In column (V) of
Table 5.5 slope dummies, i.e. interactions between West and East dummies and the key
predictor variables, are introduced and they inform on whether an individual variable
has a statistically significant effect on FDI location in the West and in the East. In ad-
dition, significance information in the square brackets in the table informs on whether
the effect is statistically different between the West and the East. These results can then
help establish whether there exists a ‘West-East divide’ in the location choice motives.
In addition to column (V), columns (VI) and (VII) respectively show the esti-
mation results for each of the restricted samples of the EU-15 and the EU-10 countries.
Columns (VI) and (VII) therefore show FDI location choice within the West and within
the East, i.e. location choice is made conditional on the multinational firm having al-
ready made a decision to invest in the West (column (VI)) or in the East (column (VII),
but it is not able to explain location ‘between’ the West and the East. In that respect,
the results of the base model estimation within the West and within the East are of no
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direct interest but are reported for completeness. However, in summary, the results of
the estimation within the West (column (VI)) and within the East (column (VII)) largely
‘agree’ with the West and East effects discussed below in column (V).
In column (V) the East intercept is included alongside the slope terms, and the
results show that the CEECs continue to be a relatively less attractive destination for in-
ward FDI compared to their EU-15 counterparts. Multinational investors continue to be
attracted to the EU Single Market.10 The negative sign on the peripherality index in the
West suggests that access to the market is unimportant for FDI in the West as periph-
eral locations are preferred, whereas for location in the East the positive sign suggests
access is important and it is consistent with the positive and significant parameter esti-
mate found for EU membership. The size of the internal market and income per capita
are not actors that motivate FDI location in the West, whereas in the East investors seek
to locate in the more prosperous markets, albeit the negative sign on the GDP term may
be an indication of the diminishing marginal returns to the internal market size. In both
the West and the East investors are attracted by locations with high growth potential.
For resource-seeking FDI, it is evident that the investors locating in the ‘old’
EU-15 have a clear preference for well-connected locations with good quality physical
infrastructure but that the infrastructure has no effect on location decisions in the ‘new’
EU-10. There is a marked difference in preferences of investors locating in the West
versus the East with respect to the education attainment and skills of the labour force.
Specifically, an increase in the education attainment of the working-age population, be
it secondary or tertiary education, motivates inward FDI location in the ‘old’ EU-15. In
the ‘new’ EU-10 education either discourages FDI (tertiary education) or is a factor of
no importance (secondary education). This implies that in the ‘new’ EU-10 skills are not
the resource that investing multinational firms are seeking for. This pattern of location
choice preferences of multinational firms in respect of education is indicative of the
‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking for higher skills in the West but possibly the ‘general-
asset’ resource-seeking in the East, where firms seek labour with lower qualifications.
The coefficient on unemployment rate is negative and statistically significant in the
West suggesting that unemployment is a signal of inflexible labour markets and a poor
quality workforce and so FDI avoids such locations, providing further support for the
‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking behaviour of firms in the West. Finally, wages do not
have a statistically significant effect on FDI location choice.
Turning to the macroeconomic variables, openness to trade does not influence
FDI location in the ‘old’ EU-15, but has a significant negative effect in the East so that
trade and inward FDI are substitutes in serving the local markets in the East. The
10It is not possible to allow the EU effect to differ between the West and the East as there is no variation
in EU membership status for the ‘old’ EU-15 members throughout the period 1997-2010.
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Table 5.5: West-East heterogeneity
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: Full West only East only
Column: (V) (VI) (VII)
West × var East × var
Market potential variables
East -41.622*** - -
(13.111)
EU membership 0.177*** - -0.068
(0.055) (0.076)
Peripherality index -3.658** 3.878*[***] -5.429*** 20.810***
(1.710) (2.098) (1.928) (5.211)
Internal market GDP 0.451 -7.574***[**] 1.684 -6.535***
(3.358) (1.971) (3.401) (2.058)
Income per capita -2.664 4.540**[*] -4.094 3.317*
(3.375) (1.796) (3.417) (1.909)
Population density -6.661** 1.650[**] -8.284** 5.817**
(3.215) (2.090) (3.256) (2.298)
Growth rate 0.020** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.019***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure 0.888*** 0.083[***] 0.946*** 0.017
(0.106) (0.112) (0.107) (0.135)
Secondary education 0.012*** -0.018[**] 0.010*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013)
Tertiary education 0.026*** -0.029**[***] 0.026*** -0.008
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014)
Unemployment rate -0.050*** 0.000[***] -0.057*** -0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Wage rate 0.405 -0.452[*] 0.561 -0.847**
(0.350) (0.306) (0.372) (0.335)
Dummy: wage rate 6.781 -6.226*** 12.599 -4.655
(11.658) (1.877) (11.796) (3.656)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade -0.001 -0.006***[**] -0.001 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exchange rate -0.009*** -0.018***[***] -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Exchange rate volatility -0.010*** 0.008**[***] -0.009** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Single currency 0.239*** 0.729***[***] 0.225*** 0.658***
(0.056) (0.117) (0.065) (0.120)
Corporate tax rate -0.006** -0.035***[***] -0.008*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
EU Structural Funds -0.043 -0.073*** -0.044 -0.030**
(0.029) (0.010) (0.030) (0.014)
Political risk 0.000 0.012* 0.003 0.016**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.085*** 0.011***[***] 0.092*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Domestic specialisation 0.177*** 0.115***[***] 0.160*** 0.091***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016)
Jacobs term -0.068*** -0.006[**] -0.033** -0.023
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.035)
Herfindahl index -0.916*** -0.996*** -0.690*** -0.714***
(0.037) (0.050) (0.040) (0.064)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania - 18.048*** - 25.408***
(4.617) (5.254)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -1.115*** -1.313***[***] -0.864*** -1.028***
(0.048) (0.057) (0.052) (0.076)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -89,443.5 -59,140.3 -13,537.2
Wald statistic 38,201.3 25,491.0 3,406.5
N 877,575 423,345 68,800
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance
level;
[***]/[**]/[*] coefficient significantly different at 1%/5%/10% significance level be-
tween West and East
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variability of the real exchange rate has an opposite effect on location choice in the
‘old’ versus the ‘new’ Member States of the EU as it deters FDI in the West but attracts
investors to the East. This may appear counter-intuitive at first, however it provides
further support for the trade-FDI substitute hypothesis in the sense that a less volatile
exchange rate may encourage firms to serve the markets of CEECs by cross-border trade
instead of FDI, thus reducing the inflows of inward FDI to the East. The effect of the
EU regional policy also differs between West and East, with location choices in the ‘old’
EU-15 not affected by EU Structural Funds, while in the East EU support is associated
with less attractive locations. The political risk rating of a country does not alter FDI
location choice in the West, while an improvement in the rating in the East increases the
probability of inward FDI. For the remaining macroeconomic factors, their effect on FDI
location choice is similar in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States, but the magnitude of
the effect differs (it is significantly greater in the East). The exchange rate appreciation
continues to deter FDI location, while the EU Single currency motivates multinational
firms to invest. Firms are discouraged by high level of corporate tax rate.
Finally, turning to the industry variables, foreign and domestic specialisation
externalities attract FDI in both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU, but the magnitude of this effect
is significantly stronger in the West. The difference in FDI location motives between
West and East is noticeable in the preferences towards inter-industry agglomeration, as
in the West diversified industries is a factor that attracts inward investment but it is not
important in the East. Again, the presence of a concentrated market structure reduces
the probability of FDI location in both the EU-15 and the EU-10.
In summary, the findings of this section provide evidence that investment in the
EU-15 is predominantly ‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking as investors are attracted to
locations with an educated workforce, low unemployment, good physical infrastruc-
ture and are not discouraged by wage demands of the labour force. By contrast, the
market-seeking motive appears to attract inward investment to the ‘new’ EU Member
States, as multinational firms choose to invest in the densely populated and rich core
markets of the CEECs. Moreover, it is possible that the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking
attracts FDI to CEECs where the multinational firms avoid locations where workers
are highly-skilled. However, it is not possible to establish which of these motives (the
market-seeking or the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking) matters more for multinational
firms that invest in CEECs.
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5.5.3 Location Choice Motives and Project-Type Heterogeneity: ‘Efficiency-
Seeking’ FDI
All of the results discussed so far focus on the relative importance of market access and
resource seeking motives but not the efficiency-seeking motive given that new invest-
ment projects are grouped together with the re-investments. In this section the possibil-
ity that location choice motives are fundamentally different between new investment
and re-investment projects is explored to determine whether the re-investments are
due to efficiency-seeking motives, i.e. adding scale for the purpose of achieving greater
economies. A key argument here is that if they were motivated by exploiting economies
of scale then it would be expected to find that market-based and resource-based loca-
tion factors are the same for both types of projects, considering that a random draw
of projects chooses to re-invest. If the factors differ between the types of projects then
it would imply that the firms are re-investing for other reasons than exploiting these
economies.
As shown in Table 5.2, the dataset distinguishes between three different project
types: new investments, expansions and co-locations. For the purpose of this analy-
sis two separate definitions of re-investments are considered. The first definition is a
‘broad’ one, whereby the expansions and new co-locations are grouped together. The
second definition is a more ‘narrow’ one, where expansions but not co-locations are con-
sidered as re-investments. The difference between these two project types is that while
expansions are defined as increases in capacity of existing functions at their present
location, co-locations involve new functions that are co-located at or near an existing
activity.
The results of location choice allowing for project type heterogeneity is given in
Table 5.6. These results are obtained from the full sample of FDI projects and allow for
the slope coefficient on the predictor variables to differ between project types through
interacting the variables with the project type dummies. To begin with, the model is
estimated where the motives for FDI are contrasted between new investments and the
‘broad’ measure of re-investments (column (VIII)). Subsequently, the definition is nar-
rowed down to include only expansion projects and these are contrasted with the new
investments and co-locations in column (IX), but the main focus is on predominantly
column (VIII). Table 5.6 reveals if there is a statistically significant effect for a respective
project type and the square brackets show whether the effect is statistically different
between project types. Although the motives for FDI differ between types of projects in
Table 5.6, there is no allowance for the motives to differ between West and East so that
the results in Table 5.6 show an overall effect for the EU-25.
Within the market potential variables, the results in Table 5.6 indicate a different
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Table 5.6: Project type heterogeneity
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: Full Full
Column: (VIII) (IX)
A × var (B ∪ C) × var (A ∪ C) × var B × var
Market potential variables
EU membership 0.188*** 0.449***[***] 0.234*** 0.347***
(0.057) (0.083) (0.054) (0.099)
Peripherality index -5.019*** -4.235***[***] -5.869*** -4.687***[***]
(1.497) (1.499) (1.498) (1.500)
Internal market GDP -3.624** -3.587** -4.193*** -4.090***[**]
(1.449) (1.449) (1.450) (1.450)
Income per capita 2.227 2.362* 2.847** 2.777*
(1.418) (1.420) (1.419) (1.424)
Population density -1.160 -1.379[***] -0.880 -1.179[***]
(1.423) (1.423) (1.424) (1.424)
Growth rate 0.029*** 0.006[***] 0.028*** -0.002[***]
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure 0.472*** 0.407***[*] 0.486*** 0.338***[***]
(0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.068)
Secondary education 0.017*** 0.001[***] 0.017*** -0.008**[***]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education 0.010** -0.002[***] 0.009** -0.009*[***]
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Unemployment rate -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.010** -0.024***[**]
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Wage rate -0.630*** -0.850***[**] -0.651*** -0.811***
(0.169) (0.180) (0.168) (0.189)
Dummy: wage rate -10.364*** -11.371***[***] -11.321*** -12.312***[***]
(2.136) (2.142) (2.136) (2.151)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exchange rate volatility -0.004 -0.000 -0.005** 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Single currency 0.150*** 0.277***[***] 0.174*** 0.236***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.055)
Corporate tax rate -0.007*** -0.016***[***] -0.008*** -0.018***[***]
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
EU Structural Funds -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.036**[***]
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014)
Country risk 0.003 -0.017***[***] -0.000 -0.013***[***]
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.011*** 0.074***[***] 0.011*** 0.102***[***]
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Domestic specialisation 0.128*** 0.174***[***] 0.132*** 0.180***[***]
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
Jacobs term -0.085*** -0.053***[*] -0.085*** -0.051***[*]
(0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019)
Herfindahl index -0.894*** -1.141***[***] -0.955*** -1.011***
(0.037) (0.058) (0.035) (0.065)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 6.746* 7.605**[***] 7.702** 8.532**[***]
(3.482) (3.486) (3.485) (3.494)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -1.220*** -1.507***[***] -1.300*** -1.305***
(0.046) (0.077) (0.044) (0.087)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -89,260.1 -89,126.5
Wald statistic 38,371.3 38,364.6
N 877,575 877,575
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level;
[***]/[**]/[*] coefficient significantly different at 1%/5%/10% significance level between
project types;
A - captures new investment; B - captures expansions; C - captures co-locations
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effect of the growth of host economies on the probability of new investment location
and re-investment. While new investment is motivated by higher growth rates, it is
a factor of no significance in the case of re-investments. Furthermore, column (VIII)
shows that while expansions and co-locations are motivated by rich markets, new in-
vestments do not attach any importance to income per capita.
In the resource variables category, there is a marked difference between new in-
vestment projects and re-investments in their attitude towards education and skills of
the workforce. Multinational firms establishing new investment facilities in the EU-25
seek skilled workers, but in the case of re-investments the investors are either indif-
ferent towards skills (‘broad’ definition in column (VIII)) or are discouraged from re-
investing further if the education level of the labour force is high (‘narrow’ definition
in column (IX)).
There is also heterogeneity between project types in their attitude towards the
behaviour of the exchange rate. In essence, new investments are deterred by an ap-
preciating exchange rate, a factor to which re-investments do not attach importance.
The volatility of the exchange rate is insignificant when new investment is compared
with ‘broad’ re-investments in column (VIII). However, for the ‘narrow’ definition, the
volatility of the exchange rate has a negative effect on the probability of new invest-
ment and new co-location, but not ‘narrow’ re-investments. Finally, the political risk
of a country discourages re-investments from taking place but it does not deter new
investment in the first place.
For the last group of variables, the industry factors, the sign and significance
of the industry variables are similar between the two types of investments. However,
Table 5.6 shows that there are significant differences in the magnitude of these effects
in all of the industry variables in column (VIII). In particular, greater significance is
attached to the intra-industry agglomeration variables for the re-investment projects,
suggesting that these projects place more importance on, or are better able to capture,
these spillover effects. This in turn suggests that if the re-investment projects have
efficiency-seeking motives in terms of capturing economies of scale, these are external
economies to the location and not internal economies to the firm.
Importantly, the information in the square brackets demonstrate that the statis-
tically significant differences exist between project types. Although some of the vari-
ables have the identical parameter sign and are statistically significant across different
project types, square brackets signal that their effect is significantly different in terms
of magnitude. In column (VIII) this applies to the EU membership, peripherality index,
physical infrastructure, wage rate, the Single currency, corporate tax rate, and as indi-
cated above, all controls included in the industry group. On the whole, these results
recognise that re-investments are different in nature to new investment, and subject to
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market- and resource-seeking motives.
In summary, the estimation results in Table 5.6 show that there are significant
differences between the determinants of FDI location choice of new investment and
re-investment projects, suggesting that motives other than internal economies of scale
are important for re-investments. However, there is also indication that intra-industry
spillover effects are of relatively greater importance to re-investment FDI so providing
some support for external economies of scale being a motive for these projects. How-
ever, the results in Table 5.5 in the previous section demonstrated that the motives for
FDI differ between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States, so that this possibility is
examined in the context of different project types in the next section.
5.5.4 Location Choice Motives by Project Type and ‘West-East’ Divide
The empirical evidence presented in the preceding sections established that motives
for FDI differ between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU countries, as well as between new and re-
investments. In this section the above two types of heterogeneity are combined to allow
an examination of the degree to which market access and resource factors affect new
and re-investment projects in the EU-15 and EU-10, with the results given in Table 5.7.
The model interacts dummy variables for the West and the East on the slope coefficients
for the predictor variables and is run separately for new investments only (in column
(X)), ‘broad’ re-investments only (in column (XI)) and ‘narrow’ re-investments only (in
column (XII)). The main focus however is on predominantly columns (X) and (XI).
Examining the market potential variables it can be seen that access to the EU
motivates re-investments but does not stimulate new FDI. This is surprising at first but
an explanation of this may be that with new investments, multinational firms are will-
ing to take more risks in order to gain access to the new markets, and not necessarily
those within the EU Single Market. For the re-investments, a decision to expand the ex-
isting activity will follow the successful economic performance of a foreign subsidiary.
It is possible that the EU Single Market creates an economic environment conducive to
firms’ growth and new job creation, and therefore, is associated with the higher proba-
bility of re-investments.
Continuing with the market potential variables, column (X) shows that none of
the market access factors positively and significantly affect new investment location in
the West, and that new investment in the West displays a preference to locate in the
periphery, away from the main markets. Re-investments in the West do not reveal a
preference for either the core or the periphery but they are attracted by the markets
that grow faster. The re-investments in the West are also deterred by congestion as
shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on population density.
188
Table 5.7: Results by project type with West-East heterogeneity
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: New investment Expansions and Expansionsco-locations
Column: (X) (XI) (XII)
West × var East × var West × var East × var West × var East × var
Market potential variables
East -26.839* -71.853*** -92.516***
(16.215) (22.889) (27.078)
EU membership 0.076 0.411*** 0.396***
(0.066) (0.101) (0.120)
Peripherality index -4.657** 1.040[***] 3.915 13.787***[***] 3.681 14.598***[***]
(2.095) (2.567) (3.057) (3.749) (3.564) (4.403)
Internal market GDP 0.063 -8.848***[*] 5.407 -4.607 0.164 -6.631
(4.207) (2.365) (5.630) (3.681) (6.549) (4.340)
Income per capita -3.019 5.518***[*] -5.888 2.439 -0.815 4.442
(4.227) (2.139) (5.670) (3.446) (6.596) (4.083)
Population density -5.375 0.269 -12.099** 4.003[**] -9.031 9.419**[**]
(4.034) (2.523) (5.363) (3.896) (6.257) (4.558)
Growth rate 0.010 0.034***[**] 0.050*** 0.012[**] 0.066*** -0.008[***]
(0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure 0.838*** 0.172[***] 1.018*** -0.130[***] 1.027*** 0.132[***]
(0.136) (0.133) (0.170) (0.212) (0.193) (0.251)
Secondary education 0.018*** -0.008[*] 0.004 -0.028 -0.002 -0.035
(0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.027)
Tertiary education 0.013 -0.015 0.071*** -0.042*[***] 0.060*** -0.050*[***]
(0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.030)
Unemployment rate -0.069*** -0.000[***] -0.019* 0.005 -0.035*** -0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Wage rate -0.120 -1.066***[*] 1.128* 0.631 2.283*** -0.086[**]
(0.432) (0.375) (0.612) (0.554) (0.712) (0.671)
Dummy: wage rate 4.787 -9.441*** 20.495 2.203 6.859 -0.822
(14.583) (2.242) (19.598) (3.619) (22.829) (4.293)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade 0.000 -0.005**[*] -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Exchange rate -0.009*** -0.018***[**] -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.007* -0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Exchange rate volatility -0.015*** 0.014***[***] 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Single currency 0.166** 0.636***[***] 0.348*** 0.795***[**] 0.496*** 0.699***
(0.071) (0.150) (0.095) (0.193) (0.113) (0.222)
Corporate tax rate -0.004 -0.034***[***] -0.006 -0.037***[***] -0.008 -0.041***[***]
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
EU Structural Funds -0.039 -0.042*** -0.022 -0.123***[*] -0.078 -0.112***
(0.034) (0.013) (0.054) (0.019) (0.061) (0.022)
Political risk 0.003 0.012 -0.006 0.010 -0.009 0.019[*]
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.070*** 0.009***[***] 0.140*** 0.056***[***] 0.187*** 0.087***[***]
(0.006) (0.002) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Domestic specialisation 0.171*** 0.107***[***] 0.202*** 0.137***[***] 0.199*** 0.146***[**]
(0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
Jacobs term -0.047*** -0.036 -0.103*** 0.029[***] -0.095*** -0.014[*]
(0.016) (0.032) (0.025) (0.039) (0.027) (0.044)
Herfindahl index -0.802*** -0.911*** -0.933*** -1.130***[*] -0.824*** -0.853***
(0.044) (0.061) (0.070) (0.093) (0.080) (0.106)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania - 19.260*** - 17.518** - 24.058**
(5.529) (8.694) (10.266)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -0.968*** -1.266***[***] -1.246*** -1.335*** -1.002*** -1.079***
(0.057) (0.066) (0.095) (0.118) (0.108) (0.138)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -60,409.3 -28,491.2 -22,087.4
Wald statistic 24,577.0 13,742.6 11,890.0
N 583,075 294,500 235,550
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level;
[***]/[**]/[*] coefficient significantly different at 1%/5%/10% significance level between West and East
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The behaviour of the new investments locating in the East is different, as it is motivated
by higher per capita income and growth rates, while for the re-investments in the East
a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the peripherality index suggests
that the probability of re-investment in the East increases in the markets closer to the
core. This may again be a result of a business environment that is more conducive to
firms’ growth so that in the case of ‘new’ EU-10 Member States it exists only in the core
markets with low transport costs.
Considering the resource-seeking motives, both new investments and re-
investments reveal their appreciation of a well-developed physical infrastructure in the
West. The skills and education of the workers are valued highly in the EU-15, but while
the middle range of skills captured by secondary education are sought to be utilised in
the new investment projects, the higher skills are more important for re-investments.
In the West, new investments and re-investments are both found to avoid areas with
high unemployment, as this may be where skills of the workforce are poor. In the ‘new’
EU-10, unlike in the West, physical infrastructure is not sufficient to attract new FDI or
encourage re-investment. The role of education in attracting new investment in the East
is also not statistically significant, but tertiary education discourages re-investments. Fi-
nally, higher wage rates in the East deter new inward FDI. These results suggest that
the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking is a motive for new investment in the ‘new’ EU-10,
given that cheap labour is sought by the new investments, whereas reduced probabil-
ity of re-investment in the locations with highly skilled labour may be indicative of the
same motive.
The remaining macroeconomic and industry controls are on the whole signifi-
cant across the West and East for different project types. The Single currency motivates
inward FDI, regardless of whether it is a new or re-investment, while the tendency of
the exchange rate to appreciate is a deterrent of FDI. Exchange rate volatility has a neg-
ative effect on new investment in both ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States, but does
not affect the probability of expansions. Corporate tax rates and EU Structural Funds
have a significant and negative effect on the probability of new investment location and
re-investment in the East, but this effect is not detected in the West. This ‘West-East di-
vide’ in the adverse effect of taxes was not evident when the analysis was conducted
on a full sample and did not account for the heterogeneity in the project type (Table
5.5). The coefficients on the industry variables demonstrate that foreign and domestic
specialisation externalities, as well as industrial concentration, affect new investment
and expansion projects across both the West and the East. The positive effect of spe-
cialisation externalities is significantly stronger in the West but the negative effect of
industrial concentration is stronger in the East. Inter-industry agglomeration, captured
by the Jacobs term, is negative and statistically significant for the West only for both
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project types suggesting that industrial diversity is more important for FDI location
choice in the West.
Finally, the results can be examined in terms of the efficiency-seeking motive
for FDI location in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU. Assuming that re-investments are a random
sample of the new investment projects that were carried out at an earlier stage, then if
exploiting economies of scale is the sole motive for expansions then there would be no
difference in the market- and resource-seeking motives between a sample of new and
re-investment projects. At first inspection it is evident that differences exist between the
new investment and expansion projects. In particular, while new investment projects
in the West do not display any market-seeking tendency, re-investments in the West
prefer markets that grow faster. Likewise, re-investment projects in the East have a
strong preference to locate in the central markets, which is unlike the new investment
that is indifferent between the core and periphery but prefers rich and fast growing
markets. Similarly, the resource-motives do not uniformly affect choices of the new and
re-investments in the West and East. Overall, this suggests that expansions are quite
different in nature to new investments, so that they are not simply about adding scale
to existing operations for the purpose of achieving greater economies to scale. While
greater economies of scale or scope may be a consequence of these expansions, the
results of this analysis suggests that they are also subject to market-access and resource-
seeking motives.
In summary, these results give a basis to argue that the market-seeking motive
is more important for new investment projects setting up their production facilities in
the ‘new’ EU-10 countries rather than the ‘old’ EU-15. Market access is also an impor-
tant motive for re-investments in the East, where the probability of re-investment is
higher in the core locations. The ‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking motive tends to drive
the behaviour of new and re-investment projects in the EU-15, where depending on the
project type the workers with middle and higher skills are sought by the multinational
firms. In the East the inexpensive unskilled or semi-skilled workers are sought, sug-
gesting that the motive for investment is the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking. Finally,
motives other than efficiency-seeking through economies of scale drive the behaviour
of expansionary investment in both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ EU.
5.5.5 Location Choice Motives: Outside and Inside EU-27 FDI
The location strategies and motives for FDI location in the EU-25 are likely to differ
between the multinational firms from outside the EU and the firms that are already es-
tablished in the EU. As discussed in section 5.2, the multinational firms from outside of
the EU are faced with more significant information asymmetries. Furthermore, while
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multinational firms from outside of the EU may want to gain access to the EU Single
Market rather than just the national market of the individual host economy, by defi-
nition the firms from inside the EU are interested in accessing the national markets in
other countries seeing that they have already an access to the EU Single Market. The
aim of this section is to explore these differences in location strategies between intra-
EU and inter-EU FDI empirically.11 The weakness of this analysis is that in the situation
when an investor from outside the EU-27 chooses to shut down a plant in one EU-25
country and re-open in another EU-25 country, it appears that the investment originates
from outside the EU-27 but in practice it is really a re-location of investment within the
EU-25. However, the FDI data does not record re-locations of existing projects so I
cannot distinguish between ‘true’ FDI originating from outside the EU-27 and the re-
locations within the EU-25.
To analyse the preferences of investors from outside and inside of the EU further,
I estimate the baseline regression model on the restricted samples of outside EU-27 FDI
(column (XIII)) and inside EU-27 FDI (column (XIV)), where the latter includes outward
FDI from Cyprus and Malta. Later, I estimate the baseline regression model on a full
sample but allow for the slope on the predictor variables to differ between outside
EU FDI and inside EU FDI (model with origin region heterogeneity in column (XV)).
Finally, I also allow for the motives for inward investment location to differ between
‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10 (West-East heterogeneity) as I re-estimate the model on the
restricted samples of outside EU-27 FDI (column (XVI)) and inside EU-27 FDI (column
(XVII)).
The estimation results for the restricted samples of outside and inside EU-27
FDI are given in Table 5.8 (columns (XIII) and (XIV) respectively). They show that ac-
cess to the EU Single Market is important for both as the EU membership of the host
economies is associated with a higher likelihood of inward FDI location. Both types
also prefer the peripheral locations of the EU-25 and the economies that grow faster but
their preferences differ in respect of the internal market GDP, income per capita and
population density. On the one hand, the investment from outside the EU-27 tends to
locate in less densely populated markets but it does not have defined preferences as to
the size of the national market and the mean income as demonstrated by the insignif-
icant coefficients on internal market GDP and income per capita. On the other hand,
the inward investment originating from inside the EU-27 gravitates towards relatively
smaller but wealthier host economies but is indifferent between densely and sparsely
populated markets.
11For the purpose of the analysis intra EU-27 includes those projects with ‘mixed’ partners (at least one
parent company from the EU-27, and at least one parent company from outside of the EU-27) because of
the information advantages of the EU partner.
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Table 5.8: Results by origin region
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: outside EU-27 inside EU-27 Full
Column: (XIII) (XIV) (XV)
D × var E × var
Market potential variables
EU membership 0.173** 0.289*** 0.081 0.344***[***]
(0.082) (0.062) (0.079) (0.060)
Peripherality index -7.707*** -6.007*** -6.823*** -6.468***[***]
(2.180) (2.108) (1.503) (1.503)
Internal market GDP -1.451 -5.437*** -3.968*** -4.164***[***]
(2.481) (1.809) (1.452) (1.453)
Income per capita 0.432 3.791** 3.410** 2.468*[***]
(2.451) (1.755) (1.424) (1.421)
Population density -4.291* -0.410 -1.191 -1.722[***]
(2.481) (1.751) (1.428) (1.428)
Growth rate 0.033*** 0.013** 0.032*** 0.014***[**]
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure 0.550*** 0.385*** 0.326*** 0.551***[***]
(0.096) (0.081) (0.065) (0.063)
Secondary education 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.003[***]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education 0.010 -0.000 0.024*** -0.016***[***]
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployment rate -0.008 -0.016*** -0.005 -0.016***[*]
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Wage rate -0.568** -0.624*** -0.898*** -0.513***[***]
(0.270) (0.219) (0.176) (0.171)
Dummy: wage rate -7.294** -13.212*** -11.554*** -11.106***[**]
(3.656) (2.650) (2.144) (2.133)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade -0.003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003**[***]
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate -0.003** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate volatility -0.007** 0.003 -0.008** 0.002[**]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Single currency 0.216*** 0.229*** 0.103** 0.303***[***]
(0.063) (0.062) (0.049) (0.048)
Corporate tax rate -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.005**[***]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
EU Structural Funds -0.057*** -0.077*** -0.043*** -0.087***[***]
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Political risk 0.000 -0.007* 0.006* -0.013***[***]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Domestic specialisation 0.153*** 0.118*** 0.150*** 0.117***[**]
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Jacobs term -0.089*** -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.100***[**]
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Herfindahl index -0.946*** -1.012*** -0.983*** -0.988***
(0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.472 9.943** 7.366** 6.680*
(6.006) (4.337) (3.501) (3.496)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -1.345*** -1.360*** -1.388*** -1.330***
(0.061) (0.052) (0.060) (0.051)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -43,730.2 -44,385.1 -88,204.3
Wald statistic 25,589.2 13,523.6 38,843.3
N 469,350 408,225 877,575
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level;
[***]/[**]/[*] coefficient significantly different at 1%/5%/10% significance level between
West and East;
D - captures outside EU-27 FDI; E - captures inside EU-27 FDI
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On the resource-driven determinants, the preferences of the intra-EU and inter-
EU investment are similar. Firstly, more developed physical infrastructure attracts in-
ward FDI, both from outside EU and inside EU. Both types of investors are attracted by
middle range skills, as demonstrated by the positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient on secondary education, but are neutral with respect to higher range skills as the
coefficient on tertiary education is insignificant. The difference between the investors
from outside EU-27 and inside EU-27 is noticed in the effect that unemployment has
on the probability of inward FDI location. Specifically, the multinational firms from
inside the EU tend to locate where unemployment is lower. Furthermore, both types of
multinational firms favour locations where wages are lower.
On the remaining controls of macroeconomic and industry groups, the signs and
statistical significance of the parameter estimates are similar across the two samples.
Among those macroeconomic factors whose effect does not change across the samples
are the exchange rate (the appreciation of the domestic currency of the host economy
deters FDI), the Single currency (the Single currency is a factor that attracts FDI), the
corporate tax rate (higher rates discourage FDI) and EU Structural Funds (the investors
avoid those countries that receive substantial support under the EU regional policy).
The effect of the openness to trade, exchange rate volatility and political risk differ
across the samples. Greater openness to trade of a host economy is associated with
reduced investment from outside the EU, but it does not influence FDI from the EU-27.
The same applies to the more volatile exchange rates. The political risk rating of a host
country is not a motive for FDI from outside the EU, but a lower rating attracts FDI
from inside the EU. Finally, both types of investors gravitate towards those countries
where intra-industry agglomeration (agglomeration of foreign and domestic firms) and
inter-industry agglomeration are strong, but avoid countries where monopolies prevail
as the main competitors.
Column (XV) allows the slope coefficients on the predictor variables to differ
between outside and inside EU FDI, i.e. introduces the origin-region heterogeneity in
the model and uses the full sample, and although the results are broadly similar to
those in columns (XIII) and (XIV), there are some differences. These differences are
most pronounced for the market potential variables and their effect on inward FDI
from outside the EU-27. Most importantly, the model with origin-region heterogeneity
suggests that the EU Single Market access is not a motive for inward FDI from outside
the EU-27, which appeared to be a significant location-pull factor in column (XIII). The
market access preferences of the multinational firms from outside the EU-27 start to
resemble more the preferences of the EU-based firms as the internal market GDP is
negative and significant, income per capita is positive and significant, and population
density is statistically insignificant. Higher growth rates continue to attract inward FDI
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from both outside and inside the EU-27 to the faster-growing host economies, in line
with columns (XIII) and (XIV).
The full sample results of column (XV) reveal a substantial difference between
FDI from outside and inside the EU-27 with respect to the effect of education. Essen-
tially, the former type is attracted to the EU-25 Member States by skills, as captured
by the positive and statistically significant parameter sign on secondary and tertiary
education. By contrast, the inward FDI originating from inside the EU-27 is neutral
with respect to middle skills (secondary education is insignificant), but it avoids those
markets where higher skills among workforce dominate. However, multinational firms
from outside the EU-27 and from inside the EU-27 avoid those markets within the EU-
25 where labour costs are relatively high. The remaining differences between columns
(XIII) and (XIV) on the one hand, and column (XV) on the other hand, include the pref-
erence of multinational firms from outside the EU-27 to locate in host countries that are
politically more stable, but indifferent between more and less open economies. The less
open economies are favoured by the multinational firms from inside the EU-27.
Although insightful and informative on the motives for FDI location in the EU-
25, the results presented so far in this section show the combined West-East effect and
conceal any differences in the motives that both types of multinational firms have when
investing in the ‘old’ EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10. The model estimated on the restricted
samples of outside and inside EU-27 FDI is re-estimated again but with West-East het-
erogeneity introduced by allowing the slopes on the predictor variables to vary. The
results are presented in Table 5.9 for outside EU-27 in column (XVI) and inside EU-
27 FDI in column (XVII). Importantly, the multinational firms from outside the EU-27
are indifferent between the ‘old’ EU-15 members and CEECs as the East dummy that
captures the overall preference to locate in the CEECs is insignificant. This is counter
to expectations considering a large proportion of these investments locate in the ‘old’
EU-15, as demonstrated in Table 5.3 of section 5.2. Furthermore, the insignificant EU
membership dummy shows that the access to the EU Single Market is not sufficient to
attract the investors from outside the EU-27. A positive and significant EU member-
ship dummy suggests that the CEECs benefited from the accession to the EU, as the
probability of inward FDI from inside the EU-27 increases with EU membership.
There is little evidence that market access motivates the inward investment from
outside the EU-27 as most market potential variables are either insignificant or have
wrong signs. Although as expected, the growth rate encourages investment in both EU-
15 and EU-10, the multinational firms from outside the EU-27 are indifferent between
markets of different sizes and different mean income. These investors tend to locate
in the periphery of the EU-15 (indifferent between core and periphery of CEECs) and
avoid densely populated areas of the EU-10 (indifferent in the EU-15). For the multi-
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Table 5.9: Results by origin region with West-East heterogeneity
Dependent variable: location choice
Sample: outside EU-27 inside EU-27
Column: (XVI) (XVII)
West × var East × var West × var East × var
Market potential variables
East 21.103 -75.586***
(21.833) (16.738)
EU membership 0.131 0.183***
(0.096) (0.069)
Peripherality index -7.376*** -0.886[***] -1.739 6.028**[***]
(2.474) (3.216) (2.419) (2.870)
Internal market GDP -5.116 -4.030 2.854 -8.917***[**]
(5.060) (3.606) (4.610) (2.370)
Income per capita 3.062 1.591 -5.228 5.574***[**]
(5.094) (3.270) (4.624) (2.166)
Population density -0.733 -8.380** -9.948** 6.262**[***]
(4.945) (3.684) (4.320) (2.573)
Growth rate 0.046*** 0.035*** -0.009 0.016**[*]
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007)
Resource variables
Physical infrastructure 0.940*** 0.070[***] 0.787*** 0.067[***]
(0.145) (0.201) (0.157) (0.137)
Secondary education 0.013*** -0.036*[**] 0.012** -0.006
(0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.015)
Tertiary education 0.026*** -0.047**[***] 0.025** -0.017[**]
(0.010) (0.023) (0.011) (0.016)
Unemployment rate -0.042*** -0.003[**] -0.057*** -0.000[***]
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Wage rate 0.748 -0.228 0.004 -0.520
(0.486) (0.554) (0.526) (0.370)
Dummy: wage rate -9.629 -5.803* 13.312 -6.061***
(17.619) (3.279) (15.943) (2.348)
Macroeconomic variables
Openness to trade -0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.006***[***]
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Exchange rate -0.009*** -0.019***[**] -0.011*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Exchange rate volatility -0.013*** 0.014**[***] -0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Single currency 0.276*** 0.755***[**] 0.224*** 0.711***[***]
(0.077) (0.205) (0.082) (0.144)
Corporate tax rate -0.009** -0.036***[***] -0.003 -0.035***[***]
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
EU Structural Funds -0.021 -0.065*** -0.065 -0.081***
(0.038) (0.018) (0.044) (0.013)
Political risk 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 0.021**[***]
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008)
Industry variables
Foreign specialisation 0.087*** 0.012***[***] 0.076*** 0.010***[***]
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Domestic specialisation 0.168*** 0.130***[**] 0.133*** 0.113***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013)
Jacobs term -0.078*** 0.010[**] -0.063*** -0.006[*]
(0.019) (0.040) (0.019) (0.032)
Herfindahl index -0.749*** -1.160***[***] -0.955*** -0.929***
(0.053) (0.087) (0.053) (0.062)
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania - 6.576 - 22.538***
(8.386) (5.592)
Dummy: Herfindahl index -0.991*** -1.484***[***] -1.178*** -1.256***
(0.073) (0.102) (0.066) (0.069)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -43,635.2 -44,281.4
Wald statistic 25,569.8 13,633.3
N 469,350 408,225
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level;
[***]/[**]/[*] coefficient significantly different at 1%/5%/10% significance level between
West and East
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national firms originating from the EU-27, the market access motive is not evident for
the inward investment in the West, but the motive appears to be market-seeking when
investing in the East. In particular, these firms are attracted to the core areas within
CEECs and those relatively smaller, richer, more densely populated and faster growing
economies are preferred.
The ‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking tendencies exert a strong influence on the
location behaviour of multinational firms that invest in the West, and this applies to
both firms from outside and inside the EU-27. The multinational firms choose those
host economies in the West that possess better physical infrastructure and labour force
with better skills (both middle secondary and higher tertiary skills). The unemploy-
ment acts as a deterrent to inward investment in the West due to its detrimental effect
on the skills of the labour force. Wages are not statistically significant, meaning that in
search of skills firms are not discouraged from paying a wage premium to the workers.
The resource-seeking motive does not influence the location strategies of multinational
firms from the EU-27 investing in the East as none of the resource variables is statisti-
cally significant. Those direct investors from outside the EU-27 appear to be motivated
by the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking as the negative and statistically significant pa-
rameter estimates on the secondary and tertiary education demonstrate that they seek
unskilled labour inputs in CEECs.
The other macroeconomic and industry variables are generally consistent across
the two samples, and across the West and East. Those variables that change sign or
become statistically insignificant include the exchange rate volatility, which is negative
for the FDI from outside the EU-27 in the West, positive for the FDI from outside the
EU-27 in the East, and statistically insignificant for the investment from the EU-27. The
corporate tax rate, which tends to have a detrimental effect on inward FDI, does not
affect the probability of the investment from inside the EU-27 in the West. The size
of the EU Structural Funds payments does not affect the investment in the West but
discourages the inward FDI to CEECs. The openness to trade and the political risk are
mostly insignificant, although FDI from inside EU-27 prefers to locate in those CEECs
that are less open to trade and more politically stable. Finally, as discovered in the other
models with West-East heterogeneity, the inter-industry agglomeration of Jacobs is not
a motive for investment in the East.
In summary, the multinational firms from outside of the EU-27 are not market-
seeking but display a ‘specific-asset’ and ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking behaviour as
they invest in the ‘old’ EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10 countries respectively. Surprisingly,
it appears that the access to the EU Single Market is not necessarily the motive for
inward FDI from outside the EU-27. The investors from inside the EU-27 are reluctant to
invest in CEECs that remain outside the EU, but the positive and statistically significant
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EU membership term suggests that as these countries accede to the EU, they start to
receive larger inflows of FDI from inside the EU. The multinational firms from inside
the EU-27 are seeking market access as they choose to locate in the ‘new’ EU-10 but
prefer access to better quality resources in the ‘old‘ EU-15, most of all workforce skills
and physical infrastructure.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides comprehensive cross-country evidence on the motives that drive
FDI location decisions in the EU-25. It distinguishes between market access and re-
source factors, and tests for the presence of efficiency-seeking behaviour through the
exploitation of economies of scale. Specifically it examines how the three motives for
FDI location differ between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States of the EU and seeks to
establish whether there exists a significant ‘West-East divide’ in the location preferences
of multinational firms. To capture the discrete choice nature of location choice, a condi-
tional logit model is used and a range of market-based and resource-based factors are
analysed, including macroeconomic and industry controls.
Overall, the chapter shows that market access and resource-seeking motives are
both important for FDI location in the EU-25 but reveals differences in the location be-
haviour exist, both between the West and East and between the different investment
modes. Allowing for FDI location motives to differ between ‘old’ and the ‘new’ EU
Member States, the results show that FDI tends to avoid congested locations in the EU-
15 by locating in the periphery further away from main markets, but this tendency is
not evident for the EU-10 countries, which suggests that access to the market is impor-
tant for the latter. Investment in the EU-15 is predominantly ‘specific-asset’ resource-
seeking, as a better educated workforce attracts FDI and multinational firms are pre-
pared to pay for the skills of the labour force. The market-seeking and the ‘general-
asset’ resource-seeking are the motives for FDI location in the ‘new’ EU-10 as firms tend
to locate in the rich, core markets, and the tendency to avoid locations where workers
are highly-skilled suggest that those direct investors consider the inexpensive unskilled
and semi-skilled workers as a source of comparative advantage for the multinational
firms operating in CEECs.
An analysis distinguishing between new and re-investment projects shows that
re-investments are quite different in nature to new investments, so that they are not
simply about adding scale to existing operations for the purpose of achieving greater
economies of scale. While greater economies of scale or scope may be a consequence
of these expansions, the results of this analysis suggests that they are also subject to
market-access and resource-seeking motives, so that they are not being made to sim-
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ply add scale to existing operations for efficiency motives. Allowing for the West-East
heterogeneity, the analysis by project type indicates that the ‘specific-asset’ resource-
seeking motive affects both new investment and re-investment projects in the EU-15, as
investing multinational firms are motivated by access to better physical infrastructure
and a skilled labour force but avoid areas with a high level of unemployment, where
skills may have been eroded. The market access motive dominates the location choices
of new investment and re-investments in the EU-10, where depending on the project
type investing multinational firms seek rich, densely populated and fast growing mar-
kets in the core of the CEECs. The analysis also shows that in the EU-10 the labour
costs discourage new investment while re-investments are less likely to occur where
workers are highly skilled, suggesting that the ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking motive
is important for new investments and re-investments in CEECs.
To account for different degrees of information asymmetries faced by the multi-
national firms from outside and inside the EU-27 the motives for FDI location are anal-
ysed depending on the origin region of the investor. It is found that the ‘specific-asset’
resource-seeking motive influences the FDI location choice of the multinational firms
from both outside and inside the EU-27 that seek access to better quality resources as
they invest in the ‘old’ EU-15 countries, most of all workforce skills and physical infras-
tructures. The unskilled labour inputs are sought by the direct investors from outside of
the EU-27 choosing to invest in the ‘new’ EU-10, suggesting the ‘general-asset’ resource-
seeking. The multinational firms from inside the EU-27 want access to the market as
they choose to locate in the CEECs but are reluctant to invest prior to their accession to
the EU, indicative of the benefits of the fifth enlargement to the CEECs. In general, the
multinational firms from outside the EU-27 are not market-seeking.
Overall, the chapter shows that the ‘old’ EU-15 continues to be a more attractive
destination for investment than the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States, independent of the
investment mode. The results also indicate that on the whole access to the EU Single
Market increases the inflow of FDI, indicating that the ‘new’ EU-10 benefited from EU
accession in 2004 and 2007. Similarly, the Single currency is also found to encourage
FDI location, suggesting that the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States should see their invest-
ment grow as they choose to adopt the Single currency. Although the analysis shows
that unskilled and semi-skilled workforce is a source of comparative advantage for the
CEECs, this chapter stops short of considering upskilling strategies inefficient in at-
tracting inward investment to these countries. Over time, the economic development
of the ‘new’ EU-10 is expected to gradually catch with that of the ‘old’ EU-15, and as
less economically developed countries such as Turkey and former Yugoslav republics
are expected to join the EU in the future, the highly skilled workers may become a new
source of comparative advantage for the CEECs as these countries start to resemble the
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‘old’ EU-15.
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Chapter 6
Border and Distance Effects
6.1 Introduction
The signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the establishment of the Single Eu-
ropean Market in 1993 laid the foundations for the dismantling of trade barriers and
the simplification of rules. The ‘four freedoms’ it embodied - the free movement of
people, goods, services and capital - formed the basis for the Single European Market
and were intended to foster strong economic integration. As well as augmenting trade
(Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran, 2004), it is likely that a reduction in trade barriers will
alter the economic geography of countries in the new and existing Member States (Han-
son, 2001). The continuing deepening and widening of economic integration within the
EU provides a highly relevant backdrop for examining the spatial effects of European
integration on the location of economic activity. Indeed, while one of the main bene-
fits of the enlargement was a boost to economic activity, Bruelhart and Koenig (2006)
note that a reconfiguration and reorganisation of productive activities in the EU is to
be expected as “integration transforms the internal structures of national economies”
(p. 246). Past efforts at economic integration have been associated with an increased
interest in studying its implications for the spatial distribution of economic activity.
Arguably, the EU fifth enlargement was one of the most complete attempts at
regional integration. At a regional level it is certainly much greater than the attempts to
achieve integration outside of Europe, such as the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), African Union (AU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and Mercosur in South America. Niebuhr (2008) argues that the impact of the fifth
enlargement on the location of economic activities in Europe is likely to be profound.
Unquestionably, the integration of the CEECs into the European Union and the acces-
sion in 2004 and 2007 transformed their internal economic geographies. This includes
the location of new industrial activity, such as foreign direct investment.
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The empirical evidence on the spatial implications of regional economic integra-
tion for industrial location tends to focus on a small number of countries (e.g. Hanson,
1996 and Hanson, 2001 for US-Mexico border-city pairs, Overman and Winters, 2005
and Overman and Winters, 2006 for the UK). It also considers activity measures such
as real GDP per capita, employment (e.g. Bruelhart et al., 2004 for the Objective 1 pe-
ripheral regions of the EU-15) or wages (e.g. Bruelhart and Koenig, 2006 for Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia). Given the increased importance of
multinational enterprise (MNE) activity in the form of FDI (Blonigen, 2005), which has
grown at a faster rate than trade over the past three decades (Yeyati et al., 2003), it is
surprising that there is little analysis of the implications for the spatial distribution of
FDI.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the distribution of FDI activity in the en-
larged EU of 25 countries (EU-25) at the level of NUTS2 regions over 1997-2010. It con-
siders how the Eastern enlargement altered the economic geography of FDI location,
identifying the regions of the enlarged EU that have most benefited from the process of
integration and the resulting reallocation of productive activity. In addition to an EU
membership effect, the focus is on the border regions located along the former West-
East border, which are likely to play a critical role within the spatial dynamics initiated
by the fifth enlargement (Resmini, 2003b). Owing to the change in market access and
the reduction in trade costs it is plausible that economic activity shifted from the eastern
border regions of the ‘old’ EU (EU-15) towards the western border regions in the ‘new’
EU (EU-10) (Lafourcade and Paluzie Hernandez, 2005), especially if the motive for in-
vestment is access to resources at a lower cost. It could also be the case that both the
eastern EU-15 regions and western EU-10 regions will gain from enlargement, as their
relative position is altered from a peripheral region to an internal EU region (Niebuhr
and Stiller, 2002).
If the motive for investment in the ‘new’ EU-10 is market-seeking and ‘general-
asset’ resource-seeking (see: Chapter 5), then the bunching of FDI in the western EU-10
regions is expected for three reasons. Firstly, the ‘new’ EU-10 as a whole offer access to
unskilled and semi-skilled labour resources at a lower real cost compared to the ‘old’
EU-10 countries. Secondly, investors want to invest in the ‘new’ EU-10 if the access
to their internal national markets is desired. Thirdly, within these countries the west-
ern regions close to the West-East border offer relatively better market access to the EU
Single Market as a whole. With the eastward extension of the EU Single Market, how-
ever, the border between the ‘old’ EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States is now
closer to the middle of the enlarged EU-25, meaning that the border itself may not be
a relevant determinant of the FDI distribution. Rather than the bunching of FDI in the
EU-10 western border regions, FDI could be distributed more uniformly across the re-
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gions that are close to the middle of the EU-25 regardless of which side of the West-East
border they are positioned. Another reason to think that the West-East border has not
shaped spatial distribution of FDI after the fifth enlargement is because the location of
FDI had already restructured along this border prior to enlargement in 2004.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the role of national borders
in the reconfiguration of FDI location patterns after the 2004 enlargement using NUTS2
regional level for all the major EU countries. The aim of Lafourcade and Paluzie Her-
nandez (2005) is similar, but they use a gravity model to study an asymmetry between
the border and interior regions of two countries only: France and Spain. They focus on
the impact of European integration on the internal geography of trade rather than FDI,
and a time period up to the year 2000 that is before the most recent wave of EU enlarge-
ment. This chapter considers FDI projects that are located in one of 260 NUTS2 regions
of the EU-25 between 1997 and 2010, of which 206 are located in the ‘old’ EU-15 and
54 in the ‘new’ EU-10.1 To study the spatial distribution of FDI activity across NUTS2
regions of the EU-25 I use data described in Chapter 4.2
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section looks
at the theoretical model that underpins the econometric analysis and explores what
traditional location theory and the New Economic Geography models say with respect
to the spatial implications of regional integration. These build on the literature review
of Chapter 2. The econometric framework is set out in section 6.3, and the results of the
estimation are presented and discussed in section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The Theoretical Framework
According to Longhi et al. (2003) there are three main strands to the literature on the im-
pact of economic integration on the specialisation and the location of industrial activity:
the neoclassical trade theory, the new trade theory and the new economic geography
(NEG). As I have argued in Chapter 2, the neoclassical theory of international trade is
the first attempt to explain the emergence of FDI. This is as a decision on where to locate
production internationally. The neoclassical trade theory attempts to explain the spa-
tial pattern of industrial location by examining differences between countries in either
comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1821), such as technology or labour productivity, or in
relative factor endowments (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933). The theory offers an insight
into where firms want to locate their production facilities and why. Towards the end
1As explained in Chapter 4, the NUTS1 region for London is used, so that strictly speaking I have 259
NUTS2 regions and one NUTS1 region.
2Two FDI projects are located in the Faroe Islands, which has autonomous status. It is not classed as a
NUTS2 region of Denmark and since regional data is not available then there are 35,103 observations for
this analysis. This also excludes fifty projects that located in Cyprus and Malta.
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of 1970s and over the 1980s, the new trade theory emerged to explain why countries
that produce similar goods and services continue to trade with each other, thus focus-
ing on intra-industry international trade. The models emphasise the role of increasing
returns to scale, product differentiation and monopolistic competition. The new trade
theory acknowledges the role of market access and predicts that as trade barriers are
removed, economic activities with increasing returns to scale will move to core loca-
tions with good market access. Krugman and Venables (1990) qualify this by arguing
that the relocation of industries from periphery to the core is most likely to occur for the
intermediate level of trade costs, since for low trade costs the geographical advantage
of core locations disappears, which means that some activity will stay in the periphery.
Bruelhart and Koenig (2006) note that the NEG theory “provides a well-suited
framework for a formal analysis of the internal geography of countries that open their
markets towards the outside world” (p. 247). The NEG theory relies on four inherent
elements to explain the spatial distribution of industrial location, and that underpin the
general functioning of NEG models. These are increasing returns to scale, monopolistic
competition, non-zero trade costs and external economies of scale (see: section 2.4 of
Chapter 2).3 Livas Elizondo and Krugman (1992) and Rauch (1991) demonstrate that
owing to the existence of trade costs some locations will naturally possess a geographic
advantage in production. Hanson (1996) ties this in with the market access concept
and argues that border regions and port cities, which have relatively low-cost access
to foreign markets, emerge as natural production sites. Therefore, regional integration
is likely to lead to their expansion and result in the spatial agglomeration of economic
activity in border regions and port cities. In this sense, market access acts as a principal
determinant of the geographic structure of economic activity (Bruelhart and Koenig,
2006), and alongside trade costs it will be important in the reconfiguration of economic
activity in response to integration.
Perhaps the most successful attempt at modelling the spatial consequences of re-
gional integration, such as EU enlargement, is a two-country, three-region NEG model
developed by Bruelhart et al. (2004). It is based on a three-region model that is de-
rived from Pflueger (2001) as an analytically solvable version of Krugman’s (1991) core-
periphery model (see: section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2). The domestic country contains an
interior region ‘1’ and a border region ‘2’; but the foreign country consists of a single
region ‘0’ only. The domestic country can be thought of as the EU and the foreign coun-
try as an accession country. There are two sectors: a perfectly-competitive ‘agriculture
sector’, which uses the labour (L) input only; and a monopolistically-competitive ‘man-
ufacturing sector’, which not only uses fixed human capital (K) and variable labour (L),
3Ascani et al. (2012) is a detailed review of the main contributions to the NEG theory that focuses on
the effects of economic integration on spatial development.
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but produces a differentiated good that is characterised by increasing returns to scale.
The size and composition of the foreign economy is exogenous, so that it has fixed
amounts of labour and human capital, L0 and K0, but the domestic economy has fixed
regional supplies of labour (L1 and L2), and interregionally mobile levels of human cap-
ital, which is therefore determined endogenously between regions 1 and 2. All goods
are traded between the regions according to non-zero ‘iceberg’ trade costs.
The model predicts that trade liberalization, which lowers the external trade
barriers (i.e., a regional integration process such as EU enlargement), will have impli-
cations for the spatial distribution of domestic manufacturing activity. Trade liberal-
isation triggers two countervailing forces. On the one hand, both domestic demand-
related agglomeration and domestic cost-related agglomeration forces are weakened
as domestic consumers represent a smaller share of domestic firms’ sales, while at the
same time foreign firms represent a more important share of supply to domestic con-
sumers (Bruelhart et al., 2004). On the other hand, external trade liberalisation increases
the competition from foreign firms, reducing the importance for domestic firms of lo-
cating away from domestic competitors and weakening the dispersion force. Bruelhart
et al. (2004) find that both their analytical and simulation results indicate that the ef-
fect of trade liberalisation on the dispersion force is stronger. However, this assumes
perfect symmetry between domestic regions (the trade costs are equal), and while it is
clear that closer economic integration reinforces the emergence of a domestic agglom-
eration of manufacturing activity, it is not possible to determine the location of these
agglomerations.
Bruelhart et al. (2004) admit that the assumption of perfectly symmetric domes-
tic regions is flawed, and they extend the model to allow for trade costs with the foreign
market that differ between regions 1 and 2. It is supposed region 2 has better access to
the foreign market, so that it is a border region, while region 1 is interior. This model
predicts that domestic manufacturing is attracted towards the border region where they
can benefit from the improved access to foreign demand, hence weakening the domes-
tic agglomeration force. By contrast, the interior region offers domestic manufacturing
firms a shelter from foreign competition, and this weakens the domestic dispersion
force. The simulation results show that domestic manufacturing is generally attracted
to the border region, unless the interior region has a relatively large share of domestic
manufacturing prior to trade liberalisation. The larger the foreign country, the greater
is the locational pull to the border region.
Bruelhart et al. (2004) examine the implications associated with changing the
sectoral composition of the domestic and foreign economy (i.e. the balance between
manufacturing and agriculture). Agricultural workers are an immobile workforce and
represent a large demand without a threat of competition. For this reason, the location
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of domestic manufacturing in the border region is greater as the share of agriculture in
the foreign country increases. The pull towards the border region also increases as the
share of domestic manufacturing sector increases. Overall, this demonstrates that the
border region is more likely to be the winner from integration the larger is the domestic
share of manufacturing and the smaller is the foreign one.
6.3 Model Specification
The two-country, three-region NEG model of Bruelhart et al. (2004) predicts that a re-
gional integration process that lowers external trade barriers and associated trade costs,
such as EU enlargement, leads to a spatial reconfiguration of manufacturing activity. In
this section an empirical approach is set out to examine how well the evidence supports
these predictions. This is then explored at the NUTS2 regional level for FDI inflows to
the EU-25 countries. The main interest is in the effect of EU integration on the regional
distribution of FDI activity in the EU-25. For this purpose the dependent variable is
measured by the number of FDI projects that region j receives at time t. However, as
total inward FDI in the EU-25 as a whole varies over time, the regional share of EU-25
FDI projects is also considered. In either case, distance terms for the former West-East
border are subsequently considered in order to capture border effects. This is the exter-
nal EU-15 border that the 2004 EU enlargement made internal to the EU-25.
The regression model is specified in a log-linear form and estimated by the Least
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. The following baseline equation is esti-
mated across the 260 NUTS2 regions of the EU-25 from 1997 to 2010:
(6.1)ln
(
(FDI+1)jt
)
annualFDIEU,t
= β0 + β1 ln
(
(FDI+1)jt−1
)
annualFDIEU,t−1
+ β2Spatial lagjt + β3Xjt−1
+ β4EUjt + β5EUROjt + β6jregionj + β7ttimet + ε jt,
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the number of FDI projects that re-
gion j receives at time t. Given that a region may receive no FDI in some years then the
number of projects is increased by one in each case in order to work with logarithms,
where ln(1) = 0. The inclusion of time fixed effects effectively means that the denom-
inator for the log of the sum of projects across the EU-25 is effectively dummied out
in both the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable, so that (6.1) is in
effect a regression in the log of the number of projects. To regress (6.1) in the log of FDI
shares it is necessary to omit the time fixed effects altogether, and both approaches are
considered below (i.e it is regressed in the numbers and shares). The log-linear form
means that the coefficients on the regressors give a proportionate effect.
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The coefficient β4 on the EU membership dummy variable is the parameter of
interest as it captures the EU membership effect. It is a dummy variable, so that the
proportionate effect can be evaluated as exp β4 − 1. Given that the theoretical model of
Bruelhart et al. (2004) outlined in section 6.2 allows for different integration effects on
domestic and foreign country, a distinction is made in the EU membership effect be-
tween the EU-10 (the dummy variable: ‘New’ EU) and the EU-15 (the dummy variable:
‘Old’ EU (after 2004)). Moreover, given that the effect of EU membership is also likely
to vary by country (see: section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4), an allowance is made for the het-
erogeneity through the inclusion of interaction terms between the EU term and country
dummies.
To capture the border effect the baseline regression model is subsequently gen-
eralized through the inclusion of a distance variable that captures the distance between
the region and the (former) West-East border.
(6.2)ln
(
(FDI+1)jt
)
annualFDIEU,t
= β0 +β1 ln
(
(FDI+1)jt−1
)
annualFDIEU,t−1
+β2Spatial lagjt +β3Xjt−1 +β4EUjt
+ β5EUROjt + β8distancej + β6jregionj + β7ttimet + ε jt,
where the β8 coefficient measures the size of the distance effect.
Two distance measures are considered that are both measured in kilometres.
The first is based on the shortest road distance between the capital of region j and the
West-East border. The second is the shortest Euclidean distance, i.e. ‘as the crow flies’,
from the capital to the West-East border border. As indicated in section 4.5.5 of Chapter
4, Google Maps is used to calculate the road distance, and the latter using an online
Distance Calculator. The road distance is used in the main analysis, while the straight-
line distance is used as part of a series of robustness checks. Naturally, the further is a
region from the West-East border the weaker is the expected effect, so that a negative
sign is expected on the β8 coefficient. An explanation for this is that distance affects
transport costs, which are a component of trade costs. To illustrate this it becomes
harder to serve regional markets in Portugal from as far as the West-East border, and
therefore industrial activity in Portugal is less likely to be affected by the Eastern EU
enlargement than is industrial activity in Austria, say.
Similarly, as with the EU membership term, an asymmetry is allowed for in the
effect that distance from the West-East border has on the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member
States. For this purpose, two interaction terms are defined: ‘New’ EU*road distance
to EU border and ‘Old’ EU (after 2004)*road distance to EU border. Subsequently, this
effect is investigated further to consider heterogeneity in distance between the ‘new’
EU-10 countries. The analysis of the FDI data in section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4 showed that
two NUTS2 regions in the EU-10 that have a similar position relative to the West-East
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show a different performance in their post-accession level of FDI inflows.4 A heteroge-
nous treatment of distance effect is the most appropriate approach to capture this.
To test more directly the predictions of the ‘asymmetric’ version of the model
of Bruelhart et al. (2004), border dummies are considered. These distinguish a border
region from an interior region (see: section 4.5.5 of Chapter 4 for the discussion on how
the border regions are defined and the dummies constructed). The aim is to establish if
asymmetries exist in the response of economic activity in the border and interior regions
of the accession countries, and if border regions are in a stronger position to attract more
FDI after the EU enlargement given their proximity to the core of the European Single
Market. The econometric model is modified, such that the distance term is replaced
with a border term:
(6.3)ln
(
(FDI+1)jt
)
annualFDIEU,t
= β0 + β1 ln
(
(FDI+1)jt−1
)
annualFDIEU,t−1
+ β2Spatial lagjt + β3Xjt−1
+ β4EUjt + β5EUROjt + β9borderj + β6jregionj + β7ttimet + ε jt,
where the β9 coefficient measures the magnitude of the border effect, for which a pos-
itive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that regions located close to the
West-East border have an advantage in attracting inward FDI. Again, as set out in sec-
tion 4.5.5 of Chapter 4, I differentiate between different border region categories in or-
der to see if the size of the border effect decays with distance.
In all cases, I work with a dynamic model by including a Lagged Dependent
Variable (LDV) to allow for inertia in the location behaviour of the investing firms.
The LDV approach is often used as a robust strategy to eliminate autocorrelation in
the residuals and to model a dynamic data-generating process in an OLS regression.
It is plausible that this year’s inflow of FDI is strongly affected by the size of inward
FDI in the previous year, meaning that the effects of an investment decision to set up a
production site in a region this year persist into the future. In this situation it appears
rational to adopt an LDV approach to account for serial dependence, and to model
regional inward investment as a long-term process (Beck and Katz, 2011; Shumway
and Stoffer, 2006). The use of the LDV model implies a loss of one year’s worth of data,
so that instead of using information on regional FDI activity for 14 years between 1997
and 2010, it is examined between 1998 and 2010. Since there are 260 NUTS2 regions this
reduces the number of observations from 3,640 to 3,380.
In the spatial context, the model that most appropriately captures the features
of the industrial location choice is dynamic in both time and space. Given the relatively
4Located at a similar distance to the West-East border, Podlaskie in Poland and Nord-Vest in Romania
receive a similar number of FDI projects prior to the fifth enlargement in 2004, but markedly different FDI
levels after 2004.
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small size of the NUTS2 regions a spatial lag term is introduced into the specification
to capture spatial dependence and interactions between NUTS2 regions. The spatial
lag (otherwise referred to as the spatially lagged dependent variable) assumes that the
magnitude of the regional FDI activity affects the size of FDI activity in neighbouring
regions and it measures the spatial spillovers. Buczkowska and de Lapparent (2014),
who study location choice of newly-created establishments at the aggregate level in the
Paris metropolitan area, find that it improves model performance. This justifies the
inclusion of the spatial lag term into my model to account for spatial spillovers, which
are more important for small geographical units, such as NUTS2 regions.
Control variables are not of the main interest in this analysis, but it is important
to include them in the model specifications to account for location factors that affect
the spatial choice decision of a multinational firm. These are discussed at length in
section 4.5 of Chapter 4 and their effect between the West and East was examined in
Chapter 5. They include terms for market potential, resources, macroeconomic events
and industry-level variables. All control variables are lagged one year, but except for
the EU Single currency dummy, which was announced well in advance and may have
been anticipated by investors. The EU membership terms are also not lagged, as this
was also announced in advance and up to two years beforehand for the CEECs (see:
Chapter 3).
Regional fixed effects are included in each model specification to control for un-
observed region heterogeneity. This method of controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity is referred to as the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. The LSDV
estimator draws out the individual region heterogeneity of the error term by including
dummies for each NUTS2 region (Roodman, 2009b). Time dummies are also part of the
baseline regression model and they control for the time trends, such as the effect of the
macroeconomic business cycle on the location of FDI activity. Finally, my model specifi-
cations make use of the clustered standard errors by NUTS2 region. The usual assump-
tion in the regression analysis is that the error terms are independently and identically
distributed (iid). Naturally, when working with panel data with repeated observations
on individual regions it is likely that the observations within region j group are cor-
related over time in some unknown way, inducing correlation in the error term, ε jt,
within j, but that error term correlation across groups of region j and region l is zero.
This induces a severe bias in the conventional standard error estimates if there is also
serial correlation in the error process (Kezdi, 2004). The introduction of the clustered
standard errors by region ensures that I allow for the possibility that model errors in
different time periods for a given region may be correlated but remain uncorrelated
with model errors for different regions (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
Although the inclusion of time and region dummies in the LSDV estimator is a
209
method used to control for unobserved heterogeneity, it is not a perfect measure. Given
that the dependent variable, ln
(
(FDI + 1)jt
)
, is a function of the fixed effects, both the
LDV and the spatial lag are correlated with the error term (Baltagi, 2008). In my model
specification, both the LDV and spatial lag are endogenous explanatory variables. A
solution to the fixed effects problem is to time difference the data (Hanson, 2001), but
as discussed in section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4 this method makes it impossible to estimate
the effect of time invariant variables, for example capital city status, and for that reason
it is not used in this study. Nickell (1981) established that OLS parameter estimates on
the LDV in a dynamic panel model are biased due to the correlation between the fixed
effects and the LDV. The bias of the LSDV estimator is referred to as the ‘Nickell bias’,
where the size of the bias is inversely related to time dimension of the panel. A Monte
Carlo study by Judson and Owen (1999) showed that potentially severe biases of much
as 20% remain even with a time-series dimension as large as 30 observations. To handle
the modelling concerns such as fixed effects and the endogeneity of regressors, while
avoiding ‘Nickell bias’ of the LSDV estimator, a two-step robust system generalised
method of moments (GMM) estimator is also used to estimate the size of the border
effects.
6.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results and considers how closely it supports the
predictions of the three-region, two-country theoretical model on the regional implica-
tions of the EU integration. I start by examining the aggregate EU membership and
distance effect of the integration, making an explicit distinction between the impact of
EU enlargement and road distance from the West-East border on the ‘new’ EU-10 and
‘old’ EU-15 (Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below). After this, I allow the EU membership and dis-
tance effects to differ between countries (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Subsequently, I explore
the role of the time fixed effects (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). Finally, I estimate the regression
models with the border effects (Tables 6.7 and 6.8) to examine the above predictions.
In the extension to my econometric analysis I consider alternative measures of distance
(Table 6.9) and investigate how the main results are affected as the country fixed effects
are used instead of the region fixed effects (Table 6.10). The GMM methodology is used
to estimate the regression models with the border effects and it constitutes the final part
of the formal econometric analysis of this thesis (Tables 6.11 and 6.12).
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6.4.1 Aggregate EU Membership and Distance Effects
I begin by estimating the aggregate EU membership and distance effect on the pattern
of regional FDI location in the EU-25. This makes a simple distinction between the
EU membership and distance effect on the acceding ‘new’ EU Member States (EU-10)
and incumbent EU Member States (EU-15). In Table 6.1 I focus on the aggregate EU
membership effect of the fifth enlargement for all CEECs (the first wave of 2004 is rel-
evant for eight countries and the second wave of 2007 for two countries), but in Table
6.2 I allow for the distance from the West-East border to influence the spatial distribu-
tion of regional FDI location too. Both equations include region and time fixed effects.
The specification is the log-linear model, which contains the Lagged Dependent Vari-
able (LDV), spatial lag, the aggregate EU membership effect and a full set of control
variables. The LDV and spatial lag are in the log form, and their interpretation differs
from the other regressors. Positive and statistically significant coefficients on the LDV
and spatial lag terms, which are bounded between zero and one, demonstrate inertia
and spatial spillovers in the behaviour of multinational firms that invest in the EU-25.
Specifically, the size of the regional inflows of FDI is not only influenced by the FDI
inflows to that region in the previous year (inward FDI inertia) but also by that size of
inward FDI in neighbouring regions.
Column (I) is the most basic version of my baseline regression model. First of
all, focusing on the result in column (I) of Table 6.1, the estimate on LDV is positive
and significant, although the magnitude of the estimate does not suggest that the per-
sistence of regional FDI is strong. The estimate on the spatial lag term is also positive
and significant, and in magnitude it is much greater, suggesting that the FDI is spa-
tially autocorrelated at the NUTS2 region level (i.e. FDI tends to locate in regions that
are contiguous). Many of the control variables are insignificant, but they indicate that
at the region level high internal market potential and openness to trade attract FDI,
but a high population density, wage rate and tax rate all deter FDI. These have the ex-
pected signs, with the population density term indicating that on the whole (across all
regions) FDI tends to go to less densely populated regions. The Jacobs term indicates
that FDI is attracted to more-diversified regions. These results for the control variables
are worse than those found in Chapter 5, but they possibly reflect the fact that some
of these terms are measured at the country rather than region level, while region fixed
effects are included that capture persistent regional influences.
On EU membership, the insignificant coefficient on the ‘new’ EU dummy term
is surprising, as it suggests that EU membership under the fifth enlargement failed to
stimulate inward FDI across the NUTS2 regions of the accession countries. This could
arise because the long period of the EU accession negotiations and the changes that the
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Table 6.1: Regional FDI location: aggregate EU membership effect
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Column: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.119***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.666*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 0.590***
‘New’ EU 0.110 0.280*** 0.243** -0.032
‘Old’ EU (after 2004) -0.369***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.062 -0.062 -0.057
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.250*** -0.249*** -0.252***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.006 0.007 -0.030
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.195* 0.203*
Capital city (‘old’ EU after 2004) 0.180**
Jacobs term -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.080***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.134 0.176 0.214 0.099
Adjacent market GDP -0.023 -0.021 -0.019 -0.013
Peripherality index -6.121 -6.518 -6.237 -2.741
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
Income per capita -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009
Population density -0.571** -0.634** -0.625** -0.865***
Growth rate 0.146 0.155 0.206 0.116
Physical infrastructure -4.742 -4.697 -5.026 -5.096*
Unemployment rate 0.648 0.451 0.469 0.360
Secondary education 0.196 0.199 0.203 0.277
Tertiary education 0.246 0.330 0.292 0.215
Wage rate -0.044** -0.043** -0.041** -0.032*
Dummy: wage rate -0.558 -0.672 -0.745 -0.782
Openness to trade 0.434** 0.544*** 0.537*** 0.432**
Exchange rate -0.301 -0.131 -0.127 -0.139
Exchange rate volatility -0.492 -0.344 -0.320 -0.238
Political risk 0.334 0.302 0.267 0.173
Corporate tax rate -0.692** -0.636* -0.645* -0.581*
EU Structural Funds -0.139 -0.076 -0.081 -0.052
Single currency -0.030 -0.022 -0.022 0.008
N 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.847 0.848 0.848 0.849
RMSE 0.471 0.470 0.470 0.468
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance
level
CEECs underwent do not exactly coincide with a surge in FDI in these countries. How-
ever, as the membership dummy is measured as unity for each year after enlargement,
it could arise because the regions of the accession countries attracted more FDI upon
their respective EU entry, which did not persist over time. To explore this, column (II)
includes three post-accession dummies to capture the EU membership effect one, two
and three years after membership (i.e. EU membership (≥ 1 year), EU membership (≥
2 years), EU membership (≥ 3 years) respectively). These dummies do not make an
allowance for asymmetries between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States, as the purpose
is to examine if the inward FDI falls-off after EU membership.
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Column (II) demonstrates that EU membership has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the inflows of FDI to NUTS2 regions in the ‘new’ EU, but the post-
accession dummies reveal that this effect is not permanent. Overall, they show that
the number of FDI projects in the EU-10 regions increased by 32.3% (exp(0.280)− 1) on
average, but that two years later it falls by 22.1% (exp(−0.250)− 1), which partly offsets
the initial gain in FDI from EU membership. A similar change in regional FDI is not
observed at one and three years post-accession, as these coefficients are not significant.
This regression suggests a reduced role of the effect that the neighbouring regions’ FDI
has on the size of the regional FDI inflow. The coefficient on the spatial lag term remains
statistically significant but falls relative to column (I) (from 0.666 in column (I) to 0.610
in column (II)). The coefficient on LDV is unchanged.
The analysis of the FDI data in section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4 revealed the capital city
region of a country tends to emerge as a prime destination for inward investment. For
this reason, column (III) adds a capital city dummy for the ‘new’ EU Member States
to account for the special status of these regions. The regression shows that the capital
city dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that the capital city
regions of CEECs attract 21.5% more inward FDI compared to other CEEC regions. As
expected it causes the coefficient on the EU membership to drop from 0.280 (column
(II)) to 0.243 (column (III)). This means that the EU membership increases the regional
numbers of FDI projects in EU-10 by 27.5%, and not by 32.3% as the previous model
suggested. The remaining coefficients remain broadly unchanged.
Finally, column (IV) of Table 6.1 separately estimates the EU membership effects
for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States by including dummy variables for the ‘old’ EU
members and for the capital city regions of the ‘old’ EU Member States. Both dummies
take the value of unity from 2004 onwards, which assumes that the EU integration
shock on the incumbent EU Member States is effective from this date. The specification
examines the aggregate EU membership effect of enlargement on both the incumbent
EU Members and acceding countries. The estimates on the membership terms indicate
a similar pattern to before, since while it is insignificant for the group of ‘new’ EU Mem-
ber States, it is negative and significant for the ‘old’ EU Member States, suggesting that
there were larger effects on FDI in the CEECs after EU membership. The post-accession
effects are robust to the new specification. Overall, the net effect of EU membership
on FDI in the CEECs now appears stronger (as high as 30.9%), but the comparison is
now made between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ Members States after 2004 only, whereas pre-
viously it was across all years. This suggests that some of the ‘old’ Members States
lost FDI to the ‘new’ Members as a result of accession. With regard to the capital city
regions, both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU capital city regions attract more FDI after the EU
enlargement, with an average of 22.5% and 19.7% more FDI projects respectively com-
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pared to the non-capital city regions. These capital city region dummies cause marginal
reductions in the coefficients on the spatial lag (to 0.590) and LDV terms (to 0.119), sug-
gesting that FDI has tended to build-up relatively more in these capital city regions in
the post-accession period.
Table 6.2: Regional FDI location: aggregate EU membership and distance effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Column: (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.119***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.668*** 0.611*** 0.613*** 0.593***
‘New’ EU 0.155 0.368*** 0.327** 0.016
‘Old’ EU (after 2004) -0.357***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.065 -0.065 -0.059
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.016 -0.014 -0.037
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.011 -0.019 -0.018 -0.008
‘Old’ EU (after 2004): road distance to EU border 0.001
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.187 0.201*
Capital city (‘old’ EU after 2004) 0.182**
Jacobs term -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.079***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.133 0.177 0.214 0.105
Adjacent market GDP -0.023 -0.021 -0.019 -0.012
Peripherality index -6.745 -7.612 -7.282 -3.101
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
Income per capita -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.010
Population density -0.557** -0.616** -0.608** -0.867***
Growth rate 0.135 0.133 0.183 0.113
Physical infrastructure -4.774 -4.737 -5.051 -5.145*
Unemployment rate 0.613 0.369 0.391 0.334
Secondary education 0.207 0.219 0.222 0.271
Tertiary education 0.244 0.333 0.297 0.215
Wage rate -0.045** -0.044** -0.043** -0.032
Dummy: wage rate -0.554 -0.679 -0.749 -0.759
Openness to trade 0.409** 0.514*** 0.509*** 0.434**
Exchange rate -0.302 -0.115 -0.113 -0.131
Exchange rate volatility -0.501 -0.346 -0.323 -0.247
Political risk 0.347 0.316 0.282 0.188
Corporate tax rate -0.751** -0.724** -0.728** -0.629*
EU Structural Funds -0.136 -0.064 -0.069 -0.048
Single currency -0.034 -0.029 -0.028 0.004
N 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.847 0.848 0.848 0.849
RMSE 0.471 0.470 0.470 0.469
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
In addition to EU membership, the above discussion indicates that what matters
for FDI in a region during the post-accession period is its position relative to the for-
mer West-East border. This is why Bruelhart et al. (2004) introduce a formal distinction
between border and interior regions, allowing for an asymmetric reaction to an integra-
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tion shock. I capture the effect of distance on the location of FDI activity by introducing
a term for the road distance between the principal town of each region to the affected
West-East border. I interact the distance term with ‘new’ EU and ‘old’ EU dummies to
capture the aggregate distance effect for the incumbent EU Members and new accession
countries. The results are presented in Table 6.2, which reproduce the specifications in
Table 6.1, including the distance term. The distance term for the EU-10 is used for the
‘new’ EU dummy in columns (V) to (VII), but distance terms are included for each of
the ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU dummies in column (VIII).
On the whole there is little difference between the respective estimation results
of the models between Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The coefficients on LDV and spatial lag
term remain positive and statistically significant in all columns, suggesting a positive
effect on the amount FDI that a region receives based on its previous period’s FDI and
in adjacent regions. The positive effect of accession on regional FDI in the ‘new’ EU
countries is again evident when allowance is made for its temporary effect through
the post-accession change in FDI (columns (VI) and (VII)). In comparison with Table
6.1, the inclusion of the distance term causes the size of the coefficient on ‘new’ EU
dummies to increase (from 0.280 in column (II) to 0.368 in column (VI) and from 0.243
in column (III) to 0.327 in column (VII)), implying that the EU membership increases
the regional inflows of FDI to the ‘new’ EU-10 by up to 44.5%. This is notwithstanding
that the estimate on the distance term is insignificant in both specifications. Indeed, as a
whole, Table 6.2 does not find a statistically significant distance effect for either the EU-
10 or EU-15 countries. The inclusion of the distance term causes the capital city region
dummy for the ‘new’ countries to be insignificant in column (VII), although these are
positive and statistically significant for both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ members in column
(VIII). The net effect of membership on FDI in the CEECs is similar in columns (VII)
and (VIII).
As regards the control variables, the coefficients on these are robust and change
only a small degree between different model specifications in (I) to (VIII). The negative
coefficient on population density is visibly larger for the specifications that include two
sets of capital region dummies in columns (IV) and (VIII), but this suggests that in-
vesting firms reveal an even stronger preference for the less-densely populated regions
once the attraction of the capital city regions is controlled for. These two regressions are
also the only ones to suggest that investors prefer regions with less developed road in-
frastructure, although in either case at the 10% significance level. The coefficient on the
corporate tax rate becomes less negative in columns (IV) and (VIII), suggesting that the
investors for which this is more important locate in the capital city regions, e.g. head
office functions, adding plausibility to the results.
215
6.4.2 Heterogenous EU Membership and Distance Effects
The next stage of the empirical analysis allows for the EU membership and distance
effects to vary between the EU-25 countries. The examination of the FDI data in section
section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4 revealed that on the whole the Czech NUTS2 regions perform
worse in attracting FDI after 2004 enlargement, whereas the Romanian regions do much
better. This calls for a heterogenous treatment of EU membership and distance terms
in the formal econometric analysis. I begin by examining the EU membership effect for
the 2004 EU enlargement (Table 6.3) and then add the heterogenous distance effect for
the West-East border to the regression model (Table 6.4). Again, all equations include
the region and time fixed effects.
I replace the aggregate ‘new’ EU membership dummy with ten country-specific
EU dummies in columns (IX) to (XII). Moreover, in column (XII) I add further 15 EU
terms to replace aggregate ‘old’ EU membership dummy. Overall, the introduction of
the heterogenous effects for EU membership leads to a decrease in the value of the
coefficients on LDV and spatial lag in all model specifications but which remain statis-
tically significant. On average, and depending on the model specification used, a 10%
increase in the last year’s regional FDI level leads to a 0.8% to 1.0% increase in the re-
gional number of FDI projects in the current year, which again points to a low level of
regional persistence (i.e. 1.10.088 − 1 = 0.008 and 1.10.108 − 1 = 0.010). However, a 10%
increase in FDI in neighbouring regions causes a 4.9% to 6.2% increase in regional FDI.
Again, it points to a high level of spatial autocorrelation, with FDI locating in continu-
ous regions. This is independent of the distance to the West-East border, since once this
term is included the corresponding estimates are 0.9% to 1.0% for FDI inertia and 5.7%
to 6.3% for the spatial dependence between contiguous regions.
First of all, an examination of Table 6.3 indicates that around half of the EU
membership terms are significant for the regions in new accession countries. In case of
column (IX) the coefficients on the EU membership terms seem to be biased downwards
compared to the other columns. This could be due to the omission of the three post-
accession terms, although this regression also omits the capital city region dummies,
which is likely to translate into an upward bias. Indeed, once the post-accession terms
are included, the latter may explain why column (X) produces the largest number of
positive and statistically significant country-specific membership terms. It suggests
that EU membership succeeded in encouraging more FDI projects in the NUTS2 regions
of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This effect does not
occur for Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian and Hungarian regions.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the regions of Romania, Slovakia and Slove-
nia have benefited the most from EU integration in terms of increased FDI. The pos-
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Table 6.3: Regional FDI location: heterogenous EU membership effect
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Column: (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.088***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.634*** 0.574*** 0.578*** 0.502***
Bulgaria: EU membership -0.147 -0.072 -0.101 -0.389***
Czech Republic: EU membership -0.189 -0.016 -0.038 -0.287
Estonia: EU membership -0.179*** 0.039 -0.136 -0.488**
Hungary: EU membership -0.090 0.099 0.073 -0.230
Latvia: EU membership 0.193*** 0.414*** 0.244 -0.129
Lithuania: EU membership 0.188** 0.375*** 0.195 -0.190
Poland: EU membership 0.088 0.307** 0.298** -0.000
Romania: EU membership 0.398*** 0.523*** 0.499*** 0.236
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.525*** 0.647*** 0.603*** 0.364**
Slovenia: EU membership 0.857** 1.088*** 1.006** 0.677
Austria: after 2004 -0.593***
Belgium: after 2004 -0.109
Denmark: after 2004 -0.211
Finland: after 2004 -0.372**
France: after 2004 -0.234
Germany: after 2004 -0.259*
Greece: after 2004 -0.617***
Ireland: after 2004 -0.387**
Italy: after 2004 -0.515***
Luxembourg: after 2004 0.538**
Netherlands: after 2004 -0.304**
Portugal: after 2004 -0.556***
Spain: after 2004 -0.390**
Sweden: after 2004 -0.232
United Kingdom: after 2004 -0.274
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.062 -0.061 -0.060
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.280***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.016 -0.014 -0.043
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.172 0.217
Capital city (‘old’ EU after 2004) 0.152*
Jacobs term -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.067***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.404 0.495 0.506 -0.151
Adjacent market GDP -0.022 -0.019 -0.018 -0.005
Peripherality index -9.380 -9.655 -9.318 -36.532***
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
Income per capita -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.021
Population density -0.552** -0.604** -0.593** -0.669**
Growth rate 0.154 0.159 0.174 0.138
Physical infrastructure -4.199 -4.155 -4.577 -6.497**
Unemployment rate 0.497 0.226 0.239 0.141
Secondary education 0.008 0.047 0.067 0.185
Tertiary education 0.154 0.218 0.151 0.246
Wage rate -0.039** -0.036* -0.035* -0.038*
Dummy: wage rate -1.045* -1.331** -1.334** -1.638**
Openness to trade 0.560*** 0.670*** 0.655*** 0.665***
Exchange rate -0.286 -0.032 -0.031 0.016
Exchange rate volatility -0.544* -0.365 -0.364 -0.304
Political risk 0.263 0.210 0.219 0.268
Corporate tax rate -0.630* -0.598* -0.587* -0.516
EU Structural Funds -0.145 -0.079 -0.082 -0.030
Single currency -0.082 -0.070 -0.067 0.023
N 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.849 0.850 0.850 0.853
RMSE 0.468 0.467 0.466 0.463
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance
level
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itive membership effect exists for all model specifications (columns (IX) to (XII)) for
Slovakia, and in all but column (XII) for Romania and Slovenia. However, the capital
city regions of Romania and Slovenia displayed a significant increase in FDI activity in
the post-accession period (see: section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4), and any model that does not
account for this is likely to produce upward bias on membership. The evidence on how
EU membership affects regional FDI activity in the other ‘new’ EU countries is more
mixed and therefore inconclusive. In essence, two out of the four model specifications
in Table 6.3 point to a positive EU membership effect for regional FDI activity in Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland, but a negative effect for FDI in Estonia. One specification finds
a negative effect in Bulgarian regions (column (XII)). Finally, all regression models fail
to establish the existence of a significant impact of EU integration on the size of inward
investment inflows to NUTS2 regions in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In section
4.4.4 of Chapter 4 it was noticed that while some Czech and Hungarian NUTS2 regions
enjoyed post-accession growth in FDI, others experienced a drop in their investment
level after the enlargement.
The model specification in column (XII) is the only one to include country-
specific ‘old’ EU membership terms. These results show that nine out of 15 ‘old’ EU
dummies are negative and statistically significant, which suggests that these fared less
well than the CEECs subsequent to EU membership. Luxembourg is the only ‘old’
EU Member State for which a positive EU enlargement effect is found.5 Furthermore,
there may be a shortcoming associated with employing heterogenous country-specific
EU-15 dummies. Essentially, since all EU-15 terms take the value of zero between 1997
and 2003, and unity thereafter, it may be argued that they are like post-enlargement
country dummies. The inclusion of the country-specific EU-15 dummies alongside the
country-specific EU terms for the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States means that the compar-
ison between the EU-15 and EU-10 is made for the accession period only, rather than
comparing between these across all years that is more relevant. This causes the het-
erogenous EU-15 terms to be of less interest, and for this reason I choose not to employ
them in the remaining regression analyses of this study.
The next stage of the empirical analysis involves adding distance terms to the
estimating equations. These results are shown in Table 6.4. Since I no longer include
country-specific EU-15 terms then I do not consider the distance effect for the regions
in the ‘old’ EU Member States. In columns (XIII) to (XV) of Table 6.4 I add ten ‘new’ EU
country-specific distance measures, and in column (XVI) I use an aggregate distance
term for the new accession countries as a whole. Given that the ‘new’ EU Member
5While the other EU-15 countries consist of several NUTS2 regions, which may see their inward FDI
increase or decrease after enlargement, Luxembourg consists of a single NUTS2 region only. This may ex-
plain the positive and statistically significant coefficient on this Luxembourg EU term, where FDI activity
rose after the fifth enlargement in 2004.
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Table 6.4: Regional FDI location: heterogenous EU membership and distance effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Column: (XIII) (XIV) (XV) (XVI)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.105***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.645*** 0.586*** 0.595*** 0.580***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.427 0.488 -0.000 0.529
Czech Republic: EU membership -0.463*** -0.297* -0.317* 0.015
Estonia: EU membership -0.182*** 0.033 -0.261 -0.075
Hungary: EU membership 0.251*** 0.430*** 0.341** 0.213
Latvia: EU membership 0.191*** 0.409*** 0.124 0.484**
Lithuania: EU membership 0.190** 0.374*** 0.075 0.608*
Poland: EU membership 0.478** 0.695*** 0.699*** 0.503***
Romania: EU membership 0.237 0.359 0.391 0.995***
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.653*** 0.765*** 0.606*** 0.708***
Slovenia: EU membership 1.912*** 2.121*** 2.282*** 1.034**
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.059 -0.057 -0.060
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.254*** -0.253*** -0.255***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.017 -0.014 -0.013
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.058
Bulgaria: road distance to EU border -0.053 -0.052 -0.011
Czech Republic: road distance to EU border 0.304** 0.308** 0.290**
Estonia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Hungary: road distance to EU border -0.140*** -0.137*** -0.119**
Latvia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Lithuania: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Poland: road distance to EU border -0.111** -0.111** -0.117**
Romania: road distance to EU border 0.019 0.019 0.011
Slovak Republic: road distance to EU border -0.071** -0.067** -0.017
Slovenia: road distance to EU border -2.769*** -2.718*** -3.509***
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.288** 0.161
Jacobs term -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.079***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.128 0.225 0.164 0.419
Adjacent market GDP -0.022 -0.019 -0.017 -0.018
Peripherality index -9.457 -9.731 -9.231 -9.421
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Income per capita -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009
Population density -0.556** -0.608** -0.591** -0.598**
Growth rate 0.157 0.162 0.190 0.182
Physical infrastructure -4.829 -4.775 -5.480* -4.507
Unemployment rate 0.520 0.250 0.263 0.256
Secondary education -0.020 0.019 0.052 0.034
Tertiary education 0.178 0.241 0.155 0.145
Wage rate -0.039** -0.036* -0.035* -0.035*
Dummy: wage rate -0.768 -1.055** -0.988* -1.332**
Openness to trade 0.563*** 0.672*** 0.652*** 0.654***
Exchange rate -0.286 -0.033 -0.029 -0.034
Exchange rate volatility -0.542 -0.364 -0.358 -0.365
Political risk 0.278 0.224 0.235 0.225
Corporate tax rate -0.633* -0.601* -0.585* -0.589*
EU Structural Funds -0.146 -0.081 -0.086 -0.081
Single currency -0.082 -0.070 -0.066 -0.068
N 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.851
RMSE 0.466 0.465 0.465 0.466
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consist of a single NUTS2 region each only,
the method I employ makes it impossible to confirm the existence of distance effect
in spatial distribution of FDI activity in these three countries, since there is no way to
compare size of FDI inflows in the regions of each of these countries that are either
closer or further away from the West-East border.
The estimates of the distance effect in Table 6.4 are generally consistent across the
model specifications, which mean that I find a negative distance effect for the NUTS2
regions of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. For the regions of the Slovakia, a
negative and statistically significant distance effect is identified provided that no capital
city region dummy is employed in the regression. The interpretation of the heteroge-
nous country-specific distance terms is that after the fifth enlargement FDI activity has
reorganised within Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, such that regions within
these countries in proximity to the West-East border have gained most FDI in the post-
accession period. Therefore, the results identify NUTS2 regions in Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia that are located closer to the West-East border to be the ‘winners’
of the EU integration, as opposed to their Eastern counterparts, which are the ‘losers’.
The distance effect is not statistically significant for the regions in Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, but these are a longer distance away from the former West-East border, as defined
by the 2004 accession.
A peculiar feature of these results is that there is compelling evidence for a sig-
nificant and positive distance effect for the regions of the Czech Republic. This suggests
that after the EU accession in 2004 the regions closer to the West-East border did worse
on average in attracting FDI activity compared to the regions that are further away, and
that FDI activity has reorganised and relocated towards the interior regions. This is sur-
prising, but an examination of the FDI data reveals that in the post-enlargement period
the border regions in the Czech Republic lost their competitive position as a destination
of inward FDI to the advantage of interior regions (see: section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4). This
places the Czech border regions as the ‘losers’ of the EU enlargement and its interior
regions as the ‘winners’.
The inclusion of the country-specific distance terms in Table 6.4 yields some dif-
ferences in the estimates of the EU membership terms compared to Table 6.3. In the
earlier analysis I was unable to find a statistically significant membership effect for the
NUTS2 regions of the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, once the distance terms
are included, a negative and statistically significant EU membership effect is found for
the regions of the Czech Republic, but which gets less negative with distance. The
opposite is the case for Hungary. Perhaps, contrary to expectations, the models with
heterogenous distance terms in columns (XIII) to (XV) produce an insignificant coef-
ficient on the EU membership for Romania. Finally, in column (XVI) an aggregate
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distance term is included for the accession countries. Although this term is insignif-
icant, this regression demonstrates that a large proportion of regions in the ‘new’ EU
experienced a positive EU membership effect. These comprise the regions of Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, this should be treated
with caution as the aggregate distance term does not perform well.
6.4.3 EU Membership and Distance: An Examination for FDI Shares
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the measurement of the dependent
variable substantially affects the conclusions that can be drawn. As indicated above, the
inclusion of time fixed effects in the model means the denominators in the dependent
and lagged dependent variable are dummied out, as these do not vary within a time
period, so that this is effectively an equation in the (log) number of FDI projects. How-
ever, the exclusion of the time effects imposes these terms on the estimation and it is a
regression in (log) FDI shares. Two sets of results are presented: the first includes time
fixed effects as part of the specification and is for the (log) number of FDI projects (see:
Table 6.5) and the second omits the time dummies and is for (log) FDI shares relative
to that of the EU-25 as a whole (see: Table 6.6). I focus on the degree to which two sets
of regression results differ from each other. The advantage of using the share is that it
holds constant events that affect the EU-25 level of FDI. Once again, in all specifications
I examine the EU membership and distance effects both at the aggregate and country-
specific level. In addition to the EU and distance terms the control variables are also
included. I start by estimating the basic regression model that contains LDV, the EU
membership term for ‘new’ regions and a full set of controls (column (XVII) in Table
6.5 and a corresponding column (XXIV) in Table 6.6) but I subsequently extend this by
adding extra terms (the three post-accession terms, spatial lag and distance term). In
this respect, the model specifications in columns (XIX), (XX), (XXII) and (XXIII) of Table
6.5 correspond to the results found in the earlier sections of this chapter.6
Importantly, the comparison between the regression estimates in Tables 6.5 and
6.6 demonstrate that a decision about whether or not to account for year-specific het-
erogeneity makes little difference to the estimates on the EU membership and distance
terms, as well as on the LDV and spatial lag terms. Essentially, the coefficients show
little difference between corresponding columns in these two regression tables. Fur-
thermore, should a variable pass statistical significance test in a model specification
with year fixed effects, it often passes it too in the corresponding model specification
that omits the year dummies. This is reassuring as it means that regardless of whether
6To be precise, column (XIX) replicates column (II) of Table 6.1, column (XX) replicates column (VI) of
Table 6.2, and columns (XXII) and (XXIII) replicate columns (XIV) and (XV) of Table 6.4.
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Table 6.5: EU membership and distance effects: FDI numbers
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XVII) (XVIII) (XIX) (XX) (XXI) (XXII) (XXIII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.106*** 0.099*** 0.098***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.610*** 0.611*** 0.577*** 0.586*** 0.595***
‘New’ EU 0.123 0.348*** 0.280*** 0.368***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.570 0.488 -0.000
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.036 -0.297* -0.317*
Estonia: EU membership 0.091 0.033 -0.261
Hungary: EU membership 0.241* 0.430*** 0.341**
Latvia: EU membership 0.648*** 0.409*** 0.124
Lithuania: EU membership 0.785*** 0.374*** 0.075
Poland: EU membership 0.516*** 0.695*** 0.699***
Romania: EU membership 1.028*** 0.359 0.391
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.751*** 0.765*** 0.606***
Slovenia: EU membership 1.112*** 2.121*** 2.282***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.073 -0.062 -0.065 -0.061 -0.059 -0.057
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.341*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.256*** -0.254*** -0.253***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.002 0.006 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.014
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.019 -0.059*
Bulgaria: road distance to EU border -0.052 -0.011
Czech Republic: road distance to EU border 0.308** 0.290**
Estonia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Hungary: road distance to EU border -0.137*** -0.119**
Latvia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Lithuania: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Poland: road distance to EU border -0.111** -0.117**
Romania: road distance to EU border 0.019 0.011
Slovak Republic: road distance to EU border -0.067** -0.017
Slovenia: road distance to EU border -2.718*** -3.509***
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.288**
Jacobs term -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.078***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.267 0.309 0.176 0.177 0.407 0.225 0.164
Adjacent market GDP -0.014 -0.013 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017
Peripherality index -9.716 -9.837 -6.518 -7.612 -9.739 -9.731 -9.231
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Income per capita -0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010
Population density -0.711** -0.783*** -0.634** -0.616** -0.608** -0.608** -0.591**
Growth rate 0.412 0.393 0.155 0.133 0.168 0.162 0.190
Physical infrastructure -3.590 -3.659 -4.697 -4.737 -4.112 -4.775 -5.480*
Unemployment rate 0.995** 0.683 0.451 0.369 0.244 0.250 0.263
Secondary education 0.167 0.175 0.199 0.219 0.015 0.019 0.052
Tertiary education 0.376 0.477 0.330 0.333 0.206 0.241 0.155
Wage rate -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.043** -0.044** -0.036* -0.036* -0.035*
Dummy: wage rate -1.499*** -1.549*** -0.672 -0.679 -1.329** -1.055** -0.988*
Openness to trade 0.578*** 0.714*** 0.544*** 0.514*** 0.667*** 0.672*** 0.652***
Exchange rate -0.458** -0.205 -0.131 -0.115 -0.035 -0.033 -0.029
Exchange rate volatility -0.710** -0.479 -0.344 -0.346 -0.366 -0.364 -0.358
Political risk 0.630 0.552 0.302 0.316 0.217 0.224 0.235
Corporate tax rate -0.867** -0.764** -0.636* -0.724** -0.599* -0.601* -0.585*
EU Structural Funds -0.190* -0.097 -0.076 -0.064 -0.078 -0.081 -0.086
Single currency -0.057 -0.042 -0.022 -0.029 -0.071 -0.070 -0.066
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.842 0.844 0.848 0.848 0.851 0.852 0.852
RMSE 0.478 0.475 0.470 0.470 0.466 0.465 0.465
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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Table 6.6: EU membership and distance effects: FDI shares
Dep. var.: LN(share of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XXIV) (XXV) (XXVI) (XXVII) (XXVIII) (XXIX) (XXX)
LDV: LN(share FDI) 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.100***
Spatial lag: LN(share FDI) 0.692*** 0.693*** 0.669*** 0.679*** 0.688***
‘New’ EU 0.102 0.276*** 0.208** 0.292**
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.569 0.538 0.002
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.026 -0.307* -0.331*
Estonia: EU membership -0.031 -0.088 -0.408**
Hungary: EU membership 0.144 0.333*** 0.237*
Latvia: EU membership 0.490*** 0.248*** -0.062
Lithuania: EU membership 0.687** 0.269*** -0.056
Poland: EU membership 0.441** 0.618*** 0.623***
Romania: EU membership 0.958*** 0.275 0.312
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.765*** 0.796*** 0.616***
Slovenia: EU membership 1.037*** 2.062*** 2.242***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.051 -0.040 -0.043 -0.041 -0.039 -0.037
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.335*** -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.238***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.057 0.058 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.045
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.019 -0.061*
Bulgaria: road distance to EU border -0.058 -0.013
Czech Republic: road distance to EU border 0.308** 0.289**
Estonia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Hungary: road distance to EU border -0.138*** -0.118**
Latvia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Lithuania: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Poland: road distance to EU border -0.111** -0.118**
Romania: road distance to EU border 0.020 0.010
Slovak Republic: road distance to EU border -0.077** -0.022
Slovenia: road distance to EU border -2.756*** -3.625***
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.315**
Jacobs term -0.024* -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.295 0.323 0.107 0.130 0.363 0.179 0.127
Adjacent market GDP -0.011 -0.010 -0.021 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017
Peripherality index -11.431 -12.346* -10.992 -11.258 -12.957* -12.886* -11.720
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Income per capita -0.015 -0.014 -0.008 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016
Population density -0.663* -0.715** -0.550* -0.542* -0.537* -0.537* -0.521*
Growth rate -0.105 -0.201 -0.296 -0.312 -0.325 -0.332 -0.302
Physical infrastructure -3.726 -3.985 -5.203 -5.297 -4.490 -5.155* -5.898*
Unemployment rate 0.853* 0.592 0.389 0.291 0.229 0.236 0.236
Secondary education -0.131 -0.116 -0.043 -0.020 -0.184 -0.179 -0.140
Tertiary education 0.121 0.243 0.124 0.131 0.024 0.055 -0.031
Wage rate -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.040** -0.042** -0.032* -0.033* -0.031
Dummy: wage rate -1.087** -1.264*** -0.426 -0.444 -0.953* -0.670 -0.588
Openness to trade 0.468*** 0.603*** 0.444*** 0.426** 0.519*** 0.522*** 0.504***
Exchange rate -0.603*** -0.407* -0.302 -0.285 -0.254 -0.251 -0.239
Exchange rate volatility -0.406 -0.252 -0.180 -0.188 -0.271 -0.269 -0.256
Political risk 1.101*** 1.044*** 0.642* 0.652* 0.620* 0.628* 0.623*
Corporate tax rate -1.393*** -1.319*** -0.993*** -1.079*** -0.968*** -0.972*** -0.964***
EU Structural Funds -0.216** -0.161* -0.119 -0.118 -0.113 -0.114 -0.121
Single currency -0.082* -0.082 -0.060 -0.066 -0.088* -0.087* -0.084*
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.839 0.841 0.846 0.846 0.849 0.850 0.850
RMSE 0.481 0.479 0.472 0.472 0.468 0.467 0.467
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N N N N N
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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I use estimating equation in the number of FDI projects or in the share of FDI projects
for the EU-25 the findings of the empirical analysis in respect of the strength of EU
membership and distance that arise in the wake of the EU economic integration pro-
cess are little changed. However, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect
to the control variables. Specifically, the comparison of the results in Tables 6.5 and 6.6
indicate that these estimates can vary quite considerably. This applies both to the size
and significance of these estimates as follows.
First, all the model specifications in FDI numbers (columns (XVII) to (XXIII)
in Table 6.5) are consistent. They suggest that greater industrial diversity encourages
more inward investment, as reflected in the negative and significant Jacobs term that
measures inter-industry agglomeration and diversification economies. However, this
is not the case for the model specifications in FDI shares. With the exception of the
basic model in column (XXIV), which also shows a negative and significant coefficient
on the Jacobs term, the other share specifications indicate an insignificant inter-industry
agglomeration. Second, according to the models in FDI numbers the location of a region
in the core or periphery of the EU-25 does not make any difference to how much FDI
it receives. However, the models in FDI shares are inconclusive, as columns (XXV),
(XXVIII) and (XXIX) suggest that regions in more peripheral markets attract more FDI,
while columns (XXIV), (XXVI), (XXVII) and (XXX) indicate that this is not an important
consideration.
Third, a similar consideration applies to the role that the quality of the physi-
cal infrastructure has on the size of regional inward investment. With the exception of
column (XXIII), all regression models that included time fixed effects show that road
infrastructure is not an important consideration for the investing multinational firms.
The models that omit time dummies are not equally conclusive, as some of them in-
dicate that the on average more FDI tend to go to regions with less dense motorway
network. However, this effect is confirmed in two out of seven model specifications
and in all two cases the motorway density passes significance test at the 10% level.
Fourth, there is a discrepancy in what two sets of results say in relation to the
impact of the exchange rate and exchange rate volatility on the size of regional FDI ac-
tivity, but overall this difference is not large. However, what is more important is that
a further examination of estimation results reveals that the models in FDI shares offer
contrasting evidence on the effect of political risk. Specifically, all the model specifi-
cations in FDI shares show that locations that are characterised by lower political risk
attract larger FDI shares (a positive and significant coefficient on political risk). On the
contrary, all models with time fixed effects in Table 6.5 suggest that the political risk
rating is not statistically significant.
Finally, there is ambiguous evidence offered by the two sets of models with re-
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spect to the effect of the EU Single currency on the size of regional FDI activity. The
estimating equations with time fixed effects suggest that the Single currency has no ef-
fect on the number of FDI projects that a region receives. However, the models without
time fixed effects offer some support that the effect of the EU Single currency on the
regional shares of FDI is negative and significant at the 10% level.
6.4.4 The Role of National Borders: The Border Effect
This section explores the possible of an asymmetry between the border and interior
regions that was derived at a theoretical level by Bruelhart et al. (2004). Unlike the
theoretical model, my attention is focused on the asymmetry between the border and
interior regions of the new accession states. Like above, I define a border region with
reference to its location relative to the West-East border that existed as an external bor-
der to the 2004 EU prior to enlargement. I do not perform a similar analysis for the
border affected by 2007 enlargement as only a small proportion of the land borders of
Bulgaria and Romania are with other EU countries. Given that the border regions of
the EU-10 are generally closer to the core of the EU, and therefore have better market
access, I anticipate the border effect on regional FDI location to be positive.
Table 6.7 reports the estimation results for the models that test the border effect
in regional FDI location in the ‘new’ EU Member States. Given that the border effect
may occur over a large geographical area, three different dummies for whether a re-
gion in the EU-10 is a border region are considered (see: Table 4.12 and Figure 4.10 in
Chapter 4): BORDER if the region is contiguous to the West-East border; BORDER 01
if it is separated from the West-East by at most one other region; and BORDER 02 if
it is separated from the West-East by at most two other regions. I examine an asym-
metric relationship between border and interior NUTS2 regions both at the aggregate
EU-10 level and for individual ‘new’ EU Member States. The shortcoming of the latter
approach is that some countries consist of a single NUTS2 region only, and for these a
country-specific difference in distance effect on FDI activity in border and interior re-
gions cannot be explored. A similar difficulty is associated with countries that consist
of border regions only (i.e. Slovenia and the Czech Republic using the BORDER 02
classification below) or interior regions only (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania).
Overall, the results at the aggregate EU-10 level in Table 6.7 offer only partial
support for a positive border effect on FDI location in response to EU integration.
Columns (XXXI), (XXXIII) and (XXXV) show that the asymmetry in the border effect
is not supported by BORDER and BORDER 01, although for the BORDER 02 measure
the border regions of the EU-10 receive on average 38.8% (exp(0.328) − 1) more FDI
projects in each year than the interior regions after 2004. Also within the individual
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Table 6.7: Border effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XXXI) (XXXII) (XXXIII) (XXXIV) (XXXV) (XXXVI)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.105***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.580*** 0.581*** 0.574*** 0.580*** 0.574*** 0.575***
Bulgaria: EU membership -0.071 -0.071 -0.070 -0.073 -0.070 -0.070
Czech Republic: EU membership -0.129 0.105 -0.120 0.610*** -0.345* -0.018
Estonia: EU membership -0.188 0.037 -0.099 0.039 -0.290** 0.038
Hungary: EU membership 0.066 0.052 0.040 0.003 -0.137 -0.213**
Latvia: EU membership 0.413*** 0.415*** 0.275* 0.416*** 0.084 0.411***
Lithuania: EU membership 0.374*** 0.371*** 0.377*** 0.368*** 0.048 0.376***
Poland: EU membership 0.264** 0.198* 0.254** 0.136 0.100 0.096
Romania: EU membership 0.522*** 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.524*** 0.523*** 0.523***
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.591*** 0.581*** 0.579*** 0.509*** 0.404*** 0.580***
Slovenia: EU membership 0.862** 1.092*** 0.949** 1.098*** 0.760* 1.087***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.062 -0.061 -0.062 -0.059 -0.061 -0.061
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.256***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015
‘New’ EU: BORDER region 0.226
Bulgaria: BORDER region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER region -0.244
Estonia: BORDER region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER region 0.300***
Latvia: BORDER region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER region 0.573**
Romania: BORDER region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER region 0.272***
Slovenia: BORDER region (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 01 region 0.138
Bulgaria: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER 01 region -0.834***
Estonia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER 01 region 0.210
Latvia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER 01 region 0.452**
Romania: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER 01 region 0.286***
Slovenia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 02 region 0.328***
Bulgaria: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Estonia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER 02 region 0.435***
Latvia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER 02 region 0.334*
Romania: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER 02 region 0.093
Slovenia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Jacobs term -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.080***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.492 0.480 0.495 0.458 0.476 0.479
Adjacent market GDP -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019
Peripherality index -9.693 -9.689 -9.740 -9.609 -9.668 -9.758
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Income per capita -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007
Population density -0.602** -0.620** -0.608** -0.645** -0.609** -0.609**
Growth rate 0.153 0.173 0.154 0.165 0.158 0.164
Physical infrastructure -4.216 -4.126 -4.196 -4.205 -4.464 -4.441
Unemployment rate 0.234 0.250 0.248 0.250 0.276 0.274
Secondary education 0.050 0.046 0.036 0.066 0.032 0.027
Tertiary education 0.220 0.197 0.231 0.199 0.231 0.231
Wage rate -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* -0.035* -0.036* -0.036*
Dummy: wage rate -1.325** -1.318** -1.337** -1.308** -1.330** -1.332**
Openness to trade 0.670*** 0.668*** 0.671*** 0.667*** 0.669*** 0.670***
Exchange rate -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.031 -0.035 -0.034
Exchange rate volatility -0.366 -0.364 -0.368 -0.364 -0.369 -0.367
Political risk 0.212 0.220 0.215 0.236 0.227 0.226
Corporate tax rate -0.597* -0.595* -0.599* -0.595* -0.597* -0.599*
EU Structural Funds -0.077 -0.072 -0.077 -0.069 -0.078 -0.078
Single currency -0.070 -0.069 -0.070 -0.067 -0.070 -0.070
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.852 0.851 0.851
RMSE 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.465 0.466 0.466
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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countries, columns (XXXII), (XXXIV) and (XXXVI) show that the estimated border ef-
fect is not robust to the particular measure used. While the border effect tends to be
positive, Poland is the only accession country for which its border regions consistently
receive more FDI projects than their interior counterparts regardless of the border re-
gion definition employed.7 Depending on the definition, the NUTS2 border regions of
Poland are found to receive on average 77.4% more investment projects than interior
regions under the ‘narrow’ BORDER definition (i.e a coefficient of 0.573), 57.1% more
under the ‘medium’ BORDER 01 definition (0.452) and 39.7% more under the ‘broad’
BORDER 02 definition (0.334).
These results do not offer compelling evidence for a border effect in the eco-
nomic geography of FDI location in the ‘new’ EU countries. However, it is noticeable
that the Czech Republic is the only country for which I find a negative and statisti-
cally significant border effect under the ‘medium’ BORDER 01 definition. Furthermore,
under the ‘narrow’ BORDER definition the parameter estimate on the Czech border
dummy is negatively signed, albeit not statistically significant. Indeed, unlike other
EU-10 countries a positive and significant effect was found for the distance variable for
the Czech Republic in Tables 6.4 to 6.6. The peculiar geography of the Czech Republic
suggests that the interior regions are close to the West-East both to the north, west and
south of this country. Overall, these features suggest that the NUTS2 regions of the
Czech Republic are outliers and display a pattern in the economic geography of FDI lo-
cation that does not conform to the spatial distribution of FDI activity observed for the
other ‘new’ EU countries. The presence of outliers can significantly distort parameter
estimates and in the context of the border effect analysis perhaps explain why no sta-
tistically significant border effect was found for the EU-10 in aggregate. This provides
a rationale for re-estimating the regression models in Table 6.8. Columns (XXXVII),
(XXXVIII) and (XXXIX) of this table include a Czech-specific border dummy alongside
the aggregate EU-10 border dummy, and a strong and consistent border effect is now
apparent under either measure.
The parameter estimates on the border terms in the first three columns of Ta-
ble 6.8 conform to my prior expectations. They demonstrate that the border effect on
the regional distribution of FDI activity is negative and statistically significant for the
Czech Republic, but positive and significant for the other ‘new’ EU Member States. This
suggests that after the EU enlargement in 2004 inward FDI activity tended to locate in
the interior NUTS2 regions of the Czech Republic, but in the other EU-10 countries the
border regions were favoured as a prospective location. Singling out the special case
7According to the ‘narrow’ BORDER definition, a positive border effect on regional FDI activity is also
found for Hungary and Slovakia, for the ‘medium’ BORDER 01 definition a positive effect is found for
Slovakia, and lastly for the ‘broad’ BORDER 02 definition a positive border effect is found for Hungary.
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Table 6.8: Border effects (the Czech Republic outlier)
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XXXVII) (XXXVIII) (XXXIX) (XL) (XLI)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.098***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.579*** 0.581*** 0.574*** 0.587*** 0.587***
Bulgaria: EU membership -0.071 -0.072 -0.070 -0.073 -0.073
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.106 0.610*** -0.345* 0.449*** -0.739***
Estonia: EU membership -0.422*** -0.324** -0.290** -0.562*** -0.562***
Hungary: EU membership 0.030 -0.062 -0.137 -0.127 -0.127
Latvia: EU membership 0.415*** 0.054 0.084 0.117 0.117
Lithuania: EU membership 0.370*** 0.369*** 0.048 0.200 0.200
Poland: EU membership 0.220** 0.170 0.100 0.095 0.095
Romania: EU membership 0.522*** 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.522*** 0.522***
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.535*** 0.471*** 0.404*** 0.386*** 0.386***
Slovenia: EU membership 0.633 0.735* 0.760* 0.500 0.500
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.061 -0.059 -0.061 -0.058 -0.058
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.254*** -0.254***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018
‘New’ EU: BORDER region 0.460*** 0.598***
Czech Republic: BORDER region -0.704** -1.188***
‘New’ EU: BORDER 01 region 0.362***
Czech Republic: BORDER 01 region -1.196***
‘New’ EU: BORDER 02 region 0.328*** 0.598***
Czech Republic: BORDER 02 region (omitted) (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 12 region -0.299*
Czech Republic: BORDER 12 region 0.044
‘New’ EU: BORDER 11 region 0.300**
Czech Republic: BORDER 11 region -1.143***
‘New’ EU: BORDER 22 region 0.164 -0.135
Czech Republic: BORDER 22 region (omitted) 1.143***
Jacobs term -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.079***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.470 0.458 0.476 0.444 0.444
Adjacent market GDP -0.018 -0.016 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015
Peripherality index -9.609 -9.607 -9.668 -9.528 -9.528
Internal market GDP 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***
Income per capita -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012
Population density -0.620** -0.645** -0.609** -0.639** -0.639**
Growth rate 0.178 0.169 0.158 0.170 0.170
Physical infrastructure -4.218 -4.178 -4.464 -4.347 -4.347
Unemployment rate 0.257 0.259 0.276 0.261 0.261
Secondary education 0.052 0.069 0.032 0.082 0.082
Tertiary education 0.188 0.201 0.231 0.188 0.188
Wage rate -0.035* -0.035* -0.036* -0.035* -0.035*
Dummy: wage rate -1.312** -1.306** -1.330** -1.289** -1.289**
Openness to trade 0.665*** 0.666*** 0.669*** 0.664*** 0.664***
Exchange rate -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.030 -0.030
Exchange rate volatility -0.365 -0.364 -0.369 -0.362 -0.362
Political risk 0.224 0.238 0.227 0.241 0.241
Corporate tax rate -0.593* -0.594* -0.597* -0.591* -0.591*
EU Structural Funds -0.072 -0.068 -0.078 -0.068 -0.068
Single currency -0.068 -0.067 -0.070 -0.066 -0.066
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.851 0.852 0.851 0.852 0.852
RMSE 0.466 0.465 0.466 0.464 0.464
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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of the Czech Republic, the analysis shows that the NUTS2 regions contiguous to the
West-East border on average receive 58.4% more FDI projects than the interior regions
(i.e. a coefficient of 0.460). As I gradually broaden the border region definition, the
relative advantage of the border regions in attracting FDI appears to diminish. While
the border regions in the EU-10 (excluding the Czech Republic) receive 58.4% more FDI
under the ‘narrow’ border definition, under the ‘medium’ definition the strength of the
border effect is 43.6%, while under the ‘broad’ definition it is 38.8%.8
These results indicate that the border effect is weaker the greater is the area
defined by the West-East border region. To examine this proposition empirically I con-
sider the two auxiliary dummy variables: BORDER 11 and BORDER 22, which were
defined in Table 4.12 of Chapter 4. These are subsets of the above border regions, where
BORDER 11 = BORDER 01 - BORDER, so that these are separated from the West-East
border by one other region, and BORDER 22 = BORDER 02 - BORDER 01, so that that
these are separated from the West-East border by two other regions (see: Figure 4.10).
I expect that on average border regions attract more inward FDI, but that the positive
border effect diminishes for regions that are further away from this border. The pa-
rameter estimates for these terms are reported in column (XL) of Table 6.8. Since the
Czech Republic does not fit with the spatial distribution of FDI observed for other EU-
10 countries, then these regions are again dummied out.
Column (XL) confirms that the positive border effect diminishes in strength for
regions further away from the West-East border. Specifically, the parameter estimate
on the aggregate ‘new’ EU BORDER dummy is 0.598 and statistically significant at the
1% level, indicating that the NUTS2 regions in the EU-10 that are contiguous to this
border on average receive 81.8% (exp(0.598)− 1) more FDI per annum than the interior
regions. This finding does not apply to the border regions of the Czech Republic, for
which the border effect is negative and statistically significant. For the NUTS2 regions
in EU-10 that are separated from the West-East border by another region (BORDER
11), the size of the border effect is 35.0%. It is a weaker border effect, but statistically
significant at the 5% level, so that the BORDER 11 regions have a location advantage in
attracting inward investment. However, this is not evident for the BORDER 22 regions,
which are found not to receive significantly more FDI than the interior regions.
Finally, I examine if there is a statistically significant decay in the strength of the
border effect with distance. For this purpose, I define a new border region dummy,
BORDER 12, which consists of all BORDER 11 and BORDER 22 regions (see: Figure
4.10). Column (XLI) of Table 6.8 regresses the model with BORDER 02, BORDER 12
8Under the ‘broad’ BORDER 02 definition, all NUTS2 regions of the Czech Republic fall within the
category of a border region and therefore the Czech border region effect cannot be estimated. As such, the
parameter estimates in column (XXXIX) repeat those previously reported in column (XXXV).
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and BORDER 22. The first term gives the strength of the border region effect for the
regions that are contiguous to the West-East border, the second term determines if the
effect is significantly smaller for the BORDER 11 regions and the third if it is smaller
in the BORDER 22 regions. The estimates confirm a statistically significant decay in
the strength of the border effect as the distance from the border increases. The regions
alongside the West-East border receive 81.8% more FDI than the interior regions, as in
column (XL), but the next set of regions (BORDER 11) on average receives 25.8% less
FDI than the contiguous regions. However, the reduction in FDI for the BORDER 22
regions is not statistically significant.9
6.4.5 Extensions: Alternative Distance Measure
Earlier I found that the distance of a region from the West-East border has a negative
effect on the inward investment effect in the EU-10 in the post-accession period. This
was the case for both the number and the share of FDI projects in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. In
this section I examine how robust the earlier results are to alternative specifications of
distance, based on the regressions in columns (XXI) and (XXVIII) of these tables, where
the distance term is statistically significant at the 10% level only. Table 6.9 considers
three alternative measures of distance for the specifications in the number and share
of FDI projects (i.e. with and without the time fixed effects). First, columns (XLII) and
(XLV) include the distance terms as a quadratic. Second, columns (XLIII) and (XLVI)
include the distance term in log form. Third, columns (XLIV) and (XLVII) consider
an alternative measure of distance, which is using the Euclidean straight-line measure
of distance, as explained in Chapter 4. Of course, the distance may affect regions in
different countries differently but this is not considered. Each specification in Table 6.9
employs a heterogenous, country-specific treatment of the EU membership effect and
an aggregate EU-10 treatment of distance effect.
It should be emphasized that the log-linear specifications used in Tables 6.5 and
6.6 already allow for a non-linear relationship between the number or share of FDI
projects and the distance. Specifically, they allow for an exponentially declining effect
of distance the further a region is from the West-East border. Columns (XLII) and (XLV)
of Table 6.9 do not suggest the relationship is any more complicated than this, as the
squared distance term is insignificant. The log transformation of the distance term in
columns (XLIII) and (XLVI) of Table 6.9 effectively allows for a linear effect between
9Again, the pattern for the spatial distribution of FDI activity in the Czech Republic does not match this
pattern, where NUTS2 regions that are separated from the affected border by two other regions (BORDER
22) are the clear ‘winners’ as the top destination for inward investment in the post-accession period. In the
remaining ‘new’ EU countries the regions alongside the affected border are the unquestionable ‘winners’
attracting a stunning 81.8% more FDI than the interior regions.
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Table 6.9: Alternative specifications of the distance term
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects) Dep. var.: LN(share of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XLII) (XLIII) (XLIV) (XLV) (XLVI) (XLVII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.106***
LDV: LN(share FDI) 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.578*** 0.582*** 0.577***
Spatial lag: LN(share FDI) 0.671*** 0.674*** 0.669***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.516 0.914* 0.572 0.516 0.920* 0.572
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.090 0.586* 0.034 0.079 0.587* 0.024
Estonia: EU membership 0.146 0.671** 0.101 0.024 0.562* -0.021
Hungary: EU membership 0.360** 0.848** 0.244* 0.263* 0.764** 0.147
Latvia: EU membership 0.816*** 1.258*** 0.686*** 0.657*** 1.113*** 0.530***
Lithuania: EU membership 0.940*** 1.294*** 0.839*** 0.842*** 1.207*** 0.743**
Poland: EU membership 0.652*** 1.095*** 0.520*** 0.576*** 1.032*** 0.446**
Romania: EU membership 1.091*** 1.468*** 1.045*** 1.021*** 1.407*** 0.976***
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.835*** 1.268*** 0.752*** 0.848*** 1.293*** 0.766***
Slovenia: EU membership 1.135*** 1.589*** 1.107*** 1.060*** 1.525*** 1.031***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.241***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.046 0.045 0.045
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.128** -0.129**
(‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border)2 0.007 0.007
LN(‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border) -0.141** -0.144**
‘New’ EU: line distance to EU border -0.076* -0.077*
Jacobs term -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.018 -0.018 -0.019
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.424 0.406 0.409 0.380 0.361 0.364
Adjacent market GDP -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019
Peripherality index -9.621 -9.556 -9.745 -12.819* -12.784* -12.981*
Internal market GDP 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Income per capita -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
Population density -0.612** -0.610** -0.608** -0.541* -0.539* -0.537*
Growth rate 0.171 0.165 0.165 -0.322 -0.326 -0.328
Physical infrastructure -4.395 -4.459 -4.140 -4.770 -4.843 -4.519
Unemployment rate 0.265 0.258 0.240 0.249 0.242 0.226
Secondary education 0.034 0.053 0.013 -0.168 -0.151 -0.186
Tertiary education 0.225 0.211 0.207 0.041 0.026 0.025
Wage rate -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* -0.032* -0.032* -0.032*
Dummy: wage rate -1.327** -1.663*** -1.330** -0.951* -1.298** -0.955*
Openness to trade 0.666*** 0.665*** 0.668*** 0.518*** 0.519*** 0.520***
Exchange rate -0.034 -0.032 -0.035 -0.253 -0.251 -0.254
Exchange rate volatility -0.365 -0.365 -0.367 -0.268 -0.267 -0.272
Political risk 0.223 0.222 0.215 0.626* 0.623* 0.620*
Corporate tax rate -0.596* -0.594* -0.599* -0.967*** -0.963*** -0.968***
EU Structural Funds -0.077 -0.075 -0.078 -0.112 -0.110 -0.113
Single currency -0.069 -0.068 -0.071 -0.088* -0.087* -0.089*
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.849 0.849 0.849
RMSE 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.468 0.468 0.468
NUTS2 region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N N
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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the number or share of FDI projects and the distance. These are both negative and
statistically significant, but now at the 5% level, suggesting that they provide a better
fit to the data. An estimate of -0.141 in the number of FDI projects equation and -0.144 in
the share of FDI projects equation suggests that on average a 10% increase in distance
from the West-East border leads to a reduction of -1.33% projects per annum, and a
reduction in the region’s share of EU-25 FDI projects of 1.36%. Finally, the Euclidean
measure in columns (XLIV) and (XLVII) of Table 6.9 appears to perform no better than
the road distance in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Since the straight-line distance is likely to be
shorter than the road distance, it is not surprising that larger estimates are obtained for
this.
Overall, these results indicate that the alternative straight-line measure of dis-
tance makes no real difference to the estimates, but that the linear specification of the
relationship between inward investment and distance performs better for the regions
of the new accession countries. Thus, while I find in section 6.4.4 that the border ef-
fect diminishes strongly, when the CEEC regions as a whole are considered there is
a significant distance effect. Since this effect is linear and is preferred over alternative
specifications that allow for a diminishing effect it means that the effect of distance from
the West-East border is not just felt at the border itself.
6.4.6 Extensions: Country Fixed Effects
To avoid biased parameter estimates due to regional heterogeneity and time effects
the model includes a set of region and year dummies. This approach is easily imple-
mentable and helps account for unobservable effects and omitted variables. However,
a problem that is intrinsic to this approach for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity
is that the inclusion of a large number of dummy variables for the large sample of re-
gions (with a small number of annual observations for each region) is likely to lead to
a large loss of degrees of freedom (Hadjimichael et al., 1996). For this reason, and since
it is plausible that a multinational firm will be more interested in investing in a partic-
ular country rather than in a particular NUTS2 region, in this section I employ country
dummies instead of using region fixed effects. I focus on the number of FDI projects
and I replicate columns (XVII) to (XXIII) of Table 6.5, but including country fixed effects
rather than region fixed effects.10 The results are presented in Table 6.10 and I explore
how this modification affects the parameter estimates compared with Table 6.5.
At first inspection it is apparent that the parameter estimates for the model spec-
ifications with country fixed effects suggest more inertia in the intertemporal inflows of
10Although the approach helps to address the problems caused by the large loss of degrees of freedom
(i.e. imprecise coefficient estimates), potential biases may arise due to regional time invariant unobserv-
ables when only country fixed effects are included in the model specification.
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Table 6.10: Country fixed effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (XLVIII) (XLIX) (L) (LI) (LII) (LIII) (LIV)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.615*** 0.615*** 0.607*** 0.601*** 0.599*** 0.600*** 0.598***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.227*** 0.198*** 0.192*** 0.222*** 0.231***
‘New’ EU 0.077 0.395*** 0.367*** 0.436***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.274** 0.744 0.386
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.162 0.157* 0.140
Estonia: EU membership 0.263*** 0.245*** 0.007
Hungary: EU membership 0.379*** 0.651*** 0.577***
Latvia: EU membership 0.538*** 0.476*** 0.247*
Lithuania: EU membership 0.757*** 0.668*** 0.420***
Poland: EU membership 0.527*** 0.783*** 0.785***
Romania: EU membership 0.449*** 0.534** 0.563***
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.597*** 0.540*** 0.416**
Slovenia: EU membership 0.925*** 1.086*** 1.199***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.261** -0.254** -0.256** -0.257** -0.257** -0.255**
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.348*** -0.314*** -0.318*** -0.326*** -0.322*** -0.320***
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.164** 0.172** 0.152** 0.127* 0.126* 0.129*
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border -0.015*** -0.015***
Bulgaria: road distance to EU border -0.059 -0.029
Czech Republic: road distance to EU border -0.008 -0.023
Estonia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Hungary: road distance to EU border -0.126*** -0.113***
Latvia: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Lithuania: road distance to EU border (omitted) (omitted)
Poland: road distance to EU border -0.088*** -0.092***
Romania: road distance to EU border -0.025 -0.032*
Slovak Republic: road distance to EU border 0.018 0.054
Slovenia: road distance to EU border -0.452*** -1.055***
Capital city (‘new’ EU) 0.230**
Jacobs term -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.076***
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.271* 0.295* 0.257* 0.282* 0.539*** 0.534*** 0.529***
Adjacent market GDP 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
Peripherality index -2.407 -2.794 -1.526 -2.848 -2.603 -2.528 -2.439
Internal market GDP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
Income per capita 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010***
Population density -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 -0.020 -0.018 -0.014 -0.016
Growth rate -0.327 -0.332 -0.345 -0.326 -0.281 -0.315 -0.348
Physical infrastructure 2.463*** 2.478*** 2.486*** 2.641*** 2.657*** 2.518*** 2.524***
Unemployment rate 0.770** 0.590* 0.727** 0.773** 0.718** 0.580* 0.664*
Secondary education 0.607* 0.598* 0.577** 0.522* 0.488 0.453 0.494*
Tertiary education 1.416*** 1.448*** 1.364*** 1.309*** 1.288*** 1.366*** 1.236***
Wage rate -0.034*** -0.030** -0.024* -0.026** -0.019 -0.018 -0.018
Dummy: wage rate -1.023*** -1.037*** -0.792** -0.879** -1.421*** -1.361*** -1.345***
Openness to trade 0.246** 0.335*** 0.254** 0.236* 0.258* 0.262* 0.253*
Exchange rate -0.423*** -0.231 -0.215 -0.211 -0.045 -0.039 -0.038
Exchange rate volatility -0.770** -0.580* -0.527 -0.547 -0.517 -0.501 -0.513
Political risk 0.168 0.121 0.082 0.121 0.041 0.007 0.025
Corporate tax rate -0.614** -0.603** -0.542** -0.618** -0.583** -0.593** -0.571**
EU Structural Funds 0.272*** 0.322*** 0.336*** 0.366*** 0.367*** 0.346*** 0.338***
Single currency -0.051 -0.044 -0.035 -0.043 -0.058 -0.060 -0.057
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
R2 0.774 0.777 0.778 0.779 0.780 0.780 0.781
RMSE 0.551 0.549 0.547 0.546 0.545 0.545 0.545
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table replicates the results in table 6.5 using country fixed effects.
*** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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inward investment. While the models with region dummies of Table 6.5 indicate that
a 10% increase in the (log) number of FDI projects in a region the previous year leads
to an approximately 0.9% to 1.3% increase in regional FDI activity in the current year,
the models with country dummies of Table 6.10 predict a much larger increase in FDI
activity in the range of 5.9% to 6.0% in response to the same shock. On the other hand,
the importance of spatial dependencies between FDI activity in the neighbouring re-
gions is much reduced. A shock that entails 10% increase in the FDI activity in adjacent
regions is shown to translate to 5.7% - 6.0% surge in regional (log) FDI according to the
models with region fixed effects (Table 6.5), but the models with country dummies pre-
dict a 1.8% - 2.2% rise (Table 6.10). Hence, the relative importance of inward investment
inertia and spatial dependencies between regions is reversed when the change is made
between region and country fixed effects.
The estimate on the aggregate EU membership term is unaffected by this modi-
fication to the model specification as I continue to find positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient estimates on the ‘new’ EU membership term in all model specifications
with three post-accession terms. However, the estimates for the regional FDI project
numbers vary in the post-accession period. The models with region dummies gener-
ally predict that the FDI level decreases two years after membership. The models with
country dummies indicate that FDI decreases one year after the EU accession and that
it continues its downward trend two years after, before picking up three years after
accession.
The models with country dummies are also more likely to find a positive and
significant EU membership effect for individual ‘new’ EU Member States, since in a
large number of cases heterogenous country-specific EU membership terms are positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The inclusion of the country fixed effects
means that I fail to identify a positive distance effect on the distribution of FDI activity
associated with the Czech regions since the coefficient on distance is now insignificant.
The aggregate distance terms in columns (LI) and (LII) are negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the models with country dummies are more
likely to detect a negative distance effect at an aggregate EU-10 level.
The most pronounced differences between models with country and region
fixed effects are associated with the parameter estimates on the control variables. A few
of these controls turn from being insignificant in the models with region dummies to
statistically significant in the models with country dummies. Income per capita, phys-
ical infrastructure, unemployment rate and EU Structural Funds all feature among the
control variables that are insignificant in the regression models with region dummies
but that have a positive and statistically significant effect on the size of regional FDI
activity in the models that account for unobserved country effects. On the contrary,
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the effect of population density becomes insignificant. The models with country fixed
effects provide a more compelling evidence of a positive effect of education on FDI
activity.
6.4.7 Extensions: GMM Analysis
The analysis so far has been conducted using the LSDV approach and estimated by
OLS. Although the LSDV approach is “an intuitive first attack on the fixed effects”
(Roodman, 2009b, p. 102), in the presence of endogeneity associated with serially and
spatially lagged dependent variable, the parameter estimates are perhaps biased and
inconsistent. Additional issues such as short panel width of fourteen years could ren-
der the LSDV methodology unsuitable. In this section I focus on re-estimating some of
the earlier models using system GMM methodology to examine how robust LSDV pa-
rameters estimates are to this alternative econometric modelling framework. The GMM
methodology was discussed at length in section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4.
Since the focus of the empirical analysis is on the effect of EU membership and
distance from the West-East border on the spatial distribution of inward FDI activity, I
select the model specifications in columns (XX), (XXI) and (XXII) of Table 6.5 to explore
using the system GMM methodology. These consider in turn the aggregate EU and
distance effects; heterogenous EU and aggregate distance effects; and heterogenous EU
and distance effects. Subsequently, I examine FDI activity in the border and interior
regions of the ‘new’ EU in response to EU integration and so estimate all of the model
specifications in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 using GMM.
Before discussing the parameter estimates of GMM analysis, it is essential to
check for second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. The presence or ab-
sence of second-order autocorrelation will determine which lags of the endogenous
explanatory variables can be used as valid GMM-style instruments in the GMM analy-
sis. The LDV and spatial lag term are treated as endogenous explanatory variables. The
Arellano-Bond test confirms that all of the regression models suffer from second-order
autocorrelation. This invalidates the use of the second lags of endogenous explanatory
variables as instruments in differenced equation, and their lagged differences as instru-
ments in level equation. Therefore, in all GMM regressions I employ third and longer
lags of LDV and spatial lag as instruments for the differenced equation, and the second
lag of the differences of these endogenous variables as instruments for the level equa-
tion. Later, I must also check for third-order serial autocorrelation and inspect Sargan,
Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests to confirm that these instruments are valid.
The GMM results are presented in Table 6.11. The diagnostic tests indicate that
there is no third-order serial autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals. Further, the
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Table 6.11: System GMM analysis: EU membership and distance effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full
Column: (LV) (LVI) (LVII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.620*** 0.630*** 0.604***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.523*** 0.570*** 0.616***
‘New’ EU 0.370***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.105 0.243
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.178 0.238*
Estonia: EU membership 0.306** 0.286**
Hungary: EU membership 0.295* 0.648***
Latvia: EU membership 0.351** 0.340**
Lithuania: EU membership 0.829*** 0.842***
Poland: EU membership 0.257* 0.491***
Romania: EU membership 0.023 0.422
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.508*** 0.597***
Slovenia: EU membership 0.544*** 0.637***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.228 -0.157 -0.137
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.281** -0.245** -0.238**
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.180** 0.176** 0.181**
‘New’ EU: road distance to EU border 0.001 0.005
Bulgaria: road distance to EU border -0.007
Czech Republic: road distance to EU border -0.047
Estonia: road distance to EU border (omitted)
Hungary: road distance to EU border -0.151***
Latvia: road distance to EU border (omitted)
Lithuania: road distance to EU border (omitted)
Poland: road distance to EU border -0.085
Romania: road distance to EU border -0.043
Slovak Republic: road distance to EU border -0.043
Slovenia: road distance to EU border -0.295
Jacobs term -0.026 -0.034* -0.036*
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.005 0.194 0.171
Adjacent market GDP -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018***
Peripherality index 4.736* 3.625 4.356
Internal market GDP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
Income per capita 0.000 0.004 0.004
Population density 0.022 0.015 0.019
Growth rate -0.252 -0.308 -0.313
Physical infrastructure 1.531** 1.478* 1.687**
Unemployment rate 0.176 0.213 0.219
Secondary education 0.470** 0.352* 0.239
Tertiary education 1.041*** 0.759*** 0.859***
Wage rate -0.005 0.001 0.001
Dummy: wage rate 0.022 -0.079 -0.075
Openness to trade 0.017 -0.033 -0.070
Exchange rate -0.448** -0.400* -0.461**
Exchange rate volatility -0.158 -0.284 -0.356
Political risk -0.304 -0.132 -0.118
Corporate tax rate -0.570 -0.351 -0.457
EU Structural Funds 0.258* 0.230* 0.263*
Single currency -0.032 -0.005 -0.014
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) (p-value) 0.086 0.090 0.084
Sargan test (p-value) 0.179 0.154 0.106
Hansen test (p-value) 0.104 0.083 0.091
Difference-in-Hansen tests
H0: GMM differenced-instruments are exogenous 0.133 0.119 0.079
H0: system-GMM instruments are exogenous 0.240 0.195 0.440
H0: GMM instruments without ‘IV’‘ instruments are exogenous 0.170 0.188 0.141
H0: Standard ‘IV’ instruments are exogenous 0.174 0.112 0.196
Number of instruments 193 202 208
Number of cross-sectional 260 260 260
N 3380 3380 3380
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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Sargan, Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests do not reject the null hypothesis of valid
overidentifying restrictions, thus indicating that I have used valid instruments in the
GMM estimation. The number of instruments used is below the number of cross-
sectional units of the panel data (i.e. 260), which complies with the ‘rule of thumb’
of Roodman (2003) that the number of instruments should be less than the number of
cross sectional units. Overall, the diagnostic tests suggest that the GMM estimates of
EU membership and distance effect are unbiased and consistent.
The results in Table 6.11 may be compared with the regressions in Table 6.5.
What is clear from a visual inspection of these results is there is a larger parameter esti-
mate on the lagged dependent variable (LDV) using GMM, which in Table 6.11 ranges
from 0.604 in column (LVII) to 0.630 in column (LVI). In the corresponding models that
were estimated using OLS the coefficients on LDV ranges from 0.099 to 0.122 (columns
(XX) to (XXII) of Table 6.5). This difference may be attributed to the weakness of OLS
in dealing with the endogenous explanatory variables in the dynamic panel data, de-
spite the fact that the LSDV approach accounts for one of the panel data modelling
problems that is associated with unobserved heterogeneity. What applies to both the
system GMM and LSDV estimates of LDV is that they find a highly significant FDI
activity inertia, which is statistically significant at 1% level in all model specifications,
suggesting that last year’s FDI activity is an important determinant of this year’s FDI
activity.
Despite the discrepancy in the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on LDV
between the LSDV and system GMM approaches, the equivalent observation is not
applicable to the estimates of the spatially lagged dependent variable. For the GMM
this ranges from 0.523 to 0.616 (columns (LV), (LVI) and (LVII) of Table 6.11), but for the
LSDV it is between 0.577 and 0.611 (columns (XX), (XXI) and (XXII) of Table 6.5). These
ranges are broadly in line. The spatial lag is statistically significant at the 1% level
in all model specifications, highlighting the importance of spatial spillovers between
neighbouring NUTS2 regions.
Turning to the parameter estimates on EU and the distance terms in Table 6.11,
the system GMM analysis produces an estimate that is similar to that found using by
OLS, and it shows that on average after their EU accession the regions in the ‘new’
EU Member States gain 44.8% more FDI projects (i.e. exp(0.370)− 1). The majority of
the heterogenous EU membership terms in column (LVI) are positive and statistically
significant when estimated by GMM, where when evaluated the positive effect of this
term for the number of FDI projects ranges from 29.3% for Poland to 129.1% for Lithua-
nia (i.e. from 0.257 to 0.829 in terms of coefficient values). A positive EU membership
effect is not detected for Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic, where the first two
countries joined in 2007, and the Czech Republic was previously found to be a pecu-
237
liar case based on its economic geography. The three post-accession EU terms in Table
6.11 are consistent in sign and magnitude with the LSDV parameter estimates, in that
it falls-off significantly two years after the EU accession. However, what contradicts
the earlier LSDV estimates is the positive and significant effect of EU membership term
three years after accession. This suggests that it may recover, although the reason for
this is not known.
The aggregate distance term is statistically insignificant in the first two columns
of Table 6.11, whereas it was negative but significant at the 10% in column (XXI) of Table
6.5. However, when it is replaced by the heterogenous distance terms in column (LVII)
of this table, the EU membership term for the Czech Republic is positive and statisti-
cally significant, a feature that distinguishes the GMM parameter estimate from that of
LSDV, which was found to be negative and statistically significant in column (XXII) of
Table 6.5. Nevertheless, out of ten ‘new’ countries the positive EU membership effect
is smallest in magnitude for the Czech Republic regions, where an EU membership is
found to increase regional FDI activity by 26.8% (i.e. a coefficient estimate of 0.238). The
largest positive EU membership effect continues to be recorded for Lithuania, where
the EU membership is found to increase inward FDI by 132.1% (0.842). Bulgaria and
Romania remain the two countries for which EU membership status does not stimulate
extra inward investment.
Although model specification in column (LVII) of Table 6.11 provides a strong
evidence for the positive impact of EU membership on regional FDI activity in a large
number of ‘new’ EU countries, there is weak evidence that the distance from the West-
East border significantly affects the economic geography of FDI. It is seen from column
(LVII) that out of ten country-specific distance terms, only one is significant, which is
for Hungary. To be precise, an increase in a distance from the West-East border by 100
kilometres causes the regional FDI numbers in Hungary to fall by 14.0% (i.e. a coeffi-
cient estimate of -0.151). In the other EU-10 countries the distance effect is insignificant,
while it cannot be estimated for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which have a single
NUTS2 region only. Unlike GMM, the LSDV results provide more convincing evidence
of a negative effect of distance on FDI location.
Moving to the border analysis, the system GMM is used to re-estimate all model
specifications that were previously regressed with OLS and reported in Tables 6.7 and
6.8. The diagnostic tests reveal that all but one of these specifications is correctly spec-
ified, do not suffer from third-order serial autocorrelation in first-differenced errors or
have valid instruments. The exception is regression model in column (LXIII), for which
the null hypothesis of no third-order autocorrelation is marginally rejected at the 5%
level. Although I attempted to lag the instruments by a further year, the specification
did not pass the Sargan and Hansen tests for valid overidentifying restrictions. For this
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Table 6.12: System GMM analysis: border effects
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (LVIII) (LIX) (LX) (LXI) (LXII) (LXIII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.614*** 0.601*** 0.625*** 0.611*** 0.626*** 0.603***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.652*** 0.689*** 0.591*** 0.676*** 0.581*** 0.712***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.145 0.108 0.157 0.108 0.157 0.058
Czech Republic: EU membership -0.008 -0.017 0.060 0.307* 0.036 0.129
Estonia: EU membership -0.024 0.231* 0.144 0.229* 0.134 0.223
Hungary: EU membership 0.215 0.159 0.229 0.126 0.180 0.100
Latvia: EU membership 0.310** 0.257* 0.207 0.271* 0.196 0.246
Lithuania: EU membership 0.846*** 0.825*** 0.845*** 0.828*** 0.689*** 0.825***
Poland: EU membership 0.164 0.109 0.181 0.061 0.137 0.041
Romania: EU membership 0.035 0.008 0.055 -0.008 0.059 -0.039
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.437*** 0.493*** 0.412*** 0.360*** 0.413** 0.394***
Slovenia: EU membership 0.252 0.484*** 0.394** 0.486*** 0.377** 0.484***
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.122 -0.116 -0.137 -0.099 -0.144 -0.118
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.239** -0.243** -0.244** -0.273** -0.242** -0.158
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.184** 0.200** 0.182** 0.214** 0.182** 0.096
‘New’ EU: BORDER region 0.270**
Bulgaria: BORDER region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER region 0.274
Estonia: BORDER region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER region 0.287**
Latvia: BORDER region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER region 0.437*
Romania: BORDER region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER region -0.040
Slovenia: BORDER region (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 01 region 0.137
Bulgaria: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER 01 region -0.241
Estonia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER 01 region 0.165
Latvia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER 01 region 0.285
Romania: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER 01 0.173**
Slovenia: BORDER 01 region (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 02 region 0.153
Bulgaria: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Czech Republic: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Estonia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Hungary: BORDER 02 region 0.150
Latvia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Lithuania: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Poland: BORDER 02 region 0.215
Romania: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Slovak Republic: BORDER 02 region 0.150
Slovenia: BORDER 02 region (omitted)
Jacobs term -0.036* -0.006 -0.036* -0.008 -0.036* -0.013
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.183 0.252 0.177 0.257 0.173 0.238
Adjacent market GDP -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.020***
Peripherality index 3.589 3.897 3.964 3.817 4.022 3.338
Internal market GDP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
Income per capita 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Population density 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.025
Growth rate -0.318 -0.727 -0.333 -0.371 -0.320 -0.373
Physical infrastructure 1.713** 1.800** 1.665** 1.735** 1.638** 1.615**
Unemployment rate 0.238 0.136 0.236 0.231 0.230 0.256
Secondary education 0.249 0.208 0.233 0.211 0.221 0.224
Tertiary education 0.778*** 0.881*** 0.803*** 0.802*** 0.794*** 0.816***
Wage rate 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
Dummy: wage rate -0.088 -0.081 -0.086 -0.096 -0.082 -0.067
Openness to trade -0.058 -0.052 -0.069 -0.050 -0.067 -0.066
Exchange rate -0.435** -0.427* -0.443** -0.424* -0.446** -0.425*
Exchange rate volatility -0.299 -0.375 -0.319 -0.500 -0.309 -0.536
Political risk -0.144 -0.171 -0.123 -0.093 -0.106 -0.094
Corporate tax rate -0.332 -0.607 -0.378 -0.519 -0.398 -0.414
EU Structural Funds 0.254* 0.278** 0.261* 0.262* 0.256* 0.284**
Single currency -0.016 -0.026 -0.013 -0.033 -0.013 -0.031
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) (p-value) 0.084 0.078 0.088 0.069 0.089 0.045
Sargan test (p-value) 0.143 0.072 0.131 0.027 0.138 0.005
Hansen test (p-value) 0.104 0.095 0.088 0.077 0.089 0.075
Difference-in-Hansen tests
H0: GMM differenced-instruments are exogenous 0.115 0.085 0.107 0.085 0.106 0.091
H0: system-GMM instruments are exogenous 0.313 0.422 0.264 0.305 0.269 0.260
H0: GMM instruments without ‘IV’ instruments are exogenous 0.185 0.067 0.205 0.139 0.196 0.038
H0: Standard ‘IV’ instruments are exogenous 0.163 0.427 0.106 0.159 0.115 0.527
Number of instruments 202 205 202 205 202 204
Number of cross-sectional 260 260 260 260 260 260
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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Table 6.13: System GMM analysis: border effects (the Czech Republic outlier)
Dep. var.: LN(number of FDI projects)
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full
Column: (LXIV) (LXV) (LXVI) (LXVII) (LXVIII)
LDV: LN(number FDI) 0.613*** 0.618*** 0.626*** 0.600*** 0.600***
Spatial lag: LN(number FDI) 0.650*** 0.607*** 0.581*** 0.678*** 0.678***
Bulgaria: EU membership 0.148 0.150 0.157 0.141 0.141
Czech Republic: EU membership 0.015 0.349** 0.036 0.286 -0.099
Estonia: EU membership -0.033 0.064 0.134 -0.125 -0.125
Hungary: EU membership 0.218 0.193 0.180 0.131 0.131
Latvia: EU membership 0.309** 0.127 0.196 0.122 0.122
Lithuania: EU membership 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.689*** 0.797*** 0.797***
Poland: EU membership 0.161 0.132 0.137 0.072 0.072
Romania: EU membership 0.036 0.045 0.059 0.032 0.032
Slovak Republic: EU membership 0.435*** 0.345** 0.413** 0.316* 0.316*
Slovenia: EU membership 0.234 0.313* 0.377** 0.145 0.145
EU membership (≥ 1 year) -0.121 -0.122 -0.144 -0.101 -0.101
EU membership (≥ 2 years) -0.239** -0.249** -0.242** -0.246** -0.246**
EU membership (≥ 3 years) 0.185** 0.180** 0.182** 0.179** 0.179**
‘New’ EU: BORDER region 0.283* 0.363*
Czech Republic: BORDER region -0.027 -0.385
‘New’ EU: BORDER 01 region 0.208*
Czech Republic: BORDER 01 region -0.422**
‘New’ EU: BORDER 02 region 0.153 0.363*
Czech Republic: BORDER 02 region (omitted) (omitted)
‘New’ EU: BORDER 12 region -0.188
Czech Republic: BORDER 12 region -0.215
‘New’ EU: BORDER 11 region 0.175
Czech Republic: BORDER 11 region -0.600***
‘New’ EU: BORDER 22 region 0.045 -0.130
Czech Republic: BORDER 22 region (omitted) 0.600***
Jacobs term -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* -0.036*
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania 0.183 0.177 0.173 0.174 0.174
Adjacent market GDP -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020***
Peripherality index 3.697 4.018 4.022 3.703 3.703
Internal market GDP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
Income per capita 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Population density 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.013
Growth rate -0.314 -0.348 -0.320 -0.324 -0.324
Physical infrastructure 1.694** 1.718** 1.638** 1.800** 1.800**
Unemployment rate 0.239 0.239 0.230 0.240 0.240
Secondary education 0.251 0.245 0.221 0.271 0.271
Tertiary education 0.790*** 0.802*** 0.794*** 0.800*** 0.800***
Wage rate 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
Dummy: wage rate -0.084 -0.089 -0.082 -0.087 -0.087
Openness to trade -0.060 -0.065 -0.067 -0.053 -0.053
Exchange rate -0.438** -0.443** -0.446** -0.436** -0.436**
Exchange rate volatility -0.327 -0.310 -0.309 -0.255 -0.255
Political risk -0.134 -0.135 -0.106 -0.166 -0.166
Corporate tax rate -0.344 -0.402 -0.398 -0.368 -0.368
EU Structural Funds 0.256* 0.263* 0.256* 0.262* 0.262*
Single currency -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.019 -0.019
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) (p-value) 0.084 0.086 0.089 0.084 0.084
Sargan test (p-value) 0.140 0.134 0.138 0.140 0.140
Hansen test (p-value) 0.097 0.088 0.089 0.107 0.107
Difference-in-Hansen tests
H0: GMM differenced-instruments are exogenous 0.105 0.101 0.106 0.105 0.105
H0: system-GMM instruments are exogenous 0.324 0.290 0.269 0.378 0.378
H0: GMM instruments without ‘IV’ instruments are exogenous 0.168 0.251 0.196 0.213 0.213
H0: Standard ‘IV’ instruments are exogenous 0.170 0.074 0.115 0.140 0.140
Number of instruments 203 203 202 206 206
Number of cross-sectional 260 260 260 260 260
N 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
Notes: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level
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reason, I report the model as it is, and the reader may need to exercise caution when
interpreting the estimates in column (LXIII).
The analysis at an aggregate ‘new’ EU level in column (LVIII) of Table 6.12 shows
that only those regions that are strictly contiguous to the West-East border possess a lo-
cation advantage against the interior regions, where the advantage amounts to 31.0%
(an estimate of 0.270) in favour of the border region. For the ‘medium’ (BORDER 01)
and ‘broad’ (BORDER 02) definitions, columns (LX) and (LXII) show that the location
advantage of the border regions is not evident. Since the NUTS2 regions of the Czech
Republic are bundled together in the aggregate border dummies, I also examine in Ta-
ble 6.13 if the GMM parameter estimates alter once allowance is made for heterogeneity
in the border effect between the NUTS2 regions of the Czech Republic and the other
‘new’ EU Member States.
The analysis of heterogenous border effect in columns (LIX), (LXI) and (LXIII)
of Table 6.12 offers partial support for the positive border effect at the level of individ-
ual countries, although perhaps the evidence is more compelling when the regression
models are estimated by OLS. Depending on the border region definition used, the pos-
itive border effect is found for Hungary and Poland (‘narrow’ BORDER definition), for
Slovakia (‘medium’ BORDER 01 definition), but it is not detected for any country using
the ‘broad’ BORDER 02 definition.
Finally, Table 6.13 explores the aggregate border effect, allowing for the possible
outlier effect associated with the Czech Republic. Columns (LXIV) and (LXV) of Table
6.13 show that the border effect is now positive and statistically significant for both the
‘narrow’ (BORDER) and ‘medium’ (BORDER 01) measures. It suggests that the regions
that are adjacent to the West-East border have a clear location advantage, receiving on
average 32.7% (coefficient of 0.283) more FDI than their interior counterparts (column
(LXIV)). Further, on the ‘medium’ measure this is 23.1% (0.208). The ‘broad’ BORDER
02 definition is the only category of border region that has no significant advantage in
attracting FDI against the interior regions, a finding that stands in contrast to the OLS
estimates in Table 6.8.
The GMM estimates in column (LXVII) show that the greatest border location
advantage belongs to those NUTS2 regions that lie alongside the affected border (ex-
cluding NUTS2 border regions in the Czech Republic), which are found to receive on
average 43.8% (coefficient of 0.363) more FDI than other types of regions. For the set
of NUTS2 regions that are separated from the West-East border by one (BORDER 11)
and two (BORDER 22) other regions respectively the relative proximity to the border
does not appear to translate to the increased FDI activity. Although the GMM analysis
recognises the leading position of strictly contiguous border regions as a destination for
inward investment after the EU enlargement in 2004, a statistically significant decay in
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the size of the positive border effect is not confirmed empirically in column (LXVIII).
The economic geography of FDI is different in Czech Republic, where the analysis iden-
tifies BORDER 22 regions as the strongest performers.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the implications of the fifth enlargement of the European
Union on the spatial distribution of FDI activity. Specifically, it has examined how the
economic geography of FDI in the European Union has changed as a result of Eastern
enlargement in 2004. I consider the pattern of FDI activity at the level of the NUTS2
regions for 25 EU Member States, ten of which joined the EU as part of the Eastern
enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The aim of the analysis is to identify the regions that
benefited the most from EU integration (‘winners’), as well as those regions that have
not (‘losers’). To the best of my knowledge this is the first statistical examination of the
reconfiguration of the regional FDI in response to the EU enlargement in 2004.
The focus of my formal econometric analysis is to quantify the effect that EU
membership and the distance from the West-East border has had on the magnitude
of regional flows of FDI into the accession countries. I expect that the most profound
impact of the integration will have been felt on the border between the two integrating
groups of countries: the incumbent EU Member States and the accession countries. In
this respect the distance of a region is measured relative to the West-East border that as
a result of the 2004 enlargement was transformed from an external EU-15 border to an
internal EU-25 border. I examine if the regions that are in closer proximity to the border
that was affected by the enlargement attract more inward FDI. The emphasis of the
chapter is on the role of the border effect in shaping the spatial distribution of inward
investment activity in the new accession states. Essentially, I argue that FDI activity in
the border regions of the accession countries responds differently to the EU integration
process compared to the interior regions of these countries. I construct a set of border
region dummies to examine the asymmetry between border and interior regions of the
accession countries and to determine if the strength of the border effect diminishes as
the distance from the West-East border increases.
Overall, I find compelling evidence for the importance of inward FDI inertia
and spatial spillovers on the regional distribution of FDI activity, implying that the size
of the regional FDI inflows depends upon FDI inflows to that region in the previous
year and on the FDI inflows into the neighbouring NUTS2 regions. The analysis shows
that on average EU membership increased the regional inflows of FDI to ‘new’ EU-10
countries by between 27.5% and 44.5%, although the effect is not permanent as FDI
falls-off at two years after accession. At the aggregate level, I can find evidence for a
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significant negative distance effect on the size of regional FDI activity. Allowing for a
heterogenous treatment of distance, I find evidence of negative effect of distance on the
regional distribution of FDI activity within some accession countries, most notably in
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, where after the 2004 EU enlargement regions
in these countries that are in closer proximity to the West-East border on average receive
more FDI projects. A different pattern is observed for the Czech Republic, owing to its
unique geography, such that the regions further away from the West-East border get
more FDI. However, overall, these results not only suggest that FDI decreases in the
CEECs as a whole the further is the distance from the former West-East border, but that
within these countries there has also been a spatial redistribution of FDI towards those
regions that are closer to the West-East border.
The analysis of border effects reveals that after the EU enlargement in 2004, FDI
particularly favoured the border regions in the ‘new’ EU Member States that are con-
tiguous to the former West-East border. The only exception to this is the Czech Repub-
lic owing to its special economic geography in relation to the West-East border and the
centroid of the enlarged EU-25. As such, the chapter shows that the NUTS2 regions
contiguous to the West-East border are most likely to ‘win’ from the EU integration,
receiving on average 81.8% more FDI projects compared to other non-border regions.
This positive border effect diminishes as the distance from the border increases, so that
is 35.0% for the regions separated from the border by one other region, but it ceases
to have any statistically significant effect beyond that. It confirms the analysis for the
distance effect across the CEECs as a whole, for which a linear decay is found to be the
best fit.
In summary, this analysis arrives at the three main conclusions on the spatial
distribution of FDI activity across the regions of CEECs in the post-accession period.
First, at the aggregate level of the ‘new’ EU-10 members it shows that the distance
from the West-East border matters for the size of regional FDI activity, where a 10%
increase in distance from the West-East border leads to a reduction of 1.33% project per
annum, and a reduction in the region’s share of EU-25 FDI projects of 1.36%. Second,
it shows that FDI has reorganised within some countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia), such that regions within these countries that are closer to the West-East
border have gained most FDI in the post-accession period. Third, it offers evidence
that the border regions in CEECs emerge as the ‘winners’ of the fifth enlargement, with
the exception of the Czech Republic where the pattern of the spatial distribution of FDI
activity suggests that the interior regions are the ‘winners’.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis studies the impact of European economic integration on the location of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) across the Member States and NUTS2 regions of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) between 1997 and 2010. It focuses on the fifth enlargement of the
EU that was completed in two stages in 2004 and 2007, and involved the accession of
the ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and two small Mediterranean
countries. The thesis fills gaps in the existing literature and believed to make three new
contributions to knowledge. First, it examines the economic geography of FDI location
at the country and region level for the EU countries and analyses how it has altered
after the enlargement in 2004. Second, it analyses empirically the motives for FDI lo-
cation choice in the ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10 countries (i.e. the CEECs). Third, it
measures the impact of the fifth enlargement on the size of inward FDI across the 260
NUTS2 regions of the EU-25, focusing on how the national borders and distance from
the former West-East border have influenced the regional distribution of FDI activity
in CEECs in the post-accession period. Alongside these contributions, the thesis has
involved a detailed review of the theory of FDI and of the empirical literature on FDI
location choice. It has also involved the collection of a unique and original dataset on
FDI on location factors at both the country and regional level.
7.1 Principal Findings
To study the impact of the fifth enlargement on FDI location choice in the EU-25 I have
used annual panel data on inward FDI obtained from the European Investment Monitor
(EIM) for the period 1997-2010. It includes all cross-border ‘productive’ investment
occurring within the European Union countries, regardless of where it arises from. The
EIM data comprise project-level data on 35,155 investments for the EU-25 (plus Cyprus
and Malta), and it records detailed information on a range of investment characteristics,
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including the company name, the year, the host location, the origin of the project parent
company, the project type and the industry of the investment. These data have been
collected for each year from 1997. The findings are discussed in relation to the three
contributions.
7.1.1 The Country and Regional Descriptive Analysis
The data allow a detailed descriptive analysis of inward FDI. In particular, I have
sought to determine the extent to which the spatial distribution of FDI activity in the
EU-25 differs between the pre- and post-accession periods and so identify the ‘winners’
and ‘losers’ of the fifth enlargement. The descriptive statistics examined as part of this
analysis are the total number of FDI projects, the EU-25 FDI project share, location quo-
tients and the mean FDI projects per annum before and after the fifth enlargement (i.e.
1997-2003 and 2004-10). These descriptive statistics were analysed for the countries and
regions of the EU-25, as well as the three sub-groups: the ‘old’ EU-15 members, the ten
‘new’ members (including Cyprus and Malta) that joined in 2004 and the ‘new’ mem-
bers that joined in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). I use maps to more easily identify the
spatial patterns in FDI location.
This analysis reveals that the distribution of inward FDI is unbalanced. Of the
more than 35,000 investment projects, approximately 80% located in the ‘old’ EU-15
countries, while of the remaining 20% of projects, 16% located in the ‘new’ EU coun-
tries that acceded in 2004 and 4% in the 2007 countries. However, I find that significant
heterogeneity exists within the respective groups. The major recipients of inward FDI
as a whole for the period 1997-2010 are the ‘old’ EU-15 countries of the United King-
dom (8,343 projects), France (6,022) and Germany (3,491). Among the ‘new’ EU Mem-
ber States, Poland (1,613) and Hungary (1,413) emerge as the major recipients of FDI.
Some countries receive little FDI, including Finland (251 projects), Lithuania (239), Es-
tonia (234), Latvia (181), Slovenia (118), Greece (100) and Luxembourg (90). Although
the United Kingdom, France and Germany dominate as the top destinations for inward
FDI in the EU, and account for more than half of the projects, the location quotient anal-
ysis shows that when the scale of inward FDI is measured relative to the economic size
of a country their performance is weaker. Overall, I find that some ‘old’ EU-15 coun-
tries ‘under-perform’ and attract a smaller share of inward FDI than might be antici-
pated based on their economic size, including (in ascending order of average location
quotient) Greece, Italy, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Portugal,
Luxembourg and Austria. By contrast, all ‘new’ EU-10 members ‘over-perform’. Al-
though the smaller economies of the EU receive the least investment in absolute terms,
the weakest performers in the EU-25 in relative terms are Greece and Italy, which at-
245
tracted the smallest amount of inward investment relative to their economic size.
The examination of the descriptive data reveals that Austria and Ireland are the
‘losers’ of the fifth enlargement, attracting less FDI after 2004. However, with the excep-
tion of these, all other countries of the EU-25 receive more FDI over 2004-10 than over
1997-2003. The quintile analysis of mean FDI per annum shows that alongside Austria
and Ireland, Estonia is another country that is in the lower quintile of the mean FDI
distribution. By contrast, countries that moved to a higher quintile include Lithuania,
Romania and Slovakia. The examination of the absolute change in mean FDI per an-
num shows that the countries that gained the most FDI in absolute terms include France
(an extra 211 projects per annum after 2004), Germany (160), the United Kingdom (126),
Romania (81) and Poland (69).
I also establish in the thesis that the national data conceal a lot of regional vari-
ation that exists within countries and that significant disparities exist between regions
of different EU-25 members. I find that most NUTS2 regions containing the country
capital city make the top end of the FDI distribution, and that with the exception of Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain they emerge as the top destination
for inward FDI in their respective countries. Although the capital regions attract sub-
stantial FDI, the quintile analysis shows that 20% of NUTS2 regions receive at most one
project per annum over the period 1997-2003, and at most two projects per annum over
2004-10. These weaker-performing regions in the lowest quintile include the regions of
Greece, the Italian Mezzogiorno and the regions of northern Finland and Sweden, but
also and perhaps surprisingly a substantial proportion of German regions.
The analysis of the change in mean FDI per annum shows that 59 out of 260
NUTS2 regions received less inward FDI after the fifth enlargement in 2004, and a fur-
ther 20 regions saw no change in FDI relative to pre-enlargement period. The latter
group includes the regions of southern Italy (Mezzogiorno) and Greece, as well as a
good proportion of the British, Dutch and French regions, plus two regions in Ireland.
I also identified a cluster of regions with negative (or non-positive) FDI growth rates
that follows the former West-East border between the ‘old’ EU-15 and the ‘new’ EU-10,
stretching from eastern Germany, through the Czech Republic and to eastern Austria.
While positive growth in FDI from 2004 applies to most regions of the ‘new’ EU, a
large proportion of the NUTS2 regions of the Czech Republic do not fit with this pat-
tern. This suggests that the regions of the Czech Republic were the ‘losers’ of the fifth
enlargement. By contrast, I found that the Romanian capital region of Bucuresti-Ilfov
featured among the few NUTS2 regions that gained extra investment of more than 30
projects per annum after 2004, making it the largest absolute change in FDI for any re-
gion in the EU-10 regions (and fifth among the EU-25 regions), suggesting that it was
the ‘winner’ from the fifth enlargement. Among the EU-10 the regions that received the
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largest FDI flow before and after the fifth enlargement in 2004 is the Hungarian capital
region of Kozep-Magyarorszag.
7.1.2 The Motives for FDI Location in the EU-15 and EU-10
The second main contribution of this thesis is the examination of the motives for inward
FDI location choice, focusing on how these motives differ between the ‘old’ EU-15 and
‘new’ EU-10. To explore whether there is a significant ‘West-East divide’ in the location
decisions of multinational firms, which is highlighted by Disdier and Mayer (2004), I
allowed for the effect of each explanatory variable in the analysis to vary between ‘old’
EU-15 countries and ‘new’ EU-10 countries. The econometric analysis was conducted
for the EU-25 countries using a conditional logit model, owing to the discrete nature of
the project location choice. The theoretical classification of three ‘asset-exploiting’ FDI
motives developed by Dunning (1993) underpinned the research framework, and was
reflected in the way in which the data on location factors were grouped into market-
and resource-based determinants. Further distinction was made between ‘specific-
asset’ resource-seeking and ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking motive as in Iammarino
and McCann (2013). The efficiency-seeking motive that seeks to achieve greater effi-
ciency through exploiting economies of scale was analysed by differentiating between
‘new’ and ‘expansion’ investment and by examining whether the location choice deter-
minants were significantly different between these.
For a sample of 35,103 inward investment projects, I found that the multina-
tional firms were attracted to the EU-25 by access to the EU Single Market. I estab-
lished that although market access and resource-seeking motives were both important
for the multinational firms locating in the EU-25, the statistically significant differ-
ences between the slope parameter estimates suggests that the motives for FDI location
differ significantly between the ‘old’ EU-15 (West) and ‘new’ EU-10 (East). I found
that the main motives for FDI location choice were ‘specific-asset’ resource-seeking
for the higher-range skills in the ‘old’ EU-15 but market-seeking and ‘general-asset’
resource-seeking for inexpensive unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the ‘new’ EU-
10. Further, motives other than efficiency and economies of scale seemed to drive the
expansion FDI, since it was also subject to market-access and resource-seeking mo-
tives. An analysis of motives for FDI location choice depending on the project type
(new investment and expansions) offered further evidence to support these findings
(i.e. resource-seeking motive for skills dominates in the West, and market access and
resource-seeking for cheap labour inputs are important in the East). Market access was
not an important motive for the direct investors from outside the European Union, large
proportion of whom invested in the ‘old’ EU-15 to access resources. I established that
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multinational firms from inside the EU-27 were seeking access to markets of CEECs,
but were reluctant to invest there prior to the EU accession suggesting that the CEECs
benefited from the fifth enlargement.
The econometric analysis establishes what attracts and deters inward FDI to or
from the ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10. The skills of the labour force appear to be a main
motive for investment location in the West of Europe, with investors avoiding locations
with high unemployment that possibly signal inflexible labour markets and a poor-
quality workforce. Investment in the EU-15 also tends to be in those less congested pe-
ripheral locations that are well-connected to other markets through good quality road
infrastructure. These findings were indicative of the ‘specific-asset’ resource-driven
location choice behaviour of investors in the ‘old’ EU-15. Market access appears to
drive the location choice in the CEECs as inward investment tends to locate in the rich
markets with high growth potential, close to the core where road connectivity to other
markets is not important. A skilled workforce did not attract inward investment to
the ‘new’ EU and in fact greater education attainment and higher labour costs both
discourage FDI suggesting ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking FDI location choice.
7.1.3 The Distance and Border Effects
The third contribution of this thesis involves the analysis of the effect of the fifth en-
largement on the spatial distribution of FDI activity across the EU-25 regions, focusing
on the role of borders in shaping the regional economic geography of inward FDI in
CEECs after the fifth enlargement. This analysis was performed for 260 NUTS2 re-
gions of the EU-25 countries for which I examined the size of the regional FDI inflows
using panel data techniques. A two-country, three-region NEG model developed by
Bruelhart et al. (2004) formalises the implications of regional integration on the spa-
tial distribution of domestic manufacturing activity among the border and interior re-
gions of the domestic and foreign countries, and underpinned my analysis. A log-
linear model was specified with serially and spatially lagged dependent variable. A
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator was used in the main part of the
econometric analysis, but to reflect the limitations of LSDV estimator in handling en-
dogenous and pre-determined explanatory variables I also performed system GMM
estimation. The aim was to establish statistically whether the benefits of EU accession
were distributed equally across all regions of the CEECs. The role of ‘border effects’
was explored as I allowed for an asymmetry between the border and interior regions
to establish if border regions benefited disproportionately more than other interior re-
gions and emerged as the ‘winners’ of the fifth enlargement. I also quantified the effect
of EU membership and the distance from the former West-East border on the size of
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regional inward FDI.
Using a sample of 35,103 inward investment projects, I found convincing evi-
dence for the location advantage of the border regions of CEECs in attracting FDI after
the fifth enlargement. Specifically, I found that the border regions receive up to 82%
more inward investment than other regions, identifying them as the ‘winners’ of the
fifth enlargement owing to their favourable location close to the major markets of the
incumbent EU-15 countries. A statistically significant decay was confirmed as I found
that the positive border effect diminished in magnitude as I moved further away from
the former West-East border. The positive border effect did not apply to the border re-
gions of the Czech Republic, which received less inward FDI than interior regions, but
owing to the peculiar geography of this country in relation to the West-East border and
the centroid of the enlarged EU-25. The analysis of distance showed that at an aggre-
gate level a 10% increase in distance from the West-East border leads to a reduction of
1.33% projects per annum, and a reduction in the region’s share of EU-25 FDI projects
of 1.36%, suggesting that westernmost regions of CEECs have an advantage over east-
ernmost regions as host locations of inward FDI. Overall, the magnitude of the negative
distance effect is weak relative to the positive border effect.
Allowing for the distance effect to differ by country, I was also able to exam-
ine whether the distance from the West-East border has caused FDI to reorganise itself
within the countries of the CEECs after 2004. This was notable for Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia, where investment favours the regions that are in closer prox-
imity to the West-East border. Again, a reverse location pattern was found for the re-
gions of the Czech Republic. I also showed that EU accession resulted in a temporary
‘boom’ in the size of inward FDI to the regions of CEECs, which fell off two years after
the accession. Finally, a statistically significant effect of inward FDI inertia and spatial
spillovers was found, suggesting that the size of regional FDI activity depended on the
size of inward FDI to that region in the previous year and the size of inward FDI in
neighbouring regions, implying that it is serially and spatially correlated.
7.2 Policy Implications: Discussion
According to Iammarino and Santangelo (2000), “FDI has traditionally been considered
one of the fundamental variables in determining long-run growth rates” (p. 7), and in-
creasing FDI activity is considered to be a signal of accelerating globalisation. Through
the process of technology and know-how transfer, the presence of multinational firms
can make a positive contribution to the productivity of domestic firms and stimulate
economic growth in the host economies. Although the presence of foreign firms implies
increased competition and some level of job destruction associated with the crowding
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out of the firms that are least able to sustain this pressure, ‘greenfield’ investments
also create (gross) new jobs and stimulate productivity gains as the most-productive
firms are likely to be those that survive in the long run. Further, those domestic firms
that seize the opportunity associated with the presence of multinational competitors
and embrace the new technologies and knowledge, and organisational and managerial
skills, may be better able to compete in the global market.
This thesis shows that the progress towards economic and political integration
of the EU - with the addition of twelve new countries and 105 million new citizens to
the existing EU’s internal market of 380 million people - influences the economic ge-
ography of FDI activity within the enlarged EU-25. The thesis shows that while some
countries and regions of the EU-25 appear to have gained a significant amount of in-
ward FDI after enlargement (the ‘winners’), other countries and regions appear to be
‘losers’. Moreover, the regions within the individual ‘new’ EU-10 countries that are
geographically closer to the West-East border (and hence, closer to the core of the EU
Single Market) tend to attract relatively more FDI. These results raise questions about
the promotion of economic convergence associated with the deepening and widening
of economic integration within the EU, and in particular with respect to the EU’s pe-
riphery. Furthermore, the findings of the thesis raise further issues about whether the
inward investment activity of multinational firms promotes the economic convergence
of the EU-25, or exacerbates the existing disparities further.
The study of Iammarino and Santangelo (2000) that aimed to investigate
whether the European integration process and foreign activities have promoted con-
vergence (or divergence) between Italian regions, found evidence that “the Italian geo-
graphical asymmetry is not an isolated case in the ‘Europe of regions’ and that cohesion
within the area is far from being achieved” (p. 16). I reach a similar conclusion after
studying the impact of FDI from the fifth enlargement on the economic geography of
the EU-25. My analysis shows that while some countries and regions within the EU-25
receive a substantial amount of inward FDI (e.g. the United Kingdom and London in
particular), other locations fail to attract FDI (e.g. the regions of Greece and the Italian
Mezzogiorno). Although I find evidence that EU accession resulted in an increase in
inward FDI to the CEECs in the post-accession period, the inward FDI flows are not
distributed evenly across regions within CEECs. Some regions (e.g. Romanian capital
regions of Bucuresti-Ilfov) gained a significant amount of FDI, while others (e.g. Pod-
laskie in the north-east of Poland and the Czech border regions) lost FDI. Given that
I find that FDI has reorganised within some countries, such that regions within these
countries closer to the West-East border have gained most raise questions about the
economic convergence of the EU Member States and its regions.
Alongside economic convergence, the thesis raises questions about the future
250
patterns of inward FDI to the EU, especially as the process of the widening of European
integration continues and more countries such as the former Yugoslav republics and
Turkey are expected to join the EU. Will the ‘new’ EU-10 Member States that acceded
to the EU in 2004 and 2007 lose investment to these prospective new members? What
will be the motives for investment in these prospective new members and how will this
affect the motives for investment in the EU-10? Will the motives for investment in the
EU-10 change and will these countries need to ‘reinvent’ their economies to attract new
investment?
The thesis established that the motives for investment in the ‘new’ EU-10 were
market-seeking and ‘general-asset’ resource-seeking, and I consider it plausible that
these will also be the motives for investment in these prospective new members that
join in the future due to their lower economic development level, the availability of low
cost labour force and the general opportunities that arise from the first mover advan-
tage. A likely implication is that the low cost unskilled and semi-skilled labour force
would no longer be a source of comparative advantage of the ‘new’ EU-10 countries
and would cease to be a factor that attracts inward FDI to these countries following the
future enlargements of the EU.
As the economic development of the EU-10 advances, the comparative advan-
tage of the EU-10 economies is expected to shift away from the labour-intensive pro-
duction towards more capital-intensive production and knowledge-focused activities.
The challenge for the EU-10 countries will be to replace jobs in declining industries with
jobs in more knowledge-focused areas of activity. Although it appears that at present
the skilled labour force deters inward FDI to the EU-10, an investment in upskilling the
population is likely to bring the long-term benefits at the expense of the short-term costs
especially if knowledge become a source of the comparative advantage in the future.
Globalisation, as well as technological and transport advancements, are expected to re-
duce the importance of places that offer low-value production of goods and services,
and increase the importance of places that facilitate knowledge exchange and creation
of new ideas (Swinney and Thomas, 2015).
7.3 Future Work
The thesis offers comprehensive cross-country and cross-region evidence on the eco-
nomic geography of FDI in the enlarged European Union covering the period of the
fifth enlargement. It has filled significant gaps in the academic literature on foreign
investment location, especially in respect of the present understanding of the determi-
nants that shape the spatial distribution of FDI activity in the EU-25 before and after
enlargement. Most importantly my work is not without limitations, and several issues
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open-up interesting avenues for future research.
First of all, the thesis adopts a relatively ‘crude’ approach to measure the
efficiency-seeking motives for FDI location choice, which is examined by looking for
any differences among market access and resource factors that exist between ‘new’ and
‘expansion’ investment. If the expansions are just a random sample of the new projects
that are carried out at an earlier stage, I expect no differences in market-seeking and
resource-seeking motives between these and the new investments if they are simply
about adding scale. I acknowledge that the assumptions that I adopt to capture the
efficiency-seeking motive are simplistic and fail to measure this motive for FDI location
choice precisely, but they are a good attempt. In the future work more thought and
consideration might be given to capturing the efficiency-seeking motive.
Second, a limitation of the conditional logit model is that it embodies the Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which imposes a uniform pat-
tern of substitutability between alternative locations. As discussed in this thesis, the
evidence suggests that this assumption is flawed and that it does not hold when two
location alternatives are considered closer substitutes than other locations. My inten-
tion was to estimate a nested logit model to complement the conditional logit analysis
in the study of the motives for FDI location choice in the ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-10.
However, owing to the large number of observations and the resulting computational
intensity of this modelling technique I was unable to estimate the nested logit model. I
would like to conduct nested logit analysis as soon as I gain access to a more advanced
technology. Importantly, the nested logit analysis is another method of studying the
importance of national borders, as in Basile et al. (2009), and it can determine if borders
strengthen the ‘West-East’ divide (see: chapter 5), complementing the analysis of the
role of borders on FDI location in CEECs in the post-accession period (see: chapter 6).
Third, the analysis of economic geography of FDI across the regions of the EU-
25 used the panel data techniques of the LSDV and system GMM estimators. Although
these empirical techniques allow me to examine the effect of the EU membership, dis-
tance from the West-East border and border effects on the size of the regional inward
FDI flows, the techniques made it impossible to analyse a range of project-specific in-
formation that was concealed when the aggregate investment flows were analysed. In
future, I intend to conduct an analysis of the inward FDI location choice at the NUTS2
region level using the discrete choice methodology. Importantly, the use of the discrete
choice methodology, such as conditional and nested logit models, would enable me to
use project-specific information such as the project type, industry group and origin of
investment, and to offer further insights into the nature of the spatial distribution of
FDI activity across the EU-25 regions and the characteristics of investment projects that
agglomerate close to the West-East border in CEECs in the post-accession period.
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The analysis of the border effects focused on how it shaped the spatial distribu-
tion of FDI activity in the CEECs in the post-accession period. An extension of this anal-
ysis is to study the effect of national borders and distance on the economic geography of
FDI in the ‘old’ EU-15 Member States. Importantly, the existing research suggests that
the significant regional disparities exist within the ‘old’ EU-15 countries (e.g. Centre for
Cities, 2015 shows that the ‘North-South’ divide exists in the United Kingdom). This
study could examine the location of the regional clusters of FDI activity within coun-
tries of the ‘old’ EU-15, and measure whether these clusters are more likely to form close
to the economic centres (capitals) of individual countries, or whether the distance to an
arbitrary economic ‘centroid’ of the EU matters more within an integrated area such as
the EU. Another feasible extension is to examine the effect of distance from the border
affected by the second wave of the fifth enlargement in 2007, although I anticipate this
effect to be relatively weak relative to the 2004 West-East border as these cross-border
ties are likely to much less strong as they are a long way away from the core of the EU.
The research conducted in this thesis is conditional on a multinational firm hav-
ing already decided to invest in the EU-25, so that I do not always consider the impact
of the ‘external forces’ caused by the economic agents outside of the EU-25 system,
although I do consider EU-25 FDI shares in the regional analysis. However, the acceler-
ating globalisation and the process that causes economies to become more interlinked
may put into question the validity of my approach. It is perhaps of interest to consider
the size of inward FDI flows to other major recipients of inward investment such as
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and the US. Given that the investing multinational firms
choose a single location from a list of location alternatives in the EU-25 in my modelling
framework, in practice multinational firms may choose a single location from all global
alternatives. Any improvement in the performance of the global competitors is going to
reduce the size of inward FDI to the EU-25, and more so to those countries and regions
that are closer substitutes to location alternatives outside the European Union.
Finally, all three contributions of this thesis utilise the European Investment
Monitor (EIM) data on FDI that records all productive investment (new ‘greenfield’
and expansion investment at an existing site for the multinational firm). A limitation
of the EIM data is its failure to report information on the survival rate of a project.
If a proportion of the projects fail soon after the start-up date of the investment, the
positive effect of the inward investment on job creation and stimulating productivity
growth among the domestic firms of the host economy will be reduced substantially.
Essentially, it is plausible that some investment projects, and perhaps predominantly
smaller projects may be carried out to first ‘test’ the market and are not necessarily in-
tended to be a long-term investment. Furthermore, it covers gross inflows only, and
if a project is a relocation from another EU-25 country, and possibly from within the
253
CEECs, then the net impact for the EU and the CEECs will be much smaller. This po-
tentially is concern for the results as 60% of investment in the CEECs arises from the
EU-15, although only four percent is from other CEECs. The border effects could arise
from these ‘boundary-hoppers’ that look for cheap resources, but which is unexplored
in this thesis and worthy of further study.
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Table A.1: Distribution of FDI projects in the European Union: project numbers per country, 1997-2010
Destination 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
(country)
Percentage
(%)
Yearly
average
Min Max
Austria 23 84 66 61 53 44 32 35 59 56 45 64 41 33 696 1.98 49.71 23 84
Belgium 100 132 109 111 88 73 77 136 179 185 175 142 146 159 1818 5.15 129.43 73 185
Bulgaria 13 10 11 16 19 29 29 64 32 68 63 60 27 29 470 1.34 33.57 10 68
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 4 9 24 0.07 4.80 2 9
Czech Republic 57 56 53 73 82 96 91 112 116 114 83 87 61 71 1152 3.28 82.29 53 116
Denmark 17 33 29 29 27 32 44 70 55 60 59 53 34 26 568 1.62 40.57 17 70
Estonia 10 10 13 18 21 17 16 35 23 15 7 14 13 22 234 0.67 16.71 7 35
Finland 12 14 11 14 31 12 9 19 9 15 25 42 15 23 251 0.71 17.93 9 42
France 426 271 392 353 265 254 313 490 538 565 541 523 529 562 6022 17.13 430.14 254 565
Germany 190 197 196 170 171 153 110 163 182 286 305 390 418 560 3491 9.93 249.36 110 560
Greece 1 7 4 4 4 5 5 7 8 12 11 13 11 8 100 0.28 7.14 1 13
Hungary 116 114 88 76 85 100 85 139 115 108 135 100 64 88 1413 4.02 100.93 64 139
Ireland 169 112 115 113 61 51 46 76 67 74 80 108 84 114 1270 3.61 90.71 46 169
Italy 43 36 45 60 52 29 23 33 49 74 69 96 100 103 812 2.31 58.00 23 103
Latvia 18 9 5 5 10 12 8 18 16 22 16 24 10 8 181 0.51 12.93 5 24
Lithuania 19 10 4 10 17 20 6 12 29 24 28 19 10 31 239 0.68 17.07 4 31
Luxembourg 8 4 3 1 5 2 4 8 8 10 13 5 8 11 90 0.26 6.43 1 13
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 2 9 6 26 0.07 3.71 1 9
Netherlands 85 84 87 105 67 61 58 56 82 95 123 116 108 115 1242 3.53 88.71 56 123
Poland 142 116 67 85 50 60 46 148 180 152 146 176 102 143 1613 4.59 115.21 46 180
Portugal 13 35 19 12 25 32 37 37 29 38 37 39 42 27 422 1.20 30.14 12 42
Romania 18 22 18 15 39 50 20 91 86 140 150 145 75 62 931 2.65 66.50 15 150
Slovakia 14 18 14 19 19 25 24 83 70 46 58 48 33 58 529 1.50 37.79 14 83
Slovenia 4 6 2 4 2 1 1 10 9 9 19 17 16 18 118 0.34 8.43 1 19
Spain 76 90 139 148 141 122 119 121 147 212 256 211 173 169 2124 6.04 151.71 76 256
Sweden 29 28 40 44 90 71 74 97 95 113 81 85 58 77 982 2.79 70.14 28 113
United Kingdom 818 639 508 574 370 369 453 563 559 685 713 686 678 728 8343 23.73 595.93 369 818
Total (year) 2421 2137 2038 2120 1794 1720 1730 2624 2744 3182 3246 3270 2869 3260 35155 100.00 2511.07 1720 3270
Percentage (%) 6.89 6.08 5.80 6.03 5.10 4.89 4.92 7.46 7.81 9.05 9.23 9.30 8.61 9.27
(source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
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Table A.2: Correlation matrix: country-level variables
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Peripherality index 1.0000
Internal market GDP 0.0839 1.0000
Income per capita 0.4596 0.2628 1.0000
Population density 0.6102 0.3667 0.3366 1.0000
Growth rate -0.0646 -0.1887 -0.1328 -0.1356 1.0000
Physical infrastructure 0.6573 0.2293 0.5814 0.8500 -0.1559 1.0000
Secondary education 0.1751 -0.2202 -0.4143 -0.1719 0.1088 -0.3237 1.0000
Tertiary education 0.1854 0.0940 0.3771 0.0737 -0.1007 0.2129 -0.3429 1.0000
Unemployment rate -0.2505 0.0111 -0.4904 -0.2767 -0.0220 -0.3641 0.1458 -0.0841 1.0000
Wage rate 0.2530 0.5524 0.5769 0.4108 -0.2378 0.3924 -0.3462 0.3699 -0.2396 1.0000
Dummy: wage rate -0.1261 -0.3592 -0.2005 -0.2213 0.1466 -0.0732 0.2046 -0.0749 -0.0189 -0.6699 1.0000
Openness to trade 0.5379 -0.4404 -0.1543 0.2012 0.2011 0.2192 0.3795 0.1250 -0.0773 -0.1720 0.0897 1.0000
Exchange rate 0.0989 0.0423 0.0875 -0.0248 -0.2243 0.0495 0.0513 0.1830 -0.1382 0.0678 0.0404 0.0411 1.0000
Exchange rate volatility -0.0907 -0.1453 -0.3717 -0.1421 -0.0584 -0.3226 0.3150 -0.1656 0.1553 -0.3266 0.1800 0.0844 0.0896 1.0000
Corporate tax rate 0.1351 0.4823 0.3042 0.3754 -0.0901 0.3953 -0.3484 -0.0606 0.0405 0.4256 -0.3215 -0.3135 -0.3771 -0.2255 1.0000
EU Structural Funds -0.2830 0.5671 0.0342 0.0668 -0.0898 0.0425 -0.4960 -0.0417 0.2026 0.2302 -0.3477 -0.4948 0.0542 -0.1016 0.3722 1.0000
Political risk 0.2976 0.1165 0.7603 0.2658 -0.0539 0.4280 -0.2987 0.1688 -0.5006 0.5440 -0.3835 -0.0809 -0.0090 -0.3425 0.2879 -0.0267 1.0000
Foreign specialisation -0.0019 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0035 -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0002 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0026 0.0036 -0.0063 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0028 1.0000
Domestic specialisation 0.1733 0.1029 0.1774 0.0663 -0.0502 0.0980 0.0327 0.0860 -0.0587 0.1795 -0.2269 0.0876 0.0403 -0.1013 0.0590 0.0212 0.2201 0.1065 1.0000
Jacobs term 0.2308 0.6944 0.4283 0.3000 -0.1300 0.3105 -0.1519 0.0712 -0.0483 0.6811 -0.6230 -0.2139 0.0286 -0.3311 0.4828 0.4594 0.4412 0.0009 0.2918 1.0000
Herfindahl index -0.0733 -0.1494 -0.1003 -0.0453 0.0063 -0.0272 0.0539 -0.0581 0.0209 -0.1067 0.0647 0.0738 0.0044 0.0203 -0.0862 -0.0680 -0.0536 0.1465 -0.0667 -0.1069 1.0000
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania -0.2771 -0.1798 -0.3633 -0.1341 0.0486 -0.2357 0.1328 -0.2303 0.0060 -0.3515 0.5247 0.0039 -0.0861 0.3186 -0.1990 -0.1840 -0.4578 -0.0017 -0.3345 -0.6436 0.0628 1.0000
Dummy: Herfindahl index -0.1261 -0.2326 -0.0218 -0.1597 0.0718 -0.0686 -0.0002 -0.0275 0.0397 -0.2219 0.2345 -0.0323 -0.0781 -0.0226 0.0028 -0.1167 -0.0289 -0.2464 -0.0650 -0.1794 -0.5966 0.0130 1.0000
Table A.3: Correlation matrix: region-level variables
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‘New’ EU: road distance 1.0000
‘Old’ EU: road distance 0.5763 1.0000
‘New’ EU: line distance 0.9907 0.5688 1.0000
Jacobs term -0.0439 0.0365 -0.0539 1.0000
Dummy: Bulgaria-Romania -0.1750 -0.1528 -0.1645 -0.5403 1.0000
Adjacent market GDP -0.0080 0.0617 -0.0035 0.3323 -0.2068 1.0000
Peripherality index -0.1936 0.0014 -0.1845 0.1168 -0.2600 0.3257 1.0000
Internal market GDP 0.0674 0.0967 0.0795 0.2925 -0.1613 0.2257 0.0547 1.0000
Income per capita 0.1303 0.1940 0.1192 0.4486 -0.4129 0.3807 0.3151 0.4793 1.0000
Population density -0.0134 0.0054 -0.0088 0.0656 -0.0537 0.0619 0.1989 0.3417 0.3665 1.0000
Growth rate 0.0047 -0.1593 0.0105 -0.3194 0.0260 -0.1042 -0.0486 -0.0487 -0.0916 -0.0044 1.0000
Physical infrastructure 0.0630 0.0827 0.0752 0.2594 -0.1895 0.3395 0.3121 0.2999 0.4799 0.5021 -0.0695 1.0000
Unemployment rate -0.0217 -0.1059 -0.0190 -0.0148 0.0491 -0.3042 -0.2287 -0.0901 -0.4379 -0.0172 0.0176 -0.1925 1.0000
Secondary education 0.2177 0.2564 0.2215 0.1474 -0.2007 0.2294 0.3453 0.2593 0.5502 0.2523 -0.0471 0.3071 -0.1795 1.0000
Tertiary education -0.7797 -0.4382 -0.7711 -0.0089 0.1484 -0.0620 0.1993 -0.1790 -0.2758 -0.0548 0.0236 -0.1837 0.0332 -0.2636 1.0000
Wage rate 0.0823 0.1522 0.0673 0.6474 -0.4660 0.4540 0.3987 0.3053 0.7513 0.1617 -0.1979 0.3964 -0.2531 0.4853 -0.1963 1.0000
Dummy: wage rate -0.2125 -0.1728 -0.1990 -0.5343 0.8496 -0.2303 -0.2206 -0.1749 -0.3676 -0.0709 0.0645 -0.1707 0.0309 -0.1671 0.1719 -0.5485 1.0000
Openness to trade -0.3816 -0.2266 -0.3624 -0.2465 0.0921 -0.0547 0.5921 -0.1799 -0.0821 0.0983 0.0945 0.1675 -0.0871 0.0927 0.2831 -0.0636 0.1364 1.0000
Exchange rate 0.1243 0.1462 0.1222 0.1666 -0.1552 0.1076 0.1173 0.0792 0.2109 0.0352 -0.0314 0.0907 -0.1383 0.1967 -0.0186 0.2273 -0.1153 -0.0224 1.0000
Exchange rate volatility -0.1034 -0.0935 -0.1016 -0.2885 0.2605 -0.1086 -0.0650 -0.1297 -0.3148 -0.0177 -0.0759 -0.1885 0.0880 -0.1163 0.2231 -0.3632 0.2162 0.0126 -0.0735 1.0000
Political risk 0.0512 -0.0805 0.0439 0.3013 -0.4701 0.2483 0.2129 0.0949 0.5560 0.1193 0.0337 0.3051 -0.3771 0.3114 -0.0549 0.5440 -0.4384 0.0220 0.1314 -0.2141 1.0000
Corporate tax rate -0.0175 -0.1137 -0.0225 0.5081 -0.2428 0.2281 0.0070 0.1817 0.2795 0.0736 -0.0290 0.2445 0.0878 0.0475 -0.1429 0.4790 -0.2842 -0.2574 -0.1473 -0.1925 0.2370 1.0000
EU Structural Funds 0.3505 0.2301 0.3588 0.0552 -0.0955 -0.1342 -0.2500 0.1203 -0.1361 -0.0443 0.0070 -0.0431 0.2347 -0.0528 -0.3120 -0.0833 -0.0908 -0.1406 0.0420 -0.0574 -0.0465 0.0252 1.0000
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Table A.4: Distribution of FDI projects in the European Union: project numbers per industry, 1997 – 2010
Industry: NACE code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
(industry)
Percentage
(%)
Agriculture
1 4 0 3 0 1 1 0 4 3 6 3 6 11 8 50 0.14
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 0.01
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0.01
Agriculture - Total: 6 0 4 0 1 1 0 4 3 8 3 6 12 10 58 0.17
Agriculture (%): 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.09 0.18 0.42 0.31 0.17
Energy
11 1 2 0 0 11 15 11 20 12 18 20 26 14 25 175 0.50
40 8 9 10 6 6 5 7 2 8 13 26 27 21 39 187 0.53
Energy - Total: 9 11 10 6 17 20 18 22 20 31 46 53 35 64 362 1.03
Energy (%): 0.37 0.51 0.49 0.28 0.95 1.16 1.04 0.84 0.73 0.98 1.42 1.62 1.23 1.91 1.03
Manufacturing
15 122 92 82 74 63 74 99 139 111 100 102 117 117 110 1,402 3.99
16 12 4 3 2 3 6 2 6 4 8 0 3 2 4 59 0.17
17 30 15 11 15 14 29 14 26 19 17 15 12 13 31 261 0.74
18 17 16 12 7 8 9 17 21 16 16 17 22 24 20 222 0.63
19 6 1 2 3 2 6 0 1 5 4 1 1 1 3 36 0.10
20 11 6 18 12 16 10 15 25 28 20 18 14 12 21 226 0.64
21 62 56 45 35 28 21 44 36 33 31 30 34 30 32 517 1.47
22 14 23 16 10 7 9 9 34 35 44 61 56 53 50 421 1.20
23 12 10 10 3 3 2 6 2 6 15 27 6 17 7 126 0.36
24 301 209 168 128 101 90 90 100 111 140 105 125 127 125 1,920 5.46
24.4 114 115 93 75 88 108 123 128 101 112 108 102 127 99 1,493 4.25
25 79 52 65 40 51 51 62 113 92 85 78 82 75 96 1,021 2.90
26 57 64 43 38 26 27 44 63 61 79 85 87 57 55 786 2.24
27 51 48 33 27 22 35 28 16 29 17 32 30 16 22 406 1.15
28 47 40 33 30 19 32 23 71 69 95 89 68 74 78 768 2.18
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Table A.4: Distribution of FDI projects in the European Union: project numbers per industry, 1997 – 2010
Industry: NACE code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
(industry)
Percentage
(%)
29 124 114 86 78 54 60 101 152 136 216 181 215 196 242 1,955 5.56
30 117 69 66 60 27 40 47 51 45 53 34 51 47 39 746 2.12
31 59 55 41 54 52 48 43 50 64 85 101 99 123 117 991 2.82
32 203 180 185 213 163 121 112 184 216 222 187 177 159 171 2,493 7.09
33 52 40 46 33 29 28 40 35 58 64 55 69 68 90 707 2.01
34.1 99 74 69 63 80 74 57 76 46 46 69 47 37 76 913 2.60
34.3 165 152 162 131 120 145 157 235 210 158 120 138 62 130 2,085 5.93
35 34 34 37 20 16 20 26 29 38 37 42 41 47 35 456 1.30
36 24 28 24 20 19 23 25 24 27 24 20 38 31 29 356 1.01
Manufacturing - Total: 1,812 1,497 1,350 1,171 1,011 1,068 1,184 1,617 1,560 1,688 1,577 1,634 1,515 1,682 20,366 57.97
Manufacturing (%): 74.85 70.04 66.22 55.24 56.35 62.09 68.44 61.61 56.86 53.12 48.61 50.02 52.84 51.77 57.97
Construction
45 5 0 5 3 7 15 7 16 12 17 26 20 25 27 185 0.53
Construction - Total: 5 0 5 3 7 15 7 16 12 17 26 20 25 27 185 0.53
Construction (%): 0.21 0.00 0.25 0.14 0.39 0.87 0.40 0.61 0.44 0.53 0.80 0.61 0.88 0.83 0.53
Retail and Hospitality
50 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 3 5 14 4 2 34 0.10
51 10 2 10 9 6 9 4 24 12 27 21 43 30 40 247 0.70
52 12 21 19 19 33 16 10 38 47 37 49 34 35 36 406 1.15
Retail and Hospitality - Total: 22 23 29 29 39 25 15 63 62 67 75 91 69 78 687 1.95
Retail and Hospitality (%): 0.91 1.08 1.42 1.37 2.17 1.45 0.87 2.40 2.26 2.11 2.32 2.79 2.42 2.37 1.95
Transport
55 0 1 1 0 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 7 1 3 31 0.09
60 7 0 1 0 12 13 13 33 13 17 6 11 12 4 142 0.40
61 11 8 1 4 5 2 9 6 8 3 14 6 16 6 99 0.28
62 13 7 5 5 7 20 9 17 14 18 25 26 25 42 233 0.66
63 57 48 67 57 52 38 48 94 158 133 156 166 116 149 1,339 3.81
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Table A.4: Distribution of FDI projects in the European Union: project numbers per industry, 1997 – 2010
Industry: NACE code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
(industry)
Percentage
(%)
64 46 60 62 143 80 43 43 59 69 61 48 34 46 46 840 2.39
Transport - Total: 134 124 137 209 159 119 124 213 263 236 250 250 216 250 2,684 7.63
Transport (%): 5.53 5.81 6.73 9.86 8.86 6.92 7.17 8.12 9.59 7.39 7.69 7.66 7.49 7.64 7.63
Services
65 98 53 46 61 62 31 47 102 119 162 196 150 132 151 1,410 4.01
66 29 32 25 18 15 15 6 23 25 36 61 47 43 26 401 1.14
67 12 24 33 14 13 2 1 0 2 4 30 16 13 17 181 0.51
70 3 6 1 0 11 0 4 3 8 23 44 43 14 13 173 0.49
71 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 7 2 5 5 5 32 0.09
72 195 245 298 432 310 283 172 299 337 438 437 368 306 350 4,470 12.72
73 0 1 0 0 7 4 1 35 27 27 41 40 42 42 267 0.76
74 84 99 87 171 138 125 136 206 283 413 436 500 396 515 3,589 10.21
Services - Total: 421 461 491 698 556 460 367 671 802 1,110 1,247 1,169 951 1,119 10,523 29.90
Services (%): 17.39 21.58 24.10 32.92 30.99 26.74 21.21 25.58 29.21 34.83 38.39 35.67 33.12 34.24 29.90
Education and Health
80 0 0 1 0 3 1 3 8 4 1 4 10 2 5 42 0.12
85 1 1 0 1 0 5 4 2 3 8 10 17 12 12 76 0.22
Education and Health - Total: 1 1 1 1 3 6 7 10 7 9 14 27 14 17 118 0.34
Education and Health (%): 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.43 0.83 0.49 0.52 0.34
Recreation
92 11 20 11 3 1 6 8 8 15 16 8 20 32 13 172 0.49
Recreation - Total: 11 20 11 3 1 6 8 8 15 16 8 20 32 13 172 0.49
Recreation (%): 0.45 0.94 0.54 0.14 0.06 0.35 0.46 0.30 0.55 0.50 0.25 0.61 1.12 0.40 0.49
Total (year) 2,421 2,137 2,038 2,120 1,794 1,720 1,730 2,624 2,744 3,182 3,246 3,270 2,869 3,260 35,155 100
Percentage (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
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Table A.5: Explanatory variables: descriptive statistics
Country-level Region-level
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
LDV: LOG(number FDI) 1.64 1.16 0.00 5.73
LDV: LOG(share FDI) -6.14 1.15 -8.09 -2.36
Spatial lag: LOG(number FDI) 0.71 0.35 0.00 1.86
Spatial lag: LOG(share FDI) -2.67 0.34 -3.51 -1.53
Road distance to EU border 830.68 626.82 1.00 3,748.00
Straight line distance to EU border 626.60 483.70 1.00 3,200.00
Number of regions distance to EU border 5.78 4.61 0.00 20.00
Adjacent market GDP 3,790.06 3,969.41 0.00 27,886.72
Peripherality index 36.84 15.77 14.54 83.91 37.74 14.58 14.54 83.91
Internal market GDP 421,779.49 615,700.23 6,061.80 2,407,913.00 40,405.54 49,811.34 722.28 538,338.21
Income per capita 20,060.80 13,848.58 1,900.00 70,400.00 20,991.90 10,373.12 1,410.93 73,021.58
Population density 129.39 102.71 16.80 492.20 315.16 672.96 3.30 6,902.00
Growth rate 2.90 3.74 -17.70 11.70 2.20 5.75 -20.18 21.20
Physical infrastructure 17.05 19.01 0.00 78.00 27.00 30.41 0.00 225.00
Secondary education 50.61 15.51 10.80 80.20 47.29 15.13 6.90 80.30
Tertiary education 23.23 8.08 8.20 44.00 21.62 7.91 5.20 49.50
Unemployment rate 8.57 3.96 1.80 22.10 8.67 4.55 0.80 28.70
Wage rate 18.41 10.05 2.65 34.83 21.24 8.76 2.65 34.83
Openness to trade 78.25 34.26 27.06 186.26 63.55 32.68 27.06 186.26
Exchange rate 97.85 10.46 53.82 134.34 98.24 8.48 53.82 134.34
Exchange rate volatility 3.30 3.31 0.01 19.30 3.15 3.35 0.01 19.30
Corporate tax rate 28.67 8.27 10.00 56.80 32.42 8.43 10.00 56.80
EU Structural Funds 1,259.57 1,948.83 0.00 10,011.59 73.15 151.33 0.00 2,229.82
Political risk 81.92 6.85 65.00 96.50 82.19 5.76 65.00 96.50
Jacobs term 3.72 1.39 1.45 9.71 4.53 1.57 1.45 9.71
Foreign specialisation 1.09 5.03 0.00 415.80
Domestic specialisation 1.10 1.39 0.00 40.41
Herfindahl index 0.65 0.32 0.02 1.00
(source: authors’ own elaboration)
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Figure A.1: FDI project shares for the ‘major’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.2: FDI project numbers for the ‘major’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.3: Location quotients for the ‘major’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
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Figure A.4: FDI project shares for the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.5: FDI project numbers for the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.6: Location quotients for the ‘minor’ EU-15 recipients
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
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Figure A.7: FDI project shares for the ‘new’ EU-10 countries
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.8: FDI project numbers for the ‘new’ EU-10 countries
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
Figure A.9: Location quotients for the ‘new’ EU-10 countries
(Source: EIM dataset, authors’ own elaboration)
264
References
Alegria, R. (2006). Countries, Regions and Multinational Firms: Location Determinants
in the European Union. ERSA Conference Papers ERSA06P143. 46th Congress of
European Regional Science Association 30th August to 3rd September 2006 - Volos, Greece.
Amiti, M. and Javorcik, B. S. (2008). Trade Costs and Location of Foreign Firms in China.
Journal of Development Economics, 85(1-2):129–149.
Andrews, C. (2000). EU Enlargement: From Luxembourg to Helsinki and Beyond.
House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/62, House of Commons Library, Lon-
don.
Arauzo-Carod, J.-M., Liviano-Solis, D., and Manjon-Antolin, M. (2010). Empirical Stud-
ies In Industrial Location: An Assessment Of Their Methods And Results. Journal of
Regional Science, 50(3):685–711.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2):277–297.
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estima-
tion of Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1):29–51.
Arpan, J. S. and Ricks, D. A. (1986). Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 1974–1984.
Journal of International Business Studies, 17(3):149–153.
Arrow, K. (1962a). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In
Nelson, R. R., editor, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors, pages 609–626. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Arrow, K. (1962b). The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing. Review of Economic
Studies, 29(3):155–173.
Arthur, W. B. (1990). Positive Feedbacks in the Economy. Scientific American, 262(2):92–
99.
265
Artige, L. and Nicolini, R. (2005). Evidence on the Determinants of Foreign Direct In-
vestment: The Case of Three European Regions. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 655.05,
Unitat de Fonaments de l’Ana`lisi Econo`mica (UAB) and Institut d’Ana`lisi Econo`mica
(CSIC), Bellaterra, Barcelona.
Ascani, A., Crescenzi, R., and Iammarino, S. (2012). New Economic Geography and
Economic Integration: A Review. SEARCH Working Papers WP1/02, London School
of Economics, London.
Ascani, A., Crescenzi, R., and Iammarino, S. (2014). Economic Institutions and the Lo-
cation Strategies of European Multinationals in their Geographical Neighbourhood.
Unpublished.
Bain, J. S. (1954). Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in
Twenty Manufacturing Industries. The American Economic Review, 44(1):15–39.
Bain, J. S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manu-
facturing Industries. Harvard University Series on Competition in American Industry.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Baltagi, B. H., Egger, P., and Pfaffermayr, M. (2007). Estimating Models of Complex
FDI: Are There Third-Country Effects? Journal of Econometrics, 140(1):260–281.
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107(3):797–817.
Barclay, L. (2000). Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Economies: Corporate Strategy
and Investment Behaviour in the Caribbean. Routledge Studies in International Business
and the World Economy. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon and New York, NY.
Bartik, T. J. (1985). Business Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the
Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States. Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, 3(1):14–22.
Basile, R. (2004). Acquisition versus Greenfield Investment: The Location of Foreign
Manufacturers in Italy. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34(1):3–25.
Basile, R., Castellani, D., and Zanfei, A. (2004). Location Choices of Multinational Firms
in Europe: The Role of National Boundaries and EU Policy. ERSA Conference Papers
ERSA04P37. 44th Congress of European Regional Science Association 25th to 29th August
2004 - Porto, Portugal.
266
Basile, R., Castellani, D., and Zanfei, A. (2008). Location Choices of Multinational
Firms in Europe: The Role of EU Cohesion Policy. Journal of International Economics,
74(2):328–340.
Basile, R., Castellani, D., and Zanfei, A. (2009). National Boundaries and the Location
of Multinational Firms in Europe. Papers in Regional Science, 88(4):733–748.
Beaudry, C. and Schiffauerova, A. (2009). Who’s Right, Marshall or Jacobs? The Local-
ization versus Urbanization Debate. Research Policy, 38(2):318–337.
Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (2011). Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series–Cross-Section Po-
litical Economy Data. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(2011):331–352.
Behrman, J. (1972). The Role of International Companies in Latin American Integration:
Autos and Petrochemicals. Supplementary Paper of the Committee for Economic De-
velopment. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
Be´nassy-Que´re´, A., Fontagne´, L., and Lahre`che-Re´vil, A. (2001). Exchange-Rate Strate-
gies in the Competition for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies, 15(2):178–198.
Be´nassy-Que´re´, A., Fontagne´, L., and Lahre`che-Re´vil, A. (2005). How Does FDI React
to Corporate Taxation? International Tax and Public Finance, 12(5):583–603.
Beugelsdijk, S. and Mudambi, R. (2013). The Border-Crossing Multi-Location Enter-
prise. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(5):413–426.
Bevan, A. A. and Estrin, S. (2004). The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment into
European Transition Economies. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4):775–787.
Bevan, A. A., Estrin, S., and Meyer, K. (2004). Foreign Investment Location and Institu-
tional Development in Transition Economies. International Business Review, 13(1):43–
64.
Bijsterbosch, M. and Kolasa, M. (2010). FDI and Productivity Convergence in Central
and Eastern Europe: An Industry-Level Investigation. Review of World Economics,
145(4):689–712.
Blonigen, B. A. (2005). A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants.
NBER Working Papers 11299, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Cambridge,
MA.
267
Blonigen, B. A., Davies, R. B., Waddell, G. R., and Naughton, H. T. (2007). FDI in
Space: Spatial Autoregressive Relationships in Foreign Direct Investment. European
Economic Review, 51(5):1303–1325.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dy-
namic Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1):115–143.
Boldrin, M. and Canova, F. (2001). Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s Regions:
Reconsidering European Regional Policies. Economic Policy, 16(32):205–253.
Bond, S. (2002). Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Microdata Methods and
Practice. CeMMAP Working Papers CWP09/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and
Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Boschma, R. and Frenken, K. (2011). The Emerging Empirics of Evolutionary Economic
Geography. Journal of Economic Geography, 11(2):295–307.
Boudier-Bensebaa, F. (2005). Agglomeration Economies and Location Choice: Foreign
Direct Investment in Hungary. The Economics of Transition, 13(4):605–628.
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., van Marrewijk, C., and Oumer, A. (2012). The Border Pop-
ulation Effects of EU Integration. Journal of Regional Science, 52(1):40–59.
Breuss, F., Egger, P., and Pfaffermayr, M. (2003). Structural Funds, EU Enlargement,
and the Redistribution of FDI in Europe. WIFO Working Papers 195, WIFO.
Bruelhart, M., Crozet, M., and Koenig, P. (2004). Enlargement and the EU Periphery:
The Impact of Changing Market Potential. The World Economy, 27(6):853–875.
Bruelhart, M. and Koenig, P. (2006). New Economic Geography Meets Comecon: Re-
gional Wages and Industry Location in Central Europe. The Economics of Transition,
14(2):245–267.
Buckley, P. and Casson, M. (1976). The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. Macmillan,
London.
Buckley, P. and Casson, M. (1985). The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise:
Selected Papers. MacMillan, London.
Buczkowska, S. and de Lapparent, M. (2014). Location Choices of Newly Created Es-
tablishments: Spatial Patterns at the Aggregate Level. Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 48(0):68–81.
268
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2013). A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust
Inference. Available online at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;
jsessionid=F966B65EC384027240714D2B1979166A?doi=10.1.1.400.5986&rep=
rep1&type=pdf, accessed 1 February 2015.
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Campos, N. F. and Coricelli, A. (2002). Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We
Don’t, and What We Should. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(3):793–836.
Cantwell, J. A. (1989). Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations. Blackwell,
Oxford.
Cantwell, J. A. (1991). Historical Trends in International Patterns of Technological In-
novation. In Foreman-Peck, J., editor, New Perspectives on the Late Victorian Economy,
pages 37–72. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cantwell, J. A. (1992a). The Effects of Integration on the Strcuture of Multinational
Corporation Activity in the EC. In Klein, M. W. and Welfens, P., editors, Multinationals
in the New Europe and Global Trade, pages 193–233. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Cantwell, J. A. (1992b). The Internalisation of Technological Activity and its Implica-
tions for Competitiveness. In Granstrand, O., Hakanson, L., and Sjolander, S., edi-
tors, Technology Management and International Business: Internationalization of R&D and
Technology, pages 75–95. Wiley, Chichester.
Cantwell, J. A. (1994). Transnational Corporations and Innovatory Activities. Routledge,
London.
Cantwell, J. A. (2000). Technological Lock-In of Large Firms Since the Interwar Period.
European Review of Economic History, 4:147–174.
Cantwell, J. A. and Iammarino, S. (2000). Multinational Corporations and the Location
of Technological Innovation in the UK Regions. Regional Studies, 34(4):317–332.
Cantwell, J. A. and Iammarino, S. (2001). EU Regions and Multinational Corporations:
Change, Stability and Strengthening of Technological Comparative Advantages. In-
dustrial and Corporate Change, 10(4):1007–37.
Cantwell, J. A. and Narula, R. (2001). The Eclectic Paradigm in the Global Economy.
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 8(2):155–172.
269
Cantwell, J. A. and Piscitello, L. (2005). Recent Location of Foreign-owned Research
and Development Activities by Large Multinational Corporations in the European
Regions: The Role of Spillovers and Externalities. Regional Studies, 39(1):1–16.
Carlton, D. W. (1979). Why New Firms Locate Where They Do: An Econometric Model.
In Wheaton, W., editor, Interregional Movements and Regional Growth, pages 13–50. The
Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
Carlton, D. W. (1983). The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms: An Econo-
metric Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 65(3):440–449.
Casson, M. (1985). The Theory of Foreign Direct Investment. In Buckley, P. and Cas-
son, M., editors, The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, pages 113–142.
MacMillan, London.
Casson, M. (1987). The Firm and the Market: Studies on Multinational Enterprise and the
Scope of the Firm. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Centre for Cities (2015). Cities Outlook 2015. Available online at http://www.
centreforcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Cities_Outlook_2015.pdf,
accessed 21 January 2015.
Chandler, A. (1977a). Institutional Integration: An Approach to Comparative Studies
of the History of Large Scale Business Enterprise. In Nakagawa, K., editor, Strategy
and Structure of Big Business, pages 121–147. University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo.
Chandler, A. (1977b). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Chandler, A. (1980). The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United
States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis. The Economic History Re-
view, 33(3):396–410.
Chidlow, A., Salciuviene, L., and Young, S. (2009). Regional Determinants of Inward
FDI Distribution in Poland. International Business Review, 18(2):119–133.
Christoffersen, P. S. (2007a). From Helsinki to Seville, July 1999 - June 2002. In Vassiliou,
G., editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five Countries, pages 51–
73. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Christoffersen, P. S. (2007b). Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negoti-
ations. In Vassiliou, G., editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five
Countries, pages 34–50. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
270
Christoffersen, P. S. (2007c). The Danish Presidency: Conclusions of the Negotiations. In
Vassiliou, G., editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five Countries,
pages 74–99. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Christoffersen, P. S. (2007d). The Preparation of the Fifth Enlargement. In Vassiliou, G.,
editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five Countries, pages 24–33.
Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Cieslik, A. and Ryan, M. (2009). Firm Heterogeneity, Foreign Market Entry Mode and
Ownership Choice. Japan and the World Economy, 21(3):213–218.
Cohen, J. and Cohen, P. (1975). Applied Multiple Regression and Correlation Analysis for the
Behavioral Sciences. Number v. 1 in Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analy-
sis for the Behavioral Sciences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hilsdale, NJ.
Conconi, P., Sapir, A., and Zanardi, M. (2013). The Internationalization Process of Firms:
from Exports to FDI. Working Papers ECARES 2013/139596, ULB - Universite Libre
de Bruxelles, Brussels.
Copenhagen Economics (2006). Study on FDI and Regional Development. Techni-
cal Report, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission, Brus-
sels. Final report by Copenhagen Economics in cooperation with Professor Magnus
Blomstro¨m. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/
docgener/studies/pdf/fdi2006.pdf, accessed 11 November 2014.
Copus, A. (2000). Peripherality Concepts and Indicators for Evaluation. Evaluation for
Quality Conference, September 18-19, 2000, Edinburgh.
Coughlin, C. C. and Segev, E. (2000). Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Spatial
Econometric Study. The World Economy, 23(1):1–23.
Coughlin, C. C., Terza, J. V., and Arromdee, V. (1990). State Government Effects on
the Location of Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy,
20(1):194–207.
Coughlin, C. C., Terza, J. V., and Arromdee, V. (1991). State Characteristics and the Lo-
cation of Foreign Direct Investment within the United States. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 73(4):675–683.
Council of the European Union (1993). Copenhagen European Council, 21 and 22 June
1993. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf, accessed 10 November
2011.
271
Council of the European Union (1994). Essen European Council, 9 and 10 Decem-
ber 1994. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm, accessed
10 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (1995). Madrid European Council, 15 and 16 De-
cember 1995. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm, accessed
10 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (1997a). Amsterdam European Council, 16 and 17 June
1997. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0006.htm, accessed 10 Novem-
ber 2011.
Council of the European Union (1997b). Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 De-
cember 1997. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm, accessed 14
November 2011.
Council of the European Union (1999). Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December
1999. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm, accessed 14 November
2011.
Council of the European Union (2000). Nice European Council, 7, 8 and 9 Decem-
ber 2000. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm,
accessed 17 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (2001a). Go¨teborg European Council, 15 and 16 June
2001. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en1.pdf, accessed 17
November 2011.
Council of the European Union (2001b). Laeken European Council, 14 and 15 December
2001. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/68827.pdf, accessed 17 November
2011.
Council of the European Union (2002a). Copenhagen European Council, 12 and
13 December 2002. Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.
272
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf, ac-
cessed 17 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (2002b). One Europe. Available on-
line at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
misc/73820.pdf, accessed 19 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (2002c). Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002.
Presidency Conclusions. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72638.pdf, accessed 17 November 2011.
Crescenzi, R., Gagliardi, L., and Iammarino, S. (2015). Foreign Multinationals and Do-
mestic Innovation: Intra-Industry Effects and Firm Heterogeneity. Research Policy,
44(3):596–609.
Crozet, M. and Koenig Soubeyran, P. (2004). EU Enlargement and the Internal Geogra-
phy of Countries. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(2):265–279.
Crozet, M., Mayer, T., and Mucchielli, J.-L. (2004). How Do Firms Agglomerate? A
Study of FDI in France. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34(1):27–54.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. and Narula, R. (2015). A Set of Motives to Unite Them All? Multi-
national Business Review, 23(1):2–14.
Cushman, D. O. (1985). Real Exchange Rate Risk, Expectations, and the Level of Direct
Investment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(2):297–308.
Cushman, D. O. (1988). Exchange-Rate Uncertainty and Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 124(2):322–336.
de Propris, L., Driffield, N., and Menghinello, S. (2005). Local Industrial Systems and
the Location of FDI in Italy. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 12(1):105–
121.
DeCoster, G. P. and Strange, W. C. (1993). Spurious Agglomeration. Journal of Urban
Economics, 33(3):273–304.
Defever, F. (2006). Functional Fragmentation and the Location of Multinational Firms
in the Enlarged Europe. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36(2006):658–677.
Defever, F. (2012). The Spatial Organization of Multinational Firms. Canadian Journal of
Economics/Revue Canadienne d’E´conomique, 45(2):672–697.
Devereux, M. P. and Griffith, R. (1998). Taxes and the Location of Production: Evidence
from a Panel of US Multinationals. Journal of Public Economics, 68(3):335–367.
273
Dicken, P. (1987). Japanese Penetration of the European Automobile Industry: The Ar-
rival of Nissan in the United Kingdom. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie,
78(2):94–107.
Dicken, P. and Lloyd, P. E. (1976). Geographical Perspectives on United States Invest-
ment in the United Kingdom. Environment and Planning A, 8(6):685–705.
Disdier, A.-C. and Mayer, T. (2004). How Different is Eastern Europe? Structure and
Determinants of Location Choices by French Firms in Eastern and Western Europe.
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(2):280–296.
Dunning, J. H. (1977). Trade, Location of Economic Activity and MNE: A Search for
an Eclectic Approach. In Ohlin, B., Hesselborn, P., and Wijkmann, P., editors, The
International Allocation of Economic Activity, pages 395–418. MacMillan, London.
Dunning, J. H. (1983). Market Power of the Firm and International Transfer of Technol-
ogy: A Historical Excursion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1(4):333–
351.
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restate-
ment and Some Possible Extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1):1–
31.
Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Addison-Wesley,
Boston, MA.
Dunning, J. H. (1998). Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected Factor?
Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1):45–66.
Dunning, J. H. (2000). The Eclectic Paradigm as an Envelope for Economic and Business
Theories of MNE Activity. International Business Review, 9(2):163–190.
Dunning, J. H. (2002). The Selected Essays of John H. Dunning, vol. 2. Essays. Edward
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
Dunning, J. H. (2009). Location and the Multinational Enterprise: John Dunning’s
Thoughts on Receiving the Journal of International Business Studies 2008 Decade
Award. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(1):20–34.
Dunning, J. H. and Lundan, S. M. (2008). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Econ-
omy. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
Dunning, J. H. and Rugman, A. M. (1985). The Influence of Hymer’s Dissertation on the
Theory of Foreign Direct Investment. The American Economic Review, 75(2):228–232.
274
Ekholm, K., Forslid, R., and Markusen, J. R. (2007). Export-Platform Foreign Direct
Investment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(4):776–795.
Elhorst, J. (2012). Dynamic Spatial Panels: Models, Methods, and Inferences. Journal of
Geographical Systems, 14(1):5–28.
Ellison, G. and Glaeser, E. L. (1997). Geographic Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing
Industries: A Dartboard Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 105(5):889–927.
Ellison, G., Glaeser, E. L., and Kerr, W. R. (2010). What Causes Industry Agglomeration?
Evidence from Coagglomeration Patterns. American Economic Review, 100(3):1195–
1213.
Ernst & Young/Oxford Intelligence (2009). European Investment Monitor. User Guide.
European Commission (1995). Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union - White Paper.
COM (95) 163 final, 3 May 1995. Available online at http://aei.pitt.edu/1120/,
accessed 29 October 2014.
European Commission (1996). First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Technical
Report, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
European Commission (1997). Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. Docu-
ment drawn up on the basis of COM (97) 2000 final, 13 July 1997. Bulletin of the Eu-
ropean Union, Supplement 5/97. Available online at http://aei.pitt.edu/3137/
1/3137.pdf, accessed 29 October 2014.
European Commission (1998). Paper on the Commission Reports 1998: Reports on
Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries. Technical Re-
port, European Commission, Brussels. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/composite_en.pdf, accessed 8
November 2011.
European Commission (1999). Paper on the Commission Reports 1999: Reports on
Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries. Technical Re-
port, European Commission, Brussels. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/composite_en.pdf, accessed 8
November 2011.
European Commission (2000). Enlargement Strategy Paper. Report on Progress To-
wards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries. Technical Report, European
275
Commission, Brussels. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/strat_en.pdf, accessed 30 November 2011.
European Commission (2001). Making a Success of Enlargement. Strategy Paper and
Report of the European Commission on the Progress Towards Accession by Each of
the Candidate Countries. Technical Report, European Commission, Brussels. Avail-
able online at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/
2001/strategy_en.pdf, accessed 30 November 2011.
European Commission (2007). Summaries of EU Legislation. Available on-
line at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_
enlargement/e50017_en.htm, accessed 7 November 2011.
European Commission (2010). Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions. Towards a Comprehensive European International In-
vestment Policy. Technical Report, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Brussels. Available online at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2011/may/tradoc_147884.pdf, accessed 11 December 2014.
European Parliament (1994). Briefing No 24. Pre-Accession Strategy for Enlargement
of the European Union. Available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
enlargement/briefings/24a1_en.htm#resume, accessed 15 November 2011.
European Parliament (2000). Briefing No 5. Malta and Relations with the Euro-
pean Union. Available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/
briefings/pdf/5a1_en.pdf, accessed 30 October 2014.
Eurostat (2010). European Regional and Urban Statistics Reference Guide (2010 edi-
tion). Technical Report, Office for Official Publications of the European Commu-
nities, Luxembourg. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/
statmanuals/files/KS-RA-10-008-EN.pdf, accessed 14 December 2011.
Eurostat (2011). Europe in Figures. Eurostat Yearbook 2011. Technical Report, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. Available
online at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-11-001/
EN/KS-CD-11-001-EN.PDF, accessed 14 December 2011.
Eurostat/GISCO (no date). GISCO NUTS 2006, c©EuroGeographics for the administra-
tive boundaries. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/
geodata/reference-data/administrative-units-statistical-units, accessed 1
January 2015.
276
Falcetti, E., Lysenko, T., and Sanfey, P. (2005). Reforms and Growth in Transition: Re-
Examining the Evidence. Working Papers 90, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
Feldman, M. P. and Audretsch, D. B. (1999). Innovation in Cities: Science-Based Diver-
sity, Specialization and Localized Competition. European Economic Review, 43(2):409–
429.
Ferrer, C. (1998). Pattern and Determinants of Location Decisions by French Multi-
nationals in European Regions. In Rugman, A. M. and Mucchielli, J.-L., editors,
Multinational Location Strategy, pages 117–138. Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
Bingley.
Franco, C., Rentocchini, F., and Marzetti, G. V. (2008). Why Do Firms Invest Abroad?
An Analysis of the Motives Underlying Foreign Direct Investments. Department of
Economics Working Papers 0817, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
Friedman, J., Gerlowski, D. A., and Silberman, J. (1992). What Attracts Foreign Multi-
national Corporations? Evidence from Branch Plant Location in the United States.
Journal of Regional Science, 32(4):403–418.
Fujita, M. and Krugman, P. (2004). The New Economic Geography: Past, Present and
the Future. Papers in Regional Science, 83(1):139–164.
Gabe, T. M. and Bell, K. P. (2004). Tradeoffs between Local Taxes and Government
Spending as Determinants of Business Location. Journal of Regional Science, 44(1):21–
41.
Glaeser, E. L. (2010). Agglomeration Economics. The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Glaeser, E. L., Kallal, H. D., Scheinkman, J. A., and Shleifer, A. (1992). Growth in Cities.
Journal of Political Economy, 100(6):1126–1152.
Glickman, N. J. and Woodward, D. P. (1987). Regional Patterns of Manufacturing For-
eign Direct Investment in the United States. Special Report for U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Washington, DC.
Goldberg, L. S. and Kolstad, C. D. (1995). Foreign Direct Investment, Exchange Rate
Variability and Demand Uncertainty. International Economic Review, 36(4):855–873.
Guimaraes, P., Figueiredo, O., and Woodward, D. P. (2000). Agglomeration and the Lo-
cation of Foreign Direct Investment in Portugal. Journal of Urban Economics, 47(1):115–
135.
277
Guimaraes, P., Figueiredo, O., and Woodward, D. P. (2002). Modeling Industrial Loca-
tion Decisions in U.S. Counties. ERSA Conference Papers ERSA02P060. 42nd Congress
of European Regional Science Association 27th to 31st August 2002 - Dortmund, Germany.
Guimaraes, P., Figueiredo, O., and Woodward, D. P. (2003). A Tractable Approach to the
Firm Location Decision Problem. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1):201–204.
Guimaraes, P., Figueiredo, O., and Woodward, D. P. (2004). Industrial Location Model-
ing: Extending the Random Utility Framework. Journal of Regional Science, 44(1):1–20.
Guimaraes, P., Figueiredo, O., and Woodward, D. P. (2009). Dartboard Tests for the
Location Quotient. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39(3):360–364.
Hadjimichael, M., Sharer, R., and Tahari, A. (1996). Adjustment for Growth: The African
Experience. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Esti-
mators. Econometrica, 50(4):1029–1054.
Hanson, G. H. (1996). Economic Integration, Intraindustry Trade, and Frontier Regions.
European Economic Review, 40(3-5):941–949.
Hanson, G. H. (2001). U.S.-Mexico Integration and Regional Economies: Evidence from
Border-City Pairs. Journal of Urban Economics, 50(2):259–287.
Harris, C. D. (1954). The Market as a Factor in the Localization of Industry in the United
States. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 44(4):315–348.
Harrison, A., Dalkıran, E., and Elsey, E. (2000). International Business. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Head, K. and Mayer, T. (2004). Market Potential and the Location of Japanese Invest-
ment in the European Union. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(4):959–972.
Head, K., Ries, J., and Swenson, D. (1995). Agglomeration Benefits and Location Choice:
Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing Investments in the United States. Journal of
International Economics, 38(3-4):223–247.
Head, K., Ries, J., and Swenson, D. (1999). Attracting Foreign Manufacturing: Invest-
ment Promotion and Agglomeration. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29(2):197–
218.
Heckscher, E. (1919). The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income. In Ellis,
H. and Metzler, L., editors, Readings in the Theory of International Trade, pages 497–512.
Blakiston, Philadelphia.
278
Henderson, J. V. (2003). Marshall’s Scale Economies. Journal of Urban Economics, 53(1):1–
28.
Hilber, C. A. L. and Voicu, I. (2010). Agglomeration Economies and the Location
of Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence from Romania. Regional Studies,
44(3):355–371.
Hill, S. and Munday, M. (1992). The UK Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Analysis and Determinants. Regional Studies, 26(6):535–544.
Hirschman, A. O. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press,
New Haven, CT.
Horst, T. (1972). Firm and Industry Determinants of the Decision to Invest Abroad: An
Empirical Study. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 54(3):258–266.
Hosseini, H. (2005). An Economic Theory of FDI: A Behavioral Economics and Histori-
cal Approach. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of
Socio-Economics), 34(4):528–541.
Hubert, F. and Pain, N. (2002). Fiscal Incentives, European Integration and the Location
of Foreign Direct Investment. The Manchester School, 70(3):336–363.
Hymer, S. (1960). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign
Investment. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Hymer, S. (1968). The Large Multinational Corporation. In Casson, M., editor, Multina-
tional Corporations, pages 6–31. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
Hymer, S. (1976). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign
Investment. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Iammarino, S. and McCann, P. (2013). Multinationals and Economic Geography. Edward
Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham.
Iammarino, S. and Santangelo, G. D. (2000). Foreign Direct Investment and Regional
Attractiveness in the EU Integration Process: Some Evidence for the Italian Regions.
European Urban and Regional Studies, 7(1):5–18.
Jacobs, J. (1969). The Economy of Cities. Vintage International. Random House, New
York, NY.
Jacobs, J., Ligthart, J., and Vrijburg, H. (2009). Dynamic Panel Data Models Featuring
Endogenous Interaction and Spatially Correlated Errors. Discussion Paper 2009-92,
Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
279
Janicki, H. and Wunnava, P. (2004). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Empir-
ical Evidence from EU Accession Candidates. Applied Economics, 36(5):505–509.
Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Do-
mestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages. American Eco-
nomic Review, 94(3):605–627.
Javorcik, B. S. (2015). Does FDI Bring Good Jobs to Host Countries? The World Bank
Research Observer, 30(1):74–94.
Johansson, B. and Quigley, J. M. (2004). Agglomeration and Networks in Spatial Eco-
nomics. Papers in Regional Science, 83(1):165–176.
Jones, J. and Wren, C. (2004). Do Inward Investors Achieve their Job Targets? Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66(4):483–513.
Jones, J. and Wren, C. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment and the Regional Economy. Ash-
gate, Aldershot.
Jones, J. and Wren, C. (2010). Intermediate and Non-Intermediate Goods and FDI Loca-
tion. International Workshop on Regional Competitiveness and International Factor Move-
ments, Orleans, France, March 2011, INFER.
Judson, R. A. and Owen, A. L. (1999). Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide
for Macroeconomists . Economics Letters, 65(1):9–15.
Kalotay, K. (2008). FDI in Bulgaria and Romania in the Wake of EU Accession. Journal
of East-West Business, 14(1):5–40.
Keeble, D., Offord, J., and Walker, S. (1988). Peripheral Regions in a Community of
Twelve Member States. Technical Report, Commission of the European Community,
Luxembourg.
Keeble, D., Owens, P., and Thompson, C. (1981). The Influence of Peripheral and Cen-
tral Locations on the Relative Development of Regions. Technical Report, Department
of Geography, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
Kezdi, G. (2004). Robust Standard Error Estimation in Fixed-Effects Panel Models. Hun-
garian Statistical Review Special, Special(9):96–116.
Kindleberger, C. P. (1969). American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment.
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Kiss, E. (2007). Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary: Industry and Its Spatial Effects.
Eastern European Economics, 45(1):6–28.
280
Kiyota, K. and Urata, S. (2004). Exchange Rate, Exchange Rate Volatility and Foreign
Direct Investment. The World Economy, 27(10):1501–1536.
Klein, M. W. and Rosengren, E. (1994). The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States : Relative Wealth vs. Relative Wage Effects. Journal of
International Economics, 36(3-4):373–389.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade.
American Economic Review, 70(5):950–959.
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing Returns and Economic Geography. Journal of Political
Economy, 99(3):483–499.
Krugman, P. and Venables, A. J. (1990). Integration and the Competitiveness of Pe-
ripheral Industry. In Bliss, C. and Braga de Macedo, J., editors, Unity with Diversity
in the European Economy: The Community’s Southern Frontier, pages 56–75. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Kumar, B. (1991). Japanese Direct Investment in West Germany: Trends, Strategies and
Management Problems. In Morris, J., editor, Japan and the Global Economy: Issues and
Trends in the 1990s, pages 213–232. Routledge, London and New York, NY.
Lafourcade, M. and Paluzie Hernandez, E. (2005). European Integration, FDI and
the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western European Border Regions.
Working Papers in Economics 145, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Econo-
mia, Barcelona.
Landaburu, E. (2007). The Need for Enlargement and Differences from Previous Acces-
sions. In Vassiliou, G., editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five
Countries, pages 9–23. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Landesmann, M. A. (2000). Structural Change in the Transition Economies, 1989 to
1999. WIIW Research Reports 269, The Vienna Institute for International Economic
Studies, Vienna.
Leamer, E. (1997). Access to Western Markets, and Eastern Effort Levels. In Zecchini,
S., editor, Lessons from the Economic Transition, pages 503–526. Springer Netherlands,
Dordrecht.
Ledyaeva, S. (2009). Spatial Econometric Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment Deter-
minants in Russian Regions. The World Economy, 32(4):643–666.
Little, J. S. (1978). Location Decisions of Foreign Direct Investors in the United States.
New England Economic Review, July/August 1978:43–63.
281
Livas Elizondo, R. and Krugman, P. (1992). Trade Policy and the Third World Metropo-
lis. NBER Working Papers 4238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Longhi, S., Nijkamp, P., and Traistaru, I. (2003). Determinants of Manufacturing Loca-
tion in EU Accession Countries. ERSA Conference Papers ERSA03P310. 43rd Congress
of European Regional Science Association 27th to 30th August 2003 - Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland.
Louviere, J., Henscher, D., and Swait, J. (2000). Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and
Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Luger, M. and Shetty, S. (1985). Determinants of Foreign Plant Start-Ups in the United
States: Lessons for Policymakers in the Southeast. Vanderbuilt Journal of Transnational
Law, 18(2):223–245.
Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of Economics. Macmillan and Company, London.
Martin, P. (1998). Can Regional Policies Affect Growth and Geography in Europe?
World Economy, 21(6):757–774.
Mayer, T. and Head, K. (2002). Illusory Border Effects: Distance Mismeasurement In-
flates Estimates of Home Bias in Trade. CEPII Working Papers 2002-01, CEPII Research
Center, Paris.
Mayhew, A. (1998). Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy Towards Central and
Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
McCallum, J. (1995). National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.
American Economic Review, 85(3):615–623.
McCormick, J. (2008). Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. Pal-
grave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
McDermott, P. J. (1977). Overseas Investment and the Industrial Geography of the
United Kingdom. Area, 9(3):200–207.
McFadden, D. L. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In
Zarembka, P., editor, Frontiers in Econometrics, pages 105–142. Academic Press, New
York, NY.
McManus, J. (1972). The Theory of International Firm. In Paquet, G., editor, The Multi-
national Firm and the Nation State, pages 66–93. Collier MacMillan, Toronto.
282
Mehrhoff, J. (2009). A Solution to the Problem of Too Many Instruments in Dynamic
Panel Data GMM. Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2009,31, Deutsche
Bundesbank, Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main.
Monteiro, J.-A. and Kukenova, M. (2009). Spatial Dynamic Panel Model and System
GMM: A Monte Carlo Investigation. IRENE Working Papers 09-01, IRENE Institute of
Economic Research, Neuchaˆtel.
Moreno, R., Paci, R., and Usai, S. (2004). Spatial Spillovers and Innovation Activity in
European Regions. ERSA Conference Papers ERSA04P588. 44th Congress of European
Regional Science Association 25th to 29th August 2004 - Porto, Portugal.
Morris, J. (1988). The Who, Why and Where of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in
the UK. Industrial Relations Journal, 19(1):31–40.
Motta, M. and Norman, G. (1996). Does Economic Integration Cause Foreign Direct
Investment? International Economic Review, 37(4):757–783.
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions. Duckworth, London.
Nayak, D. and Choudhury, R. N. (2014). A Selective Review of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Theories. ARTNeT Working Paper Series No. 143, ESCAP, Bangkok.
Neary, J. P. (2002). Foreign Direct Investment and the Single Market. Manchester School,
70(3):291–314.
Nerlove, M. (1967). Experimental Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic
Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections. Economic Studies Quarterly, 18(3):42–
74.
Nickell, S. J. (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica,
49(6):1417–1426.
Niebuhr, A. (2005). The Impact of EU Enlargement on European Border Regions.
HWWA Discussion Papers 330, Hamburg Institute of International Economics
(HWWA), Hamburg.
Niebuhr, A. (2008). The Impact of EU Enlargement on European Border Regions. Inter-
national Journal of Public Policy, 3(3/4):163–186.
Niebuhr, A. and Stiller, S. (2002). Integration Effects in Border Regions : A Survey of
Economic Theory and Empirical Studies. HWWA Discussion Papers 179, Hamburg
Institute of International Economics (HWWA), Hamburg.
283
Norman, G. (2001). Internalization Revisited. Department of Economics, Tufts Univer-
sity, Medford, MA 02155, USA, Unpublished Paper. Available online at http://www.
tufts.edu/~gnorman/InternalizationRevisited.pdf, accessed 8 April 2011.
O´ Huallacha´in, B. and Reid, N. (1997). Acquisition versus Greenfield Investment: The
Location and Growth of Japanese Manufacturers in the United States. Regional Stud-
ies, 31(4):403–416.
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (2000). The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeco-
nomics: Is There a Common Cause? NBER Working Papers 7777, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, Cambridge, MA.
OECD (2009). OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 2008: Fourth
Edition. Technical Report, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Paris.
Office for National Statistics (1996). Business Monitor MA4: Overseas Direct Invest-
ment. Technical Report, Office for National Statistics, London.
Ohlin, B. (1933). Interregional and International Trade. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
O’Mahony, M. and Timmer, M. P. (2009). Output, Input and Productivity Measures at
the Industry Level: The EU KLEMS Database. Economic Journal, 119(538):F374–F403.
Overman, H. G. and Winters, L. A. (2005). The Port Geography of UK International
Trade. LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 16273, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, LSE Library, London.
Overman, H. G. and Winters, L. A. (2006). Trade Shocks and Industrial Location: The
Impact of EEC Accession on the UK. LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
676, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, London.
Pazienza, P. (2014). The Relationship Between FDI and the Natural Environment: Facts, Ev-
idence and Prospects. SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer International Publishing,
Cham.
Peng, M. (2008). Global Business. Available Titles CourseMate Series. Cengage Learning,
Mason, OH.
Pezaros, P. (1999). The Agenda 2000 CAP Reform Agreement in the Light of the Fu-
ture EU Enlargement. EIPA Working Paper 99/W/02, European Institute of Public
Administration, Maastricht.
284
Pflueger, M. P. (2001). A Simple, Analytically Solvable Chamberlinian Agglomeration
Model. IZA Discussion Papers 359, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
Podkaminer, L. (2013). Development Patterns of Central and East European Countries
(in the Course of Transition and Following EU Accession). WIIW Research Reports 388,
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna.
Procher, V. (2009). FDI Location Choices: Evidence from French First-Time Movers.
AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, 3(3):209–220.
Procher, V. (2011). Agglomeration Effects and the Location of FDI: Evidence from
French First-Time Movers. The Annals of Regional Science, 46(2):295–312.
Pusterla, F. and Resmini, L. (2007). Where Do Foreign Firms Locate in Transition Coun-
tries? An Empirical Investigation. The Annals of Regional Science, 41(4):835–856.
Rasmussen, A. F. (2003). Address by Anders Fogh Rasmussen Prime Minister of
Denmark at the Ceremony of Signature of the Accession Treaty Athens 16 April
2003. Available online at http://www.stm.dk/_p_11266.html, accessed 17 Novem-
ber 2011.
Rauch, J. E. (1991). Comparative Advantage, Geographic Advantage and the Volume
of Trade. Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 101(408):1230–1244.
Reinert, K., Rajan, R., Glass, A., and Davis, L. (2010). The Princeton Encyclopedia of the
World Economy. (Two Volume Set). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Resmini, L. (2000). The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in the CEECs: New
Evidence from Sectoral Patterns. The Economics of Transition, 8(3):665–689.
Resmini, L. (2003a). Economic Integration, Industry Location and Frontier Economies
in Transition Countries. Economic Systems, 27(2):205–221.
Resmini, L. (2003b). The Implications of European Integration and Adjustment for Bor-
der Regions in Accession Countries. In Traistaru, I., Nijkamp, P., and Resmini, L.,
editors, The Emerging Economic Geography in EU Accession Countries, pages 405–441.
Ashgate, Aldershot.
Resmini, L. (2007). Regional Patterns of Industry Location in Transition Countries: Does
Economic Integration with the European Union Matter? Regional Studies, 41(6):747–
764.
285
Revelt, D. and Train, K. (1998). Mixed Logit With Repeated Choices: Households’
Choices Of Appliance Efficiency Level. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
80(4):647–657.
Ricardo, D. (1821). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. History of Eco-
nomic Thought Books. McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic
Thought, McMaster.
Romer, P. M. (1983). Dynamic Competitive Equilibria with Externalities, Increasing Returns
and Unbounded Growth. PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago.
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 94(5):1002–1037.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy,
98(5):S71–102.
Roodman, D. (2003). xtabond2: Stata Module to Extend xtabond Dynamic Panel Data
Estimator. Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of Eco-
nomics, Boston, MA.
Roodman, D. (2009a). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 71(1):135–158.
Roodman, D. (2009b). How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System
GMM in Stata. Stata Journal, 9(1):86–136(51).
Rouwendal, J. and Meijer, E. (2001). Preferences for Housing, Jobs, and Commuting: A
Mixed Logit Analysis. Journal of Regional Science, 41(3):475–505.
Ruggiero, R. (1996). Foreign Direct Investment Seen as Primary Motor of Globalization.
Statement by Mr Renato Ruggiero, WTO Director-General, at the UNCTAD Seminar
on Foreign Direct Investment and the Multilateral Trading System in Geneva on 12
February 1996. Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_
e/pr042_e.htm, accessed 4 March 2011.
Rugman, A. M. (1981). Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets.
Columbia University Press, New York, NY.
Rugman, A. M. (1985). Internalization Is Still a General Theory of Foreign Direct In-
vestment. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 121(3):570–575.
Rugman, A. M. (1986). New Theories of the Multinational Enterprise: An Assessment
of Internalization Theory. Bulletin of Economic Research, 38(2):101–118.
286
Sajdik, M. and Schwarzinger, M. (2011). European Union Enlargement: Background, De-
velopments, Facts. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ.
Sargan, J. D. (1958). The Estimation of Economic Relationships using Instrumental Vari-
ables. Econometrica, 26(3):393–415.
Saryusz-Wolski, J. (2001). The Reformed European Union and the Challenge of En-
largement. In Monar, J. and Wessels, W., editors, The European Union After the Treaty
of Amsterdam, pages 56–69. Continuum, London and New York, NY.
Schmidheiny, K. and Bruelhart, M. (2011). On the Equivalence of Location Choice
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson. Journal of Urban Economics,
69(2):214–222.
Schumann, W. (no date). How Enlargement to the East Progressed. D@dalos
Chronology. International UNESCO Education Server for Democracy, Peace and Hu-
man Rights Education. Available online at http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/
grundkurs5neu/Chronologie.htm, accessed 15 November 2011.
Shumway, R. and Stoffer, D. (2006). Time Series Analysis and Its Applications: With R
Examples. Springer Texts in Statistics. Springer, New York, NY.
Singh, H. and Jun, K. (1995). Some Evidence on Determinants of Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Developing Countries. The World Bank Working Papers, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Smith, A. (1976 [1776]). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Na-
tions. In Campbell, R. and Skinner, A., editors, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence of Adam Smith. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Spies, J. (2010). Network and Border Effects: Where Do Foreign Multinationals Locate
in Germany? Regional Science and Urban Economics, 40(1):20–32.
Sun, L., Hong, E., and Li, T. (2010). Incorporating Technology Diffusion, Factor Mobil-
ity and Structural Change into Cross-Region Growth Regression: An Application to
China. Journal of Regional Science, 50(3):734–755.
Surico, P. (2001). Globalisation and Trade: A ”New Economic Geography” Perspective.
FEEM Working Papers 13.2001, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan.
Swinney, P. and Thomas, E. (2015). A Century of Cities: Urban Economic
Change Since 1911. Technical report, Centre for Cities, London. Avail-
able online at http://www.centreforcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
15-03-04-A-Century-of-Cities.pdf, accessed 25 July 2015.
287
Taylor, J. (1993). An Analysis of the Factors Determining the Geographical Distribution
of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in the UK, 1984-91. Urban Studies, 30(7):1209–
1224.
Teece, D. J. (1980). Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise. Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 1(3):223–247.
Teece, D. J. (1981). The Multinational Enterprise: Market Failure and Market Power
Considerations. Sloan Management Review, 22(3):3–18.
Teece, D. J. (1986). Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise. An
Assessment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7(1):21–45.
Teece, D. J. (1987). Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integra-
tion, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. In Teece, D. J., editor, The Competitive
Challenge, pages 185–219. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA.
Temprano-Arroyo, H. and Feldman, R. A. (1999). Selected Transition and Mediter-
ranean Countries: An Institutional Primer on EMU and EU Relations. Economics of
Transition, 7(3):741–805.
The World Bank (2009). World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Eco-
nomic Geography. Technical Report, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Avail-
able online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2009/Resources/
4231006-1225840759068/WDR09_bookweb_2.pdf, accessed 8 March 2011.
Tolentino, P. E. (2001). From a Theory to a Paradigm: Examining the Eclectic Paradigm
as a Framework in International Economics. International Journal of the Economics of
Business, 8(2):191–209.
Train, K. (2003). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
UNCTAD (2010). World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy.
Technical Report UNCTAD/WIR/2010, United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD), New York and Geneva.
UNCTAD (2013). World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment
and Trade for Development. Technical Report UNCTAD/WIR/2013, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), New York and Geneva.
Urata, S. and Kawai, H. (2000). The Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct
Investment by Japanese Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Small Business Eco-
nomics, 15(2):79–103.
288
van der Panne, G. (2004). Agglomeration Externalities: Marshall versus Jacobs. Journal
of Evolutionary Economics, 14(5):593–604.
Vassiliou, G. and Christoffersen, P. S. (2007). Financing the Enlargement. In Vassiliou,
G., editor, The Accession Story. The EU from Fifteen to Twenty-Five Countries, pages 100–
108. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Venables, A. J. (1996). Equilibrium Locations of Vertically Linked Industries. Interna-
tional Economic Review, 37(2):341–359.
Venables, A. J. (2006). Shifts in Economic Geography and Their Causes. Economic Re-
view, 91(4):61–85.
Vernon, R. (1966). International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cy-
cle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(2):190–207.
Walch, N. and Wo¨rz, J. (2012). The Impact of Country Risk Ratings and of the Status
of EU Integration on FDI Inflows in CESEE Countries. Focus on European Economic
Integration, 2012(3):8–26.
Walker, J. (1983). OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. Statistical
News, pages 61.1–61.4.
Watts, H. (1982). The Inter-Regional Distribution of West German Multinationals in the
UK. In Taylor, M. and Thrift, N., editors, The Geography of Multinationals, pages 61–82.
Croom Helm, London.
Wheeler, D. and Mody, A. (1992). International Investment Location Decisions: The
Case of U.S. Firms. Journal of International Economics, 33(1-2):57–76.
Williamson, O. E. (1971). The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Con-
siderations. American Economic Review, 61(2):112–123.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. The Free Press, New York, NY.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New
York, NY.
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient
Two-Step GMM Estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1):25–51.
Woodward, D. P. (1992). Locational Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Start-Ups
in the United States. Southern Economic Journal, 58(3):690–708.
289
Wren, C. and Jones, J. (2011). Assessing The Regional Impact Of Grants On Fdi Location:
Evidence From U.K. Regional Policy, 1985–2005. Journal of Regional Science, 51(3):497–
517.
Yeyati, E. L., Stein, E. H., and Daude, C. (2003). Regional Integration and the Location
of FDI. Research Department Working Papers 4343, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, DC.
290
